

CONFIDENTIAL.

(8378.)

PART XIII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

A F F A I R S

OF

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

April to June 1903.

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ERRATA.

- Page 40, No. 64, line 5. For "11th instant" read "10th instant."
- Page 136, No. 174, line 1. For "yesterday's date" read "7th instant."
- Page 153, No. 194, line 2. For "28th ultimo" read "24th ultimo."
- Page 162*, No. 210*, line 3. For "13th May" read "12th May."
- Page 170, foot-note. For "No. 198" read "No. 197."
- Page 213, No. 269, line 1. For "despatches Nos. 217, 221, and 222A" read "despatches Nos. 219, 221, and 222A."
- Page 228, No. 293, line 5. For "has been renounced" read "has been announced."
- Page 233, foot-note. For "No. 279" read "No. 278."
- Page 239, No. 317, line 1. For "22nd instant" read "12th instant;" and foot-note, for "No. 272" read "No. 273."
- Page 248*, No. 331*, line 3. For "construction of telegram to Kataba" read "construction of telegraph to Kataba."
- Page 281*, No. 355A, line 1. For "respecting the Seistan arbitration" read "respecting Russian action in Seistan."
- Page 284, inclosure in No. 358, line 6. For "the manufactory of date cases" read "the manufacture of date cases."
- Page 315, foot-note. For "Nos. 258* and 319" read "Nos. 260* and 319."
- Page 316, inclosure in No. 382, line 3. For "telegram of the 15th instant" read "telegram of the 13th instant."

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia and Arabia.

PART XIII.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams to the Viceroy, dated 25th March, relative to the Seistan arbitration.

India Office, March 31, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 25, 1903.

YOUR telegram of 21st.

Sir A. Hardinge has been instructed again to insist as an essential condition of our consenting to presence of Yamin-i-Nizam as Persian Representative on Commission, that he should be completely dissociated from Miller.

Regarding Colonel McMahon's wish to locate whole camp with escort near Nasratabad, it would be desirable, in view of the genuine alarm of the Persian Government, caused by mis-statements circulated as to our intentions, and the size of his escort, that Colonel McMahon should take with him into Persian territory as small an escort as would be compatible with his dignity. Can he arrange to leave his camp on the Afghan side of the river?

See my telegram of 13th.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 25, 1903.

YOUR telegram of 22nd : Seistan.

Foreign Office have instructed Sir A. Hardinge to take early opportunity to represent to Grand Vizier that removal of Hashmat-ul-Mulk, who has proved himself an able Governor, would be greatly deprecated by His Majesty's Government.

No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

(A.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 30th March, relative to the Persian loan.

India Office, April 1, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 2.

*Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.**India Office, March 30, 1903.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

FOREIGN Office telegram No. 30 of 28th March to Sir A. Hardinge regarding loan to Persia, crossed his telegram No. 43 of same date, which seems to strengthen necessity of some such policy as is suggested in the Foreign Office telegram, and renders it more than ever desirable that our action should be rapid. The matter seems of great importance, and the earliest possible expression of your views is desired, with a view to which I repeat to you Lord Lansdowne's reply to Sir A. Hardinge:—

"There appears to be general harmony between your telegrams Nos. 43 and 44 of 28th and 30th March, and my telegram No. 30 of 30th, and your present proposal, as we understand it, would provide for effectual fulfilment of our conditions. We attach great importance to guarantees against reimbursement.

"Regarding Caspian fisheries, we are doubtful whether there is any advantage in asking for this security, which seems to be needlessly provocative of Russia.

"We are prepared to leave her alone in the North, while we wish to be left alone in the South."

No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

(B.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a decypher of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st April, on the subject of the proposed Persian loan.

India Office, April 1, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 3.

*Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.**April 1, 1903.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

YOUR telegram of 30th March.

The proposal for a loan to Persia in its latest form appears to be that advance should be made from revenues of India without any kind of political return, but solely in the expectation that later on larger loan, with possible *quid pro quo*, might be secured.

The proposed transaction does not contain the condition which we have all along contended would alone justify a loan exclusively drawn from Indian revenues, viz., that the Government of India must be able to show that their interests have been materially protected.

If, therefore, the terms now suggested for the loan are to be adopted, we think that His Majesty's Government should take equal part with India (see Viceroy's telegram of 9th February).

The Government of India are now prepared to share with His Majesty's Government the financial responsibility.

With this difference, present opportunity appears to be exactly similar to that which occurred in 1900, and which His Majesty's Government have always regretted was missed.

No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 1st instant, relative to the hoisting of the British flag at Jalela.

India Office, April 1, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 1, 1903.

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State of 27th March.

The British Commissioners considered it highly desirable to hoist the British flag at Jalela, to assure inhabitants that the place had been permanently evacuated by the Turks. The act was not due to my initiative, but, in my opinion, it has probably had a very tranquillizing effect on the district.

Should the Turks complain, I would ask His Majesty's Government to remember that it was at Jalela that the British flag, pulled down at Alwara, was deliberately and grossly insulted and finally torn to pieces.

(Repeated to Viceroy, Secretary of State, and Bombay.)

No. 5.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 31st ultimo, and from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 2nd instant, relative to the use of His Majesty's ships in connection with the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 2, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 31, 1903.

ADMIRALTY are asking when His Majesty's ships "Hermione" and "Intrepid" will be able to return to the Mediterranean. What are your views as to the period for which it will be necessary to retain the ships at Aden? Presumably we cannot spare them yet, but they ought not to be retained longer than is really necessary.

(Repeated to Aden.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 2, 1903.

SECRETARY of State's telegram of 31st March.

Until Commission have actually demarcated some considerable extent of Amiri border, and there is reason to believe in the honest intention of Turkish Government to proceed with whole demarcation without unnecessary delay, I would venture to urge that His Majesty's Government should not contemplate the return of the ships referred to. I do not think it will be possible for at least some weeks to say when the ships can be withdrawn from Aden, as delimitation is only now about to be commenced.

(Repeated to Viceroy, Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 6.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 1, 1903.

MY telegram No. 45 of the 30th March.

I have reason to believe that the Russian Government have given the Caspian Fisheries Loan, without insisting on their previous conditions, in order to save the Grand Vizier.

On Monday the Court party had practically arranged the new Ministry; so if this information proves true, he has not found the money for the Shah an instant too soon.

To-morrow I expect to hear more on the subject.

No. 7.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 2, 1903.

EL KATR coast.

I have called the Porte's attention to another paragraph which appeared in the Turkish press of the 31st instant, and given Tewfik Pasha to understand that the Mudirs would be turned out if they went to Zobara or Odeid.

I was again assured that there was no intention of sending them there.

No. 8.

Consul-General Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 7. Commercial. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Odessa, March 30, 1903.

MY despatch No. 1, Commercial.

I am informed, on good authority, that the contract for the Persian Gulf Line has been concluded between the Imperial Government and the Russian Steam Navigation Company.

An annual subsidy of 200,000 roubles is promised for ten years, in consideration of four sailings in the year. The new steamers will, I believe, now be ordered.

An important feature in the scheme is that the Imperial Government are to have a prevailing voice in the selection of the Company's representative in the Gulf. I venture to beg that, in order to guard my informant, the place of origin of this information may not be made known.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. L. SMITH.

P.S.—I have sent copies of this despatch to St. Petersburg and Constantinople.

C. L. S.

No. 9.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 3.)

Sir,

India Office, April 1, 1903.

WITH reference to your letters of the 29th October, 6th and 21st November last, relative to the case of Salem Kemri, a native of Zanzibar, who was brought to Paris by M. Piat, formerly French Consul at Zanzibar, for the purpose of assisting in the production of an anti-English publication, and was subsequently confined in Ste. Anne Lunatic Asylum, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to inclose, for any action which Lord Lansdowne may consider suitable, a copy of a Report upon the case by the Government of India, together with sworn statements by Dr. Young and Salem Kemri.

It will be seen that the Government of India entirely discredit M. Piat's statements regarding the previous history of the boy Bachir; and that the probability is that M. Piat, in fact, owes money to Salem Kemri.

I am also to request that you will draw Lord Lansdowne's special attention to the third paragraph of the Government of India's letter regarding the difficulties which stand in the way of intercepting the scurrilous pamphlets in the production of which M. Piat would appear to be engaged, and to the hope expressed by the Government of India that His Majesty's Government may be able to represent the matter in such a light as to cause the dissemination of such publications under the auspices of the French Government to be discontinued.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Fort William, March 5, 1903.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches of the 7th and 28th November regarding Salem Kemri, a native of Zanzibar, who was taken to Paris by M. Piat, formerly French Consul at Zanzibar, for the purpose of assisting in the production of an anti-English publication.

[1617]

2. The statements of Dr. Young and Salem Kemri have been taken on oath, and their depositions form an inclosure to the letter from the Government of Bombay, dated the 23rd January, 1903.

With regard to the sums alleged by M. Piat to be due to him from Salem Kemri, it will be seen that, according to the apparently trustworthy account given by the latter, the only sums received were 80 rupees for the purchase of an outfit on leaving Aden, and a sum of 300 fr. received in Paris on the 20th June, 1902. Tickets also were provided. It seems evident that the understanding was that Salem Kemri should receive a free passage for himself and his servant, together with a small outfit, and the claim for the refund of the cost of these appears to be entirely unjustifiable. The sum of 300 fr. which changed hands on the 20th June appears to have been on account of service already rendered. No salary, apparently, was paid for any portion of the remaining period up to the 17th July, when the unfortunate man was removed to a lunatic asylum, and the balance of account appears, therefore, to be in favour of Salem Kemri, apart from the 370 fr. which M. Piat is said to have detained.

It will be observed that the French Consul at Aden is stated to have issued a passport to the servant Bachir before his departure for Europe, and this fact appears to supply a sufficient refutation of M. Piat's insinuations regarding the boy's status.

3. With reference to the publications known as the "Fath-al-Bassayir" and the "Murshid-al-Albab," which are described by Salem Kemri in his statement, we forward copies of the papers noted in the inclosed list, showing that, in order to check the circulation of these pamphlets in Arabia, India, and the Persian Gulf, we have instructed our postal authorities to seize any copies that may be discovered in the post-offices at Aden, Bombay, Karachee, or Muscat.

It may be necessary to take similar action in the case of the other Arabic pamphlet, entitled the "Nasch-el-Ummeh," to which our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf refers in his letter dated the 10th November, 1902. This point will be further considered when fuller information is obtained as to the character of this publication. We anticipate, however, that the facility with which changes can be effected in the title of these pamphlets is likely to frustrate the measures which we have taken, or may take, to intercept them; and we entertain the hope that the disclosures which have been made by Salem Kemri as to the origin of these scurrilous publications may enable His Majesty's Government to represent the matter to the French Government in such a light as to render it improbable that their dissemination under the auspices of the French authorities will be continued.

4. We trust that our proceedings will meet with your Lordship's approval.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

CURZON.

T. RALEIGH.

E. F.-G. LAW.

E. R. ELLES.

A. T. ARUNDEL.

DENZIL IBBETSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bombay Castle, January 23, 1903.

IN continuation of my Confidential letters dated the 18th December, 1902, and 12th January, 1903, I am directed to forward herewith a copy of a confidential letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 5th January, 1903, together with the depositions (in original) of the Reverend Dr. Young and Salem Kemri, as desired in paragraph 2 of the Secretary of State's despatch dated the 7th November, 1902.

2. M. Piat's publication, which the Secretary of State assumes to be the same as that mentioned in the correspondence quoted in paragraph 1 of his Lordship's above-quoted despatch, is also, I am to observe, identical with the paper reported in my Confidential letter, dated the 14th October, 1902, and it is possible that the title was changed as a result of the action taken against the publication in its earlier name.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ashby to Government of Bombay.

(Confidential.)

Aden, January 5, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 25th November, 1902, forwarding Secretary of State for India's despatch of the 7th idem to the address of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, and to his despatch of the 28th idem to same address, a copy of which was forwarded here direct, I have the honour to forward herewith the depositions of Dr. Young and Salem Kemri.

2. It will be seen that the latter never attempted to rid himself of the lad Bachir in the sense M. Piat desires to be understood. Salem Kemri states that he asked the Sultan to recall him, and to send another servant in his place owing to M. Piat's cruelty to the lad.

3. He further states that he never knew or understood that Bachir was anything but a paid servant of the Sultan of Lahej. The Sultan is at present at Delhi, and a reference to his son, who is acting for him, as to the antecedents of Bachir remains unanswered. Any information subsequently obtained from the Sultan will be communicated in due course. M. Piat's statement that Bachir was sold in Aden may be, however, regarded as absolutely without foundation.

4. 80 rupees were actually advanced to Salem Kemri at Aden. The cost of passages for himself and servant amounted to 580 rupees, or a total of 660 rupees (44l.). In addition to this sum, Salem states he received 300 fr. from M. Piat on the 20th June—one month's wages.

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

Deposition.

JOHN CAMERON YOUNG, M.A., M.B., C.M., states on oath:—

I am a medical missionary employed by the United Free Church of Scotland, and have been in Aden and Sheikh Othman for ten years. My age is 41. I first met Salem Kemri in Lahej about twenty months ago, and treated him for fever. About June 1901 an officer of the Sultan of Lahej brought him to our school at Sheikh Othman, and said the Sultan had sent him to see if I would teach him English. I agreed, and he joined the school, where he made very rapid progress. Like the rest of the scholars, he attended our evangelistic service, and before long was convinced of the truth of Christianity, but it was not until a few days before he left for Paris that he was baptized. I advised him to accept M. Piat's offer, as I knew of Protestant clergymen at work in Paris to whom I gave him letters. They were Pastor Cordey, of the French Evangelical Church, and the Reverend E. G. Brechin, B.D., Scotch Presbyterian. About the beginning of July I received a letter from him written in Arabic and sent to me through the Sultan of Lahej; it was dated the 7th June, and apologized for not writing sooner, saying that M. Piat had forbidden him to write to any Europeans, and that he was sending this through the Sultan of Lahej, with whom he was allowed to correspond. In it he said he was sorry that he had come to Paris; that it was not to teach Arabic that he was brought, but for secret Government work of a bad description. He asked me to try and get him back to Aden. This letter I destroyed, for fear lest my Arabic servants should see it. Subsequently I got another letter (about the 12th July) which I now produce. A week or so later I received a letter from Mr. Brechin, dated the 9th July, which I also produce. On the 21st July I wrote to Mr. Brechin, inclosing a draft for 20l., and asking him to send Salem back to Aden, and got a reply, dated the 4th August. Later on, when in Egypt, I wrote to Mr. Brechin, asking him to try and effect Salem's release; and, if he could not do so, to cable for me. About the 28th August I received a cablegram from him asking me to go to Paris. I sailed next day from Alexandria to Marseilles. On my arrival in Paris, I went first to the asylum and saw Salem there, felt convinced that he was not insane, and later on, in company with Mr. Brechin, I waited upon Mr. George Atlees, the British Vice-Consul, asking him to do what he could to effect Salem's release. He told me that he had received a letter from Salem, and was doing what he could to have him discharged; that he himself had seen him, and was quite convinced of his sanity. Subsequently he sent me the order for his release, and I went to the asylum and took him with me to Genoa, whence he came by Rubattino steamer to Aden, landing here on the 30th September.

While in Paris I called at M. Piat's house, and was told that he was out of town, and had been for several weeks; his servants could not give me his address, but said that if I sent a letter it would be forwarded. I left my card. From the asylum I got a note saying that some of Salem's effects were at the Hôtel de Ville. I went there, but no one seemed to know anything about them. I asked about the servant Bachir at M. Piat's house, and was told that he was away with M. Piat. I subsequently sent the note I obtained from the asylum to Mr. Brechin, who delivered it to the Consul.

Before I arrived in Paris I received a letter from Pastor Cordey, in which he said that he called on M. Piat and failed to find him at home. Subsequently M. Piat called on him, and told him that Salem had turned Christian in order to curry favour with the Sultan of Zanzibar. Pastor Cordey discouraged further effort on Salem's behalf, as from what M. Piat said he considered him an impostor.

I know nothing about Bachir's previous history, though I am aware that there are a considerable number of Abyssinians in the employ of the Sultan of Lahej as paid soldiers, and Mr. Mackenzie, of the British Anti-Slavery Society, made diligent and careful inquiry in the territory of the Sultan, and only found a few slaves, all of whom were eunuchs. His Report was published some years ago by the Society.

(Signed) JOHN C. YOUNG.

Before me:

(Signed) P. T. POTTINGER, Captain, I.S.C.,
Magistrate, 1st Class.

Aden, December 16, 1902.

Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

Salem Kemri to the Rev. Dr. J. C. Young.

[Printed literally.]

July 1, 1902.

I HAD sent a letter for you before in a letter of the Sultan of Lahej, because I am afraid that any one to know me that I have English person who know me, for this man had said to me, if you speak with other man of European tribe, I shall show you much trouble. Now, Sir, I got little time to written this letter for you to tell you some of my story.

This man has sent to taken me from Aden for to teach him Arabic language; his name was M. Piat, Counsel of France. Now he make me like slavery; he said bad to me and beat me and my boy, and don't let me or my boy to gone out, but with him or with one of his family until nearest place, and when I said to him, Sir, let me to gone to Aden, he said to me, Give me my money which I spent for you to come from Aden to here; and I said to him, I not said to you that you to spend your money for to bring me here for to kill me, and I have not money till I to give you. He was angry and beat me and make me in one room like prison; I have crying for people to here my news, but they don't know my language; he said to him this were mad man, and he bring a doctor for to saw me; and when the doctor had come, he ask me what for are you crying, I said to him I afraid this man had beating me and the doctor cannot to stand me, for he was France doctor and the M. Piat said to me why you said this news, you must not to said other time like this words, and he traslent to the doctor. I don't know what he has said to him, and he gone away without I know anything about him. Now, Sir, my story is long. I cannot to tell you more than this now. At last I have got little time to send this letter which you had give me for Sir J. Brechin, B.D., and Sir Pastor Cordey to tell they some of my story, and Pastor has come one day and he fined me in a road and he said to me don't afraid. I am here. I am your friend, your brother. I said to him I don't wish to stay in the house of this man; if he want me to do his business I will do, but let him to bring me other house to stay in it. The Pastor has said to me I will go to Sir Brechin and we will think together about you, and then we will sent a letter for you and you must to go in a Post Office to take it, and he has gone and I had gone to Post Office to ask about a letter every day, and I don't fined any letter, and from that day till to-day I had not seen any one—Pastor or Brechin. Now, Sir, if you like God indeed please sent a letter to any one which know him to take me from this man, for he will kill me, I think. I don't his business, for it is very bad business, but I don't to tell any one about his business, it is very dangers business and wish his money which he spend about me, but I think he must not to get for many reasons which I know, but he intimidation me, for he think I not have one to protected me from his harm and his trouble, and when

he saw one had come to take me, he will become very afraid from his Government. I think do please, Sir, let one to saved me from this and to sent me to you. I don't have any money here, but when I had come to Aden, I will got work to do, and I will give you your money, Sir. Please, Sir, don't said to any European or Arabian man this news. Sir, I afraid to got this man any news about me before I had not gone away from him.

My place is Rue Vinuese, 3 F., Paris.

At once, Sir, saved me please.

Inclosure 6 in No. 9.

The Rev. E. J. Brechin to the Rev. Dr. J. C. Young.

Paris, July 9, 1902.

I DULY received your letter regarding S. Salem. I had a letter from him inclosed, telling me that he was being abused by his employer, M. Piat. I understand he wrote you also. Both Mr. Cordey and I have seen him; and, as far as we can make out, M. Piat is keeping Salem a close prisoner and terrorizing him. Salem says he is beaten, but he can show no bruises. He told me that he was engaged at secret, dangerous work, and could not tell me what it is. M. Piat kept his first month's salary as payment for his passage from Aden, and I hear that he has paid him his second month's salary, 300 frs.

I went to see the English Consul here. He said that there was nothing for him to do; that if Salem had any charge to make against M. Piat, it would need to be made to the French authorities.

Mr. Cordey is to see M. Piat some day soon, in order that he may find out, if possible, the real state of matters.

It seems to us that the only thing to do is to wait until Salem has enough to take him back to Aden, and then see him safely on his way.

I thought it better to let you know. Many thanks for your kind letter.

Inclosure 7 in No. 9.

The Rev. E. J. Brechin to the Rev. Dr. J. C. Young.

Paris, August 4, 1902.

I RECEIVED yours of the 21st July this morning, with inclosed cheque for 20l.

Since writing you, I received the inclosed letter from Mr. Cordey, which will best explain to you the state of affairs as far as I know them. I am so sorry to hear all this about Salem, for, like you, I thought him an honest-looking fellow.

You will see from the letter that M. Piat and the doctors are to have him sent back to Aden as soon as possible. I shall keep your cheque until I hear from you what you wish me to do with it under the new circumstances.

Miss Wood is from home just now, but I shall be able to tell you by my next letter about the parcel.

Inclosure 8 in No. 9.

Deposition.

SALEM KEMRI, native of Zanzibar, age about 30, states on oath:—

During the month of March 1902 I was at Lahej, when I received a message from the French Consul at Aden, M. Reis, asking me to come to Aden, as he wanted to see me. I came in and M. Reis told me that he had received a letter from Paris, from M. Piat, a gentleman whom I had formerly known as French Consul in Zanzibar, asking him to find me and to ascertain whether I was willing to go to Paris, where he promised me good employment. The nature of the work was not mentioned; and on my asking about it, M. Reis told me that he could not tell me this, but at present was only to find out whether I was willing to go or not. I said that I would be willing, provided that I was satisfied as to the nature of the work, rate of pay and arrangements for travelling expenses, &c. I then left and returned again a month later.

On this second occasion M. Reis informed me that he had heard from M. Piat that the work for which I was required was to teach a person Arabic for two hours a-day,

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and that the rest of the day would be at my own disposal. The wages were to be 300 frs. a-month and free lodgings for myself and servant. I was also to be given a second-class passage for myself and deck passage for my servant by a Messageries steamer. I accepted these terms, and he told me to be ready to leave on the 14th May; he further gave me 80 rupees to buy warm clothes at Port Said.

I accordingly left Aden on the 14th May in the steam-ship "Yarra," and was met at Marseilles by an old gentleman named César Tian*, who took me from the ship to a hotel; he told me to rest here for the day and go on by night to Paris.

I left that night, and on arrival at Paris found M. Piat waiting for me on the platform. He took me to his house and showed me all the rooms I was to occupy; he seemed very pleased to see me, shook me warmly by the hand, and said how glad he was that I had come. He treated me as a guest, and I frequently sat at his own table with him. He told me not to go out by myself, but said that, if I wished to go out, some one would always be available to accompany me—generally a lady who was staying in the house and whom he introduced as his cousin and the wife of the French Consul at Bagdad, or else one of her children (sons, ages about 17½ and 18½). He warned me not to speak to any one except only to such Frenchmen as he might introduce me to, and especially warned me against speaking to Englishmen.

I was getting tired of having no occupation, and about a fortnight after my arrival M. Piat called me to his office and began to laugh and joke with me, and then said I was to get a larger salary than had been bargained for, and would probably receive some honour from the Government. He then produced two books full of Arabic writing and two blank books, and said that, if I did the work secretly and well, I should be well paid. I said I would do my best, and asked where was the man I had to teach. He replied that, as the work had to be done secretly, he had not informed M. Reis as to the nature of it, but had said that he wanted me as a teacher. I then asked what was the nature of the work, and he told me to look and see. I looked at the books and he told me to correct any mistakes that I might see in the Arabic, and that I would also have to write every day in the blank books whatever he might tell me. He said we were to take extracts from these books and insert them in an Arabic newspaper which we were to send to Arabia, India, and every country where there were Mussulmans.

I took the books to my room, and found they were full of letters, telegrams, and translations or cuttings from other newspapers.

There were telegrams from all countries—Aden, Constantinople, Austria, Italy, Persia, Russia, &c.—most of these were attacks against the policy of England. The British and Germans were everywhere disparaged, while France and Russia were praised.

The British were said to be grasping and unjust, and were always trying to acquire fresh territory, and on this account God has of late been scourging them, as was shown by famine and sickness, and by the competition of America and Germany in trade; that America, by providing oil as fuel, was depriving England of her income from coal; that there was war in the Transvaal, Afghanistan, and Somaliland, and generally throughout India; that God had smitten the King with illness when all preparations had been made for his Coronation.

I cannot now remember exactly what else was written in the books, but they were all filled with this sort of language against the British, and it also said that the Egyptians now call the Khedive an unbeliever, as he only did whatever the British told him to. The Sultan of Turkey once sent soldiers to take possession of an island (Thasos) which belonged to a lady of the Khedive's family, but Lord Cromer got the British to send a man-of-war to claim it on the Khedive's account.

There were copies of three letters in the books which were said to have been sent to Mulla Abdulla Ayshur, in Somaliland, the Sheikh of Koweit (Mubarak-as-Sabah), and Mulla Najeeb-ed-din Haddah, of Afghanistan.

The first of these to the Somali Mullah purported to come from all Mussulmans and their teachers, and told him that, if he could tear up the railway line near Uganda, he would damage the British far more than he could at Berbera, as he would cause confusion at both ends. This letter also promised assistance in money, arms, and ammunition from Jibuti; that such action would be approved by all Mussulmans.

The second letter to Sheikh Mubarak purported to be from all Moslem teachers, and said that the English were infidels, and that, if the Sheikh kept company with them and followed their instructions, he would become an infidel; that he should carry out the wishes of the Sultan of Turkey and not keep company with the English, as the company of infidels is condemned by the Koran.

* Of the firm of Tian and Reis, who have a trading establishment at Aden.

The third letter to Mulla Najeeb-ed-din Haddah purported to be from all Moslems in the world. It promised help if he continued to make war on the British, and said that this assistance was only being delayed till they were satisfied that he would remain steadfast in his opposition to the British; that all Moslems under British rule were tired of their position, advising him to make alliance with Russia, which is a splendid country. This letter was a long one, but the gist of it was to advise him to throw in his lot with Russia rather than with England.

There was also something in the books about Sir Arthur Hardinge at Tehran. I cannot now remember exactly what it was, but said he had been opposing Russian schemes in Persia, and that he was trying to persuade the Shah to allow him to construct a railway from Peshawar into Persia. Russia had consequently asked Great Britain to recall Sir Arthur Hardinge on account of his marked antipathy to the Russian Government. The result of this request was not yet known, but that it would make little difference, as Russia was close on the borders of Persia and had plenty of soldiers ready, while England was far away and could not easily bring an army, so that, if Persia listened to Sir Arthur Hardinge, he would lead them into difficulties and then let them get out as best they could without assistance.

In Abyssinia the British had asked the Emperor for a Concession to bring water from his country into the Soudan; this Concession was granted because the Emperor knew that in any quarrel between him and the British he could easily cut off the water-supply and thus cause their people and trees to die.

Another passage exhorted all Moslems not to listen to the British, as wherever they go they take possession of the country, and treat the real owners as mere puppets. The rulers of any countries where the British had already set foot should hasten to make Treaties with France or Russia, or any other great country in proximity to their borders.

There was a great deal more to this effect in the books that I cannot now remember; it was chiefly against the English, but partly also against Germans.

Mention also was made of British barbarities in the Transvaal, especially the concentration camps, where, it was alleged, the women were treated like beasts. That when peace was finally declared, English ladies went out in the streets in England like common people, and shouted for joy, without giving thought to their poor sisters undergoing degradation in the concentration camps.

In Somaliland the Mullah was besieging Berbera and could capture it at any time, as the British had very few soldiers there and the Mullah had a large army, and cut up any one who attempted to go to or from Berbera and the interior. The result was that the trade of Berbera was being destroyed.

When I read these books I thought that this work is not good. I am now a Christian and a British subject, and cannot do such work against their Government. Accordingly, I went to M. Piat, and said I was sorry I could not do this work, but that I should be glad to teach Arabic, if there was any one for me to teach. He turned red with anger and caught hold of me, but spoke nicely and asked why I would not do it; he said I would get an increase of pay up to 500 fr. a-month, and would be made a French citizen and would get honour from the Government, and my property in Zanzibar, which had been taken from me by the Sultan, would be restored to me through French influence, and I should no longer be under the Sultan. By this means I should once more be a rich man, whereas, if I refused the work, I should continue to be a poor man, and the British would oppress me as before. He asked, "Why, then, do you refuse? It will be much better for you to take it; you will be very sorry afterwards if you refuse. No one will help you except the French Government." I said all this might be true, but I could not do the work. He said, "I have brought you here and recommended you to M. Delcassé; he does not know you personally, but only from my recommendation; what can I say to him now? He will hold me responsible for your refusal." I admitted this, but persisted in my refusal. He then became angry and called me a fool and an ass, and that I had no gratitude; that if I refused to do the work, he would make things bad for me. I asked if he intended to kill me, but he replied that he would not kill me, but would make me wish I was dead.

I then went away, and for two days could not eat from grief and fear. I did not know any way about Paris or anything of French customs or laws. I ate nothing but a little cake I had in my room, as I feared poison in the food from M. Piat. On the third day he sent for me and asked why I would not eat. I said I would not eat food from his house, but would do so at a hotel. I said my eating depended on myself, and as for the work, I had come to teach Arabic, and would not do the work he had given me. He then called me a fool and an ass, and struck me, saying that I must eat. He then took me up to my own rooms and again struck me several times with the open hand and once or twice with his fists. I cried out in the hope that somebody might hear and rescue me,

but no one came. After that I did the work as he ordered, hoping to be able to get away in time.

I was allowed to go out into the Trocadéro, and one day while there I wrote two letters to Pastor Cordey and the Reverend E. J. Brechin, and inclosed with them the two letters addressed to them that had been given me by Dr. Young in Aden. In these letters I asked them to come and meet me, and on the following day Pastor Cordey came, and I asked him to take me to his house, as I was very tired of this man. I said I had also written to Mr. Brechin, but he had not come. Pastor Cordey said he would first see Mr. Brechin, and took his address from me, and then went off, telling me not to be afraid, but to call at the Post Office, and I should hear from him. A day or two afterwards I got a letter from him, in which he said he had seen Mr. Brechin, who was coming to the Trocadéro to see me. Mr. Brechin came and I spoke to him. I asked him to go to the British Consul about me, as I had been brought to Paris for one work and then set to do something quite different; he asked what my work was, but I said I could not tell him; he tried to persuade me to tell, but I refused to say: he then asked where I lived and told me to go home. I went home, and he saw me go into the house, and then he went on.

Twice after this Pastor Cordey came to see me, but all he said was to tell me not to be afraid, as they would see me righted. Consequently, I continued to do the work ordered by M. Piat, but every day I begged him to allow me to return to Aden. I even offered to pay my own return fare if he would allow me to go, but he would not let me.

At last one day I wrote Pastor Cordey's address and showed it to a cabman, telling him to drive me to the house; he did so, and I begged Pastor Cordey to take me away from where I was; he said he had no place for me there. I begged him to send me to a hotel or elsewhere, as I did not wish to return to M. Piat's house. He said I must return, but that I should tell M. Piat that I wanted to return to my own country, and would not do the work. If M. Piat ill-treated me, I could complain to the police. I replied that I did not know the language or where the police-station was, but he insisted that I must go back. Pastor Cordey also told me to say that I was a Christian, but I was afraid to do this for fear that I should be killed for having been with the English.

I continued to plead with M. Piat to send me back to Aden, but he would say "yes" one day and "no" another. At last he said he would let me go; but that if ever I told any of these secrets he would have me killed wherever I might be. He told me he could not inform M. Delcassé that I refused to work, as he would then put me into prison, where I should probably die; that he (M. Piat) was looking after this Government work for M. Delcassé, and the latter did not know me personally. If he told M. Delcassé I was ill, he would probably send a doctor to treat me, so that the best way was for me to feign madness.

I forgot to say that on the day following that on which M. Piat beat me and I called out, M. Piat brought a man who, he said, was M. Delcassé's doctor; he asked why I cried out. I replied that I wasn't ill, but that I was afraid of this man (M. Piat). M. Piat told me that I mustn't talk like this, or I would see what he would do to me; he then spoke to the doctor, who looked at my tongue and felt my pulse and the back of my head. After the doctor went away, M. Piat said to me that the doctor declared I was epileptic, and must bathe in cold water and rub my chest and back. I replied that the doctor did not know anything about it. I had never had an epileptic fit in my life. He said, "You are a madman; this is M. Delcassé's doctor. Do you suppose he does not know?" The doctor could not talk Arabic, and I could not talk French, so I did not know how to talk to him, and could only reply to what M. Piat said.

M. Piat told me that if I feigned madness I should quickly get back to my own country. I left him and consulted my servant Bachir; he recommended me to do it. I told him not to speak of it to any one, as it might be bad for us both. M. Piat said he would bring a man next day who was going to Jibuti, and would look after me on the voyage, and that I was to feign madness before him. At 10 A.M. the next day he sent for me, and I went and found a man with him whom I did not know. I sat on a sofa while this man asked me a lot of questions through M. Piat, but I did not answer anything. M. Piat then put his hand into my pockets and took out my purse containing two notes of 100 fr. each, 3½ Napoleons in gold; he said he would keep this for me there, and I said nothing. He told me the man would accompany me to Aden, but I still made no reply, and the man left, and I went to my own room.

Next day he sent for me, and I went down and found he was not there, but only his cousin's wife in the room: two men were with her—one was M. Delcassé's doctor,

who had seen me before, and the other was the man I had seen the previous day—the woman acted as interpreter, translating into English, which I know fairly well. She asked if I knew the man who had come the day before, but I gave no reply. She said this is the man who is going to Aden with you; don't you know him? He came yesterday. I remained silent. M. Delcassé's doctor then looked at my eyes and tongue, and felt my pulse, and then spoke to the other man; they then went away, and after a few minutes M. Piat came and had a long conversation with the lady, and finally told me to go upstairs.

The next day M. Piat brought another man whom I knew as the teacher in a school, and told me I might go for a carriage drive with him. I accordingly went into a cab with M. Piat and this other man, and they took me to an asylum (St. Anne's); a letter was here given to M. Piat, which he took, and we drove to a police-station. There we saw the doctor who had come on the previous day. I begged them to take me away and send me home, but they paid no attention. I was then taken to another office with a room for the temporary confinement of prisoners, where I was kept all night. Next morning another doctor came, and M. Piat still acted as interpreter; the doctor said he must watch me for a few days, but I asked not to be kept shut up in this little place, which was not much more than a cupboard; so they took me off again to St. Anne's Asylum.

Next morning another doctor belonging to the hospital came and pricked me with a pin, and asked me if I felt it. I said, yes, I did. I was then taken to the ward in which I was afterwards found by Dr. Young; it was then about the 18th July, and it was the 16th September when I was released.

Besides the money mentioned above as taken from me by M. Piat, I left my boxes with clothes and books at his house, and he has given me no pay since I arrived in Paris except one month's pay (300 fr.), which he paid me on the 20th June.

In addition to the money mentioned above, there were also four English sovereigns in gold which I omitted to mention.

The Gazette was formerly called "Fateh-el-Basayer," but the name was subsequently changed to "Murshed-el-Eab." It was issued two or three times a-month, and was sent to India, Koweit, Morocco, Linga, Muscat, Lamu, Bunder Salem, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, Bahrein, Bussorah, Melinda, Cutch, Aden, Jibuti, and other places. The sons of Abdulla Hassan Ali in Aden, and also Sheikh Saleh Balaka, were sent copies; also Aman Salahk, one Bazarah, and Saiyid Safi. In Koweit, Sheikh Mubarak and Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud. In Bussorah, Saiyid Ahmad Nakeeb and Saiyid Talib. The Sheikh of Bahrein and Sheikh Ibrahim-bin-Muhammad-bin-Khalifa. The Vali of Bushire, the officer in charge of the Customs. In Linga, the Vali and the Chief of the Customs, Sheikh Sultan-bin-Rachena, Sheikh Saiyid Muhammad Mulla. In Bunder Abbas, the Vali and the Chief of the Customs. In Bombay, Sheikh Abdulla and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Muhammad (brothers), Captain Muhammad Bakr, Sheikh Yusuf-bin-Ibrahim.

These are just names I can now remember from the list, but there were many others.

I first saw M. Piat in Zanzibar, but was not then personally acquainted with him. I left Zanzibar in A.H. 1317 in the month of Muharrem, owing to a difference I had with the Sultan Hamood, whom I was serving as a junior Secretary; my father was a large merchant there. From Zanzibar I went to Jibuti, where I stayed eight months and was made a Cadi; while there, the Governor told me that he had orders to arrest me and send me back to Zanzibar; he advised me to go, so I crossed over to Chaneba* in Yemen, and thence to Hodeida and subsequently to the Persian Gulf, and finally came to Lahej, where I arrived a little more than two years ago. From Lahej I wrote to the French Consul at Aden, M. Reis, asking him if he could get me some employment in Jibuti; he replied that he had no work for me there, but I might return without fear. I did not hear again from him for a long time. I first met Dr. Young in Lahej more than a year ago. I went to him to get some medicine when I was suffering from fever. The Sultan of Lahej had known my father, and he gave me clothes, a house, and 30 rupees a-month. I then asked him to allow me to go to Sheikh Othman and learn English; he agreed, and I lived in Sheikh Othman for six months, learning English in Dr. Young's school. I was then called back to Lahej for two months and was again on my way to Sheikh Othman when I got word to go and see M. Reis.

I estimate the value of the property left in Paris at about 15*l*, but there are title deeds and other papers that I cannot value. There was no written agreement between me and M. Reis or M. Piat, and there was no undertaking that I should serve for any

* Near Mokha.

particular time. M. Reis gave me a ticket and a passport for myself and servant. I don't know the price of the ticket, but M. Piat informed me that it was 1,240 fr.

As regards my servant Bachir, he was one of a number of Abyssinians in the service of the Sultan of Lahej who placed him at my disposal to take with me as a good servant. I was to pay him 5 rupees a-month and his food and clothes. I have never heard that he was a slave, and he never said anything to me the subject. I don't know anything about his previous history, but there are a considerable number of Abyssinians serving as soldiers in Lahej, and none of them are slaves. Had Bachir been a slave, he would have taken the opportunity to escape in Aden.

(Signed) SALEM KEMRI.

Before me:

(Signed) P. T. POTTINGER, Captain,
1st Class Magistrate.

Aden, December 15, 1902.

Salem Kemri, recalled to-day, the 27th December, 1902, states on oath—

While I was in Paris I wrote two or three letters to the Sultan of Lahej. I also wrote to the Sultan's son, the Sultan's cousin, the Sultan's interpreter, and to a Saiyid at Lahej. M. Piat told me to write to my friends to let them know I had arrived safely and had got good employment. I wrote as he told me. This was before I was shown the real nature of the work I was expected to do. I can't say for certain whether in my letters to the Sultan or others in Lahej I mentioned Bachir or asked for authority to get rid of him. I certainly did not do so in the first letters, but I may have, perhaps, in a subsequent letter asked the Sultan to allow me to send Bachir back, as he was not of much use, and it would be better if he could send another servant in his place; this was after M. Piat had beaten the boy one day for being idle, and I thought it would be advisable to get him away; in my letter to the Sultan I never used the word "slave." I always spoke of Bachir as a servant, and never heard that he was supposed to be a slave.

Before I left Aden I took Bachir to see M. Reis, the French Consul, and we both spent the night at his house. M. Reis questioned Bachir about what pay he was to get, &c., and asked if he was going of his own free will. Bachir replied in the affirmative, and M. Reis then made out the passport.

On further consideration, I can say for certain that, after M. Piat beat Bachir, I did write to the Sultan, and say that I should like to send the boy back and get another servant in his place. This is the only thing I did that could lead M. Piat to suppose that I had applied to the Sultan for authority to get rid of him. M. Piat frequently asked both me and Bachir whether the latter was a servant or a slave, and we always replied that he was a servant.

Bachir told me one day that M. Piat had said to him that I was returning to Aden, but that he would keep him in Paris, but Bachir replied that he wanted to return with me.

(Signed) SALEM KEMRI

Before me:

(Signed) P. T. POTTINGER, Captain,
1st Class Magistrate.

Aden, December 27, 1902.

Inclosure 9 in No. 9.

List of Property left by Salem Kemri in M. Piat's House.

ONE box containing—
One Arabic dictionary.
One Arabic grammar.
One English-Arabic dictionary.
One Arabic-English dictionary.
Four volumes of the Bible in English, bound in calf.
Several school-books.
Title-deeds of his houses and land in Zanzibar.

One box containing letters, correspondence, &c.

One box containing clothes.

Deck chair, cups, saucers, plates, &c., bedding, and a little furniture. Also some clothes hanging on pegs in the room.

4½ in English sovereigns, 3½ Napoleons, 200 fr. in two notes of 100 fr. each.

No. 10.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

CASPIAN Fisheries Loan.

Tehran, April 2, 1903.

With reference to my telegram No. 47 of yesterday's date, I understand that the Russians have reopened negotiations, and now offer 200,000l., without political conditions, on the Caspian Fisheries' security. The Grand Vizier kicks at our demands respecting reimbursement and further security, which I have told him are essential, but would rather get 300,000l. from us.

With regard to reimbursement, my idea would be to give a short term, say, three or five years, in which the advance is to be redeemable, but to penalize reimbursement before a given date, say, seven years, by requiring them to pay increased retrospective interest in such a case. The Grand Vizier has informed the Russians that he will offer the Fisheries to the Imperial Bank if they will not accept them. For this reason, I think we may as well stick to them as nominal security. We might later on substitute, by agreement with Russia, as a concession to her, some guarantee which, from her point of view, would be less objectionable.

The Persian Government will probably require more money soon, especially if the Grand Vizier is upset by the Court party; hence, even if he closes with the Russians, we ought to have ready a cut and dried offer.

The opposition to the Grand Vizier is still bitter and united, though he has saved his position for the present owing to the existence of these offers.

No. 11.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

LOAN.

Tehran, April 3, 1903.

With reference to my telegram No. 48 of yesterday's date: Should your Lordship concur, I should like at once to conclude an arrangement on behalf of the Imperial Bank, by which they advance 250,000l. or 300,000l. on the security of the Caspian Fisheries, with the provision suggested by me against immediate repayment, and assigning the southern customs as a subsidiary guarantee.

The Grand Vizier will always prefer, other things being equal, to borrow from the Russians rather than from us, so I cannot say whether he will not prefer the Russian offer of 200,000l. on the Fisheries alone as being less dangerous, but he may be tempted by the larger sum I have suggested.

There is no time to be lost, and I would request an early reply.

No. 12.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 26. Commercial.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ANGLO-PERSIAN Commercial Declaration.

Tehran, April 3, 1903.

It is desired by M. Naus that the notes exchanged with him should be annexed to the ratified Declaration, as this is apparently considered of importance by the Russians. I have informed him, in reply, that, personally, I had no objection to his

proposal, but that I thought it might be considered unusual by your Lordship. I suggested, in the latter case, that there should be a separate ratified Protocol, declaring as an integral part of the Treaty the documents annexed to it.

As soon as the Persians hear that our ratifications are in hand, which I presume is now the case, they will prepare theirs.

No. 13.

Minute by Sir L. Griffin.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 3.)

A SPECIAL meeting of the Board of the Imperial Bank was held to consider the proposal of the Foreign Office, and to decide the terms on which the Bank could act in the matter of an advance up to 500,000*l.* by the Government to the Persian Government, the Imperial Bank being the intermediary, and paying 4 per cent. interest to the British Treasury.

Present: Sir Lepel Griffin, Chairman; Sir Thomas Gordon; Sir George Mackenzie; Mr. William Keswick, M.P.; and Mr. Newell, Manager.

The Board resolved that they could carry through the transaction for a commission of 1 per cent. per annum on the amount advanced.

(Signed) LEPEL GRIFFIN.

No. 14.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 3, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 10th November, 1901, in regard to financial assistance to the Persian Government, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state that, in view of the recent telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject, of which copies have been transmitted to you, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that an opportunity has now occurred for reconsidering the question, of which advantage should be taken.

It appears from Sir A. Hardinge's telegrams that the success of any proposal which may be made in the matter to the Persian Government depends on its being carried through with promptitude and secrecy.

In these circumstances Lord Lansdowne desires to propose the following bases for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India:—

1. The Government of India to be prepared to lend a sum not exceeding 500,000*l.* to the Imperial Bank of Persia at 4 per cent. interest.

2. His Majesty's Government and the Government of India to accept joint responsibility for the principal and interest of the loan.

3. The Imperial Bank of Persia to make an advance of 300,000*l.* at once as nominal lender to the Persian Government at 5 per cent. interest, so as to receive a commission of 1 per cent. per annum for its own services in the matter.

4. Sir A. Hardinge to be informed that, if he attaches serious importance to the inclusion of the Caspian Sea fisheries as a security, His Majesty's Government are prepared to authorize an advance upon them provided that the Southern Customs be also included in the security given, though they would prefer, having regard to Russian susceptibilities as to their sphere of influence in Northern Persia, that the customs of Southern Persia should be the only security. Further, that if the fisheries are included, it is essential that the arrangement should be of a kind which would enable the Bank hereafter to accept, in place of the fisheries, some guarantee less objectionable to Russia, as is suggested in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram No. 48 of to-day, without discredit to His Majesty's Government.

5. Effectual precautions to be taken to guard against the risks mentioned in Lord Lansdowne's telegram No. 30 to Sir A. Hardinge of the 28th ultimo—namely, that the drafts payable from the Southern Customs might be paid off, as they fell due, with funds furnished by Russia, thus placing Persia more than ever under Russian financial tutelage; and further, that if a British advance through a British-Persian Bank is not a loan by the British Government, it might be contended that a Russian advance through a Russo-Persian Bank would not be a loan by the Russian Government, and that consequently a Russo-Persian Bank could hold drafts on the Southern Customs

No. 13*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 3, 1903.

PERSIAN loan.

I have received your telegrams Nos. 47 and 48 of the 1st and 3rd April.

Bases upon which His Majesty's Government are prepared to proceed are as follows:—

1. A sum not exceeding 500,000*l.* and bearing 4 per cent. interest to be lent to the Imperial Bank of Persia by the Government of India.

2. Joint responsibility for payment of principal and interest of the loan to be accepted by the British and Indian Governments.

3. 300,000*l.* will be advanced at once to the Persian Government by the Imperial Bank as nominal lender bearing 4 per cent. interest, the Bank charging a commission of 1 per cent. for its services.

4. You may insist on the Caspian Fisheries being included if you attach serious importance to them, but we should prefer to take only the Southern Customs as security, for the reasons mentioned in my telegram No. 32 of the 30th ultimo.

Any arrangement, if the fisheries are included, must of necessity be of a kind to enable the Bank, hereafter and without discredit to us, to make such a concession as you have suggested.

5. The risks mentioned in my telegram to you No. 30 of the 28th ultimo must be guarded against by taking effectual precautions, the nature of which we are quite content to leave you to determine.

6. The nature of the securities relating to the Southern Customs should be such as to enable the Bank to transfer them to our custody, and they should not be negotiable.

The above are the conditions on which you are authorized to proceed.

without any violation of the agreement between the British and Persian Governments that the Customs of these ports should not come under foreign control. Sir A. Hardinge to determine the nature of such precautions.

6. The securities relating to the Southern Customs need not be negotiable, but should be of a kind which the Bank could transfer to the custody of His Majesty's Government.

If Lord G. Hamilton agrees to these proposals, Lord Lansdowne will at once authorize Sir A. Hardinge by telegraph to proceed upon the lines indicated.

I am further to inform you that if the Government of India are willing to provide funds up to 300,000*l.* immediately, and possibly a further sum up to a maximum of 500,000*l.* later, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to guarantee them against loss on the transaction to the extent of one-half of the amount involved.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 15.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 3, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 31st ultimo relative to the report of the creation of Turkish administrative posts at certain places on the El Katr coast of Arabia, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.*

Lord G. Hamilton will observe that Sir N. O'Connor considers it advisable that His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire should endeavour to keep himself fully informed of the movements of the officials who were said to have been selected for these posts, and should give him early and direct information if there should be any indication of their intending to go to El Katr.

I am to suggest that instructions in the sense proposed should be sent to Colonel Kemball.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 16.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to the Persian Loan.

India Office, April 3, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 3, 1903.

YOUR telegram of 1st April is assumed to signify assent to our plan for a loan to Persia; and the Council of India having agreed, His Majesty's Government is acting on it. The following is the scheme adopted:—

A sum not exceeding 500,000*l.* shall be provided from Indian revenues, half the risk as regards both principal and interest being undertaken by the British Treasury. Of this sum 300,000*l.* will at once be placed at the disposal of the Foreign Office, who

* See Part XII, No. 530.

will be asked to superintend and to make themselves responsible for all further transactions connected with this money, with the object of enabling the Imperial Bank of Persia to finance the Persian Government at a low rate of interest.

For this advance the Persian Government is to make Southern Customs security, and to undertake not to repay the loan for a certain number of years, and in no circumstances to pledge the same security for a loan from any other institution or Government.

No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to the Seistan Arbitration.

India Office, April 4, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 3, 1903.

COLONEL McMAHON, who was in camp at Shahgul, telegraphed on 24th March as follows:—

"As Hashmat-ul-Mulk's removal would be a blow to our interests, and a gain to Russia, I would recommend that, unless the matter is already settled, objection to Persian Commissioners should be waived, and that, by the use of this and other concessions, the Persian Government should be induced to cancel their decision to remove Hashmat-ul-Mulk from the Governorship of Seistan."

Provided Yamin-i-Nizam's communications with Miller are stopped, we concur in this recommendation, as we consider the present situation quite intolerable, all Colonel McMahon's letters to the Persian authorities being, as we know, taken to Miller, who advises as to action.

No. 18.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 4, 1903.

MR. CROW telegraphs under yesterday's date that the Turkish transport "Adana" had just left Bussorah with one battalion of recruits for Hassa.

No. 19.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 44.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 4, 1903.

I HAVE had under consideration, in communication with the Secretary of State for India and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, your despatch No. 15 of the 26th January last, regarding a request made by the Persian Government that the Commanders of His Majesty's ships may be instructed not to take active measures against piracy within the territorial waters of Persia or to land armed forces on Persian soil for the purpose.

I approve the reply suggested by you.

You should at the same time point out to the Persian Government the inconsistency of their present attitude in making this demand in view of the fact that in

1897, with the object of suppressing the traffic in arms, they gave permission for His Majesty's ships to search merchant vessels in Persian waters and to confiscate any arms and ammunition intended for Persian ports which might be found on board.

You should also remind them of the active assistance rendered to them in 1898, by the co-operation on land of British naval forces with Persian troops, for the pursuit and punishment of the murderers of Mr. Graves.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 20.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 4, 1903.

LOAN. Before receiving the suggestion contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 35 of the 3rd instant, the Persian Government this morning proposed an advance from the Imperial Bank of 200,000*l.*, repayable capital and interest in twenty years, on the Caspian Fisheries, with the collateral security of the postal and telegraph revenues. It is feared by the Shah that if he engages to us the southern customs it may be resented by the Russians, but the Grand Vizier will recommend it to His Majesty as I have explained that we attach importance to it.

I suggested that M. Naus might sign an Agreement with the manager of the Imperial Bank as to the Fisheries (with the collateral security of the posts and telegraphs which bring in 15,000*l.* a-year) for production to the Russians, and that the Grand Vizier and myself might sign a secret or separate Agreement making the southern customs a further subsidiary security, in view of the responsibility assumed by His Majesty's Government towards the bank for the repayment of the advance.

The original proposal of the Russians was for an advance of 200,000*l.* with the monopoly of the Mint contracts for the Russian Bank, and one or two other clauses whose effect would have been the Imperial Bank's destruction. Although they are willing for the present to modify these terms, they will require the advance to be repaid in six months (which the Persian Government cannot do) or its consolidation into a loan the conditions of which will be the above. They have stiffened their terms again as the Grand Vizier's fall is no longer imminent, but in order to prevent our putting him in our debt they may once more reduce them.

The Bank Manager here believes that the posts and telegraphs will be sufficient security for an initial smaller loan of 200,000*l.*, and I should be glad to get them in, but I have strongly insisted on the southern customs being also included. I have informed the Grand Vizier that the 200,000*l.* asked for can, if necessary, be increased later on on similar conditions, but in view of the Shah's extravagance I think it prudent at present to offer only that amount.

I should be glad if your Lordship could get instructions sent to the Bank Manager here to sign when we have come to an agreement. The nominal contract should be between the bank and the Persian Government, though, if desirable, the arrangement can be recorded in a written Agreement between me and the Grand Vizier.

No. 21.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

India Office, April 3, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 12th February last on the subject of Sir A. Hardinge's proposal that the Imperial Bank of Persia should be encouraged to open a branch in Seistan, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to inform you that, after consultation with the Government of India, the matter has now been considered by the Secretary of State for India in Council, with special reference to the question of the subsidy required by the Bank for opening the branch.

2. Lord George Hamilton understands that arrangements have been made by His Majesty's Government to give effect to the scheme for taking over and carrying out the road concession of the Imperial Bank of Persia, which will have the effect of

relieving Indian revenues from the obligation to pay a moiety of the subsidy of 2,000l. a-year for ten years, which, as stated in my letter of the 5th April, 1902, the Secretary of State in Council was prepared to guarantee.

3. On the understanding that Indian revenues are relieved from all liability on this account, the Secretary of State in Council is prepared to provide, for a period of five years, the whole of the subsidy which he has been informed that the Imperial Bank require for the establishment of a branch in Seistan, viz., a maximum sum of 1,500l. a-year, that maximum being reduced by the amount of any net profit actually made by the Seistan branch in each year.

4. Having regard to the fact that the Imperial Bank is a Persian institution and that the operations of the branch will be in Persian territory, the Secretary of State in Council is of opinion that it is desirable that the agreement for the establishment of the branch should be made with the Bank by His Majesty's Government, and not by the Government of India.

5. Lord George Hamilton will be glad to be informed whether Lord Lansdowne will be prepared to make the necessary arrangements with the Imperial Bank, on the understanding that the subsidy required by the Bank will, as stated in paragraph 3 of this letter, be paid from Indian revenues in such a manner as may seem to Lord Lansdowne expedient.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 22.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 21st March, transmitting a copy of Sir N. O'Connor's despatch No. 135 of the 14th March, in regard to the proposed establishment of Turkish administrative posts on the El Katr coast, and at Odeid on the Pirate coast.

In that despatch, Sir N. O'Connor deprecates any direct raising of the question of Turkish sovereignty over the El Katr promontory, and argues in favour of dissuading the Porte from proceeding further with their proposals to appoint Mudirs on the coast, on the ground that it would be highly impolitic to disturb the *status quo*.

Since receiving your letter of the 21st March, in which Lord Lansdowne asks for Lord George Hamilton's observations on the above despatch, the situation has been somewhat changed by the receipt of Sir N. O'Connor's telegrams of the 23rd and 30th March respectively, affirming definitely that Mudirs would not be sent to Zobara, Wakra, or El Odeid.

Lord George Hamilton, I am to say, fully concurs in the general line adopted by Sir N. O'Connor in his despatch, and will be quite satisfied if the *status quo* can be maintained, as, from the assurances contained in the above telegrams, seems probable, without raising the difficult and delicate question of Turkish sovereignty in the country south of Katif.

The position of Odeid, however, is not similar to that of the El Katr towns. As stated in my letter of the 4th February last, "neither the existence of a separate and independent" (i.e., of Abu Thabi) "chiefship at Odeid, nor its subordination to El Katr, has ever been recognized by the Government of India;" nor does Lord George Hamilton understand that the Government of India contemplate its absorption by Ahmed-bin-Thani, though it is true that the latter in November 1899 asked permission to occupy it. The Chief of Abu Thabi is one of the trucial Chiefs of the coast, our special engagements with whom were, at the request of the Turkish Ambassador, communicated to the Porte in 1893. (See Sir P. Currie's letter of the 23rd March, and Sir A. Godley's reply of the 28th March, 1893.)

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

India Office, April 4, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton, to forward, for the information of Lord Lansdowne, copies of telegrams to and from the Resident at Aden, as to the period during which it will be necessary to retain His Majesty's ships "Hermione" and "Intrepid" at Aden in connection with the delimitation.

Lord George Hamilton concurs in the view expressed by the Resident that it would be inexpedient to recall the ships until the work of demarcation, now about to be commenced, has made such progress as to afford a guarantee that it will be carried through without further obstruction. A premature withdrawal of the ships, in his Lordship's opinion, may not improbably result in encouraging action on the part of the Turkish authorities which will make it necessary again to dispatch the vessels to Aden.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 31, 1903.

ADMIRALTY are asking when His Majesty's ships "Hermione" and "Intrepid" will be able to return to the Mediterranean. What are your views as to the period for which it will be necessary to retain the ships at Aden? Presumably we cannot spare them yet, but they ought not to be retained longer than is really necessary.

(Repeated to Aden.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 2, 1903.

SECRETARY of State's telegram of the 31st March. Until Commission have actually demarcated some considerable extent of Amiri border, and there is reason to believe in the honest intention of Turkish Government to proceed with whole demarcation without unnecessary delay, I would venture to urge that His Majesty's Government should not contemplate the return of the ships referred to. I do not think it will be possible for at least some weeks to say when the ships can be withdrawn from Aden, as delimitation is only now about to be commenced.

(Repeated to Viceroy, Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 24.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

WITH reference to Sir H. Walpole's letter of the 4th April, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th April, relative to the use of His Majesty's ships in connection with the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 6, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 24.

*Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.**April 5, 1903.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

YOUR telegram of 31st March.

We agree with General Maitland (see his telegram of 2nd April) regarding proposal to withdraw the Mediterranean ships from Aden.

No. 25.

India Office to Foreign Office.--(Received April 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th instant, relative to the Persian loan.

India Office, April 6, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 25.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 5, 1903.

SEE telegram to Sir A. Hardinge of the 3rd April. With the advance of so large a sum upon security of Southern Customs, I think that a guarantee expressly admitting action to be taken in the event of default should be insisted upon.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 26.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.--(Received April 6.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 6, 1903.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut:—

Troopship "Nimed Khuda" left here night of the 4th April for Hodeidah with 1,600 recruits on board.

No. 27.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 6, 1903.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 69 of to-day relative to the Aden delimitation.

Your Excellency should make a communication to the Turkish Government, reminding them of the warning already given by His Majesty's Government that they cannot allow Turkish reinforcements to be sent to the neighbourhood of the disputed territory until a satisfactory settlement of the frontier question is arrived at, and you should at the same time express our earnest hope that we shall not, by the action of the Turkish Government, be placed in the disagreeable necessity of sending a naval force to Hodeida with orders to prevent the disembarkation of the recruits who are now being sent to that port.

No. 28*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

FINANCIAL assistance to Persia.

Foreign Office, April 6, 1903.

With reference to your telegram No. 51 of the 4th instant, it is essential that the customs of Southern Persia should be part of the security for any advance by us.

His Majesty's Government have no objection to your dealing with this part of the bargain by means of a confidential and separate agreement to be drawn up between the Grand Vizier and yourself, provided that its form is such as to be absolutely binding on the Persian Government, and that it fulfils the conditions insisted on by us from the beginning, as set forth in my telegram No. 30 of the 28th March.

Arrangements will be made with the Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, in London, to instruct their Manager in Tehran to sign, as soon as you have come to an agreement with the Persian Government.

No. 28.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 6, 1903.

THE following telegram has been received at the India Office from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd April, relative to the Perso-Afghan Frontier Arbitration:—

"Colonel McMahon, who was in camp at Shahgul, telegraphed on the 24th March as follows:—

"As Hashmat-ul-Mulk's removal would be a blow to our interests, and a gain to Russia, I would recommend that, unless the matter is already settled, objection to Persian Commissioners should be waived, and that, by the use of this and other Concessions, the Persian Government should be induced to cancel their decision to remove Hashmat-ul-Mulk from the Governorship of Seistan."

"Provided Yamin-i-Nizam's communications with Miller are stopped, we concur in this recommendation, as we consider the present situation quite intolerable, all Colonel McMahon's letters to the Persian authorities being, as we know, taken to Miller, who advises as to action."

There seems no objection to your acting on the lines suggested by the Viceroy.

No. 29.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Resident, Aden, dated the 8th March, and inclosures, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 6, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Resident, Aden, to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Aden Residency, March 8, 1903.

COPY of Colonel Wahab's Secret letter, dated Camp Dthala, the 6th March, 1903, forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London. It covers the political diary of the Commission from the 11th February, 1903, to the 5th March, 1903, inclusive.

The instructions referred to as having been received on the 18th February are apparently those at the end of Secretary of State's telegram of the 17th. See Colonel Wahab's telegram of the 13th February, transmitted in Resident's telegram of the 16th February.

(Signed) P. J. MAITLAND, *Brigadier-General,*
Political Resident, Aden.

Note.—Copies of the diary have been forwarded to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and the Government of Bombay; also to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Diary.

(February 11 to March 5, 1903, inclusive.)

February 11.—Twelve members of the family of Sultan Kahtan of Mahjaba visited the Commission with letters from Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar. Reassured them as to our intentions with regard to their country. Wrote to Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar to deter him

from sending more of the Yafa to see us, and saying that he had better concentrate his efforts on inducing Sultan Kahtan to enter into friendly relations of a permanent nature.

February 12.—It is reported that 500 Turkish troops have arrived at Taiz.

February 13.—Sheikhs Muthanna, Kahtan, and Kassim Saïd, of the Sakladi (Shaibi) visited the Commission.

Sheikh Ali Abdallah-bin-Saleh of Sudan, and Sheikh Ali Muhammad-bin-Ali Saïd of Asbil, both from the country near Rada, came, but were told that their country is too distant and unknown to us at present for us to enter into relations with them.

Sheikh Amir Abd ar Rab came with letters from the Dhabiani Sheikhs of the Yafa.

February 14.—The detachment Royal Dublin Fusiliers returned to Dthala from Nobat Dakim.

Mr. Fitzmaurice visited the Turkish Commissioners, who denied having received any fresh instructions.

February 15.—The Amir returned, having arranged with the Kotaibi Sheikhs for the protection of the telegraph line.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi came in the afternoon to inform us that they had received orders: (1) to dismiss all Arab levies, if there were any, in the four points evacuated; (2) to maintain the *status quo* and the rights of the Sheikh of Dthala, as they were at the time of the formation of the Commission; (3) to recognize the district of Yafa as one of the nine Cantons; (4) to take measures necessary to assure delimitation north-eastwards from Lakmat ash Shub towards the desert, and so that the British Commissioners should not be exposed to any molestation; (5) to leave for decision between the two Governments points on which the Commissioners on both sides cannot agree.

February 16.—It is reported that, though the Turks are reinforcing from the north, they are reluctant to denude Taiz for fear of a British advance from Musemir.

The Amir came, bringing with him Seid Fadhl-al-Alawi, a man of influence among the Radfan tribesmen, who was prepared to answer for their good behaviour.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi again came over to say that they have received additional instructions that the Shaibi are to be recognized as part of the Yafa. Agreed that a meeting of the Commission shall take place at Jalela on the 18th instant.

February 17.—An emissary from the Chief of the Ahl Genemi near Rada came to make advances.

February 18.—Eleventh meeting of the Joint Commission took place at Jalela. Discussed the carrying out of the instructions recently received by the Turkish Commissioners. On returning to camp received a telegram ordering a verification to be made of the evacuation by all armed men in Turkish employ of the four points, Jabal Jihaf, Jabal Mafari, Lakmat as Sallah, and Jabal Shahad.

Mr. Fitzmaurice and Major Tod went back to Jalela to tell the Turks of the arrival of these orders, and that I intend proceeding to-morrow to carry out the verification as regards Jihaf and Mafari; also to ask them to send word to their nominees to do nothing to oppose the restitution of the *status quo* of 1901.

February 19.—Marched at 5 A.M. with 150 rank and file Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and 2 guns Abbotabad Mountain Battery, to Uztal of the Mafari. Arrived at 7 A.M., and camped at the village of Sueda.

Reinstated Sheikh's Muthak-bin-Nasir and Obeid-al-Makar in their villages. The Amir of Dthala joined me. Heard that Nakib Ghalib of Mafari had gone to Jalela, and Sheikh Saleh Husen-az-Zendani, of Jihaf, to Kataba. Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi visited Mr. Fitzmaurice in camp at Dthala, and protested against the employment of the above detailed force for the purpose of verification. Later in the day I received a letter from Colonel Mustapha Ramzi, also protesting, and demanding that the force should be withdrawn at once.

February 20.—Sheikh Ali-bin-Ali Nagi-az-Zandani and other Akils of Jabal Jihaf came in to the Amir. Nakib Ghalib returned to Jabal Mafari, and said Muhammad Taha of Al Haud and Sheikh Husen-bin-Hasan of the Humedi visited him as intermediaries. Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi again visited Mr. Fitzmaurice to protest against our action.

February 21.—Marched with 100 men and two guns to Sarir, the principal village of Jihaf; the Amir accompanied me. Halted for some hours while a party visited the summit. All was quiet, but Sheikh Saleh Zendani had not returned. Saïd Muhammad Taha brought in Nakib Ghalib from Jabal Mafari. Returned to Sueda in the evening. Sheikh Ad Daghar of Jabal Hesha came in to the Amir, saying that his country is threatened by Muhammad Nasir Mukbil. Sultan Kahtan of Mahjaba (Yafa) wrote in making advances.

February 21 [sic].—Marched with 50 men for Jabal Mafari, sending the remainder

of the force to Dthala. Ascended Jabal Mafara, under the guidance of Nakib Ghalib. The Amir, with some following, came up later. Spent some hours on the summit, and then marched back to Dthala.

February 23.—Received a letter from Sheikh Saleh Zendani, who has returned to Saria.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi visited the Commission to ask when we shall be ready to move to Lakmat-ash-Shub.

Received warning of a possible attack on the Commission camp by a party of Arabs under the leadership of Seid Ahmad Mohsin of Lakmat-as-Sallah.

Zakarya Effendi has returned from Nadira with forty mounted men, and is said to have had a stormy interview with Colonel Mustapha Ramzi, on account of his acquiescence in our visit to Jihaf and Mafari.

February 24.—Seid Ahmad Mohsin is said to have fled from Lakmat-as-Sallah to the north, and to be trying to raise the Al Haiki, Al Yubi, Ahl Mares, and others against the British.

February 25.—Deputed Sheikh Husen Saleh to meet Saleh Zandani and Nakib Ghalib at Mojaran in the Azraki country; they expressed confidence in us, but are very suspicious of the Amir's intentions towards them.

Sheikh Masud of Subah came and offered to bring Sheikh Jabari Nasir from east of Rada to visit us.

Wrote and informed the Turkish Commissioners that I intend proceeding to Lakmat-as-Sallah to-morrow to verify the re-establishment there of the *status quo*.

February 26.—Marched with 180 Hampshire Regiment, 70 2nd Bo. Grenadiers, and two guns Abbotabad Mountain Battery to Lakmat-as-Sallah, 50 of the Amir's men preceded us, and the Amir himself accompanied the column. Reinstated Saïd Ahmad and the other refugees in Lakmat-as-Sallah, Seid Ahmad Mohsin and his followers having fled. Visited Lrkmat-ash-Shub with a small party.

The remainder of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 250 rank and file, arrived at Dthala.

February 27.—Marched back to Dthala. Wrote to the Turkish Commissioners informing them that the verification had been satisfactorily accomplished.

Interviewed five Sheikhs of the Mawsatta.

February 28.—Two companies 23rd Bombay Rifles and two guns No. 6 Mountain Battery arrived.

March 1.—Reported that 140 Turkish troops, with baggage, have marched from Jalela to Kataba.

Interviewed Nakib Sufan-bin-Hadi-ash-Shaif, of the Dthu Husen of Jabal Bard, north of Jauf, and Sheikh Bagash, of the Dthu Muhammad. They say that the truce between the Turks and the Imam made by Ibn-al-Huda has expired, and that hostilities have recommenced.

March 2.—Mr. Fitzmaurice and Major Tod visited Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi at Jalela, and spoke about the desirability of settling the Amiri border before we move, and other matters Colonel Mustapha Romzi had gone to Kataba for the day.

A Sepoy of the 2nd Bombay Grenadiers shot by an Arab at Ar Radu'a. The remainder of No. 6 Mountain Battery and a double company 23rd Bombay Rifles arrived. They report that five shots were fired at the head of their column when approaching Al Hajjar in Alawi country on Saturday morning.

March 3.—Mr. Fitzmaurice and Major Tod, with a small party, and accompanied by Nasir-bin-Shaif, visited the Shairi country and Al Husen, where a large bazaar was taking place. On the party wishing to go a short way in the direction of the Muflahai Yafa village of Khalla, they were stopped by a demonstration on the part of the Khalla Sheikhs and people who were at the bazaar. They then visited the Northern Amiri villages of Lakmat-as-Shub, Al Khobar, &c., and returned by the Shairi villages of Jalas and Lakmat-al-Hajjar.

Sub-Surveyor Lal Singh returned from work near Ar Radu'a, having been fired on by some of the Halmin of Beran.

March 4.—The remaining wing of the 23rd Bombay Rifles arrived. Interviewed the Azraki Sheikhs.

March 5.—Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi came saying that their Government had asked why they did not proceed with the move agreed on. Replied that we have to wait till the mistake made by the Porte in saying that "Jalela remains, as heretofore, Ottoman territory," is rectified.

Sheikh Saleh Muthanna, of the Shairi, reports that Muhammad Nasir Mukbil has destroyed a number of houses on Jabal Hesha, and had called upon Sheikh Nagi Abdallah

of the Dakkam to give up the refugees to his country. Sheikh Nagi has refused, and has sent to the Shairi Sheikhs to buy him ammunition in the Dthala market.

(Secret.)

Forwarded to the Resident at Aden.

Camp Dthala, March 6, 1903.

(Signed)

R. A. WAHAB, Colonel.

No. 30.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 4th April, relative to the Persian loan.

India Office, April 7, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 30.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 4, 1903.

MY telegram of 3rd April. Yesterday Sir A. Hardinge was instructed as follows, in reply to his telegrams Nos. 47 and 48 relating to the loan to Persia:—

"We are prepared to proceed on the following bases, in accordance with which you are hereby authorized to proceed:

"1. The Government of India is prepared to lend to the Imperial Bank of Persia, at 4 per cent., a sum not exceeding 500,000l.

"2. Responsibility for the principal and interest of this loan will be accepted jointly by the British and Indian Governments.

"3. The Imperial Bank, as nominal lender, will at once advance to the Persian Government 300,000l. at 4 per cent., charging as their own commission an additional 1 per cent. per annum.

"4. You may, if you attach serious importance to this, include Caspian fisheries, but we should prefer, for reasons given in Foreign Office telegram No. 32, that the Southern Customs should be the sole security. If you include fisheries, it is essential that you should arrange in such a manner that the Bank will be able hereafter, without discredit to us, to make such a concession as you have suggested.

"5. We are content that nature of precautions to guard against risks, mentioned in my telegram No. 30, should be determined by you, but they must be effectual.

"6. Securities relating to Southern Customs should be such as could be transferred to our custody by the Bank, but they need not be negotiable."

No. 31.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th instant, relative to the Seistan arbitration.

India Office, April 7, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 6, 1903.

PERSO-AFGHAN frontier.

Colonel McMahon is in camp at Takht-i-Shah, and is inspecting disputed tract in company with the Afghan and Persian Commissioners.

He telegraphed on the 29th March that his relations with the two Persian Commissioners are now very cordial, and likely to remain so unless disturbed by intervention of Miller's influence.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 32.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

(Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 7, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tebran, reporting that he had received a proposal from the Persian Government that an advance of 200,000l. should be made to them by the Imperial Bank of Persia on the revenues derived from the Caspian fisheries, with the postal and telegraph revenues (estimated at 15,000l. per annum) as collateral security; the advance to be repayable in twenty years.

Sir A. Hardinge has been informed that His Majesty's Government cannot give their assistance towards such a transaction unless the customs of the Southern ports are included in the security for the advance, and he has suggested that he might sign a separate and Secret Agreement to that effect.

I am to inform you that, in the event of a satisfactory arrangement being arrived at, the sum of 200,000l. will be paid to the Imperial Bank of Persia by the Secretary of State for India for the purpose of being advanced to the Persian Government, the Bank being the nominal lender, and charging the Persian Government interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, of which 4 per cent. will be remitted to the Secretary of State for India, the remaining 1 per cent. being retained by the Bank as a commission for its services in the matter. Any sums received in payment of the capital advance will be paid over at once to the Secretary of State for India without deduction.

It will be made part of the arrangement that the securities for the advance given by the Persian Government shall be in a form capable of transfer to, and allowed of by, His Majesty's Government, and shall be deposited with them if they so desire. It is not intended that they should in any case be negotiated.

If these conditions are acceptable to the Board of Directors, I am to request that the Manager of the Bank at Tebran may at once be instructed by telegraph to place himself in communication with Sir A. Hardinge for the purpose of arranging the details of the transaction, and may be authorized to sign the Agreement with the Persian Government, on behalf of the Imperial Bank, as soon as its terms are settled.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 33.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 7, 1903.

I SCARCELY think that we should be justified, under the circumstances, in asking the Porte to turn back the 1,600 men referred to in your Lordship's telegram No. 68 of the 6th instant. They are merely ordinary recruits going to Hodeida to replace men whose time of service has expired.

No. 34.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1903.

LOAN. Your Lordship's telegram No. 37 of to-day's date.

We may, I think, come to an agreement to-day, but the Russians have got wind of the proposal, and may upset it at the last moment. I would, therefore, ask that, in order to save time and prevent Russian interference, the Bank Manager here should receive telegraphic authority to sign, as soon as he hears from me that it is concluded.

No. 35.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 7, 1903.

PERSIAN Loan.

With reference to the request made by you in your telegram No. 53 of the 7th April, that the Manager of the Imperial Bank should receive instructions for signing the Agreement in the name of the Bank, the following telegram was sent to him this afternoon:—

"Private and Confidential. Please put yourself in communication with Sir A. Hardinge, and should he come to an arrangement with the Persian Government for advancing them 200,000*l.* with interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, we authorize you to lend the name of the Imperial Bank of Persia to the transaction. Arrangement has been made here as to terms."

No. 36.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 7, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day's date, addressed to the Chairman of the Bank, and I am directed to send you herewith the translation of a telegram which has been sent to the Chief Manager of the Bank in Tehran, which I trust will meet your requirements.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. NEWELL,
Manager.

Inclosure in No. 36.

Imperial Bank of Persia to the Chief Manager of the Bank at Tehran.

(Private and Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 7, 1903.

PLACE yourself in communication with British Minister, and, in the event of his arranging, advance Persian Government 200,000*l.*, 5 per cent. per annum. You are authorized lend Bank's name to transaction.

Terms arranged here.

No. 37.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton,

forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Resident, Aden, of the 25th March, and inclosures, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 7, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

Resident, Aden, to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Aden Residency, March 25, 1903.

COPY of Colonel Wahab's No. 244, Secret, dated Camp Dthala, 22nd March, 1903, to the Government of India, Foreign Department, forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London.

(For Political Resident, Aden),

(Signed) J. S. ASHBY, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Note.—A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

Note.—The originals and facsimiles referred to by Colonel Wahab not received, only translations of letters of Seid Ahmad Mohsin and Sheikh Musaed Yahia Said Mahraz. He has been asked to forward them.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

Colonel Wahab to Government of India.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Camp Dthala, March 22, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith originals and facsimiles of inflammatory letters appealing to Islamic fanaticism from Zacharia Bey, Turkish Commissioner and Acting Kaïmakam of Kataba to the Yafa tribes, from Said Ahmad Mohsin, the Turkish nominee at Lakmat-as-Salleh, and from Sheikh Musaed Yahia Said Mahraz. The latter shows from the native point of view the nature and effect of these appeals. The notorious Muhammad Nasir Mukbil of Mavia has sent several contributions to this religious campaign addressed to the heads of Yafa, and I am endeavouring to get the originals.

The photographic reproductions and facsimiles are intended for His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to be shown to the Turkish Government, should his Excellency deem it expedient.

About two months ago the Yafa tribes were very friendly, and either visiting or communicating with this Commission, with a view to the arranging about the delimitation north-east, when suddenly they seemed to waver in their friendly attitude, and on inquiry, I was informed that this change was the outcome of Turkish appeals, mainly that of Zacharia Bey and other Turkish agents.

The result has been to stir up the religious fanaticism of these tribes on the north-east to such an extent as to considerably increase the risks and even the practicability of this Commission entering their country to demarcate towards the north-east.

The unsettled nature of things in Amiri territory has contributed very materially to this unfortunate result, but I have no doubt that the evacuation of Jalela and the satisfactory settlement of the Amiri boundary, both now apparently within measurable distance, will help very materially to allay this excitement among the Yafa, the more especially as the Amir himself, when reinstated in his territory, and assured of the value of our protection, will be a powerful and willing instrument in smoothing the difficulties of the Commission when delimiting towards the north-east.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB, Colonel.

Camp Dthala, March 22, 1903.

Copy forwarded to the Political Secretary, India Office:

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB, Colonel.

Inclosure 3 in No. 37.

Letter from Seid Ahmad Mohsin Abd-ad-Daim, late of Lakmat-as-Sallah by Turkish nomination, to Sheikh Saleh Zendani, Nakib Ghalib, and the people of Jihaf, inciting them to Jihad against the British.

(Translation.)

IN the name of God the Merciful, the Great, Worker of Miracles, Creator of the world, and Maker of mankind, and the Holy Ruler. Blessing and peace upon our master Muhammad, son of Adanan. This poor letter is sent by the poor slave, the humble servant of God, Ahmad-ibn-Mohsin Abd-ad-Daim, to the honourable Sheikhs and great Chiefs Sheikh Saleh Husen-az-Zendani, and Nakib Ghalib-bin-Ahmad, and all your followers the Akils of Jihaf; may God protect you. Amen.

Greetings to you, the mercy and blessing of God be upon you. We inform you that warning has come to us from (the Turkish) Government that their Government has faded and their days have passed.

You know that the Franks have come out after them, and stretched out their hands, and their guns, and their soldiers, and their intention is to alter the faith of Islam. In short, prepare for Jihad against the wicked infidels. We will attack them one night, for we have written to all the tribes, Yafa, Shaibi, Mares, Andi, and to Yemen. We await the answers of all.

We will keep one another informed. The attack upon the accursed will take place one night. Courage! Courage! O, people of Islam, and ye who carry the Koran! Be prepared. This is what we have to write to you. Greetings to you, and the mercy and blessing of God upon you.

18th Al Kada, 1320 (15th February, 1903).

The blessing of God upon our master Muhammad.

Inclosure 4 in No. 37.

Translation of Letter from Musaad Yahia Said Muhras.

To our noble friends Sheikh Saleh Zendani and Nakib Ghalib.

God save you! Amen.

PRAISE be to God alone who knows the secrets of his creatures, God who has no successor, and the blessing of God on the Prophet who has no one after him, Muhammad best of his people. May this letter be delivered to my heart's blood, and the seat of my soul in my body, pupil of my eye, and the joy of my mind, the father and master Amir Shaif Sef, may He preserve and exalt you and protect you from all evil, and may God make paradise your abode, and hellfire that of your enemies, and may God return us and you among the saved, and be with us and you in all circumstances a helper for the sake of the Prophet the true and faithful, and after this, the reason for writing this letter to you, O father, you are of the house of our fathers, our Chiefs, and we your tribesmen, God said obey God, and obey the Prophet and those who are set over you. We are waiting for you, in obedience and faithfulness. God decreed that the Franks, the soldiers of the Government are stopping in your country.

It has been revealed to us concerning our Seid Ahmad (Ahmad Moshin, i.e., Turkish nominee, of Lakmat Sallah) that he has sent letters to the Sultans of the Yafa, and has quoted many of the sayings of the Prophet to them, to the effect that as long as the Franks remain rain will not fall nor scarcity cease, nor will there be the true religion, and that the Turks and Moslems should join hands against the infidels.

After receiving that letter all the Akils of Yafa met and agreed and undertook to intrigue and send a letter to the Halmin and Aj'ud for assistance and to hold the roads of Tom, Halmin and Harjat Halmin and Ja'di (Aj'ud). There is no other road except the Shaib, and no one will withdraw from giving assistance. The reason of this is to caution you, for they do not make regular expeditions, but sudden attacks. For you do not cease to frequent the camp, and most of the people are hostile to you, but the ill-feeling of the people is because of your relations (with the British). The reason of this is a word of warning to you. Bear with me if I have spoken too much. I want nothing

from you in the way of asking for anything, except honesty and faithfulness, and the wages of the messenger, 1 dollar. You are right in all things. And if you will please tell us what is in your mind. If you want to do anything we will do it. May God lengthen your life. In conclusion salaam.

P.S.—Let it be known to you that my brother went up to the Yafa and brought me news that they are plotting against the (British) camp at night time, and your judgment is sufficient.

Send to the Halmin and the Al Aj'ud and tell them that you are their father.

If you please the Halmin and the Al Aj'ud they will interpose between you and an attack (free translation of very idiomatic sentence).

Now whoever passes here or unites against me I am free from responsibility.

I pray you my father for a reply by the messenger Husen Thabet.

No. 38.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, April 7, 1903.

Sir,

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 23rd February, and to your reply of the 25th February, relative to the proposal that His Majesty's ship "Harrier" should proceed to Hodeida to attend the trial of pirates, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 5th instant, from the Commander-in-chief on the Mediterranean Station, renewing his former suggestion. Their Lordships will be glad to be informed whether Lord Lansdowne has any objection to the proposal.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 38.

Admiral Sir C. Dornville to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Malta, April 5, 1903.

MAY "Harrier" go to Hodeida to arrange trial of pirates and dispose of three captured dhows now at Kamaran Bay, as Turkish authorities are urging settlement of case, and it is undesirable to keep "Harrier" in those waters longer than necessary, as hot season is approaching?

No. 39.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 8, 1903.

LOAN. The Persian Government are anxious to sign early to-morrow, as the Grand Vizier has informed the Russians, in reply to their remonstrances, that the Agreement is already concluded. They have agreed to assign, as a subsidiary security, the revenues of the southern customs in addition to those of the posts and telegraphs.

No. 40.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 8, 1903.

SIGNATURE of Loan Agreement took place to-day.

I will to-morrow telegraph its text.

No. 42.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 8, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, transmitting copies of telegrams to and from the Resident at Aden as to the period during which it will be necessary to retain His Majesty's ships "Hermione" and "Intrepid" at Aden in connection with the delimitation, and conveying Lord George Hamilton's concurrence in the view that their premature withdrawal would be inexpedient.

I am to inform you, in reply, that copies of the above-mentioned telegrams have been communicated to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 43.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 9.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 9, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform you that a telegram has been received from the Chief Manager of the Bank in Tehran intimating that an Agreement has been signed by the Bank.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

No. 44.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 9, 1903.

WITH reference to my preceding telegram, I now telegraph a translation of the material parts of the Loan Agreement which was signed yesterday by the Manager of the Imperial Bank and by the Shah, Grand Vizier, and M. Naus on the part of Persia:—

"The Imperial Bank of Persia makes an advance of 200,000/ to the Persian Government, interest to be at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum.

"The Persian Government engages itself to repay the said advance, capital and interest, in twenty years, out of the proceeds of the royalties on the Caspian Fisheries.

"Should the Caspian Fisheries revenues be insufficient to secure the regular repayment of the advance, it is agreed that the Persian Government engages itself to pay the amounts requisite for that purpose out of the revenues of the posts and telegraphs, and out of the revenues of the Customs of Fars and of the Persian Gulf, should the former be insufficient."

It is the opinion of the Bank Manager here, that the absence of any clause allowing anticipations such as exists in the 1893 English, and in the two Russian Loan Contracts, and the stipulation as to twenty years, is sufficient practical safeguard against earlier repayment. It will, however, probably not be difficult to supplement it by a confidential agreement by which the repayments will be transformed into a terminable annuity, of which the interest and sinking fund would amount to a little less than 8½ per cent. per annum. The public agreement could not have been so drawn for obvious reasons, and in view of the pressure under which it had to be concluded I hope your Lordship will condone any technical defects in it. The Russian Legation would have stopped it had it not been carried through on the 8th instant (and we were only just in time), and the Imperial Bank would have been threatened by a very great danger, in the form of Russian control over the Mint.

It was considered best to insert the Caspian Fisheries, in view of the fact that they had formed the basis of the offer first made to the Russians, and then with their knowledge to the Imperial Bank, and in view of the stipulation as to twenty years, which coincides with the duration of their concession.

No. 41.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 8, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 7th instant, inclosing copy of a telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople (No. 68 of the 6th April) respecting the dispatch of Turkish recruits to Hodeida, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a telegram which has been received from his Excellency in reply.*

It will be seen that Sir N. O'Connor is of opinion that, as the recruits in question are only being sent to replace time-expired men in the ordinary manner, His Majesty's Government would not, in the circumstances, be justified in asking the Turkish Government to stop them.

The Secretary of State for India will no doubt obtain the views of the Resident at Aden on the subject; but, unless General Maitland has any strong objections to urge, Lord Lansdowne is disposed to think that, in the circumstances described by Sir N. O'Connor, the Turkish troops should be allowed to land.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

The Bank Manager will hand over to me the deed to be dealt with as your Lordship thinks best in London, as soon as he receives authority from his directors. We can arrange at leisure with M. Naus minor details, *i.e.*, as to precise dates of payment of annual interests.

Although for the moment the advance will probably save the Grand Vizier, I should not be surprised all the same if he were to fall before long.

No. 45.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 9, 1903.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 37 of the 25th February, relative to the capture of pirates in the Red Sea.

On the 5th April, Commander-in-chief on the Mediterranean station inquired by telegraph whether there was any objection to His Majesty's ship "Harrier" going to Hodeida in order to arrange for the trial of the pirates, and to dispose of the three captured dhows now lying at Kamaran, as the Turkish authorities are pressing for an early settlement of the case, and as it is desirable that the ship should not be kept in those waters longer than necessary, in view of the approach of the hot season.

I request that your Excellency will inform me by telegraph of your view of the matter.

No. 46.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 9, 1903.

THE Lords Commissioners of the Treasury are no doubt aware that the possibility of affording some financial assistance to the Government of Persia has for some time past been under the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

The question has recently formed the subject of correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Viceroy of India; and I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners, a copy of a letter which, after full discussion of the matter, was addressed to the India Office on the 3rd instant.*

It will be seen that, in order to place the Imperial Bank of Persia in a position to assist the Persian Government with funds, it has been decided that the Government of India should be requested to lend a sum not exceeding 500,000*l.* to the bank, at 4 per cent. interest; and that His Majesty's Government should share with the Government of India, in equal moieties, any loss through failure of the Persian Government to meet their obligations in regard to interest or capital of the advances made.

Further, that the Government of India should at once provide a sum not exceeding 300,000*l.*, to enable the Imperial Bank to make an advance of that amount immediately to the Persian Government, at 5 per cent. interest, of which 4 per cent. would be remitted as received to the Government of India, while the bank would retain a commission of 1 per cent. per annum for its services in the matter. The security for the advance is in any case to include a lien on the customs of Southern Persia, though the royalties on the Caspian Sea fisheries and other branches of revenue may also be assigned for the purpose.

The Secretary of State for India has concurred in these proposals, as will be seen from the letter from the India Office of the 4th instant, of which a copy is inclosed.†

I am also to transmit copies of a subsequent correspondence with the Imperial Bank of Persia,‡ showing the latest stage of the negotiations between Sir A. Hardinge and the Persian Government. It will be observed that at present it is proposed to limit the advance to the sum of 200,000*l.*

* No. 14.

† No. 16.

‡ Nos. 32 and 36.

On learning that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been able to come to an arrangement with the Persian Government in regard to this matter, Lord Lansdowne will supply their Lordships with full information as to the details of the transaction.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 47.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, April 9, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th instant and the telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, which has been recently communicated to you, respecting the proposed financial assistance to the Government of Persia, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you the decypher of a telegram from Sir A. Hardinge,* reporting that an Agreement on the subject was signed yesterday. Similar intelligence, but without further particulars, has been received by the Imperial Bank of Persia.

I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that preparations should be made for placing the sum of 200,000*l.* at the disposal of the Imperial Bank of Persia as soon as the terms of the Agreement have been received from Sir A. Hardinge.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 48.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 8th April, relative to the dispatch of Turkish recruits to Hodeidah.

India Office, April 9, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 8, 1903.

IN existing circumstances Sir N. O'Connor does not think that we should be justified in stopping the transport which is about to sail to Hodeidah with 1,600 Turkish recruits to replace time-expired men in ordinary course of relief. Unless there are special reasons for objecting to this concession, His Majesty's Government propose to concur.

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 49.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 10th April, relative to the dispatch of Turkish recruits to Southern Arabia.

India Office, April 10, 1903.

* No. 40.

Inclosure in No. 49.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 10, 1903.

I THINK no objection need be taken to the landing of the Turkish recruits for Southern Arabia, referred to in Secretary of State's telegram of the 8th.

(Repeated to Viceroy, Secretary of State, and Bombay.)

No. 50.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 10, 1903.

HODEIDAH pirates.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 70 of the 9th instant. I learnt yesterday of the adjournment of the trial, and at my instance the Grand Vizier has telegraphed instructions that it should be proceeded with at once. Dr. Richardson will report to me the result.

The "Harrier" had better delay going to Hodeidah for the moment, as the sentences given will presumably influence in some degree our action in regard to the dhows.

No. 51.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, April 10, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you the decypher of a further telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* reporting the terms of the Agreement signed on the 8th instant, for the advance of 200,000*l.* from the Imperial Bank of Persia to the Persian Government.

It appears to Lord Lansdowne that the conditions stated in my letter of the 3rd instant, are sufficiently complied with in this Agreement, and His Lordship hopes that the Secretary of State for India in Council will be able to make arrangements for the immediate payment of 200,000*l.* to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

The money should be paid as a deposit for the purpose of being advanced to the Persian Government on the conditions specified in the letter from the Foreign Office to the Bank of the 3rd April.

No. 52.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Consul at Muscat, relative to the French flag and Suri dhows question.

India Office, April 11, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Captain Cox to India Office.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Muscat, April 10, 1903.

CIRCUMSTANCES, of which I have informed the Government of India, have raised in an acute form the question of the French flag, and the Sultan's position becomes intolerable unless the question can now be brought to a definite settlement by His Majesty's Government. Circumstances are as follows:—

* No. 44.

1. The dhow of a French flagholder was molested by fellow tribesmen in the course of disturbances of a purely inter-tribal nature taking place within the precincts of Sur, and the French Consul addressed the Sultan in an official communication demanding satisfaction and compensation. Sultan declined to consider the claim, and I protested against French Consul's action.

2. A Suri holding a French flag, being subjected to quarantine detention on his arrival at Muscat, absconded to Sur, breaking quarantine himself and abducting two followers from quarantine station during the night.

No. 53.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th April, relative to El Katr.

India Office, April 11, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 9, 1903.

FURTHER confirmation of the El Katr appointments (see my telegram of the 15th March) has been received by Kemball, at Bushire, from the Mudir, designated for Odeid.

I consider that issue to the El Hasa authorities of official orders cancelling these appointments should be pressed on the Porte.

No. 54.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 11, 1903.

THE Russian Minister, with whom I have recently had a conversation, is anxious to prevent the fall of the Grand Vizier as likely to precipitate a grave crisis, although he is annoyed with him for taking our advance. My personal opinion, I told him, was that a frank discussion in London or St. Petersburg of an understanding between Russia and ourselves was the only way to save Persia from political and administrative collapse; the bases of such an understanding to be—

1. Cessation of Shah's reckless expenditure and of rival political loans to meet it;
2. Such simple financial reforms and control by our united action as were essential to obtain this object; and
3. Maintenance of the *status quo*.

The break-up here which both Powers wished to postpone might be averted if the Austro-Russian *entente* in the Balkans could be supplemented by an Anglo-Russian *entente* worked in the same spirit.

M. Vlassow said he would submit this idea to his Government, and expressed his warm approval of it.

The Russians may be less unwilling than they were two years ago to talk it over, if they once feel that events are moving too fast for them as well as for us, and that they have not yet got it all their own way here.

The Russian Minister takes an even more pessimistic view than I do of the outlook here.

No. 55.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 11, 1903.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram No. 70 of the 7th instant on the subject of Turkish recruits for Hodeida.

Secretary of State for India has been in communication with the Resident at Aden on the subject.

His Majesty's Government agree that in the circumstances no opposition need be offered to the landing of the recruits.

No. 56.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 11, 1903.

PERSIAN Loan.

With reference to your telegram No. 55 of 9th April.

200,000*l.* has been paid to-day by the Imperial Bank of Persia by the India Office.

I am glad that you have succeeded in making this arrangement, which appears to be on the whole satisfactory.

No. 57.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 11, 1903.

I LAID before the Marquess of Lansdowne your Confidential letter of the 7th instant, transmitting a copy of a telegram from the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, in which he renews his suggestion that His Majesty's ship "Harrier" should be ordered to proceed to Hodeidah.

Lord Lansdowne communicated with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject, and I am to forward herewith the decypher of a telegram which his Lordship has now received from Sir N. O'Connor.*

In view of the opinion expressed by his Excellency, Lord Lansdowne would suggest, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the "Harrier" should not be sent to Hodeidah at present.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 58.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 167.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 4, 1903.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 64 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Memorandum by Mr. Block recording a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which Tewfik Pasha, on the authority of the Grand Vizier and Minister of the Interior, denied the accuracy of the statement in the local press that it was intended to send Mudirs to the Katr coast.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR

Inclosure in No. 58.

Memorandum by Mr. Block.

A LOCAL French newspaper, "Le Moniteur Oriental," having published a paragraph on the 31st ultimo stating that the Porte had appointed a certain Arab Effendi and another to the Mudiriets of Adédá and Zebeir [*sic*] respectively, in the district of Katr, your Excellency instructed me to call the Foreign Minister's attention to it.

I found that the "Moniteur" had taken its information from a Turkish unofficial paper, the "Malumat" of the 30th March, and upon showing the two papers to Tewfik Pasha he said he had no knowledge whatever of any such appointment being made, and that, as the Grand Vizier had told him, the Porte had no intention of sending Mudirs there, but he would again ask the Grand Vizier. I said that the Porte would make a very grave mistake if, in spite of its declarations to the Embassy, it were now to send Mudirs, and I added privately that he must understand that if the Mudirs do proceed they will be turned out.

The following day, the 2nd instant, Tewfik Pasha informed me that at the Cabinet Council he had again spoken to the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior, who averred that they had no knowledge of any intention to send Mudirs to those places. The information given by the "Malumat" was incorrect; indeed, there is no such name as "Arab" Effendi. Upon my observing that the "Bureau de la Presse" ought to have controlled the statement, Tewfik Pasha replied that the editor, Tahir Bey, defied the "Bureau de la Presse," and orders from the Ministry of the Interior were entirely neglected by him; he added that he had repeated to the Grand Vizier what I had said, to the effect that if the Mudirs do proceed they will be turned out.

(Signed) A. BLOCK.

April 4, 1903.

No. 59.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 13.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 13, 1903.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 7th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 11th instant, from the Commander-in-chief on the Mediterranean Station, and my Lords request they may be informed what reply should be sent.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Malta, April 11, 1903.

MY No. 170.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has informed Vice-Consul at Hodeidah that instructions have been sent by telegraph to Vali to proceed with trial of pirate dhows immediately in the presence of Consul. Consul requests necessary papers may be expedited, and asks if witnesses can attend sitting in Court of Justice. Request instructions may "Harrier" go Hodeidah for purpose.

No. 60.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 13, 1903.

HODEIDAH pirates.

I have received a telegram from Dr. Richardson saying that conviction depends on testimony of "Harrier." Under the circumstances, I withdraw objection to her attending trial, as stated in my telegram No. 71 of the 10th instant.

No. 61.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 13, 1903.

YOU are already aware, from communications which have passed between this Office and members of the Board of Directors, that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran recently represented that it would be very desirable for the advancement of British interests in Persia that a branch of your Bank should be established in the Province of Seistan, through which there is an increasing traffic for merchandize passing between India and Khorassan by the new route via Nushki.

It is understood that the Directors of the Imperial Bank of Persia are willing to establish such a branch, provided that they are assured of some financial assistance towards the expenses which are likely to result during the earlier period of its existence.

The amount of these expenses is estimated, roughly, at not less than 1,500*l.* per annum.

Lord Lansdowne has been in communication with the Secretary of State for India on this point, and has now been informed that the Secretary of State for India would be prepared to provide for the purpose in view a maximum subsidy of 1,500*l.* a-year for a period of five years, that maximum to be reduced by the amount of any net profit actually made by the Seistan branch in each year.

I am to request that you will inform Lord Lansdowne whether the Bank will be prepared to establish a branch in Seistan on these conditions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 62.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th April, relative to the dispatch of Turkish recruits to Southern Arabia.

India Office, April 14, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 13, 1903.

PERMISSION for Turkish recruits to be landed at Hodeidah: Your telegram of the 8th April and Resident at Aden's telegram of the 10th. We have no objection.

No. 63.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 14, 1903.

WITH reference to your Confidential letter of the 13th instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting that he has learned from the British Vice-Consul at Hodeidah that the evidence of witnesses from His Majesty's ship "Harrier" is necessary for the conviction of the pirates who are to be tried there.

Sir N. O'Connor states that in these circumstances he sees no objection to the "Harrier" going to Hodeidah, and Lord Lansdowne concurs in his Excellency's view.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 64.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)

Sir,

India Office, April 14, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of Sir T. Sanderson's letter of the 8th instant, on the subject of the dispatch of Turkish recruits to Hodeidah, and to forward a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th April, in connection with that from the Resident at Aden, dated 10th April, of which a copy was inclosed with this Office letter of the 11th instant.

I am directed to state, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, that Lord George Hamilton concurs in the view that the troops may be allowed to proceed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 12th March, relative to Russian quarantine arrangements in North-east Persia.

India Office, April 15, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

February 15, 1903.

I HAVE been informed by you that the Grand Vizier, when he was in London, promised the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that he would endeavour to have the Russian quarantine cordon withdrawn. The British Agent at Turbat-i-Haidari reports that the Russian captain has been telling the people there that he will shortly build quarters for himself and staff. The British Agent also says that the Foreign Office Agent confidentially informed him that Russian officers have been doing everything in their power to make things unpleasant for the Afghans in Turbat-i-Haidari, which is the centre of the Afghan wool trade.

This telegram was repeated to the British Legation at Tehran.

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

February 19, 1903.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 14th February.

Our Agent at Karez reports that the Russian doctor there applied recently to be allowed to return to Russia, and has been told, in reply, that he must remain for another year, as there is sickness at Quetta and Bunder Abbas, and that it is proposed to enforce quarantine.

(Addressed to Foreign, Calcutta, and repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 65.

Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

March 8, 1903.

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 18th February.

The Governor-General informs me confidentially, and does not wish his name mentioned, that the Russians have applied for funds for quarantine cordon for the year beginning the 21st March next, and that he has refused them, alleging that no funds for the purpose are available, and that the Russians should apply to Tehran. In view of difficulties being raised about the entry of Colonel MacMahon's escort into Persian territory, the Persian Government cannot consistently agree to Russian officers and troops remaining in the heart of the country. The withdrawal of this cordon would have an excellent effect on the Afghan frontier and in Khorasan, and would be a great encouragement to the Governor-General, who would feel that the Russians cannot in these parts do what they please any longer.

The Legation have been furnished with a repetition of this telegram.

Inclosure 4 in No. 65.

Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

March 10, 1903.

THE Agent at Karez reports that the Russians are making arrangements to put on quarantine at Karez. He states that a letter has been sent by the Russian doctor there to the Consul-General at Meshed, reporting that he had no tents or appliances, and received, by special post, a reply asking him to submit a detailed Report, indicating exactly what he required for the arrangements connected with quarantine.

The Legation have been furnished with a repetition of this telegram.

No. 66.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 14th April, relative to Russian quarantine arrangements in Persia.

India Office, April 15, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 66.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 14, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon.

In continuation of my telegram of the 15th March, information has been received in telegram from Consul-General at Meshed, dated the 7th April, that the Russian

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captain is reported by our Agent at Turbat-i-Haidari to be actively negotiating for the purchase at that place of a large house and garden for himself and his staff. As the arrangements, which are so injurious to our interests, appear to be in danger of acquiring permanence we hope that matter will not be dropped.

No. 67.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 19th March, relative to Mohammerah affairs.

India Office, April 14, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 67.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, February 14, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, copy of a letter to my address from Mr. McDouall, His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mohammerah, in which he reports the delivery to the Sheikh of Mohammerah of the letter from Sir Arthur Hardinge, reference to which has been made in the despatches from his Excellency to Lord Lansdowne.

2. I think it as well to draw attention to the entry in this week's diary of the Residency regarding the separation of the Arabistan Customs from the Gulf Customs Administration.

The detachment of Mohammerah from Bushire for Customs purposes may, it seems to me, have a special significance in connection with the Russian loans.

Inclosure 2 in No. 67.

Vice-Consul McDouall to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.

(Confidential.)

Mohammerah, February 7, 1903.

I GOT to the Sheikh's camp on Sunday evening and gave him the letter. I also told him you sent salaams, and were sorry you had not been able to meet him, but hoped to do so later, and could come up specially to see him at any time if he wished to see you particularly. I also said you were pleased at the letter, which said more than you expected.

At first he seemed not quite satisfied, saying it was satisfactory up to a point, but did not allude to certain matters that he had mentioned to Colonel Meade. I said I supposed he alluded to what Sir M. Durand refused to discuss, viz., the possibility of a breakup of Persia.

As to that he could not expect anything; but the promise given him in the letter would appear to mean that in no case would foreign Powers be allowed to attack Mohammerah, and such a possibility as he had in view would not, in my opinion, alter that.

I also read to him part of the "Times" leader on Chirol's letter on the Persian Gulf.

Next day, after further discussion and thought, he seemed much more satisfied, but said the Minister did not yet trust him, urging him not to break with the Persian Government.

He said he had every wish and intention to serve the Persian Government loyally; the only question had been the Customs, which was now settled satisfactorily, and as long as they treat him as the Minister says they will, no other question can arise. Also the Minister writes advising him as a friend he would be more satisfied if he gave him orders as a servant of Britain.

Finally, he asks that you will convey to the Minister his thanks and gratitude; he will write a reply later, after Haji Rais returns, as he does not wish any one else to be acquainted with the matter, and Haji Rais is, so he must write the reply.

When Haji Rais comes he will go through the letter again with him and me, and, if advisable, will ask, you to come up to talk it over before sending the reply.

Haji Rais left Tehran for Ispahan on the 20th ultimo, and if the Bakhtiari route is impassable, will come via Bushire.

No. 68.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 19th March, relative to Russian quarantine arrangements in Persia.

India Office, April 14, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 68.

Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Meshed, March 12, 1903.

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 11th instant regarding Russian quarantine. I have communicated with the Naiyur-ed-Dowlah, and have asked him to protest against the proposed imposition of quarantine, and to press for the removal of the cordon.

His Highness has sent me the purport of a telegram which he sent yesterday in cypher to the Grand Vizier. It says that he has heard secretly that the Russians wish to impose quarantine against India and Afghanistan, and that the Doctor and Native Attaché of the British Consul-General are being sent at once to Karez; that the imposition of quarantine would mean an increase in the number of posts; and that Russian troops in Khorasan would lead to great friction with Afghans and the British, who would certainly resent it; and that serious trouble might result; that, so far as he is aware, there was no disease in Afghanistan, and that no disease could travel hundreds of farsakhs without signs of its approach; that he consequently strongly recommended that the Russian quarantine cordon should be altogether removed. His Highness also tells me that the Russian Consul-General has telegraphed to Tehran for necessary funds for the cordon; but that, so far, he has had no reply.

The attempt which the Russians are now making is a deliberate political movement, resorted to because their intrigues in Khorasan and on the Afghan frontier with the object of inducing the Afghans to have closer relations with them, have for the moment certainly failed completely.

I have been hearing from Khushk that the Russians treat Afghans coming to Russian territory with extraordinarily favourable customs; and that Passport Regulations are not enforced against them, and that their disputes and claims are almost invariably decided in their favour.

The Russians have, moreover, been endeavouring through the Persian Customs and the late Foreign Office Agent, Turbat-i-Haidari, which is the centre of Afghanistan-Khorasan trade, to harass the Afghans trading in Khorasan. The taxation of Afghan sheep, which was temporarily enforced last year, and the brutality to Afghans of the late Foreign Office Agent, Turbat-i-Haidari, were among the results of their endeavours.

The Afghans have been, however, steadfastly loyal to us, and the Ameer has recently sent fresh orders to Herat that all relations with Russians via Khushk are to be discouraged.

The Governor of Herat has not only been keeping me informed of the Russian attempts to establish direct relations with him, but has also met these efforts by asking me to address Russian authorities on the Khushk on his behalf, and the Afghan Agent

here recently came with a large number of Afghans to the British Consul-General publicly to express their gratitude for the action taken with regard to the Foreign Office Agent, Turbat-i-Haidari.

These occurrences have evidently irritated the Russians, and there is, in my opinion, no doubt that the real object of their attempt to impose quarantine is to punish the Afghans for their loyalty to us, and to intimidate the Governor-General here.

Fortunately, the Naiyur-ed-Dowlah is not a man to be intimidated, and he has not only refused them funds for their quarantine arrangements, but has strongly urged on his Government the necessity for removing the cordon.

I venture to plead for the strong support of His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Naiyur-ed-Dowlah in his courageous attempt to resist the efforts of the Russians to punish the Afghans for their loyalty to us and to intimidate him.

The Legation has been furnished with a repetition of this telegram.

No. 69.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(E.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 19th March, relative to Muscat affairs.

India Office, April 14, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 69.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential)

Muscat, February 28, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of this office letter dated the 25th February, to the address of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on the subject of the proceedings of the "Infernet" and "Boyarin" while at Muscat.

2. Since it was dispatched His Highness the Sultan has informed me that the Russian captain specifically stated to him that his ship and the "Infernet" were going to travel in company to show the public and "those whom it may concern," that the interests of their Governments were identical.

Inclosure 2 in No. 69.

Major Cox to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, February 25, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report the proceedings of the "Infernet" and "Boyarin" while here, for your information.

2. The "Infernet" arrived on the 21st instant, and the Commander, accompanied by thirteen officers, called on His Highness the Sultan on the following morning. He asked His Highness to postpone his return visit until the ship's return from the Persian Gulf a fortnight hence.

At his interview with the Sultan Commandant d'Hespel mentioned to His Highness that he heard (as is in fact the case) that his Customs receipts had been very low for the last two or three months, and asked him why he did not farm them out to some reliable person.

He subsequently referred to the action of the English against Turkey in the Aden Hinterland.

3. The "Boyarin" arrived in harbour on the morning of the 23rd, and the Commander called on the Sultan and told him that his own ship and the "Infernet" intended to make the tour of the Gulf in company, and would return to Muscat in about a fortnight. He added that he expected to bring the Russian Consul at Bushire back with him, as the latter was anxious to visit Muscat and to pay his respects to the Sultan.

4. The two ships weighed anchor at the same moment and steamed out of Muscat in company. Their appearance here together, evidently by arrangement, and the manner of their departure, has, as was no doubt intended, created not a little impression in Muscat, and the Sultan was anxious to know what I thought was the meaning of it.

No. 70.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 17.)

Sir,

India Office, April 11, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, forwarding a decypher of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated the 9th instant, reporting the terms of the Agreement signed on the 8th instant for the advance of 200,000*l.* from the Imperial Bank of Persia to the Persian Government.

In reply, I am directed to say that, having regard to the opinion expressed by Lord Lansdowne that the Agreement sufficiently complies with the conditions stated in your letter of the 3rd, and agreed to in my letter of the 4th instant, the Secretary of State in Council has caused 200,000*l.* to be paid to the Imperial Bank of Persia as a deposit for the purpose of being advanced to the Persian Government on the conditions specified in the letter from the Foreign Office to the Bank of the 3rd instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 71.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 17.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 15, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant addressed to the Chairman of the Bank, which was submitted to the Board of Directors at their meeting to-day. I am requested to inform you that the Bank is willing to establish a branch in Seistan on the terms of your letter. My Directors understand "net profits" to mean the profits after deduction of all ordinary expenses, including the usual interest on the capital allotted to the branch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

No. 72.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th April, relative to the French flag and Suri dhow question.

India Office, April 17, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 72.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 16, 1903.

ON the 11th and 12th British Consul at Muscat telegraphed, in continuation of his message of the 10th, relative to proceedings of French flag-holders, that, at request of the Sultan of Muscat and of the Health Officer, he requested that the steam-launch of His Majesty's ship "Perseus" should be sent, with Muscat officials on board, in pursuit of five Arabs who broke quarantine. These were apprehended and imprisoned, three being holders of French flags. The French Consul thereupon addressed to the Sultan a peremptory demand that he should pay 1,500 dollars as indemnity for detaining the dhows, and that the three dhows claiming French protection should be released immediately. The Sultan refused to comply, and wrote to French Consul explaining the status of foreign flags in Oman as expounded by British Government, suggesting that, as the British and French Governments already had the question under consideration, the present incident should be referred to them, and stating that he would abide by their joint decision, and that he was informing the British Government to this effect.

Cox telegraphing on the 14th reports the intention of Sultan to imprison the quarantine breakers for three months, but His Highness is extremely apprehensive of reprisals.

Present opportunity appears to be suitable for final settlement of long-discussed question, and we trust that we may be authorized by His Majesty's Government to support the Sultan in his attitude, which was entirely reasonable. The French claim, that having granted French flags to the Sultan's subjects they have the right to interfere when the holders of these flags break the laws of Muscat, appears to be entirely inadmissible.

We propose that British ship of war should remain for the present at Muscat.

Please refer to Government of India letter, dated the 27th February, 1902, with accompanying Memorandum, and to action in similar cases at Zanzibar, which Foreign Office approved in letter to Mr. Cave of the 8th November, 1902.

No. 73.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 18.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 17, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of a telegram received to-day from Tehran, together with my reply.

The mint contract, of which we have been endeavouring to obtain a share in accordance with usual practice, is of importance to the Bank, and as an Imperial Bank of issue, we are entitled to a reasonable share of it. Last year we were granted about a-third of the contract.

The threat directed against our note issue by Russia may have been misunderstood, and can hardly be taken seriously, but His Majesty's Minister will no doubt safeguard the chartered rights of the Imperial Bank.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LEPEL GRIFFIN, *Chairman.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 73.

Telegram received from Tehran, dated April 17, 1903.

RUSSIA absolutely veto mint contract to Imperial Bank of Persia, threatening hostile action note issue.

Inclosure 2 in No. 73.

Telegram sent to Tehran, dated April 17, 1903.

DO not cease to press Prime Minister for fair share mint contract, and ask for support British Minister.

No. 74.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 18, 1903.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 25 of the 17th ultimo, relative to the Russian quarantine cordon in Khorassan, I repeat a telegram which has been received at the India Office from the Viceroy, dated the 14th April:

"Russian quarantine cordon. In continuation of my telegram of the 15th March, information has been received in telegram from Consul-General at Meshed, dated the 7th April, that the Russian Captain is reported by our Agent at Turbat-i-Haidari to be actively negotiating for the purchase at that place of a large house and garden for himself and his staff. As the arrangements which are so injurious to our interests appear to be in danger of acquiring permanence, we hope that matter will not be dropped."

Please let me know what action you have taken in the matter and the result.

No. 75.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 18, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that, upon the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, a letter, copy of which I inclose herewith,* was addressed to the Imperial Bank of Persia, acquainting them with the conditions under which the Government of India are prepared to provide financial assistance towards the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank in Seistan.

I transmit herewith copy of a letter received from the Imperial Bank,† stating that they are willing to establish a branch in Seistan upon the conditions mentioned, and upon the understanding that the expression "net profits" means the profits after deduction of all ordinary expenses, including the usual interest on the capital allotted to the branch.

I am to request that you will lay this correspondence before the Secretary of State for India. Lord Lansdowne would be glad to be informed whether Lord George Hamilton considers that an arrangement should be accepted upon these terms.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 76.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 19 A.)

My Lord,

Tehran, February 1, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the reply of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to the note respecting the customs and status of the Sheikh of Mohammerah which I addressed, by your Lordship's directions, to his Excellency, as reported in my despatch No. 1 of the 6th ultimo.

This note, as your Lordship will observe, takes no exception to any of the reservations made in mine, and is couched in very friendly language.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

* Nf. 61.

† No. 71.

Inclosure in No. 76.

Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Translation.)

January 13, 1903.

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 9th January last, and have with satisfaction made myself acquainted with the contents which signify the sincere friendship between the two Governments, and I would now express my own heartfelt satisfaction at the friendly assurances exchanged between the two Powers, and I trust that the harmony and sincerity which has for so long existed between the two Powers may be still further strengthened, and that the friendly feelings between the authorities of both Powers may as always tend to an increased amity.

No. 77.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 26.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 3, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S.—The inclosed extract from the Meshed Diary, giving Colonel Whyte's views with regard to the proposed scheme for the reform of the "malat" by the Belgians, may perhaps prove of interest.

A. H. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 77.

Monthly Summary of Events in Persia, not reported in separate despatches.

Tehran.

THE Shah returned from Yajerd on the 24th instant, suffering from gout and an attack of fever, which still confines him to his room.

His Majesty has appointed the Ala-ed-Dowleh Governor-General of Fars, and the Firman Firma Governor of Kermanshah. The Shoa-es-Sultaneh was very anxious for the former appointment, and a reconciliation was effected for that purpose between His Imperial Highness and the Kawam-ul-Mulk, who has arrived at Tehran from Kerbela. The Kawam was, however, coldly received by the Grand Vizier, and it is now rumoured that the young Prince will be made Governor-General of Tehran, the present holder of that post (His Imperial Highness the Ain-ed-Dowleh) being sent to restore order in Arabistan and Luristan, which he formerly governed with success. The Ain-ed-Dowleh's willingness to accept this post is, however, doubtful. The Governorship of Hamadan has been promised to His Royal Highness Salar-es-Sultaneh, a younger brother of the Shah.

The army has been promised that the eight months' arrears of pay owing to it shall be paid before Noruz, and a beginning has been made with the police, the Government being reported to have drawn upon the private funds in the Palace for this purpose.

There is a good deal of murmuring about the new Tariff, but so far there have been no symptoms of disturbances, though prices have already gone up.

Ispahan.

The new Tariff is being much discussed amongst the merchants and Mollahs, but they do not apparently contemplate taking any action.

The question of the rumoured changes in the collection of internal taxes, under Belgian administration, is still much talked about. There seems greater likelihood of opposition to such a scheme than to the new Tariff, as the Mollahs are more interested in it.

Shiraz.

The whole province is in a state of great disorder, and there have been several tribal disturbances.

There is much agitation against the new Tariff, and the people are said to be preparing for a riot.

Merchants are of opinion that British import and export trade via Bushire will die out, and that trade with Russia via Ispahan will increase. Cotton and almonds were formerly exported to England via Bushire, but they now go to Russia via Ispahan.

Asterabad.

The inhabitants of Gumish Tepeh are said to have turned out the Customs officials. There is agitation among the merchants against the new Tariff. They say the new duty on tea will ruin the export trade to Khiva.

Atrek Khanum, a Turkoman lady of Persian nationality living in Russian Turkestan, has recently placed herself at the head of her retainers and made a raid into Persian territory. She has proceeded towards Kurdistan, but the Ilkhani has sent 200 horsemen to capture her. She is supposed to be instigated by the Russians, in order to create disturbances among the Turkomans.

Bushire.

The Belgian yacht "Selika," purchased by the Shah last summer, has arrived from Antwerp, under the name of the "Muzafferi," manned by Belgian officers and crew. All the latter have returned home except two executive and two engineer officers, to superintend the working of the ship. She is armed with two guns, mounted on her bridge, which are believed to be 1-pr. Q.F. Hotchkiss. She is shortly to proceed to Mohammerah, where she will be used for Customs work.

The cholera at Yask appears to have subsided, and it has almost disappeared from Minab.

There has been a disturbance, created by Baskakirdis, in the district of Minab, in which one life was lost and much property looted.

Troops are being collected at Mohammerah with a view to operations against the Beni Truf.

Reports have reached Lingah that on account of the enmity existing between Haji Ali Kuli Khan, the Deputy Governor of Lar, and Baker Khan, Deputy Governor of Yshkanan, the former entered the latter's province with a large force and sacked the village of Biram, and that Baker Khan is making preparations to check Haji Ali Kuli Khan's advance.

Seistan.

With reference to last month's diary, Mohamad Omar, after crossing into Afghan territory by Koh Malik Siah, is said to have camped at Daki Dehli. He has threatened to attack our post at Thanas unless his messenger, who was seized by the Thadar of Robat is released. Pasand Khan, the Russian Consul's Beluch employé, twice visited Mohamad Umar at Daki Dehli with messages from the Russian Consul. The Yamin-i-Nizam made no effort to capture Mohamad Umar.

Fifty infantry and fifty cavalry have been sent to Deh Dost Mohamad on the Seistan-Afghan frontier, where they are said to be digging a moat round the town.

Two hundred infantry and 100 cavalry are said to be under orders to move to Koh Malik Siah.

The Russian Consul is hurrying on the construction of the new telegraph line from Birjand to Seistan. He has applied to the local Governor to supply him with 200 camels to send to Neh for the transport of telegraph poles from there to Seistan.

This request reached the Governor during a meeting with the Karguzar and Head Mullah. The latter inquired what the Russian Consul had to do with a Persian telegraph line. The Karguzar replied that the new Meshed-Seistan line was entirely under the supervision of the Russians, and during a further discussion on this subject, the Karguzar is said to have stated that the Russians had also recently purchased from the Shah the exclusive right to construct roads and railways in Persia.

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O

The Russian Bank at Meshed intend sending some traders to Seistan and opening shops very shortly.

The Yamin-i-Nizam is said to be in receipt of 400 krans per month from the Russian Consul.

The scarcity of wheat and barley in Seistan is becoming serious and prices are very high.

A small detachment of Russian Cossacks is said to be expected shortly at Nasratabad. Another report says that they are Persian Cossacks under a Russian officer.

Meshed.

Rumours are current at Askabad and Meshed that a number of Concessions have been granted by the Shah to the Russians, which will be announced on the 21st March.

With regard to the reported intention of the Russians to build a branch line linking Sarakhs with the Trans-Caspian Railway, a secret agent recently sent by Colonel Whyte to Sarakhs reports that he can get no confirmation of the rumour there. He states that a large quantity of building material has been collected at Sarakhs, but it is said to be required for the building of a church.

On the other hand, from some remarks made to him by M. Sobansky, Colonel Whyte is of opinion that there are grounds for the report. It is stated that a large force of Cossacks has come to Pul-i-Khatun. The Karez agent is being instructed to ascertain whether this report is true.

Colonel Whyte considers that the new Tariff will bear especially hard on the British Indian merchants trading at Meshed. They are mostly men of small capital, and the heavy duty imposed on tea and indigo, which are the chief imports from India, will make trade in them very difficult, if not impossible. The Tariff is on the other hand very favourable to Russian and Afghan traders.

Colonel Whyte states that the activity of the Russian Government is more pronounced than he has ever known it. He learns from a reliable source that the Acting Russian Consul-General recently assembled the Russian merchants, and declared he had been authorized to inform them that their Government would give them a bounty of 25 per cent. on all goods sent to Kerman and Yezd.

The recently appointed British Agent at Turbat-i-Haidari has recently arrived at his post, and was well received by the Karguzar and Afghan merchants.

He reports that Captain Yas, the Russian officer in command of the quarantine cordon, has been telling people that he intends building quarters for himself and his staff. He evidently believes that the cordon has come to stay.

The new Karguzar of Turbat-i-Haidari appears to be extremely friendly to British interests, and has announced that he intends doing all he can to help Afghan traders, and to remove the bad name which the place had gained among Afghans, owing to the hostility of the late Karguzar, probably at the instigation of the Russian officer there.

Tehran, March 3, 1903.

Inclosure 2 in No. 77.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia, for the week ending December 27, 1902.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

November 29.—259 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 40 waggon-loads of supplies and carts used for the transportation of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

November 30.—83 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 61 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 11 waggon-loads of supplies, 6,000 boxes of bread, 4 waggon-loads of clothing, and 25 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 1.—45 infantry and 6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 33 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 2.—261 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad

18 waggon-loads of bread and 9 waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 3.—513 infantry and 6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 20 waggon-loads of supplies and 28 waggon-loads of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 4.—150 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 100 infantry and 50 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 250 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 5.—80 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 350 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 17 waggon-loads of supplies and four waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 6.—39 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 330 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 8 waggon-loads of supplies and 100 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 7.—153 infantry and 40 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 3 waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 8.—50 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 329 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 10 waggon-loads of supplies; 80 waggon-loads of fodder, and 200 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 9.—8 infantry and 12 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 455 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 10.—92 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 11.—210 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 11 waggon-loads of supplies, 25 waggon-loads of bread, and 16 waggon-loads of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 12.—41 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 230 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Russia; 200 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 2.—250 infantry arrived at Ashkabad from direction of Bokhara; 7 waggon-loads of Government stores passed through Ashkabad in direction of Merv.

December 4.—17 waggon-loads of supplies and 12 waggon-loads of railway material passed through Ashkabad in direction of Merv.

December 5.—21 waggon-loads of railway material passed through Ashkabad in direction of Merv.

December 6.—25 waggon-loads of Government stores passed through Ashkabad in direction of Merv; 8 infantry arrived at Ashkabad from direction of Krasnovodsk.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, December 27, 1902.

Inclosure 3 in No. 77.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia, for the week ending January 17, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

December 13.—180 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 14.—600 infantry recruits passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 24 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 54 waggon-loads of supplies and 18 waggon-loads of fodder were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 15.—400 infantry recruits and 38 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 40 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad.

December 16.—175 infantry recruits and 50 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in direction of Ashkabad; 7 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 17.—210 infantry recruits and 25 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 18.—330 infantry recruits and 27 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 15 waggon-loads of supplies, 56 waggon-loads of dried bread, 4 waggon-loads of clothing, and 40 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 19.—25 waggon-loads of supplies, 207 waggon-loads of dried bread, and 4 waggon-loads of clothing, were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 20.—350 infantry recruits and 17 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 36 transport carts and 4 waggon-loads of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 21.—32 Cossacks and 25 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 80 infantry recruits passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 22.—190 infantry recruits passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 2 guns passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 23.—204 infantry soldiers and 20 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 4,000 boxes of dried bread were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 24.—11 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 83 transport carts and 16 waggon-loads of rifles, ammunition, and clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 25.—240 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 103 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 26.—116 infantry recruits and 21 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 8 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 2.—300 Cossacks arrived at Ashkabad from the direction of Krasnovodsk.

January 4.—8 waggon-loads of Government stores arrived at Ashkabad from Russia.

January 5.—250 infantry arrived at Ashkabad from the direction of Merv.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, January 17, 1903.

Inclosure 4 in No. 77.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia, for the week ending January 24, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

December 27.—283 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 3 waggon-loads of supplies and 93 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 28.—101 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 29.—15 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 17 waggon-loads of supplies, 1,000 boxes of dried bread, and 90 transport carts were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 30.—200 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

December 31.—14 waggon-loads of supplies and 2 waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 1.—150 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 2.—58 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 22 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, January 24, 1903.

Inclosure 5 in No. 77.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia, for the week ending January 31, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

January 3.—180 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 200 infantry recruits and 58 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 4.—22 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 15 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 5.—109 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 98 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Ashkabad.

January 9.—275 waggon-loads of dried bread, 8 waggon-loads of ammunition, and 11 waggon-loads of clothing, were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad during the week ending the 9th January.

January 10.—3 waggons containing 360 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk to Kushk Post; 7 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 9 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

January 12.—21 waggon-loads of fodder and 19 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 13.—81 infantry and 14 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 15.—8 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 8.—3 waggon-loads of ammunition and 7 waggon-loads of railway material passed through Ashkabad in the direction of Merv.

January 9.—4 waggon-loads of dried bread passed through Ashkabad in the direction of Merv.

January 10.—850 infantry left Ashkabad in the direction of Merv.

January 11.—8 waggon-loads of railway material and 4 waggon-loads of Government stores passed through Ashkabad in the direction of Merv.

January 12.—400 infantry left Ashkabad in the direction of Merv.

January 13.—300 infantry with 6 small guns left Ashkabad in the direction of Merv.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, January 31, 1903.

Inclosure 6 in No. 77.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia, for the week ending February 7, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

January 17.—23 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 18.—8 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 21.—8 waggon-loads of dried bread and 9 waggon-loads of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 23.—11 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His British Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, February 7, 1903.

Inclosure 7 in No. 77.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia, for the week ending February 14, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

January 24.—Six infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 39 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 25.—Two waggon-loads of clothing and 350 boxes of ammunition passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

January 27.—Four time-expired infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

January 28.—22 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

The following has been given by the news-writer at Ashkabad as the strength of the Russian garrisons at the places mentioned below:—

Shaikh Junaid	..	..	Infantry and cavalry	..	..	3,000
			Artillerymen	..	..	54
			Small guns	..	..	32
			Large guns	..	..	6
			Store houses, above ground and under ground, containing provisions, &c.			85
Kerki	..	..	All arms	..	..	1,000
Charjui	..	..	Infantry and cavalry	..	..	3,000
Merv	..	..	Infantry	..	..	3,000
			Cossacks	..	..	1,000
Sarakhs	..	..	Infantry and cavalry	..	..	800
Pul-i-Khatun	..	..	Cossacks	..	..	200
On the railway line between the Ashkabad and Kushk stations			Infantry	..	..	1,500
			Cossacks	..	..	700

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, February 14, 1903.

Inclosure 8 in No. 77.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia, for the week ending February 21, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

January 31.—150 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 1.—12 waggon-loads of supplies and 1 waggon-load of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 9 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

February 2.—16 infantry soldiers passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 3.—100 rifles and 140 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 5.—58 infantry and 14 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 15 waggon-loads of supplies and 5 waggon-loads of fodder were dispatched in the direction of Ashkabad; 5 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

February 6.—23 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 7 waggon-loads of supplies and 2 waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, February 21, 1903.

Inclosure 9 in No. 77.

Extract from Meshed Diary for week ending February 7, 1903.

THERE is great excitement among all classes at Meshed over the news of the new Customs Tariff, and the rumours that the collection of the revenue of the country is to be handed over to the Belgians. The details of the new Tariff have so far been kept a secret, but I have had a letter from the Acting Director-General of Customs to-day, intimating that it is to come into force on the 14th February next. M. Molitor was obliged to admit that no copies of the new Customs Tariff for distribution had reached him, but as he has offered to give me at the Custom-house any information which I may require regarding it, I am going to the Custom-house to-day to obtain particulars. There is dismay among the Afghan and Indian traders here, who believe that the main object of the new Tariff is to crush Afghan and British Indian trade with Persia.

With regard to the revenue question, the Belgians may find, if it is really true that the collection of the revenue is to be handed over to them, that the undertaking is far more difficult and dangerous than they imagine. The Attaché of the Consulate-General, Munshi Ahmed Din, has had an interesting conversation with the son of the Governor-General, the Fateh-es-Sultaneh, about this question. The Fateh-es-Sultaneh told him that the Belgians would, from the day on which they took over the revenue collection, find themselves in direct conflict with the priesthood. There was, he said, hardly a Mujtahid of importance in the country who had not dishonestly come into possession of property to which he had no sort of legal right, and none of the Mujtahids who were among the chief landowners in the country paid a twentieth part of the revenue which could be justly demanded from them. The Fateh-es-Sultaneh had, he stated, reason to know that for some time past the principal Mujtahids of Meshed and Tehran have been in active correspondence with the Mujtahids of Kerbela, and that as the Mujtahids felt that with the transfer of the collection of the revenue to Christians their power in the country was likely to be affected, he feared that something in the nature of a religious movement against the Shah would be started, unless some steps were taken to safeguard the interests of the priesthood if the revenue administration is handed over to the Belgians.

No. 78.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 12, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 29 of the 3rd instant, a copy of a note from the Imperial Bank of Persia, showing the rates levied on the Resht and Kum roads respectively.

Though the Tehran-Kum section of the Bank's road is still in good condition, the Kum-Sultanabad section has, I am assured by several trustworthy persons, one of whom, His Majesty's Consul-General at Isfahan, lately travelled over it, been allowed to fall into a state which will require some small expenditure of money by the new Transport Company before the latter can claim to charge tolls on it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Sir A. Hardinge.

Sir,

Tehran, March 4, 1903.

WITH reference to my conversation with your Excellency concerning the rates of tolls collected on the Tehran-Kum road as compared with those on the Kazvin-Resht road, I have the honour to submit the following particulars:—

	Kazvin-Resht Road. (106 miles.)	Tehran-Kum Road. (91 miles.)
	Krans.	Krans.
Baggage animals	4	1
Carriages—		
4 horses	40	10
3 horses	30	10
2 horses	20	10
1 horse	10	10

The condition of the Tehran-Kum road is in no way inferior to its condition at the time of your Excellency's last journey over it, nor have complaints of any description been made by the postal authorities. The mails are carried over it as regularly as ever.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RABINO.

No. 79.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 12, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, under flying seal, a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Kerman on the subject of the political condition of South-Eastern Persia.

The skin of the leopard, whose slaughter by the Shah formed the pretext for the levying of the tax described by Major Sykes, was presented by His Majesty as a special mark of favour to Lord Downe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Consul Sykes to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

(No. 2.)

My Lord,

Kerman, February 23, 1903.

IN the present despatch, I propose to give my impressions of the political situation in the Provinces of Kerman and Persian Baluchistan.

Since writing my last despatch in 1900 events in Persia have moved forward at a considerable rate, and, generally speaking, not to our advantage. But this part of the country seems to be little affected by events, such as the loan, and the management by Belgian officials of the Customs, whereas British activity on the Baluchistan frontier produces its full effect in Kerman.

During the winter of 1901-1902 a raid on a somewhat large scale was made from the Persian side of the frontier only to be repulsed with severe loss on the British side, and a

few months later the Political Agent at Kalat met the Governor-General of Kerman, when the two officials dealt out stern retribution.

The presence of a well-equipped British force in Persian Baluchistan has, undoubtedly, augmented our prestige in that part of the world, following as it did on the Karwan operations, and the striking success of Colonel Mayne in Makran. Several of the Khans of Bam and Kerman were on duty with the Governor-General, and, with certain exceptions, the political effect has been good.

Next in importance at the present time is the splendid work which is being accomplished by the medical staff of the Church Missionary Society. For some years Kerman has been unfortunate, two doctors in succession being obliged to leave owing to sickness shortly after arrival, but, quite recently, Dr. Summerhayes has performed a number of striking operations, the success of which has produced an immense sensation. He has, among other cases, operated on the leader of the Sheikh sect for cataract, and has consequently strengthened the friendship of that most influential personage towards us.

Upon my return to my head-quarters, I took advantage of the fact that the Government of India is prepared to pay some 40*l.* per annum for medical attendance on this Consulate to induce the leading inhabitants of Kerman to support this good work. The result has been eminently satisfactory, every important Mullah and Khan sealing a paper in which the Church Missionary Society is requested to station one of their doctors at Kerman; moreover, the promises of pecuniary support to the hospital which is being built are large.

To turn to more general questions, his Excellency the Ala-ul-Mulk, who was Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Constantinople, has been dismissed, and his successor, his Highness Aziz Ulla Mirza, Zafar-u-Saltana, is on his way to Kerman. His Deputy, who recently reached the capital of the province, has called on me, and is extremely friendly.

He professes to entertain strong feelings of dislike and contempt for Russia, which may or may not be sincere: in any case, the speaker would conceive that they were calculated to prove to me the friendliness of his feelings.

Respect for the Government is at a low ebb in this part of Persia, as when I called on the Acting Governor-General, he read me out a telegram from the Shah, announcing that a leopard had fallen to the Imperial rifle, and that every Governor must pay 20*l.* to reward the head keeper.

My friend, after reading the message, said that he did not propose to pay this sum out of his own pocket: consequently, I understood his meaning when, a few days after this conversation, a wine-shop was raided, and its owner fined the above sum.

To resume—never in my recollection, my Lord, has the country been more unsafe than at present, the fact being that the lawless element is now armed with Martini rifles. The savage Bashakirdis, in particular, constitute a standing menace to caravans on the Bandar Abbas road, their latest exploit being to kill a British Indian subject and wound his servant.

The local authorities, however, with their invariable friendliness, are deputing a special official to exact retribution and compensation.

On the Yezd road, a year ago, a member of the Church Missionary Society was robbed, and hitherto no one has been punished; the storekeeper of the Central Persia telegraph line has been robbed quite recently in the same district, and, unless the Persian Government be moved to take strong action, I anticipate constant trouble on this section of the line.

Persia, my Lord, resembles a lemon which has already been squeezed by hand, but which is now in a lemon-squeezer. Side by side with the rapid rush to bankruptcy, which is, it is to be noticed, accompanied by a steady increase in taxation, the people are gradually learning European ideas of order and justice, which state of affairs would augur ill for the declining years of the present Shah, were it not that the paralyzing blight of opium smoking is steadily sapping the energy and vitality of all classes in the moribund Kingdom of Persia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. MOLESWORTH SYKES.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 38. Secret.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 29, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to offer the following observations on my proposal that His Majesty's Government should, as was done by the late Lord Beaconsfield in the matter of the Suez Canal and by M. de Witte in that of the Russian Bank here, purchase a sufficient number of shares in the Imperial Bank of Persia to acquire a controlling voice in the management of that institution.

I inclose for reference a short Memorandum, which I have prepared in the main from information obtained by me from the chief manager of the Imperial Bank here, as to the history of the two rival Banks—the Russian and the British one in Persia—and the share which they have respectively taken in the loans advanced to the Persian Government. I need scarcely remind your Lordship that loans in this country mean political power. Persia is a corrupt constituency, in which the seat is to be won by the holder of the longest, or, rather, the most lavish, purse. And, to take another simile from English political life, the effect of the Russian Loan Agreement of 1900 has been to place the opposing powers at Tehran in a position not unlike that occupied in relation to the Government by the Houses of Lords and Commons. The dignity, the theoretically co-ordinate authority, the influence derived from wealth, great traditions and legal rights, and the checking and restraining power enjoyed by the House of Lords still remain with Great Britain. But the exclusive right of granting regular supply, and the paramount control which that right has conferred on the House of Commons, belong for the present to Russia, and accordingly, in any determined struggle between the two, it is Russia which is almost sure to win.

The balance of power between the two rival Empires will not be righted until this condition has been redressed. It dominates Persian politics, and confronts us in every question, whether it be Seistan, or a new Commercial Treaty, or the appointment of friendly, and the removal of unfriendly, Governors, with which our respective Legations have to deal. It would be of less importance if the Shah and his advisers were enlightened and public-spirited enough to economize, to develop the resources of their country, and, by paying off in a few years' time the Russian debt, to regain their freedom of borrowing in the open market. But they are, as your Lordship is aware, extravagant, fatalistic, and careless of the future beyond belief. Even the Atabeg-i-Azam, the only statesman among them, is a kind of political Micawber, buoyed up, like that hero, after brief periods of acute depression, by cheery hopes begotten of a singularly sanguine and genial temperament, that at the last moment "something will turn up" to save Persia from the ruin she is courting.

The only way by which, so it appears to me, we can mitigate the grave dangers of this situation is to take a lesson from M. de Witte, and place the Imperial Bank in a position as nearly analogous as possible to that of the Banque d'Escompte de Perse.

The latter is indestructible as far as the Russian Government is concerned. Unprofitable business will not cause its liquidation, nor can its control ever pass into foreign hands.

The Imperial Bank has so far carried on its business at a profit, and save in 1894–95, when there was a heavy loss in silver, the shares have always proved a satisfactory investment; their intrinsic value is, I believe, in excess of the price at which they are dealt with, on account of the unfriendliness of the Stock Exchange.

Its existence, however, and, as your Lordship has yourself observed, its continuance as a British institution depend on the views of its proprietary, which is more or less constantly changing. Some eleven years ago the Board unanimously voted the return of 5*l.* a share to the shareholders. The representations of the chief manager brought about a reversal of this decision. But for this the Bank would have ceased to exist.

One or two unfavourable balance-sheets, the repayment under Russian pressure of its advances to the Persian Government, or some untoward and unforeseen loss might easily determine the Bank's liquidation, on which its sound position would, indeed, be a premium, since the shareholders would get more by liquidation than by the sale of their shares in the open market.

There is, moreover, nothing to prevent large blocks of shares falling into foreign hands, should those of two or three principal holders come into the market through

their deaths or a change in their views. I believe that last year it was intimated to M. de Witte, through M. Tatischeff, that he could influence the policy of the Bank by buying some, upon which M. Grube declared that the Russian Banque d'Escompte was strong enough to destroy its rival without incurring this unnecessary outlay. M. Grube has, indeed, stated to a diplomatic colleague of mine that the blows which he is dealing will achieve this end in another four or five years at most, and the persistent reports which he spreads of the insecure position of the Imperial Bank have not been without effect on the timid, credulous, and suspicious Persian merchants, several of whom have observed to me that our English Bank is, after all, a mere private, and, they hear, somewhat shaky, concern, whilst the Banque d'Escompte is as firm as the Russian Government.

It is true that the majority of the Directors must be Englishmen, but there is no such provision as to the shareholders, and it is they who control the Bank's policy. M. de Witte could easily find British subjects who would further his views on the Board.

It was for this reason that I ventured to remark in my telegram No. 42 of the 27th March that the disappearance of the Bank or the loss of its really British character was a constant danger. If it fell, the one normal weapon still left both to the Persian Government and to ourselves for resisting the complete and final financial subjugation of Persia to Russia would be destroyed, and the blow to our influence incalculable.

The simplest method of averting this peril seems to me to be the purchase by His Majesty's Government, by private and secret means, of a sufficiently large block of shares to give them a controlling interest. They would not, like M. de Witte in the case of the Banque d'Escompte, have to buy them all—about half would, I should think, suffice. The investment would not only not be risky, but would be profitable; for the Bank could still be carried on upon strictly business lines. It may be objected, as was pointed out to your Lordship, that these involve, from an English point of view, transactions of a somewhat usurious character, by which, I presume, is meant the charging of 12 per cent. interest, but this rate cannot fairly be described as usurious in Persia, where the customs of the country, the lack of adequate tangible securities and the uncertainties of exchange are considered. It is, for example, the ordinary rate in Zanzibar, and probably in several other Eastern countries. I should think, too—though on this matter I write with diffidence—that the increase of the value of the shares, and the more extensive operations which would result from the purchase of a large number of them by Government, might render a lower rate of interest possible without injuring private shareholders.

The political action of the Bank would take the form of advances to the Persian Government secured on the customs, the postal and telegraph receipts, and, if the maliat is ever reorganized, on the land revenues of the different provinces, especially those of the south and south-east, in return for which, as our influence in consequence increased, important political advantages could be obtained.

These advances are so far limited by the Charter, and, I think—though of this I am not quite sure—by the Concession to one-third of the Bank's capital*—i.e., about 200,000*l.*—but a controlling interest could bring about a change in both Charter and Concession (the Persian Government would gladly give it in the case of the latter), and even an increase of capital. They would, of course, be advances on account current, and at present, under the terms of the Russian Loan Contract, could only be for a comparatively short term of years, but the larger they became the more difficult would it be for an impecunious Government like that of Persia to pay them off, even with Russian assistance, and its own political interests would combine with its poverty to make it most unwilling to do so, especially if it were stipulated in the contracts that repayment before a certain date would involve a retrospective increase of interest. This stipulation, as your Lordship may remember, was made when the Persian Government borrowed 200,000*l.* from the Bank in the spring of 1901.

I fully recognize that for the present my suggestion does not, and is not likely to, commend itself to His Majesty's Government, and I can, of course, only bow to their decision. But I have thought it right to lay before your Lordship as fully as possible the reasons which led me to make it, on the chance that if at some future period affairs here become even more critical and more menacing to British interests than is already the case, it may, perhaps, be again thought worth considering.

I learn with much satisfaction that Sir George Mackenzie has joined the Board as a Director, and I hear from a private source that there is a possibility that it may still further be strengthened by the presence of Sir Thomas Jackson, the Chairman of the

* They are not limited by the English Charter, but by the Persian Concession.

London Committee of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Company. If the latter gentleman could be induced not only to accept a directorship, but to come out to Tehran and personally study the business and prospects of the Bank, I believe that his views on the financial situation here might prove of some value to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Memorandum.

(A.)—*Imperial Bank of Persia.*

THIS Bank was founded in 1889 in virtue of a Persian Concession and a British Charter.

Its capital paid up was 1,000,000*l.*, subsequently reduced by the writing-off of losses, principally in exchange and silver, to 650,000*l.*

By the terms of the Charter there is a liability in case of insolvency equal to the paid-up capital.

The capital may be increased to 3,000,000*l.*

Bank notes may be issued in Persia to the extent of the paid-up capital guaranteed by a metallic reserve of 33 per cent.

The present amount of the note issue varies from 250,000*l.* to 300,000*l.*, four-fifths of which is in Tehran alone.

Advances to the Government may not exceed, according to the Charter, one-third of the paid-up capital.

The majority of the Board is to be of British nationality.

Operations of the Bank.

The Bank—

- (a.) issues notes;
- (b.) takes deposits and discounts bills;
- (c.) buys and sells foreign exchange and imports silver for coinage;
- (d.) makes advances to the Government;
- (e.) makes advances to private individuals.

The results of the working of the Bank have been satisfactory excepting the heavy silver loss in 1895, and its position is sound in every respect.

The profits have been, so far—

							£	s.	d.
September	1890	..	..	..	..	..	67,863	16	5
"	1891	..	..	..	..	..	47,771	13	3
"	1892	..	..	..	..	..	71,020	3	2
"	1893	..	..	..	..	..	38,798	1	5
"	1894	..	..	..	..	..	29,318	13	10
"	1895	..	..	..	..	..	29,275	6	11
"	1896	..	..	..	..	..	46,220	14	9
"	1897	..	..	..	..	..	41,773	11	7
"	1898	..	..	..	..	..	39,266	11	7
"	1899	..	..	..	..	..	40,661	13	10
"	1900	..	..	..	..	..	53,147	5	2
"	1901	..	..	..	..	..	44,461	14	5
"	1902	..	..	..	..	..	56,679	11	1

Of these profits—

- 75 per cent. are made in Tehran, which holds about one-third of the capital.
14 per cent. at Persian branches.
11 per cent. in London, which has one-half of the capital and all the reserves.

The fact of so large a portion of the capital and the totality of the reserves being retained in London is a strong feature.

The important points in the working of the Bank, from a political point of view, are as follows:—

(A.) The issue of notes, by which it practically controls the currency in Tehran and some other places.

(B.) The advances to the Government. These, politically, are of very great value, the most effective action that can be exercised over the Persian Government being through the purse. Since the Russian Loan Contract of 1901, when all Government debts to the Bank were paid off, they have amounted to 240,000*l.*, the last one of 40,000*l.* having been made a few weeks ago.

(C.) Advances to private individuals. These advances, which are frequently made to high personages about the Court, Provincial Governors, &c., although having no security beyond the signatures of the borrowers and their guarantors, have, during the experience of more than thirteen years, proved to be sound, and being generally granted with a good deal of caution, have so far occasioned no losses. It need scarcely be added that they give a considerable hold over influential dignitaries and Ministers. The result of these loans to individuals has been to reduce the rate of interest from 24 and 18 per cent., the charge of native bankers, to 12 per cent., below which it is difficult to work on account of the heavy exchange risk due to the enormous fluctuations in the price of silver in London. Interest is allowed on deposits at 6 per cent., and in some cases higher. Native and Armenian bankers allow interest at 12 per cent. in account current.

(B.)—*The Russian Banque d'Escompte de Perse.*

A small Russian Bank was founded here about a year after the creation of the Imperial Bank of Persia; badly managed, it was unsuccessful, and was on the point of being liquidated when M. de Witte stepped in, and, for the sake of Russian prestige rather than with a view to serious financial operations, bought all the shares of the Company and handed it over to the Banque d'État to manage.

Later events proved the value as a political acquisition of these shares. The Persian Government, finding itself in financial straits after the exhaustion of the late Shah's accumulations, applied, in the first place, to England, and next to France and Russia, for assistance in the shape of a loan.

Unfortunately, the Stock Exchange, greatly indisposed by the Lottery Concession incident, took an erroneous view of the situation. In 1893 the Tobacco Corporation was liquidated, and its rights extinguished by means of a Persian Government loan of 500,000*l.* at 6 per cent., repayable in forty years, but redeemable at any time. Practically, the shareholders of the Corporation received bonds of the loan in payment, but an issue of the loan was made in London. It was a failure in consequence of the opposition of influential members of the Stock Exchange; the bonds were refused a quotation, and were dealt with as low as 60—an entirely unjustifiable depreciation.

It was thought that the Persian Government would be greatly concerned at this check, but in point of fact it did not realize that it had received a check at all, and would in any case have cared little about it. It had paid its debts in bonds on which it intended to pay interest, and eventually capital, as in fact it did. If holders chose to sell their bonds at a loss it was their business.

The whole loss of the depreciation on the shares fell on the English shareholders of the Tobacco Corporation.

When the proposal to float a loan for Persia was mooted, the Stock Exchange was again up in arms, and threatened to make such a loan impossible, either in London or on the Continent.

This action was a great blow to British interests, as it made a loan upon the usual financial and commercial lines impossible. The loan, therefore, had to be a political one, viz., a loan to be guaranteed or made either by Great Britain or Russia.

The attempt to negotiate an English loan broke down because the amount offered was insufficient, and the conditions asked for as to the collection of customs were so stringent as to be humiliating to any sovereign State not absolutely bankrupt.

The Persian Government applied repeatedly for a loan of some 2,000,000*l.*, or possibly more, giving the customs receipts as a security, but without accepting foreign collection or control, save in the event of default. The English market refused, and

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the British Government was not prepared to take a new departure and guarantee or advance money for Persia.

The Russian Government then appeared on the scene, and granted a loan to Persia of some 2,200,000*l.* through the Banque d'Escompte de Perse, or, as it was then called, the Banque des Prêts, repayable in seventy years and redeemable in ten on the security of the entire customs of Persia, except those of Fars and the Persian Gulf, with control in case of default. A financial condition was inserted in the contract precluding Persia from effecting a similar operation in any other country but Russia till this loan was redeemed, but no other direct political advantages were asked for.

The payment of arrears of debt, the journey of the Shah to Europe in 1900, and the usual Persian leakage and extravagance soon exhausted the funds which should have been entirely employed in reorganizing the national finances, and a new loan of 1,000,000*l.* had therefore to be concluded with the Banque d'Escompte in the spring of 1902 on the same terms as that of 1900.

No direct political conditions were attached to this operation, but its practical price was the Russo-Persian Commercial Declaration of October 1901, together with the grant to the Russian Bank of a road Concession which will eventually be developed into a railway between Julfa and Kazvin, via Tabriz.

Except for the issue of notes, which is the monopoly of its English rival, the business of the Banque d'Escompte de Perse is similar to that of the Imperial, but its sole shareholder is the Russian Government, and its loans, as distinct from its advances on current account, are provided either by the Russian Treasury or the Emperor's privy purse. It, however, does pawnbroking business and trades in Russian goods, the latter so successfully, owing to its Government backing, that it is fast driving all other traders in them, even Russians, out of the field.

To native traders who import only Russian goods the Banque d'Escompte makes advances below 12 per cent., viz., 10 per cent. and sometimes 9 per cent., but its charges for small loans or pledges are generally a good deal higher than those of the Imperial Bank.

No. 81.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 29, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note which, on receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 25 of the 17th instant, I addressed to the Atabeg-i-Azam respecting quarantine in Khorassan.

Before writing it, I mentioned to his Highness that I had been instructed by your Lordship to remind him of the assurances he had given you last year in London. He said he had already sent a message on the subject to the Russian Minister, who had taken it very ill, and had pointed out that last month's returns showed that plague was on the increase rather than on the decrease both at Bombay and at Kurrachee. It would be best that I should send him an official communication giving our views and arguments on the whole question, which would serve as a basis for a discussion between M. Vlassoff and himself.

I hardly think in the meantime that the Grand Vizier will incur fresh immediate expenditure on quarantine arrangements. He has not enough to pay for the most imperative needs of Government, let alone such superfluous luxuries as this politico-sanitary cordon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 81.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Atabeg-i-Azam.

Your Highness,

Tehran, March 23, 1903.

ON the 12th September, 1901, I had the honour to invite the attention of his Excellency Mushir-ed-Dowleh to the proceedings of the officers in charge of the quarantine cordon, as reported to me by Surgeon-Major Duke in Khorassan, and to

intimate that although I had as yet no instructions to demand its withdrawal, and was anxious to avoid occasioning any difficulties to the Persian Government on that account, I anticipated that the complaints made by Indian traders and pilgrims might lead to a remonstrance on the part of His Majesty's Government.

During His Imperial Majesty the Shah's recent visit to England the Marquess of Lansdowne brought this matter before your Highness, and suggested as a possible alternative to the withdrawal of the Russian officers in charge of quarantine arrangements at Karez and Turbat-i-Haideri the establishment of a quarantine station or cordon in Seistan under an English doctor or officer, who would be responsible for the prevention of the entry of plague from India.

Your Highness, in your note to his Lordship of the 30th August, observed, with reference to this last proposal, that "the Persian Government did not see its utility or necessity, and intended to take steps for bringing about the suppression of the Russian quarantine actually existing in the Province of Khorassan."

I am now directed by Lord Lansdowne to remind your Highness of this declaration, and to ask what steps have been taken by the Persian Government to terminate the quarantine in question.

This inquiry appears to his Lordship to be all the more necessary, as the Government of India have received information, which is however I trust incorrect, that it is proposed to erect new buildings for the quarantine officials at Karez and Turbat-i-Haideri. The beginning of a new financial year seems, moreover, an opportune moment for a formal announcement by the Persian Government that the continued maintenance of a land quarantine against India is, to use your Highness' own words, neither useful nor necessary, and for the adoption of measures to put an end to it.

It is indeed obvious that the existence of the cordon in question is superfluous, in view of the fact that the distance between the still infected parts of India and the places in Persia at which the Russian doctors and officers perform their duties is so great as to preclude any likelihood of a case of plague in a caravan which has already traversed it. The Russian authorities cannot seriously contend, as your Highness seemed to think they might, that Russian territory is exposed to any danger of infection through Persia, since it takes longer for a traveller or party of travellers from Bombay or Kurrachee to reach Karez and Turbat-i-Haideri than it would for them to reach Moscow or St. Petersburg by the ordinary route through Europe, on which no quarantine is in force. Moreover, even if this danger were a real one, the presence of a quarantine cordon in Khorassan would not meet it, since overland travellers could avoid the cordon and thus introduce plague into Persia and through Persia into Russia by proceeding to the northern parts of Persia via Kerman and Yezd. If therefore a land quarantine against India were necessary, which I have endeavoured to show that it is not, the station for the purpose would have more reason for being placed, as in the Gulf ports, at the actual frontier of Persia, say, at Nasratabad, in Seistan, the first Persian town reached by Indian overland travellers. In this case it is obvious that, as at Bushire, an Indian doctor, acquainted by personal experience with the symptoms and treatment of plague, and with the language and habits of the natives of India, would, on general as well as on mere political grounds, be the most suitable foreigner for the Persian Government to employ.

It will be remembered that in 1897 the Government of India, plague being then in Beluchistan, agreed to appoint, at the suggestion of the late Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Surgeon-Captain Brazier Creagh as Medical Officer in Seistan, with instructions to take and advise such general measures of quarantine, in conjunction with the Persian Governor, as might seem advisable. The reappointment of such an official is not at present proposed by the British Government, which agrees with your Highness in thinking that the entire withdrawal of the quarantine cordon would prove the simplest as well as the least costly course, besides being in accordance with the principles of the Venice Convention to which Persia is a party, and Lord Lansdowne has merely suggested it as an alternative to the existing arrangements, should the Russian authorities continue to attach importance to their retention. In this event, it might, perhaps, be arranged that the pay of the British quarantine officers and their guard in Seistan and of the Russian officers and guard in Khorassan should be wholly or partially borne by the British and Russian Governments respectively instead of by that of Persia, which, if I understand your Highness correctly, regards both these cordons as unnecessary, and may reasonably, therefore, object to paying for them. Although I am not authorized to put forward this latter suggestion, I would undertake, if you wished, to recommend it to Lord Lansdowne, with the further provision that health certificates issued by the doctors in charge of either cordon should be reciprocally accepted as sufficient. But the British Government

is still of opinion that the better plan would be for that of His Majesty the Shah to decline for the future to authorize any land quarantine stations in Eastern Persia, and to suggest to the Russian Government, if it still feels anxiety on this score, that Indian and Afghan travellers entering Transcaspia should satisfy the authorities of the latter province that they were not likely to bring disease into it. The conditions under which they should do so would then be discussed between London and St. Petersburg, and would cease to concern the Persian Government.

Should any doubt still exist in your Highness' mind as to the freedom of British Beluchistan from plague, I have the honour once more to assure you officially that that province (and, indeed, by far the greater part of Northern India) is healthy, in the sense in which the term is defined in Chapter II, section 2 of the Venice Convention, which regulates land quarantine (see the notification in Chapter I), and that, according to the provisions of that Act, precautionary measures are therefore no longer applicable to it.

I would, in this connection, again draw your Highness' attention to the contents of Chapter II, sections 3 and 5 of the Convention, which bear directly on this point.

His Britannic Majesty's Government is most desirous, in inviting that of Persia to comply with the engagements entered into by it at Venice, to proceed in the most conciliatory manner, and with every allowance for the special difficulties attaching to this question, and I feel confident that your Highness will reciprocate its attitude by approaching in an equally friendly spirit the various suggestions which I have had the honour, in pursuance of this object, to lay before you.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 82.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 40. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 30, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report that on receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 19 of the 6th March I spoke to M. Naus in the sense of its contents, and said that I should address an official note to him on the subject. I observed to him that Article 4 of the Russo-Persian Declaration of 1901 could not have annulled, and could not therefore be understood as intending to annul, by a retrospective provision, rights secured to a British enterprise under the anterior guarantee of the Persian Government, and that your Lordship had thought it desirable, so as to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, that I should make this point quite clear. By "rahdari," we understood, as Signatories of an analogous Declaration, the various tolls formerly collected for the use of the old caravan routes by or on behalf of the Persian Government, and consolidated into a tax of 22 shahis per load, under a law which had been conditionally accepted as applicable to their subjects by the Treaty Powers represented at Tehran, and by the words in the future tense "ne permettra l'établissement d'autres taxes" we understood tolls not yet "established," i.e., either new tolls or increases to existing ones.

His Excellency replied that the Persian Government, if the question of the Ahwaz-Isfahan tolls ever came up, which he thought unlikely, would support this view ("soutiendrait cette thèse"), and he went into the history of the negotiations about the road article with M. Goluboff, describing how the Russians had at first insisted that no fresh road concession should be given without their consent, then that the tolls on any road conceded by the Persian Government should be fixed by the Russian Legation, and, lastly, how the Article had as a compromise been cast in its present form. In all these discussions, there had however been no intention, at any rate in the mind of the Persian negotiators, of interfering with the existing rights of private concessionnaires, especially where these were in the nature of a repayment for improvements made and kept in order. Moreover, even if the Persian Government were, owing to its negligence on this point, to be compelled to recede from this position, the present tolls on the Ahwaz-Isfahan road could always be confirmed in the form of a bridge toll. He repeats this last suggestion in a private letter, dated the 21st March. "La taxe existante peut incontestablement être confirmée comme redevance due pour l'usage des ponts construits par les concessionnaires."

I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a note which I addressed, after the interview above described, to M. Naus. His Excellency has so far not replied to it, and

perhaps he will prefer not to enter on paper into a disquisition as to the intention and meaning which the Persian Government attach to their Declaration with Russia, nor on the principle of "qui tacet consentire videtur,"—is it very important that he should.

As regards the Arabistan road, it is useless for the new Transport Company to agitate for the right to levy tolls on such parts of it as are not passable for wheeled traffic. The provisions of the Declaration of 1901 must be got round in some other manner, and there are no great difficulties about this. For the present, I have pointed out to the Persian Government that the new Company cannot be expected to begin work till Luristan and Arabistan are pacified. Some progress has been made in this direction of late, the Lur (Barakwend) insurgents having been heavily defeated by a force of Bakhtiari, under Isfendiar Khan, whom the Government had authorized to attack them, whilst the Sheikh of Mohammerah, co-operating with the Bakhtiari from the south, has gained a victory over the Beni Truf rebels. A Persian prince, who is at the same time a high ecclesiastic, rather shook his head when I expressed satisfaction at this intelligence as good news for the Persian Court, and observed that for the disasters to the Shah's troops to be retrieved by semi-independent Chieftains of doubtful fidelity was a proof of impotence and helplessness in the Central Government, which was almost as bad as a fresh defeat.

The new Transport Company have appointed Mr. Hyacinth Rabino, our Pro-Consul at Kermanshah, to be Manager of the northern section of their business.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Sir A. Hardinge to M. Naus.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 21 Mars, 1903.

LA nouvelle Société pour l'exploitation de la route de l'Arabistan, avisée par suite des explications que votre Excellence m'a données au mois de Janvier dernier que le Gouvernement Persan ne pouvait, en raison de l'Article 4 de la Déclaration Russo-Persane de 1901, l'autoriser à prélever des taxes, sauf pour l'usage de ponts ou travaux d'art construits par elle, sur les tronçons non carrossables de cette voie, a demandé au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Londres si cette interdiction s'étendait également à la route Ahwaz-Isfahan pour l'exploitation de laquelle Mr. Lynch, un de ses principaux fondateurs, est associé aux Khans des Bakhtiari.

Il lui a été répondu que des droits déjà garantis à une entreprise Anglaise en vertu d'un accord intervenu entre le Gouvernement Persan et la Légation d'Angleterre à Téhéran ne pouvant être annulés par un arrangement postérieur entre la Perse et une troisième Puissance, sans le consentement préalable et explicite du Gouvernement Britannique, l'Article précité ne visait évidemment que des nouvelles taxes à établir, à l'exception bien entendu de celles dites de Rahdari, c'est-à-dire, des taxes pour l'entretien des voies publiques, autrefois perçues partout pour le compte de l'État et consolidées il y a deux ans sous la forme d'un droit de 22 shahis par charge prélevé par l'Administration des Douanes à la frontière sans égard à la distance parcourue.

Le Marquis de Lansdowne a jugé opportun, afin d'écartier tout malentendu, de communiquer ce qui précède au Gouvernement Impérial de Perse et de lui notifier que c'est dans ce sens que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique interprète l'Article 4 de la Déclaration analogue qu'il m'a autorisé à signer le 9 Février. Sa Seigneurie est d'ailleurs persuadée que les Ministres de Sa Majesté le Schah reconnaîtront sans peine que toute modification de la Concession négociée en faveur du Sieur Lynch et garantie par les Déclarations du Sadr Azam et du Mushir-ed-Dowleh, du 19 Octobre et du 19 Décembre, 1897, devra, d'après toutes les règles de l'équité, faire l'objet d'une nouvelle entente entre les deux parties.

Comme c'est avec votre Excellence que j'ai eu l'honneur de traiter de nombreuses questions se rattachant au nouveau régime commercial, je me permets encore une fois d'avoir recours à elle dans ce but, en la priant de bien vouloir porter les observations que mon Gouvernement m'a chargé de lui faire à la connaissance de son Altesse l'Attabeg-i-Azam.

Je profite, &c.
(Signé) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 41. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 30, 1903.

I AM informed both by the Grand Vizier and by M. Naus that their plans for reorganizing the malat, and reducing internal expenditure, are encountering determined opposition at the hands of the Court party, and that the latter have prevailed upon the Shah, who was at one time favourable to them, to withhold his assent. Just before the Nouruz festival his Highness had a two hours' interview with His Imperial Majesty and impressed on him that some measures of reform were indispensable, if a fresh political loan were to be averted. The "Turks," however, partly from enmity to the Grand Vizier, partly from genuine fear lest their personal interests should suffer, have assured the Shah that the scheme proposed by him is dangerous; that a fixed Budget will make him a limited Monarch instead of an absolute one; that a readjustment of revenues based on equal taxation will offend the clergy and perhaps lead them to raise a revolution; and that they, as "the King's friends," which is the name by which they call themselves, are resolved to save the throne from the perils by which it is threatened. To impress the Shah's mind still further they have resorted to the most grotesque devices. Thus the Amir Bahadur Jeng, the Chief of the Royal Bodyguard, has been warned by Imam Hussein in a dream that a reform of taxation would be disastrous, whilst another Courtier, not to be beaten, professes to have received a nocturnal intimation to the same effect from the Caliph Ali himself. These shameless stories are, I am assured, gravely listened to by the Shah, and he appears even to have been persuaded to take an oath not to sanction any changes for the present. There is, however, no need of midnight miraculous messages from conservative prophets and saints to convince an ordinary observer that even so moderate a reform as that proposed by M. Naus in my despatch No. 183 of December last cannot hope to succeed, unless a change scarcely less miraculous should come over the whole spirit of this Government. The financial Delegates whom it is proposed to send down to the provinces to take the collection of taxes out of the hands of Governors whose payments are in arrears would find the task set to them impossible.

The local Governor to whose province they went would express regret that a certain district had proved recalcitrant and would offer to send soldiers there with the Treasury official. The latter, if a Persian, would then probably develop dysentery or sunstroke, "the result of the hardships of the road," and, after a short residence as the Governor's guest, would return to Tehran invalided on a medical certificate from his Excellency's doctor and with a gratuity in his pocket from his Excellency himself. If he were an European he might proceed to the contumacious villages; he would be received on arrival with rifle shots (arranged and paid for by the local Government), his soldiers would bolt in simulated panic, and he himself would be compelled to fly with them. The Governor would then regretfully point out that his men could not fight without pay or ammunition, both of which, notwithstanding his repeated appeals to Tehran, were withheld by a corrupt War Department, and would request the financial Delegate to send him the necessary funds as soon as the next Russian loan enabled the Shah's Treasury to provide them. If, on the other hand, the more drastic resource of dismissing the Governor was resorted to, his friends and sympathisers at Court would plead his cause with the Shah and get him reinstated or given another good place, and the Grand Vizier would merely have gained a fresh enemy, whose successor would doubtless emulate his tactics.

His Highness did, indeed, in the late Shah's reign, separate for a time as an experiment the financial from the executive administration of the Provinces of Fars and Ispahan, and he tells me that the plan proved, for the short period it was tried, a success; but the Sovereign was then a man of strong character, whom his Governors and Courtiers feared, and who did not shrink from harsh and often cruel methods. His successor has not the force or the prestige to support a Minister in carrying out sweeping changes in opposition to powerful vested interests, especially that of the clergy, whom the policy, adopted since the time of the Tobacco Régie, of bribing them to keep the peace, has rendered bolder and more grasping than before.

While I feel, however, that so long as the present Shah is on the Throne any real reorganization of the provincial revenue and administration is impossible, I think some of the proposals of the Grand Vizier for reducing expenditure might prove practical.

His Highness wishes to suppress hereditary pensions descending to daughters as well as to sons, and to abolish the system under which, by collusion with the Mustafis life-pensions charged to various provincial Treasuries are fraudulently drawn by the same pensioner in different provinces under different names. He desires to reduce the nominal strength of the army from 80,000 to 40,000 men; the latter being, he says, more than its actual real strength; to cut down the number of Generals to one for every regiment (there are now several), and compel them to keep their regiments up to their proposed numbers. So little is this now done that when, the other day, his Highness wrote to summon a regiment quartered at Urmī, in Azerbaijan, to the capital, he found that its Commanding Officer had pocketed the men's pay and practically disbanded them, and that they were trading or earning wages as labourers, &c.; and this officer had accordingly to bribe the Vali Ahd to report to the Central Government that this actually non-existing force could not, in view of the state of the province, be spared from duty on the Turkish frontier.

Your Lordship may remember that a somewhat similar state of things was reported by His Majesty's Consul in Seistan, where the Commanding Officer of, I think, the Kain regiment, though he received the pay due to 800 men, could only muster, when called on, 150.

The Grand Vizier would also like to give the provincial Governors regular salaries instead of allowing them to recoup themselves for the purchase of their posts from the Court by dividing the provincial revenue with the local Chiefs and magnates; and though this could not, I think, be attempted in every province all at once, a beginning might be made in one or two. More than this could not be safely undertaken, and even this would, I suspect, be by no means easy.

For the present, opposition to the above reforms and to the Grand Vizier as their author has united the different elements composing the Court party as well as numerous outside malcontents, and his Highness' position is more seriously menaced than at any time since the Shah's return from Europe. His Majesty has, up to the present, refused to dismiss him; and a week ago ordered the chief movers in the intrigues against him to proceed in a body to his house and request forgiveness for their attacks, but the latest news which I receive is that they are now more confident than ever, and that important changes are now not far off. It seems, however, judging from past experience, more likely than not that the Atabeg will maintain himself in power, but at the price of abandoning the reform projects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 84.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 42. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 31, 1903.

MY telegram No. 42 of the 28th instant will have informed your Lordship of the proposal now definitely made by the Persian Government to the Imperial Bank of Persia, in view of the unacceptable conditions asked by the Banque d'Escompte de Perse, that it should undertake the Caspian fisheries' operation mentioned by me in earlier despatches; but I ought, perhaps, to explain the circumstances which make this transaction somewhat different to what it was when the Bank undertook it for a short period some years ago.

Under the old Tariff the fish imported by M. Lionozoff from Persia into Russian ports paid only 5 per cent. import duty, and was free from export duty in Persia. The Russian Government, in the course of negotiations for the new Tariff, objected to a special import duty on fish; but its negotiators gave the Persian Government a verbal assurance that the old duty would be maintained, in the case of fish from the Caspian, under the new régime, and when accordingly after the 14th ultimo the Baku Custom-house began to levy on Lionozoff's fish the duties fixed by the Russian General Tariff, they were ordered from St. Petersburg, at the instance of M. Vlassoff, to charge on them for the present only 5 per cent. But it is by no means clear that they would continue to do this if the Persian Government were to accept an advance secured on these fisheries from the Imperial Bank; and if they raised the duty, as the Russians have, I believe, intimated they may in this case do, and if, as a consequence,

M. Lionozoff maintained that his contract with the Persian Government had been vitiated by an act by the other party to it, independent of his own will, the Persian Government would have to proceed against him in the Russian Courts, where it is not certain that they would win their case.

It is clear, therefore, that we are justified in asking for a collateral and subsidiary security, and I have already pointed out this to M. Naus, who admits the justice of my contention.

As soon as I gathered from your Lordship's telegram of the 29th instant that there was a fair prospect of the arrangement desired by the Grand Vizier being made by the help of His Majesty's Government, I sent a message to him yesterday evening through Abbas Kuli Khan, saying that although I could as yet make him no promise, I thought there was every disposition in London to help him, and that I might soon be authorized to discuss details with M. Naus. His Highness, who was in a very despondent mood, had a long conversation with Abbas Kuli Khan on the general political situation, with special reference to the renewed attacks of the Court party, which have, during the last few days, become much more threatening to his position.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of a Memorandum by Abbas Kuli Khan on this interview; but it must be remembered, in noting the account of the visit paid by the Hakim-ul-Mulk to M. Vlassoff, that the former Minister is the Atabeg's worst enemy, and that His Highness' description of the language used by him is the report by a Persian of what a Russian told him had been said by another Persian, and may therefore not reproduce with absolute accuracy the conversation which actually took place.

I should add that my Russian colleague is, from what he has said to me, evidently under the impression that the Grand Vizier's position is somewhat seriously shaken, and that he may at any moment anticipate dismissal by resignation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Memorandum communicated by Abbas Kuli Khan to Sir A. Hardinge.

Interview with the Atabeg-i-Azam.

I COMMUNICATED your message about the Caspian Fishery to the Atabeg-i-Azam. His Highness requested that you would urge His Majesty's Government to get the matter settled as soon as possible, as the Persian Government is in great pecuniary difficulties. He said he would tell M. Naus to communicate to you the details of the Fishery Contract.

In delivering your message I took the opportunity of asking privately whether there was any truth in the recent rumours about the Court intrigues against him. He said that these rumours ought not to surprise any one acquainted with the Court opposition which had recently become stronger than ever. The Vazir-i-Darbar is trying to turn against him the Ain-ul-Dowleh, the Amir-Behadur and other courtiers.

The Atabeg also said that M. Vlassoff, who had had an interview with him to-day, told him that a few days ago the Vazir-i-Darbar called on him, and after expressing his friendship with Russia, said in the course of conversation that if he had heard that he (Vazir-i-Darbar) was friendly with England this was not the case, since he knew very well that a Constitutional Monarchy like England could not be of any help to him, and though the Mint was, last year, taken away from him at the suggestion of the Russian Legation, he was well-disposed towards the Russian Government, and was earnestly looking forward to an opportunity when he could give a proof of his friendship by rendering some service to Russia.

The Russian Minister had replied that the Mint question was an internal affair of Persia, which no Legation could interfere with, but, with regard to the other question, he must not suppose that Russia, although not always agreeing on political points with England, was hostile to that country, the Sovereign of which was a near relative to the Czar.

His Highness further said that, notwithstanding these intrigues, there was no coolness yet between him and the Shah, but sooner or later he would be obliged to resign, on account of the financial difficulties and the Shah's extravagance.

He also said that he is bent on keeping the promise which he made in London to

Lord Lansdowne in your presence and mine, viz., that he would not contract a further Russian loan, as this would mean the alienation of the sovereign rights of Persia. So far, he said, he had not acted as a traitor to his country, but should he continue in office, under the present circumstances, he might be driven to do so by the insatiable greed of the courtiers and the extravagance of the Shah.

(Signed) ABBAS KULI.

Tehran, March 30, 1903.

No. 85.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 43.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia.

Tehran, March 31, 1903.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 85.

Monthly Summary of Events in Persia not reported in separate Despatches.

Tehran.

THE Shah received the Diplomatic Body on the 23rd instant, at the usual Noruz Salaam, after which the Austrian, Belgian, and British Ministers were received in private audience by His Majesty. The latter presented to the Shah a Persian translation of the Bible on behalf of the British and Foreign Bible Society, which had requested his acceptance of this gift during his recent visit to England. At the reception of the Persian officials two days later, the financial difficulties in which this country now finds itself were illustrated by the fact that the usual gratuity of 5 tomans to each was reduced to 2 tomans.

The usual New Year changes in Governorship have not been numerous, as far as the important provinces are concerned. Besides those already reported, His Royal Highness Prince Muvassir-ed-Dowleh succeeds Zahir-ed-Dowleh as Governor of Mazenderan; but will not proceed to his post, preferring to retain his place at Court and to administer his province through a deputy.

Bushire.

The Salar-i-Muazzem has been confirmed as Governor of Bushire for the year beginning the 21st March.

His Majesty's ship "Renown" arrived on the 1st ultimo, and left for Bombay after a stay of a few hours only, owing to quarantine.

Saleh-bin-Ibrahim and the family of Yusuf-bin-Ibrahim (the noted enemy of the Chief of Koweit) left Mohammerah for Jeddah on the 29th January.

A reconciliation has been effected between Haji Ali Kuli Khan, Deputy Governor of Luristan, and Bakar Khan, Deputy Governor of Ishkanan, the latter agreeing to pay Government revenues for the Geladar, Ishkanan, and Shib Koh districts.

The Arabistan Customs have been separated from Bushire and placed direct under Tehran, and M. Waffelaert has been appointed Director-General of the Customs of Arabistan.

Sipahdar Bakhtiari is said to have resigned in favour of his brother, Shehab-es-Sultanch.

The prospects of the crops on the Karun are good, but rain will be required before long.

[1617]

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Seistan.

The most exaggerated rumours are current with regard to Colonel McMahon's mission, the nature of which has been grossly misrepresented by means of certain Mollah friends of the Russian Consul, with the object of creating bad feeling among the masses.

The new telegraph line, which has now reached Sarbisha, is being hurried on by the Russian Consul; 1,000 camels were impressed by the orders of the Deputy Governor and sent to Neh. This caused many traders, who feared that their camels would be seized, to escape to Quetta.

It is said that the Hashmat-ul-Mulk has offered 50,000 tomans, instead of 24,000 tomans this year, for the Governorship of Seistan, but has asked that the Yamin-i-Nizam may be removed.

The latter is said himself to have made a bid for the Governorship.

The Russian Consul is reported to be trying to buy land and houses by private contract in different parts of Seistan. The owners of the land have refused to sell, as land in Seistan is Crown property.

The Russian bank at Meshed is said to be opening seven shops at Nasratabad.

The Russian Consul left on the 14th ultimo. It is stated that he is going to Koh Malik Siah.

Meshed.

The report that a large force of Cossacks had come to Pul-i-Katun appears to be untrue.

A Secret Agent reports that the Governor and Karguzar at Persian Sarakhs are the obedient servants of the Russians, who appear to do as they please there.

The Nayer-ed-Dowleh has been reappointed Governor-General of Khorassan and Seistan for the coming year.

His position is one of great difficulty, and in view of the great Russian pressure on him he has helped us in a way in which few Persians of his position would have done. He is rich, related to the Shah, and is of some independence of thought and feeling; and he may be trusted to offer some resistance to the Russian efforts to bring Khorassan under their own domination. He attributes his reappointment to the influence of the British Legation, for which he is very grateful.

The Kerez Agent reports that Captain Yas, in command of the quarantine cordon at Turbat-i-Haidari, is shortly to be relieved by Captain Butkin.

The Secret Agent at Sarakhs states that he has heard from a reliable source that the Russians are making secret preparations to build a railway from Tajend to Sarakhs, which will be carried on to Seistan via Pul-i-Khatun.

Colonel Whyte reports that there can no longer be much doubt that a deliberate attempt is about to be made by the Russians to impose quarantine in Khorassan against India and Afghanistan. As no news of any kind has reached Meshed of any sickness in Afghanistan, the move can only be a political one.

The Russian authorities at Kushk have lately been treating Afghans coming to Russian territory with extraordinary favour; the Passport and Customs Regulations are not being enforced against them, and their claims and disputes are almost invariably decided in their favour. In Khorassan, on the other hand, signs are not wanting that Russian intrigue is at the bottom of the brutal way in which Afghans have been treated by the late Karguzar of Turbat-i-Haidari, the chief centre of Afghan trade in the province. But the only effect which their intrigues appear to have had has been to make the Afghans draw closer to us. The Ameer has recently sent fresh and stringent orders that all relations with the Russians via Kushk are to be discouraged. The Governor of Herat has not only been keeping Colonel Whyte informed of the attempts of the Russians to establish direct relations with him, but has met their attempts by asking him to write to them on his behalf.

These occurrences have doubtless incensed the Russians against the Afghans, and they hoped to be able to be revenged on the latter through the hitherto subservient Persians. The Governor-General, however, since his confirmation in his office, has been showing great courage in questions in which the Russians are concerned; and when the Russian Consul-General applied, as usual, for funds for the quarantine cordon for the coming year, the Nayer-ed-Dowleh met the request with a flat refusal, saying that he had no funds at his disposal and inviting him to refer the matter to Tehran. In accordance with Colonel Whyte's advice, he has sent a strong telegram to the Grand Vizier, urging him to obtain the withdrawal of the Russian officers and troops employed on the cordon.

The Meshed agent of the Kavkaz and Mercury Carrying Company is said to be endeavouring to engage transport for the carriage of a large quantity of Russian goods, said to be lying at Ashkhabad, to Seistan. He is also alleged to be trying to engage permanently 100 mules, to form a caravan which will move regularly between Meshed and Seistan, for the convenience of Russian merchants who may wish to trade in Seistan.

The surgeon of the Consulate-General has been sent to attend the Commander-in-chief of Herat, whose eyes are seriously affected. The Government of India has agreed to his going either to Kafir Kila or to Herat.

Kerman.

Several of the Khans of Bam have frequently requested Major Sykes to represent the fact that they are anxious to learn English.

They keep up a constant communication with Kerman, and supply most of the officials for Beluchistan.

The Church Missionary Society is anxious to extend its work into Seistan, and Major Sykes has written to the Society's Persian Secretary, Mr. Stileman, suggesting that Bam might be a stepping-stone.

Major Sykes considers that a medical missionary in Bam might have a more extended influence than a clergyman who merely taught English.

Shiraz.

[Nil.]

Ispahan.

[Nil.]

Tehran, March 31, 1903.

Inclosure 2 in No. 85.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia for the week ending February 28, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

February 7.—24 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 4 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

February 8.—2 guns and 84 boxes of ammunition passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 45 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 10.—81 Cossacks arrived at Krasnovodsk from Russia.

February 11.—15 Cossacks and 35 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 17 waggon-loads of supplies and 8 waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 12.—600 boxes of ammunition passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 9 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

February 13.—6 Cossacks and 14 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 12,000 boxes of dried bread have passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad during the week ending the 13th February.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, February 28, 1903.

Inclosure 3 in No. 85.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia for the week ending March 7, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

February 14.—51 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 12 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 40 boxes containing rifles and 118 boxes of ammunition passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 16.—6 infantry and 7 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 25 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 52 waggon-loads of supplies and fodder were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 18.—3 waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 20.—83 infantry recruits passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 7 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

February 19.—30 waggons full of Cossacks passed through Ashkabad in the direction of Merv.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, March 7, 1903.

Inclosure 4 in No. 85.

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Whyte on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia for the week ending March 14, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

February 21.—380 boxes of ammunition and 285 packages of clothing passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 193 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 23.—6 infantry and 12 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 8 guns and 39 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 24.—2 guns, 94 boxes of ammunition, and 17 waggon-loads of dried bread were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 25.—46 infantry and 35 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 5 waggon-loads of supplies, 1 waggon-load of clothing, and 55 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk to Ashkabad.

February 26.—38 infantry and 4 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 1 waggon-load of clothing and 55 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

February 27.—38 infantry and 4 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 5 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, March 14, 1903.

No. 86.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 44.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 31, 1903.

MY telegrams Nos. 39 and 40 of the 21st and 25th instant will have given your Lordship the latest news obtainable here as to the progress of the Helmund arbitration. I have the honour to inclose herewith a translation of the telegram from the Yemin-i-Azam to the Atabeg-i-Azam to which reference was made in my telegram No. 40.

As I stated in that telegram that I would do, I have spoken strongly to M. Naus about the tactlessness and discourtesy displayed by M. Maurice in seizing camels belonging to the Government of India, and have said that I felt sure that M. Maurice's excuse that he had been ordered to act thus by his Chief was not in agreement with the facts.

His Excellency said he had instructed M. Maurice some months ago, without reference to Colonel MacMahon's Mission, to prohibit the export of grain from Seistan, but that he considered that he had behaved improperly in interpreting this general instruction as authorizing him to treat without consideration a special Mission to which he had been ordered to show all respect and allow every possible facility. He would write to call him to order ("le rappeler à l'ordre" was M. Naus' exact phrase) and he should transfer him, a step he had long been contemplating, elsewhere. He added that

if I were writing on this subject to His Majesty's Government he hoped I would mention that he had expressed to me his regret, which he did, for this unfortunate incident.

I hear that all sorts of rumours have been spread among the Persians, no doubt inspired from Russian sources, that we mean to divert the course of the Helmund, annex Miankangi, and so forth. It is, perhaps, under the influence of these rumours that the Grand Vizier has addressed to me a note, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, and which reminds me in somewhat confused language that the Persian Government can only accept the Arbitrator's Award on condition that it maintains the Goldsmidt line. I have not thought it necessary to answer this communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 86.

Yemin-i-Nizam to Atabeg-i-Azam.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Bastek, March 23, 1903.

I HAVE received your Excellency's orders both *en clair* and in cypher.

The English Commissioner with escort arrived at Miankangi on the 16th.

Preparations for their reception were made on the Helmund border. Soldiers with music and led horses were sent out to meet them officially. Notwithstanding the few articles we have with us the reception went off most satisfactorily and according to the dignity of the Imperial Government. In accordance with my orders I have already given and will give them every assistance.

Major MacMahon, the Commissioner, offers his respects and congratulations through me to His Majesty the Shah, and thanks His Majesty for the good-will shown by the Persian officials.

With regard to the complaints there has been some mistake, and therefore there is no need for apology. Up to the present the Persian Commissioners have carried out their duty, and therefore nobody can have any complaints or any proof of such complaints. Besides the persons I have already reported, there are Major Douglas, the Military Attaché to the British Legation, who is leaving shortly for Tehran, Captain Webb-Ware, Governor of British Beluchistan, and some other Sardars, Khans, and Nobles of Beluchistan.

I hope everything will be done to the satisfaction of the Imperial Government, and that the rights and the frontier of Persia will be protected and maintained.

Inclosure 2 in No. 86.

Atabeg-i-Azam to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Translation.)

Tehran [received March 10, 1903].

ALTHOUGH the Foreign Office, in their two notes dated the 2nd and 9th November last addressed to the British Legation, have explained the duty of the Helmund Commission and stated that it is not to be contrary to Goldsmidt's decision, now that the Commissioners have commenced the work, I, by command of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, have again to remind you most distinctly that the Persian Government will, as it has already stated, accept the Commissioner's decision if it is in accordance with Goldsmidt's Agreement of 1872. It would be perhaps better for me to explain that, as you have suggested, this Commission may be also Commission of Arbitration, but since the object of it, in the opinion of the Persian Government, is to investigate into the complaints made by us respecting the violation of Goldsmidt's Agreement by the Afghans, and to find out which party has infringed the Agreement in question, and to give decision in accordance with it; and since this condition has been stipulated in the two above-mentioned notes, the English Government will, I have no doubt, consider the Persian Government justified in not accepting the decision of the Commission in case it does not agree with Goldsmidt's Agreement.

I avail, &c.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 11. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 18, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Resident at Bushire on the subject of the promulgation of the new Customs Tariff, and its reception by the native merchants.

The new Tariff is generally unpopular, but though the clergy of Isfahan have remonstrated with the Grand Vizier against it, and it has provoked agitation at Tabreez, Shiraz, and Bushire, the dissatisfaction evoked by it has not taken the form of active opposition, or occasioned, as at one time was anticipated, disturbances.

I have the honour to inclose herewith a comparative Statement by Mr. Rabino, Acting Pro-Consul at Kermanshah, showing its probable effect upon the trade entering Persia by the Turkish frontier, none of which is of course Russian.

It is generally anticipated, and M. Naus himself admits it, that the increased duty on tea will to a great extent defeat its own object by the impetus which it will give to smuggling along the extensive frontier running through wild deserts between Persia and Afghanistan and India.

I was discussing the effects of the new Tariff a few days ago with the Malek-ul-Tujjar, one of the principal Tehran merchants, who, though no friend to British interests, he having been a chief promoter of the agitation against the Tobacco Régie, expressed great disgust at the manner in which it favoured Russian trade, at the expense both of Persian and of all other foreign interests. I asked him how it would affect the price of tea. He replied, that tea would in future be a good deal cheaper, as most of the tea drunk by the Persians would be smuggled, and thus pay no duty at all, and he added that the principal agents of the smugglers would be M. Naus' own frontier and coastguards. This of course is a piece of Persian paradox, but I suspect that a substratum of truth underlies it, and that in a country like this, when the native officials are dishonest on principle, and the revenue officers are richer than the revenues, the temptations incidental to a high duty on an article of universal consumption will form a fruitful source of "mudakhil."

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 87.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Sir A. Hardinge.

Sir,

Bushire, March 2, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, copies of the inclosed letters addressed by me to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta, regarding the introduction of the new Customs Tariff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. KEMBALL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 87.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

Bushire, February 16, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 10th instant I was officially informed by the Director-General of Customs in Bushire that the 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty hitherto prevailing in Persia was abolished, and that a new specific Tariff would be introduced and have effect from the 14th instant. M. Dambrain informed me that printed copies of the new Tariff had not been received from Tehran, but that in due course copies would be sent to me. Meanwhile, merchants and others could inform themselves regarding the Tariff by application to the Custom-house.

I have seen a manuscript copy in French of the new Tariff. It is long, and apparently very complicated. What effect its introduction will have on our import trade it seems futile at present to discuss. Time alone can show this, but it is interesting to note that the duties on teas has been very considerably raised. On white teas the duty is now 10 krans per Tabreez man of 6½ lbs., while the duty on other teas is 6 krans per Tabreez man. Roughly speaking, this may be taken to represent a duty of 60 per cent.

on teas imported from India. In other words, I estimate that the average price of Indian tea in the local bazaar will be raised from the existing price of 9 a. 7 p. per lb. under the 5 per cent. duty to 11 a. 6 p. per lb. under the new duty. The bulk of the tea imported into Persia comes from India.

With regard to cotton piece-goods, I am informed by a British merchant now in Bushire, whose firm does business in Bushire, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tehran, and who has studied the new Tariff, that the favouritism shown to goods imported from Russia is apparent. He quotes the case of certain articles of white and grey shirtings which may be taken as typically English, on which the duty under the new Tariff has been raised on the three classes mentioned by him and imported by his firm to 7½, 8½, and 9½ per cent. On the class of goods which may be taken as typically Russian the duty remains at 5 per cent.

With regard to prints, on the two classes which he quotes, and which may be taken as typically English, the duty has been raised to 5½ and 6½ per cent., while on a class which may be taken as typically Russian the duty has been reduced to 4½ per cent. I give these cases of tea and cotton piece-goods merely as examples tending to confirm the impression which appears to exist among merchants here, that the new Tariff is directly aimed against the English and Indian trade with Persia.

The duties on exports from Persia have generally been removed by the new Tariff, but it is important to note that the duty on opium exported from Persia has been considerably raised, and now stands at 20 krans per Tabreez man. The rate of exchange at present prevailing is 59 krans per pound sterling. Copies of the new Tariff will be forwarded on receipt from the Customs Department.

I understand the Persian merchants of Bushire have sent telegrams to the Shah and to the Minister of Customs praying that the date of application of the new Tariff may be postponed for some months, so that their forward contracts may not be affected. The immediate application of the Tariff appears to be their chief cause of complaint against it.

Inclosure 3 in No. 87.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

Bushire, March 2, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 16th February, regarding the introduction of the new Customs Tariff, I have the honour to report that the merchants of Bushire, acting in accordance with instructions received by them from Shiraz and elsewhere, are not clearing goods from the Custom-house.

I understand that there is a large quantity of tea, some 2,500 cases, lying in the Custom-house, which arrived a day or two after the new Tariff came into force, and it will be difficult for the importers to clear this consignment under the new Tariff. It appears that the Persian merchants have received a reply from the Minister of Customs refusing to postpone the introduction of the new Tariff. The telegram which was received in Bushire is interesting, and I have the honour to submit a copy for your information.

Mr. H. A. Maclean, who has been deputed by the Board of Trade to visit Persia, arrived in Bushire just after the new Tariff was introduced, and will no doubt in due course submit a report showing how British trade is likely to be affected thereby. It appears to be generally expected that, however other articles may be affected, the importation of Indian tea into Persia must be considerably checked.

Inclosure 4 in No. 87.

M. Naus to the Merchants of Bushire.

(Telegraphic.)

[Undated.]

YOUR telegram regarding the new Tariff has been received and perused. I am extremely obliged to you for your good action in accepting the new Tariff and the commands of His Majesty. This is proper. In fact, looking at the matter in a just manner, the object in changing the old Tariff has been no other than that of easing the condition of the respectable merchants of the country, and I can solemnly declare that the thoughts of His Majesty are night and day engaged for the improvement of the manufactures of the country, and gaining a sale for them in the foreign markets for the comfort of his subjects. "To such a Shah it is incumbent upon them to be obedient."

But as regards the question, viz., that you were not aware of the making of the

new Tariff, that owing to the forward sales loss has been caused, and that you, therefore, ask for a respite, you are doubtless aware that from the date the new Tariff came into force not a dinar has been levied on the greater portion of exports through the frontier towns. Under these circumstances, how is it possible to grant postponement for three months for the enforcement of the new Tariff, considering that the present arrangement will cause, in reality, considerable loss, and much more so if the time be allowed?

Be sure that if all the revenues of the Customs are lost, no order will ever be issued for cancelling the commands of His Majesty.

Inclosure 5 in No. 87.

KERMANSHAH.

TABLE showing the Custom Duty on Imports from January 21, 1902, to January 20, 1903, according to the old Tariff, and the Amount which would be collected according to the new Tariff.

Articles.	From where Imported.	Quantity.	Value in Krans.	Custom Duty, Old Tariff.	Custom Duty, New Tariff.
		Batmans.		Krans.	Krans.
Matches	Austria ..	3,680	36,806	1,840.30	1,472
Starch	" ..	138	1,059	52.95	138
Live-stock—					
Horses (3) ..	Bagdad ..	..	700	42	No duty.
Camels (1,195) ..	" ..	..	170,965	10,258.05	"
Wood, worked ..	" ..	76	930	55.80	7.60
Spirits (3 bottles = 2 batmans) ..	" ..	13,750	43,521	2,176.05	36,800
Candles	France ..	3,865	38,212	1,910.60	1,700
Coffee	Holland ..	2,835	27,070	1,624.20	14,175
Preserves in tins ..	Arabia ..	217	2,027	101.65	101.65
Rope, string, &c. ..	England ..	359	1,692	84.60	107.70
Drugs	" ..	6,895	43,469	2,235.35	2,235.35
Spices and pepper ..	Germany ..	201,429	1,362,261	68,308.15	302,143.50
Gunny bags	India ..	17,461	49,512	2,475.60	5,238.30
Sewing thread, cotton ..	Holland ..	66,009	196,012	37,155.60	66,009
Woollen thread ..	England ..	240	3,200	160	72
Gold and silver tinsel ..	" ..	7	5,100	255	14
Fruits—					
Dates	Mendali ..	531,340	717,111	43,029.05	139,012
Oranges and lemon ..	Turkey ..	20,941	62,081	3,713.95	"
Dry	" ..	3,767	25,301	1,497	"
Clothing, including linen articles ..	" ..	207,391	10,513.90	10,513.90	?
Pianos (2)	" ..	..	5,148	257.40	800
Musical instruments (20) ..	" ..	400	400	20	80
Minerals	Germany ..	235	2,188	111	No duty.
Machinery and tools ..	" ..	223	8,697	434.85	78.05
Silk goods and hardware ..	" ..	19,261	232,466	11,953.65	34,869.90
Metals—					
Tin sheets	England ..	1,661	8,588	429.40	830.50
Iron and steel, in bars ..	" ..	37,509	107,661	5,383.05	4,688.60
Worked iron and steel ..	" ..	7,218	39,836	1,995.95	2,526.30
Zinc, in bars	" ..	11,147	187,560	9,378	6,688.20
Copper bars	" ..	24,351	321,715	16,405.45	14,610.60
Gold and silver watches (3) ..	" ..	..	95	4.75	12
Furniture	Austria ..	156	1,906	95.30	95.30
Stationery—					
Paper and envelopes ..	" ..	1,119	6,872	343.60	279.75
Paper and cardboard ..	" ..	638	3,606	180.30	159.50
Raw hides	Bagdad ..	28,347	212,271	12,736.90	14,173.50
Lambskins	" ..	48,518	1,985,083	119,105.10	48,518
Leather, various ..	" ..	2,726	37,064	2,094.70	1,363
Leathern articles ..	" ..	321	7,023	395.70	481.50
China and earthenware ..	Austria ..	283	4,614	230.70	153.20
Chemicals	Germany ..	5,237	34,924	1,772	5,237
Lithographical types ..	" ..	223	2,753	137.65	892
Resin and bitumen ..	" ..	6,884	23,025	1,286.85	No duty.
Soap—					
Toilet	France ..	2,185	14,718	736.40	2,400
Various	" ..	433	2,988	152.90	86.60
Sugar—					
Loaf	" ..	957,394	4,204,629	210,231.45	143,609.10
Crushed	" ..	63,914	218,443	10,922.15	6,391.40
Sweet meats	" ..	147	1,152	57.60	147

Articles.	From where Imported.	Quantity.	Value in Krans.	Custom Duty, Old Tariff.	Custom Duty, New Tariff.
		Batmans.		Krans.	Krans.
Dyes—					
Indigo	India ..	1,383	73,793	3,689.65	125,000
Kermes	France ..	9,984	181,854	9,092.70	"
Various	" ..	2,496	26,883	1,352.55	2,700
Hemp and lint goods ..	" ..	11,172	212,783	10,653.50	5,586
Cotton goods—					
Bleached	England ..	901,700	13,853,640	692,682	2,041,082.40
Various	" ..	792,202	20,065,978	993,349.80	"
Woollen goods ..	" ..	532	53,225	2,661.25	4,256
Silk goods	" ..	427	107,984	5,299.20	12,810
Tea	India ..	106,441	1,527,741	76,387.05	638,646
Glassware	Austria ..	1,836	24,322	1,216.10	734.40
Window-pane	" ..	15,249	90,115	4,505.75	3,049.80
Mirror, in frames ..	" ..	935	13,099	651.95	651.95
Bicycle (1)	" ..	..	400	20	40
				2,395,907.10	3,699,470.55

TABLE showing the Custom Duty on Exports from January 21, 1902, to January 20, 1903, according to the old Tariff, and the Amount which would be collected according to the new Tariff.

Articles.	Exported to—	Quantity.	Value in Krans.	Custom Duty, Old Tariff.	Custom Duty, New Tariff.
		Batmans.		Krans.	Krans.
Batter and other fats ..	Bagdad ..	250	2,250	112.50	175
Wood, worked	" ..	1,145	5,049	252.45	No duty.
Wax not prepared	" ..	145	1,779	8,895	"
Rope and string, &c. ..	" ..	152	1,240	112.40	"
Honey	" ..	70	350	17.50	"
Alimentary products, various ..	" ..	16,765	12,197	610.35	5,867.75
Drugs	" ..	4,396	16,569	828.45	No duty.
Empty cases and gunny bags ..	Bagdad ..	140	1,334	66.70	"
Spices	" ..	22,225	90,709	4,540.75	"
Sewing thread, silk ..	France ..	9,992	988,556	49,427.80	"
Fruits—					
Almonds and pistachios, &c. ..	Bagdad ..	17,074	45,005	2,261.60	"
Dried raisins	" ..	29,604	40,275	2,013.75	"
Dried, various	" ..	15,714	28,594	1,428.20	"
Gum, native	England ..	162,493	2,434,986	121,749.30	"
Grain and seed, various ..	" ..	1,608	1,478	73.90	160.80
Wheat	" ..	915,114	164,739	8,461.15	91,511.40
Clothing	" ..	..	48,994	2,494.50	No duty.
Oil, linseed	" ..	1,092	3,276	163.80	"
Wool, raw	England ..	11,535	40,755	2,078.90	"
Minerals	" ..	900	1,300	65	"
Iron, scrap	Bagdad ..	88	107	5.35	"
Silk goods and hardware ..	" ..	6,657	50,319	2,545.95	"
Opium	Hongkong ..	21,515	2,387,568	119,378.40	430,300
Raw hides	England ..	101,883	926,899	41,344.95	No duty.
Leather, various	" ..	15,066	121,004	6,050.20	"
Leathern articles	" ..	2	41	2.05	"
Mill stones	Bagdad ..	13,529	4,405	224.50	"
Resin and bitumen	" ..	1,112	2,146	107.30	"
Silk in cocoons	France ..	419	22,945	1,147.25	628.50
Sweet meats	Bagdad ..	571	4,405	220.25	No duty.
Dyes, henna	" ..	423	2,541	127.05	"
Colours and dyes, various ..	" ..	5,037	13,505	675.25	"
Carpets	England ..	74,582	1,318,860	65,943	"
Cotton goods, various ..	Bagdad ..	1,363	34,231	1,711.55	"
Silk goods	" ..	958	124,895	6,244.75	"
Russian tea	Bagdad ..	43	1,313	65.65	"
Glassware	" ..	202	3,213	160.60	"
Woollen goods, various ..	" ..	90	450	22.50	"
				440,814.55	528,643.45

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 12. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 23, 1903.

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 24, Commercial, of the 9th March, I took an early opportunity of seeing M. Naus and informing him that His Majesty's Government wished to make it clear that in their view the reference to the self-governing Colonies and to most-favoured nation treatment in Article 2 of the Anglo-Persian Declaration of the 9th February, did not exclude the right of one part of the Empire to grant preferential treatment to another. I said I presumed he agreed with me in holding that the "most favoured nation" meant the "most favoured foreign nation," since he had seemed disinclined to admit that even Egypt, which possessed, unlike our Colonies, the right of negotiating Commercial Treaties with foreign States independently of the Suzerain or Sovereign Power, was for the purposes of commercial relations with other countries a "nation" independent of Turkey.

His Excellency, after a few moments reflection, said that, looking at the question offhand, he was not disposed to dispute the correctness of my view, but that he would like to give the point consideration before finally expressing an opinion, and he asked what our present practice was.

I said that I believed some Colonies, certainly Canada, already gave the mother country preferential rights, and that as Persia had never claimed that this was contrary to the Treaty of 1857, she would, I thought, be precluded from doing so now. Every State was free at its own discretion to establish or remove customs barriers between its component parts; such barriers had existed in France before the Revolution between different French provinces, and in Spain between Castille, Aragon, Navarre, and so forth, and in the present day France and Germany had special Tariffs for their Colonies. These arrangements were domestic matters, of which no foreign State would complain so long as it was not placed in a position of disadvantage as compared with any other.

M. Naus said he thought I was right, but that it was possible that our self-governing Colonies might at some future date obtain from the Crown, without separating for other purposes from the Empire, the right of concluding independent Commercial Treaties, and of denouncing those made by the mother country, and he had, therefore, deemed it wise in an Agreement of a permanent character, to provide against the possibility, which he admitted was remote, of differential treatment in them between different foreign countries, as distinct from such treatment as between one portion of the British Empire and another. The latter, he did not think, could be objected to.

He asked if I thought an exchange of notes on the subject necessary. I said I had at present no instructions to propose one, and I imagined it would be sufficient if I could inform His Majesty's Government that the Persian Government understood and accepted our position.

In the course of a visit which his Excellency paid me a few days later I inquired if, after thinking over the matter, he had formed any fresh views upon it. He replied that he had not, and that he admitted the soundness of our contention. I venture to think that this admission should be sufficient to remove any doubts which the Colonial Office may have been induced to entertain from a brief and misleadingly worded telegraphic account of the verbal arguments used by M. Naus during our earlier discussions, in support of a provision in the Declaration against the possible future action of a self-governing Colony.

I should wish, before concluding this despatch, to bear witness to the very conciliatory spirit displayed by M. Naus in the course of our commercial negotiations. It is often stated that the Belgian officials in Persia are the mere instruments of Russian policy, that their supposed neutral character is a convenient disguise worn till Russia is strong enough to dispense with their assistance and supersede them by avowed agents of her own, and that, in the meantime, they do all in their power to oppose and injure British interests. It is possible that some subordinate employés may have given occasion to suspicions of this nature, and it is certain that, in view of the tremendous hold over the fiscal policy of the Persian Government given to Russia by the loan contracts and the pledging of the customs to the Russian Bank or rather Ministry of Finance, the Belgian officials have been careful to avoid, as far as possible, any friction with the Russian Representatives. But M. Naus has, on more than one critical occasion, opposed a manful resistance, in the interests of Persia, to aggressive claims and demands on the part of Russia, and has saved,

by his firmness and ability, the Government which employs him from concessions which would have still further compromised its independence.

When the conclusion of a special Agreement with us was first mooted he opposed it, it is true, tooth and nail, on the ground that it would give Persia, as he put it in the debate which we had on the subject at the Grand Vizier's, two masters in commercial matters instead of one; and he only came round very slowly, as the result of several talks with me, to the opinion that the balance of power thus established would be, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this country, to the advantage rather than otherwise of the Persian Government. But, once it was decided that the thing had to be done, he entered into the negotiations in the most friendly and helpful manner. It would have been easy for him by insisting on special Tariffs corresponding to the Russian Tariff B in the various territories, each having their own commercial system, which compose the British Empire, to have delayed, and perhaps altogether jeopardized, the conclusion of the Agreement, but he immediately accepted my proposal to solve the question of reciprocal duties by merely stipulating for the application in the United Kingdom of the general Customs Tariff now in force there, and leaving Persian trade, not merely in the Colonies, but in India, where it is much more important, to the chance of most-favoured-nation treatment. I may add that in all the numerous minor questions which I have had to treat with him I have always found him, whilst tenacious with respect to what he regarded as the rights and interests of Persia, willing and anxious to meet me where he could.

I should perhaps state, with reference to the attitude of the Persian Government on the subject of the Anglo-Persian Declaration, that the Grand Vizier has received a despatch from the Mushir-ul-Mulk reporting that M. de Witte and Count Lamsdorff had expressed great displeasure at its conclusion. They had said it was ungrateful of the Grand Vizier, after all the labour expended by the Russian Government in revising their Treaty, so as to enable Persia to increase her revenues, to sign behind their backs another Agreement, the effect of which was to give to Great Britain the control over all future Tariff revision which had hitherto belonged to Russia alone, and they had intimated that this proceeding had somewhat shaken their confidence in the sincerity of his Highness' professed friendship for them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 89.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 187.)

My Lord,

Pera, April 14, 1903.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 71 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that orders have already been sent to the Governor of El-Hasa, cancelling the appointments of Mudirs on the El-Katr coast.

I believe that the intimation I have given the Porte, that if these officials are sent they will not be allowed to land or to remain, will act as a serious deterrent, but I venture again to suggest that your Lordship should inform the Turkish Ambassador that you have taken act and note of the declarations made to me by the Sublime Porte in connection with this question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 90.

[Nil.]

No. 91.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 18th April, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 20, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 18, 1903.

IT was hoped that great effect would be produced on the Chiefs and people of the Upper Yaffai when Jalela was evacuated and demarcation of the Amiri country commenced, but their distrustful attitude so far shows no signs of improvement. I fear that at present the British Commissioner entering their country would be resisted. A widespread feeling of distrust has been created by the unwillingness of His Majesty's Government to enter into Treaties with them, and by the Turks insinuating that they will be subjecting themselves to infidel instead of Moslem masters by their adherence to the British Government. Their suspicions may possibly be allayed after a time, especially if we conclude Treaties with Beda and the Upper Aulaki. But these Treaties will not be so easily concluded as they might have been last year. I would, however, again ask for permission to negotiate them if possible. Chief of Beda is now here pressing for declaration of British Government's intentions. I earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government will agree to our entering into Treaties with all the north-eastern tribes. But as regards Beda, I would further point out that, though we have relations with its Chief and people, and though it is wedged in between the Yaffai and Aulaki, it is not one of the nine tribes, and unless, before demarcation approaches its borders, we have some definite agreement with it, the Turks are likely to make very inconvenient claims. Colonel Wahab and Mr. Fitzmaurice hold this view strongly, and are impressed with the necessity for early conclusion of these Treaties.

(Repeated to Viceroy, Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 92.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 19th April, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 20, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 92.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Aden, April 19, 1903.

MAHOMED-BIN-NASIR MUKBIL, our old enemy, has been removed under an escort of fifty cavalry to Sana.

(Repeated to Viceroy, Bombay, Secretary of State, and Constantinople informed.)

No. 95*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*Foreign Office, April 20, 1903.*

INFORMATION has been received by the Imperial Bank of Persia to the effect that the Russian Government are attempting to prevent their having any share in mint contracts in Persia, and that they threaten hostile action against their note issue.

Imperial Bank have accordingly instructed their Manager at Tehran to ask for your support, and your good offices should clearly be exercised on their behalf.

[1617]

Y*

No. 93.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

(C.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th instant, relative to the rumoured creation of Turkish administrative posts on the El Katr Coast.

India Office, April 20, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 93.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 7, 1903.

MY telegram of the 26th ultimo. Sir N. O'Connor, in view of repetition of rumours regarding El Katr in Turkish press, has obtained from Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs a renewal of the assurance that Mudirs will not be sent to the places referred to. But he desires that the movements of the officials said to be designated for the posts in question should be closely followed by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who, if they should show any intention of proceeding to El Katr, should send early information direct to Constantinople.

No. 94.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 20, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dechyher of a telegram dated the 18th instant, from the Commander-in-chief East Indies.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Colombo, April 18, 1903.

IN view of situation at Muscat, with reference to French protection of Sultan's subjects, being acute, "Perseus" will be stationed there for the present.

No. 95.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 20, 1903.

THE Russians have threatened to take the action described in your Lordship's telegram No. 43 of the 20th April, being exasperated at their failure to secure the mint monopoly. I shall, of course, strongly support the Bank.

The Manager here is getting in as much silver as he can in order to protect his note issue, and we shall be safe in demanding the mint contract when once this is done. In the meanwhile, however, it will probably be more judicious to be prudent and patient.

[1617]

Y

No. 96.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 20, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of a telegram from your Manager at Tehran in which he states that Russian influence is being exerted to absolutely forbid your having any share in the contract for the Mint, and that hostile action against your note issue is threatened from the same quarter.

I am directed by Lord Lansdowne to inform you that he has instructed His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, by telegraph, to give his support to your Manager in both these matters, although, from the tenour of telegrams received from Sir A. Hardinge, it is clear that he would be ready to do so on his own responsibility.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 97.

Consul-General Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 9. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Odessa, April 16, 1903.

WITH reference to the proposed line of steamers to the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I hear that the Imperial Government are anxious that the order for the two projected steamers should be given to the Baltic Company ("Baltischki Zavod") on the Vassili Island.

The local newspapers reported that for the purpose of equipping this line the Russian Steam Navigation Company were about to raise a loan of 5,000,000 roubles (525,000*l.*), but this is an exaggeration. I am told that not more than one-tenth of this sum will be needed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. S. SMITH.

No. 98.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Government of India, dated the 21st April, relative to the arrival of Turkish recruits to Hodeida.

India Office, April 21, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 98.

Resident, Aden, to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 21, 1903.

FIFTEEN HUNDRED Turkish troops, who, I think, must be the recruits mentioned in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 8th instant, are reported by the Consul at Hodeida to have arrived there, for destination in the interior which is unknown. Consul promises further information later.

(Repeated to Secretary of State and Bombay; and Constantinople informed.)

No. 99.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 22.)

Sir,

India Office, April 22, 1903.

WITH reference to my letters of the 5th February and 25th and 26th March, 1902, on the subject of the French claim to jurisdiction over subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, to whom French papers have been granted, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to request that you will lay before the Marquess of Lansdowne the inclosed copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 16th April, reporting the action of the French Consul at Muscat with respect to the arrest by the orders of the Sultan of three Arab dhows, flying the French flag, which broke quarantine at Muscat.

2. It is necessary at the outset to explain that the duties of Health Officer at Muscat have been intrusted by the Sultan to the British Agency Surgeon.

3. It will be within Lord Lansdowne's recollection that, writing on the 5th March, 1902, the French Consul at Muscat assured Major Cox that the French authorities had no intention of subjecting Oman subjects to French jurisdiction; and that they only claimed the right given them by the Brussels Act to exercise surveillance and police over dhows flying the French flag.

4. Moreover, in the Memorandum communicated by Lord Lansdowne to the French Ambassador on the 16th April, 1902, an understanding between the French and British Governments is assumed to the following effect, viz., that no right of protection on shore or in the territorial waters of Muscat is claimed by the French Government in respect of subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, who hold French papers, and that within the Sultan's territory they are to be regarded as subject to his ordinary jurisdiction.

5. M. Cambon, it is true, has hitherto abstained from committing himself to an acceptance of this understanding; but the attitude of the French Consul appears to Lord George Hamilton to be inconsistent both with his own statement to Major Cox and with the view of His Majesty's Government expressed in Lord Lansdowne's note.

6. In these circumstances Lord George Hamilton will be glad to be informed if Lord Lansdowne is prepared to agree in the line of action which the Government of India desire to adopt.

7. The telegram quoted in the margin has, meanwhile, been addressed to the Viceroy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALEPOLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 99.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton, April 16, 1903.

[See India Office, April 17.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 99.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 20, 1903.

MUSCAT. French Ambassador returns next week from Paris, and we are led to expect a communication from him on the subject of the French flag-holders. Any action on the part of our Political Agent tending to aggravate the situation or bring on a crisis would be peculiarly unfortunate while His Majesty is visiting Paris, and should be avoided pending the expected communication from the French Ambassador.

No. 100.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 22, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 25 of the 17th March, I sent a note on the subject to the Grand Vizier on the 23rd ultimo. I sent your Lordship a copy of it by the last messenger, and it should reach you in a few days. I have now sent him a further reminder, and he promises, after seeing the Shah, to give me an official reply.

I hardly think we can expect him to take strong measures against Russian interests just now when his position is still shaky.

No. 101.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

Sir,

India Office, April 21, 1903.

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of 13th March, and the Viceroy's telegram of 15th March, forwarded to Foreign Office with letter of the 16th idem, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to forward, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, a further telegram from the Viceroy of the 14th instant on the subject of the Russian quarantine cordon in North-East Persia.

His Lordship agrees with the Government of India, that it would be prejudicial to Indian interests if the existing quarantine arrangements at Turbat-i-Haidari under Russian control were to acquire a permanent character; and he would be glad to be informed whether, in Lord Lansdowne's opinion, any further steps can now be taken, either with a view to the abolition of the cordon, or with the object of modifying the arrangements so that they may be less obnoxious to Indian and Afghan traders and more in consonance with the principles laid down by the Venice Convention.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 101.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Calcutta, March 15, 1903.

HARDINGE'S telegram of 13th March.

In view of complete freedom from plague of Baluchistan, Northern and Western Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Waziristan, trust quarantine in Khorassan, elsewhere, will be strongly opposed by His Majesty's Government, especially if carried out by Russian doctors with escorts. Inquiries from Russian Consul and reports from Kashgar indicate intention to put on cordon in Tashkurghan also.

Inclosure 2 in No. 101.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Panihar, April 14, 1903.

FOLLOWING telegram dated 7th April, from Consul-General, Meshed, is repeated for information in continuation of my telegram of 15th March:—

"British Agent at Turbatihaidari reports that Russian Captain in actively negotiating for purchase of a large house and garden [? there for] himself and staff."

We hope His Majesty's Government will not drop matter, since arrangements, which are so injurious to us, appear to be in danger of becoming permanent.

No. 102.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 21st April, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, 22nd April, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 102.

Lord G. Hamilton to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 21, 1903.

THE situation indicated in Resident at Aden's telegram of 18th April, seems to us most unsatisfactory. It appears from the telegram that:—

1. The Upper Yaffai will oppose the entry of the Commission into their country; and the effect upon them contemplated in your telegram of 5th, as a result of the Turkish evacuation of Jalela, has not been produced.

2. In consequence the Resident contemplates that the delimitation north-eastwards of the frontier of Upper Yaffai, to facilitate which a large force has been moved up, and upon which we have insisted so strongly with the Turkish Government, must be abandoned or indefinitely postponed.

3. We are pressed by Resident to conclude at once Protectorate Treaties with two other tribes, Beda and the Upper Aulaki, of which the former is not one of the nine cantons.

As to this proposal I shall be glad, before expressing an opinion, to be informed what course is contemplated with regard to the delimitation of the frontier of the two tribes mentioned. Our main object has been to cut the Turks completely off from access to the Hadramaut by drawing the line from the Amir of Dthali's territory to the desert. Will delimitation to Upper Yaffai frontier effect this, or will it be necessary to extend delimitation to the north-western frontiers of Beda and the Upper Aulaki also? Such was not understood to be the case. If otherwise, it is mainly in order to influence Upper Yaffai that it is proposed to conclude these new Agreements? In my telegram of 9th January I authorized conclusion of Treaty, combined with subsidy and promise of protection, with Upper Yaffai. Have any definite offers been made them, and with what result?

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 103.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 23rd instant, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 24, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 23, 1903.

I HAVE sent by post to Colonel Wahab copy of Secretary of State's telegram of the 21st April, and am awaiting his observations. As to delimitation north-eastwards the situation has been unsatisfactory all along. I would venture to observe

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that from the beginning I have urged that we should conclude Treaties with the tribes in this direction. Instead of concluding Treaties with the Upper Yaffai, it was decided by His Majesty's Government in December last to offer them payment for allowing the Commission to enter their territory, but (as pointed out in my telegram of the 28th January) an arrangement on this basis could not be concluded by Colonel Wahab, who, owing to divided state of the tribes, apparently did not promise a Treaty.

In my telegram of the 3rd February, replying to inquiry, I stated that unless we concluded formal engagements with the Yaffai and Aulaki, the Commission would find it unsafe to venture into their territory. I have consistently endeavoured to show that delimitation north-eastwards should be preceded by conclusion of Treaties.

The situation has been immensely simplified by the Turkish evacuation of Amiri territory; and on completion of the demarcation of that portion of the frontier the Commission will have secured a base for their advance north-eastwards, but this does not make Treaty unnecessary. The conclusion of Treaty before delimitation is, as I understand it, contemplated by the Viceroy's telegram of the 5th February.

We clearly recognize that the object of the demarcation north-eastwards to the desert is to cut off the Turks from access to the Hadramaut. Before the arrival of Commission at Dthali the Upper Yaffai country was believed here to extend to Behanal Kasam, which is more or less covered by the desert, and is understood to be under Aulaki protection. But the present opinion of the Commission is that the territory of the Yaffai does not extend very far north-eastwards, and that remaining portion of the frontier in this direction will be that of tribes dependent on Beda. Colonel Wahab, moreover, pointed out in his letter of the 13th January, that definite assurances of British protection were necessary to secure adhesion of Chiefs of Beda and Behan.

The necessity for a Treaty with Beda, possibly also with Behan, is due to the fact of the tribe not being included in the nine cantons; but the Yaffai will also be influenced by our concluding Treaties with Beda and the Upper Aulaki.

I would add that I am of opinion that, as soon as we have completed demarcation of Amiri boundary, we should proceed with the delimitation north-eastwards, of which I do not contemplate the indefinite abandonment, and for this reason I hope that there will be no delay in concluding Treaty.

[Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 23, 1903.

COLONEL WAHAB has sent the following telegram for transmission, and its substance has been communicated to Constantinople:—

"Turkish topography, on the basis of which the green line was indicated on the map, has been shown by the joint survey of the boundary zone to be grossly, if not wilfully, inaccurate. The Turkish Commissioners declare that they are precluded by their instructions from admitting that Ukla is included in our Protectorate, though they themselves state that it is not in Mares, though it is proved to be in Amiri limits by configuration of ground and documentary evidence, and though we waive all claims to two villages. Similarly, as regards Dakkam, of which some hamlets, as well as the principal village in which the tribal Chief resides, lie to the west of the Tiban River, our claims to it as a whole, which were indorsed in Viceroy's telegram of the 6th March, are contested by the Turks."

Colonel Wahab writes that the Turkish Commissioners can take, but not give, and that they have no real power to demarcate; and it appears from the above telegram that, though the Turkish Commission has been brought to the point of demarcation, there is no actual progress. I suggest that in the first instance the Turkish Government should be urged to give Commissioners fullest possible powers.

The Sheikh of Lakmat-as-Saleh has been released after three years' imprisonment at Taiz, and Zakaria Bey has been dismissed from the Commission.

[Repeated to Secretary of State, and Bombay.]

No. 104.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 24th April, relative to the position at Muscat in connection with the French flag question.

India Office, April 24, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 104.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 24, 1903.

MUSCAT. By to-day's mail we are sending in Secret Department, and to address of Political Secretary, Captain Cox' letters explaining situation, which show that in breaking quarantine a holder of Suri flag led the way, followed by the French flagholders, and that his dhow was fired on in Sur harbour for defying the orders of his tribal Chief.

Captain Cox, to whom your telegram of the 20th was repeated, replied on the 22nd as follows:—

"I fully realize that occasion is unfortunate, and I shall do all I can to prevent any local crisis. Sultan of Muscat had same object in view when he wrote on the 12th April to French Consul. It is at the same time desirable that His Majesty's Government should know that pending the communications they are expecting from French Government, French Consul has received several telegrams from Foreign Minister, on the strength of which he has paid three visits to the Sultan, demanding, on behalf of his Government, that prisoners should be delivered up or released. As yet Sultan has not complied, but assurance of our support is urgently required."

We consider that as French Government refuses to give any explanation of reasons for grant of French flags, Sultan should be supported, pending negotiations in Europe, in enforcing his orders against flagholders.

No. 105.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 24, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 24th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 105.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Colombo, April 24, 1903.

FOLLOWING telegram received from "Perseus," at Bushire:—
"Turkish Mudir for Wakra has arrived at Bahrein notwithstanding renewed assurances of Turkish Government that Mudirs would not be sent. Resident's instructions are to watch and report their movements, but take no action pending result of remonstrance with Constantinople. Ambassador and Indian Government informed."

No. 106.

Musurus Pasha to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

MUSURUS PACHA présente ses compliments au Marquis de Lansdowne et a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de sa Seigneurie qu'il résulte d'une dépêche télégraphique adressée à la Sublime Porte par le Gouverneur-Général intérimaire du Yémen que le nommé Ghanimé, négociant établi à Sana, a été assassiné le 7 Février, vieux style, tandis qu'il se rendait à Aden pour des affaires de commerce, par un individu du village de Pérké que le Cheikh de Havachib, un des neuf Cantons, avait chargé d'accompagner la victime.

Se conformant aux instructions de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur de Turquie prie sa Seigneurie de vouloir bien faire transmettre à qui de droit des ordres propres à assurer l'arrestation et la punition du meurtrier.

*Ambassade Impériale de Turquie,
Londres, le 24 Avril, 1903.*

No. 107.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 24th April, relative to the Seistan arbitration.

India Office, April 25, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 107.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

SEISTAN Arbitration.

April 24, 1903.

On the 9th April Colonel McMahon telegraphed as follows:—

"No 317. I propose to inform Persian and Afghan Commissioners, within the next few days, of my arbitral opinion as to boundary, and, should they not object, at once to proceed to demarcate the necessary portion of the line. Having completed demarcation and map, I propose to deliver my final award in writing, which will include arbitral decision regarding water disputes. When all is completed, as I hope, by end of April, I propose, unless I am instructed otherwise, to proceed to Perso-Beluch boundary."

I replied on the 21st April:—

"Have Persian and Afghan Commissioners submitted to you any statements of their case? Otherwise, it is necessary that they should do so before you announce your arbitral opinion. Then, while cool weather lasts, it might be convenient that you should decide the Perso-Beluch boundary, returning to Seistan to see condition of the Helmund during hot season, before you announce your final opinion. It is probable that, if you stay, you will have a better opportunity of effecting a lasting settlement, and there is no need for extreme haste."

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 108.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 25, 1903.

ADEN Frontier delimitation.

Resident's telegrams to India of the 23rd have been repeated to me by Fitzmaurice. It seems to be rather the tribes than the Turkish authorities that are now giving trouble; but I am afraid, nevertheless, that disagreements with the latter will be interminable unless, failing agreement by a certain date, we authorize Commission to delimit frontier independently.

No. 109.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 49.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 25, 1903.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 39 of the 29th ultimo relative to the quarantine cordon established in Khorassan under the direction of Russian officers.

The note which you addressed to the Grand Vizier on the subject on the 23rd ultimo is approved by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 110.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 1, 1903.

GENERAL KOSSAKOVSKY, whose resignation of his post as Commander of the Cossack Brigade I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 54 of the 1st April, 1902, was relieved about two months ago by his successor, Colonel Tchernozuboff, who formally took over command of the brigade on the 22nd ultimo.

The relations between the General and the Russian Legation did not improve with the advent of M. Vlassoff, and it is reported that the latter's influence prevented the Russian Government from acceding to a request made by the Shah that a change in the command of the Cossack Brigade should be for the present deferred.

Colonel Kossakovsky paid me a farewell visit yesterday, and left the same evening for Russia.

The new Cossack Colonel is a man I should say not much over 30, and of pleasant and far urbaner manners than his predecessor, but without the latter's imposing appearance and intimate acquaintance with the East. He is on very friendly terms with M. Vlassoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 111.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 6, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 51 of the 4th instant, the text of the draft Agreement originally proposed by the Persian Government for an advance by the Imperial Bank of Persia on the revenues of the Caspian Fisheries with those of the Persian Posts and Telegraphs as collateral security.

The Grand Vizier, whom I saw on the 4th instant, was naturally attracted by the

[1617]

2 A

proposal of a 5 per cent. rate of interest, as the result of the assignment as an additional security of the Southern Customs, and promised to do what he could to overcome the objections of the Shah, who appears to have been persuaded by some mischievous person that to pledge these customs to us would be to increase our power for wresting the Gulf ports from him. I had hoped, before the closing of the bag which I am sending home to-day by Mr. Grahame, to have been able to report the result of his Highness' interview yesterday with His Majesty, but I have not as yet heard from him on the subject.

The Russian Government, though it waived, when the Grand Vizier was in imminent peril, its demands respecting the Mint, has now announced that it will only make the proposed advance of 200,000*l.* for a period of six months, which is tantamount to a postponement and not an abandonment of these conditions. The Atabeg has obtained from the Shah an "autograph" declaring that His Imperial Majesty will under no circumstances give a minting monopoly directly or indirectly to any foreign institution, and for the moment the negotiations with Russia are at a standstill, as M. Grube has expressed his conviction that no help is likely to be obtained by Persia from us and that he can therefore afford to wait. If he hears, as he probably will very shortly, of our offer and the matter is not yet concluded, the question will doubtless enter upon a new phase.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR A. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 111.

Original proposal of Persian Government modified in course of subsequent discussions between Sir A. Hardinge, Grand Vizier, and M. Naus.

L'IMPERIAL Bank of Persia consent au Gouvernement Persan une avance de 200,000 livres sterling productive d'intérêts à raison de 8 pour cent l'an.

Le Gouvernement Persan déclare donner l'ordre à son Excellence M. Naus, qui est actuellement chargé de la perception des redevances sur les pêcheries de la Caspienne, de rembourser la dite avance à l'Imperial Bank of Persia en vingt années, capital et intérêts.

Il est convenu :—

1. Que si les revenus des pêcheries de la Caspienne étaient insuffisants pour assurer le paiement régulier du remboursement prévu ci-dessus, son Excellence M. Naus serait chargé de prélever les sommes nécessaires à cet effet sur les revenus des Postes et des Télégraphes ;

2. Que si le dit M. Naus cessait d'être chargé de l'encaissement des revenus précités, l'obligation des paiements à effectuer serait imposée par le Gouvernement aux fonctionnaires qu'il commissionnerait pour l'encaissement des revenus des Pêcheries, des Postes et des Télégraphes.

No. 112.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 191. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 18, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 140 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of a telegram addressed to the Sublime Porte by the Vali of the Yémen relative to the condition of affairs in that province, which has been obtained by Mr. Block from a secret source.

Your Lordship will observe that the Vali appears to be especially alarmed at the agitation set on foot by the Imam of Sanáa, and depicts the general situation as very unsatisfactory; and states that "in view of the incitements and secret hopes of the English," it is urgently necessary that the garrison of the Yémen should be reinforced by troops who are not of Arab race.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Vali of the Yémen to the Sublime Porte.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

March 29, 1903.

HAMED-ED-DIN, the Imam of Sanáa, has decided to profit by the events which have been and are still taking place in the Yémen. He has taken as his pretext for agitation the Elvahlé matter, the measures taken with respect to the Beni Mersané tribe in the search for the Italian pirates, and the intervention of the English arising out of the Sambouk question, and especially the delimitation of the frontier owing to the Navahitissaa (nine cantons) question. It has been reported that he has been addressing himself to the population on the most difficult and delicate frontier of the vilayet, saying, "The Government is selling to the English a most important vilayet like the Yémen, together with its Mahommedan population. The Ottoman Government is the cause of these evils; accordingly a general revolt against that Government is a religious duty," and that on his exhortation the Arabs on the desert frontier have declared a revolt.

Although it has been necessary to send sufficient troops to chastise them, owing to military movements undertaken for some time past by the Army Corps, manœuvres, &c., in which the troops have been employed, they are at present very scattered. At headquarters there are 3 battalions, 2 guns, and 150 projectiles. These with the necessary ammunition have been sent off at once to the district in question. Nevertheless, a certain number of men of the VIIth Army Corps have left the colours, and the total number of troops left is insufficient for the present condition of the vilayet. It was, therefore, notified that troops were to be sent from the Vth Army Corps. To this day they have not been sent. If they are sent, the men being natives of warm countries and of Arab race, they will, it is feared from precedent, incite the troops remaining here to disobedience, and more harm than good may be expected from them at this juncture. In view of the incitements and secret hopes of the English, long-witnessed and known in the Yémen, the reinforcements of the Army Corps with troops of Arab race will not produce the expected benefits.

The guns and stores previously requested from Constantinople, the dispatch of which has been notified from the Ministry of War, have not arrived; and further military movements have been rendered impossible. The present condition and the future of this vilayet are being exposed to serious danger. The troops collected by Hamed-ed-Din have, as explained, occupied positions difficult of access. The impossibility of feeding the Imperial troops collected here and there and of military movements by them is clear. The dangers do not need recapitulation, if the guns and stores are on their way I request their delivery with all speed. If they are not, I urge the need of taking measures at Constantinople; for the dispatch without loss of time of 3,000 to 4,000 troops, if not from the Vth Army Corps from some other quarter, and that in any case they be sent now with all possible dispatch.

No. 113.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 193.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 20, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 414 of the 21st September, 1902, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reporting on the misgovernment of Thalib Pasha, Mutessarif of El Hassa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Consul Wratishaw to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bussorah, March 10, 1903.

REFERRING to my despatch No. 43, Confidential, of the 15th August, 1902, as to the appointment of Sevid Thalib Pasha as Mutessarif of Hassa, I have the honour to report that the new Governor's administration seems much what was to be expected from his infamous reputation.

The following recent instance of his almost incredible disregard for appearances in satisfying his rapacious instincts has raised the greatest indignation amongst the Arab population, not only in the Hassa sandjak, but in Bussorah, and even as far as Bagdad. One of the principal merchants of Katif is Mansur Pasha, the local representative of the Civil List. He is very rich, and Thalib Pasha soon saw in him a suitable subject for blackmail. Mansur, however, declined to accede to the Mutessarif's extortion, and fled to Bussorah, and thence to Bagdad. Soon after, at the end of January, Thalib Pasha made a descent on Mansur's house, and imprisoned his brother, Abdul Hussain, carrying off property, including pearls, in which Mansur trades, to a very considerable amount. Mr. Gaskin, the British Agent in Bahrein, reports that on the 7th February three dhows loaded with loot arrived there in charge of Mohamad Attik, the Mutessarif's confidential man, and I learn that these vessels subsequently came into the Shatt-el-Arab and discharged their cargo at Sebilieh, the Nakib's river-side residence, about 15 miles from Bussorah.

To excuse his conduct, Thalib has forwarded to the Vali a bundle of "seditious newspapers" which, he asserted, had been found in Mansur's house, and also reported that a considerable number of rifles had been seized at the same time.

This latter statement is very likely correct, for all Arabs, particularly those who have valuables, possess arms, and the circumstance has not the importance which might attach to it in other parts of Turkey.

With regard to the newspapers, a strange light is thrown on the accusation by Mr. Gaskin's report, that on the 9th January Mohamad-bin-Attik called on him and stated that Thalib Pasha was anxious to see some copies of Arabic newspapers from Egypt, Constantinople, London, and Paris, and made special mention of the "Khabifa," which is published in London, and asked for some copies. He was told that the British Agency did not receive any, but the inference obviously is that he was sent to collect such newspapers for subsequent discovery at Mansur's house.

Meanwhile, Mansur Pasha at Bagdad had interested the Mushir, who is also Acting Vali, in his behalf. The Mushir communicated with the Vali and with Constantinople, and the Vali has telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior requesting that a Special Commissioner be sent to inquire, but has received no answer. He is much depressed at the idea of having to hold an inquiry himself, as this will, he considers, mean that he is to whitewash Thalib, and so disgrace himself. He told me he would rather resign; he believes the newspapers were placed in the house by Thalib's orders, and expresses his astonishment that the British do not interfere on behalf of Mansur, as the latter traded with British Indian pearl merchants, to whom many of the pearls seized by the Mutessarif belonged. This is, I believe, the case, but I have as yet received no complaints from British subjects.

Mansur Pasha is a Shiah, which will tell in Thalib's favour at Constantinople, but is likely to embitter local feeling at Katif, where the Shiahs are numerous and influential.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

No. 114.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 203.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 21, 1903.

WITH reference to my telegrams No. 49 and No. 51 of the 18th ultimo and No. 54 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that, according to information received from Mr. Fitzmaurice, the Sheikh Nasir Makbul was deported about a week ago from

the neighbourhood of the frontier, and orders have been received by the Turkish Commissioners for the dismissal of Zacharia Bey Mahommed, the Acting Governor of Kataba, who was guilty of sending letters to the tribesmen inviting them to a "jihad" against the British.

The Imperial Iradé for the dismissal of the Governor of Paiz has been issued, and his successor is now on his way thither.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 115.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th April, relative to the proposed creation of Turkish administrative posts on the El Katr coast.

India Office, April 27, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 115.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

COLONEL KEMBALL communicated on 23rd April following telegram sent by him to Sir N. O'Connor:—

"El Katr.

"On 21st Yusuf Ali, Mudir-designate for Wakra, arrived from El Hassa at Bahrein, and intends leaving, which probably he will not be able to do for some days, to take up his post at Wakra. I would suggest that Porte should send orders to countermand his appointment, and should not send them through the Vali of Bussorah or through the Mutessarif at El Hassa, that course involving great delay, but personally to Yusuf Ali at Bahrein. If he establishes himself at Wakra, it will be difficult to remove him. It is therefore imperative that suggested orders should be sent at once. There should be ample time for orders to reach him from Constantinople, as I have told Gaskin to try to arrange difficulties in the way of his obtaining his passage to Wakra, so that he will probably have to remain for the present at Bahrein. Wakra was recently visited by His Majesty's ship 'Sphinx,' which found Turkish flag flying there, but no Turkish officials or soldiers. The Chief of Katr has, I understand, flown the Turkish flag at Wakra for some years, but the appointment of a Mudir is none the less objectionable."

We trust that Porte may be pressed to issue the proposed orders. Meanwhile, Colonel Kemball has been asked to report how Turkish flag has been flown at Wakra.

No. 116.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 27th April, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 27, 1903.

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Inclosure in No. 116.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 27, 1903.

FOLLOWING telegram from Colonel Wahab, with reference to his telegram of 21st April, has been received for transmission:—

"From detailed survey of line it appears that Selat Kataba, which oldest documents recognize as Amiri border, runs from north-west of Kataba. The Turks declare that the real Selat is a small overflow channel which, issuing from the main watercourse, passes south-east of Kataba. With a view to solving difficulty, I proposed a joint survey of both watercourses, without, however, advancing any claims to Kataba. Turkish Commissioners have now stopped the joint survey, and have referred matter to Constantinople. As they refused to give way in same manner in regard to Ukla and Dakkam, Chief of which is now in my camp, I propose to complete the general survey of the western Amiri boundary alone, and to submit my Report and map, and then, if Turks delay on these grounds to settle the question, I propose to proceed with demarcation north-eastwards."

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 117.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 26th and 27th April, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 27, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, April 26, 1903.

IN continuation of my telegram of 23rd April:

After sending my telegram of 18th I heard of arrival at Dthali, together with some other Sheikhs, of principal Sheikh of Mausatta Yaffai, Ali Mohsin Askar, son of Ali Askar, through whom negotiations have been mainly conducted.

He had nothing special to say; but Colonel Wahab thinks that since Jalela was evacuated the attitude of the Yaffai has improved, and that by the time that the Amiri border has been completely demarcated the effect of the incendiary letters will have disappeared.

I am glad that there is, in fact, some improvement in situation, but, as appears from letters received by me and by the Abdali Sultan, and from a conversation which Denniston, our Political Officer at Dthali, reports having had with Ali Mohsin Askar, the Yaffai tribes are still very disunited, and the principal idea of those of them who are inclined to us is to obtain as much money as possible.

It will be understood that these tribes have little fear of the Turks, and are all very independent.

The policy of offering them money to permit the British Commission to pass through their country will, I hope, not be pursued, except, perhaps, as a last resource. Its effect, so far, appears to have been to increase dissension, and it will necessarily lower our prestige with the Turks and with the Arabs if one of the nine Cantons is allowed to extort from us large sums of money to permit our Commission to go through their country. In fact, considerable embarrassment in the future may very well prove the result of such a precedent.

I have hopes that, if allowed a free hand, I shall be able to effect an agreement with the Yaffai on fairly reasonable terms, especially if we conclude Treaties with Beda and Upper Aulaki, which I trust will be permitted by His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 117*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*Foreign Office, April 27, 1903.*

WITH reference to the telegram from the Resident at Aden of the 23rd April, on the subject of El Katr, addressed to your Excellency, the action of the Porte in appointing a Mudir to Wakra is contrary to the assurances which they have repeatedly given, and you should, as suggested by the Resident, press for orders for his withdrawal.

Inclosure 2 in No. 117.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

MR. FITZMAURICE telegraphed on 24th April as follows to Constantinople:—

Aden, April 27, 1903.

“ See Resident at Aden's telegram of 18th.

“ I would venture to point out that, as the official declaration of British Government to the Porte in 1873 covers conclusion of any necessary Treaty with Beda, itself not one of the nine Cantons, any further notification to the Porte until such Treaty had been concluded would seem to be unnecessary, and, from local point of view, inexpedient. Previous notification will rouse the Turks to greater activity in that direction, and would mean some resistance.

“ The Turkish evacuation of Jalela, and the removal of Zakaria Bey and of Muhammad Nasir Mukbil, have caused considerable diminution of the hostility of the Yaffai, as evidenced in their recent relations with us.”

(Repeated to Secretary of State and Bombay.)

No. 118.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 190.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 27, 1903.

I SPOKE to the French Ambassador to-day upon the subject of the recent arrest at Muscat of some persons claiming French protection, who had attempted to evade the Quarantine Regulations at that place, and who were at this moment the Sultan's prisoners.

I explained that the arrest of the delinquents had been effected by a launch belonging to His Majesty's ship “Perseus,” by order of the Sultan and his health officer, who was also the British Agency surgeon.

I understood that the French Consul had protested, and had demanded the release of the imprisoned persons.

I told his Excellency that our conversations on this subject had left me under the impression that the French Government did not claim the right to protect subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, who held French papers, so long as they were within the territorial waters of Muscat, but were, on the contrary, prepared to regard such persons when within the Sultan's territory as subject to his ordinary jurisdiction.

M. Cambon replied that in his view persons entitled to use the French flag could not be arrested by the Sultan without the concurrence of the French Consul.

I pointed out that in this case the owners of the dhows who had been imprisoned had been arrested at sea whilst they were in the act of evading the Quarantine Regulations. It seemed to me that it would have been impossible for the French Consul in such circumstances to have taken a part in effecting their arrest.

M. Cambon observed that if the facts were as I stated them, the prisoners should have been brought before the French Consul after their seizure and handed over to him.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 119.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 22, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a letter, dated the 14th ultimo, from the Officer Commanding His Majesty's ship “Sphinx,”* and copy of

* Not printed.

an extract from a letter of the 27th ultimo from the Officer Commanding His Majesty's ship "Perseus," reporting the visit of the Russian cruiser "Boyarin" and the French cruiser "Infernet" to Koweit and Muscat.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 119.

Commander Pears to Rear-Admiral Sir C. Drury.

(Extract.)

"Perseus," at Bombay, March 27, 1903.

THE Russian cruiser "Boyarin" and the French cruiser "Infernet," at Muscat, arrived in company at 2 P.M. on the 14th.

The Russian Consul at Bushire was on board the former vessel, and, I understand, interviewed the Sultan with a view to the establishment of a Russian Consular officer at Muscat, but I believe nothing more than tentative suggestions were made, and nothing definite settled.

No. 120.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th instant, relative to the Persian loan.

India Office, April 28, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 27, 1903.

SIR A. HARDINGE'S telegram to Lord Lansdowne of the 9th April regarding loan.

We consider it desirable, in view of a recently created Customs administration of ports of Mohammerah and Arabistan, under Sheikh of Mohammerah, that it should be clearly understood that, whether the duties are collected at Mohammerah or further inland, these customs are considered by us to form integral part of the customs of the Persian Gulf, as formerly, and to be included in our security for loan.

As regards expression "Fars and Persian Gulf," we should like to know what is the exact interpretation in other respects to be placed on it. We invite attention to correspondence ending with Foreign Office despatch to Tehran of the 10th May, 1900, and to Mr. Des Graz's letter to Mushir-ed-Dowleh of the 17th September, 1902, and subsequent correspondence; we presume that the expression includes all ports from Gwetter to the Shat-el-Arab, which are ports of Southern Persia, and therefore included in Shah's pledge of the 23rd October, 1897.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 121.

Question asked in the House of Commons April 28, 1903.

Mr. Schwann.—To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he can give the values and bulk, during the last five years, of the total traffic of the River Karun into Western Persia; and whether any, and if so what, steps have been taken to promote the use of that route for commerce by British and Indian traders.

Answer.

Following are the values of the imports into the Karun ports taken from the trade Reports of His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mohammerah:—

Year.									£
1897	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	26,030
1898	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	72,817
1899	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	62,971
1900	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	100,437
1901 (Ahwaz only)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	72,358

It would be impossible, within the limits of a question, to deal with the statistics of bulk; but I would refer the honourable Member to the following Reports in the Annual Series: Nos. 2186, 2346, 2442, 2631, and 2803.

The question of the best means of encouraging the use of this route by British and Indian traders has the constant attention of His Majesty's Government. Steps are being taken for the appointment of a British Vice-Consul to reside at Ahwaz on the Karun.

No 122.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, April 28, 1903.

KATR Coast Mudirs.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 87.

Yesterday the Grand Vizier telegraphed asking the Vali of Bussorah for explanations as to the rumoured appointment as Mudir of Wakra of Yusuf Bey, and instructing him not to allow any disturbance of the *status quo* in El Kattr.

I am now pressing the Grand Vizier, at the instance of the Resident, Bushire, that the Vali be instructed to send orders of recall to Yusuf through Bushire. I presume that he can be stopped at Bahrein if His Highness refuses.

No. 123.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

Sir,

India Office, April 28, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th April, forwarding a copy of a telegram of the same date from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, on the subject of the Aden delimitation.

As regards the difficulties reported in the Resident's telegrams of the 23rd and 27th April, in connection with the demarcation of the green line laid down on the joint map of the Turkish and British Commissioners, Lord George Hamilton is of opinion that, inasmuch as incorrect information was furnished, whether wilfully or not, by the Turkish authorities to the British Commission, it is desirable that in the demarcation the line should be rectified to bring it into accordance with the facts, so far as they are beyond dispute, as appears to be the case in respect of the village of Ukla. As regards the Dakkam, the line laid down on that portion of the frontier in the joint map is marked with dots to show its provisional nature, and Lord George Hamilton is of opinion that it would be expedient, with a view to avoiding complications in the future, that in the demarcation the line should be traced so as to give the Sheikh of Dakkam the villages on the west of the river, should his claims on inquiry be found to be indisputable.

Lord George Hamilton is therefore disposed to recommend, if Lord Lansdowne concurs, that the consent of the Porte should be obtained to such rectifications of the line as may be found, in the course of the demarcation, to be necessary, and that in the meanwhile the British Commission shall be instructed to continue to survey the line with a view to ascertaining the facts, and laying down the boundary in the event of the Turkish Government refusing to co-operate. Such a course appears to

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Lord George Hamilton to be in accordance with the view expressed in Sir N. O'Connor's telegram of the 25th April. The British Commission would of course be instructed to propose no variations of the green line, except where there is conclusive documentary evidence in support of the variation proposed, and where the readjustment of the line is likely to avoid the risk of complications in the future, and insure a permanent settlement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 124.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

Sir, *India Office, April 28, 1903.*
WITH reference to the recent telegrams from the Resident at Aden, on the subject of the delimitation north-east to the desert, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to state, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, that he is of opinion that, for the reasons given by the Resident, it will be impracticable to proceed with the demarcation unless Treaties have previously been made, not only with the Upper Yaffai and Upper Aulaki, but with Beda, the territory of which, it is now stated, lies between that of the Upper Yaffai and the desert.

Lord George Hamilton will be glad to be informed whether Lord Lansdowne has any objection to instructions being given to the Resident to treat with the Upper Aulaki and Beda, as well as with the Upper Yaffai, with a view to obtaining their co-operation in the demarcation. As regards Beda, Lord George Hamilton would invite Lord Lansdowne's attention to the telegram from Mr. Fitzmaurice to Sir N. O'Connor of the 24th April, repeated in the Resident's telegram of the 27th April, in which he expresses the opinion that, though Beda is not one of the nine Cantons, it is covered by the declaration made to the Porte in 1873.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 125.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

(A.)
Sir, *India Office, April 28, 1903.*
IN continuation of Sir H. Walpole's letter of the 22nd April, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to inclose, for Lord Lansdowne's information, a copy of a further telegram from the Viceroy on the subject of a recent incident at Muscat, and of the reply which, after consultation with Lord Lansdowne, Lord George Hamilton has sent to the Government of India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 125.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 24, 1903.*
MUSCAT. By to-day's mail we are sending in Secret Department, and to address of Political Secretary, Captain Cox's letters explaining situation, which show that in breaking quarantine a holder of Suri flag led the way, followed by the French flagholders, and that his dhow was fired on in Sur Harbour for defying the orders of his tribal chief.

Captain Cox, to whom your telegram of 20th was repeated, replied on 22nd as follows:—

"I fully realize that occasion is unfortunate, and I shall do all I can to prevent any local crisis. Sultan of Muscat had same object in view when he wrote on the 12th April to French Consul. It is at the same time desirable that His Majesty's Government should know that pending the communications they are expecting from

French Government, French Consul has received several telegrams from Foreign Minister, on the strength of which he has paid three visits to the Sultan, demanding, on behalf of his Government, that prisoners should be delivered up or released. As yet Sultan has not complied, but assurance of our support is urgently required."

We consider that as French Government refuses to give any explanation of reasons for grant of French flags, Sultan should be supported, pending negotiations in Europe, in enforcing his orders against flagholders.

Inclosure 2 in No. 125.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 27, 1903.
YOUR telegram of the 24th April. You may authorize Captain Cox, if Sultan of Muscat continues to be pressed by French Consul, to assure him of support of His Majesty's Government, in the event of his pleading, as an excuse for continuing to enforce his orders against the flagholders, that discussion on the subject is pending between French and British Governments; but my instructions of the 20th instant should be borne in mind.

No. 126.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 50. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 29, 1903.*
I HAVE received your despatch No. 40, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo, relative to the interpretation to be placed on the provisions in regard to the levy of road dues, contained in Article 4 of the Declaration signed between the Russian and Persian Governments on the 27th October last.

The verbal communication which you made to M. Naus on the subject, and your note to him of the 21st ultimo, have my approval.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 127.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 29, 1903.*
I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a note from the Turkish Ambassador,* stating that Ghanimé, a merchant of Sana, has been murdered on his way to Aden by a man deputed by the Sheikh of the Haushabi to accompany him, and asking that orders may be sent for the arrest and punishment of the murderer.

Lord Lansdowne would suggest that the Secretary of State for India should cause inquiry to be made into the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 128.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

Sir, *25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 29, 1903.*
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, and beg to supply the information desired by His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

* No. 106.

1. The capital allotted to the Seistan branch would be on the lines followed with branches of the same character and would be probably fixed at 10,000*l.* for a commencement, to be increased if required, and further governed by the probable annual requirements of the Indian Government, which the Bank would be glad to be informed of.

2. The usual rate of interest to be charged on the capital would be at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

No. 129.

Association of Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 30.)

My Lord, *Parliament Mansions, Victoria Street, Westminster, April 29, 1903.*

I AM directed by the Executive Council to forward to your Lordship the following Resolution respecting trade with Persia, which was unanimously adopted at the Annual Meeting of this Association, representing 100 Chambers of Commerce:—

"That, in view of the increasing influence of Russia in Persia, and particularly in view of the revised Tariff between the Russian and Persian Governments, imposing lower duties on an *ad valorem* basis on the chief Russian imports into Persia than on the principal British imports, this Association respectfully urges upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of using every effort to safeguard the commercial and political interests of the British Empire in Persia by negotiating a direct Commercial Treaty with Persia. That a copy of this Resolution be sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that he be asked to receive a deputation on this subject."

The Executive Council further desire that I should request your Lordship to be good enough to receive a deputation. In the event of being able to accede to this, I may perhaps be allowed to suggest that, as the next meeting of our Executive Council will be held on Tuesday, the 19th May, that date might, if convenient to your Lordship, be a suitable one for the interview.

I hope to be favoured with an early reply in order that there may be ample time to communicate with our various Chambers of Commerce, many of whom will desire to send representatives to attend the deputation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD W. FITHIAN,
Secretary.

No. 130.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th instant, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, April 30, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 130.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 29, 1903.*

YOUR telegram of the 21st April. See Resident at Aden's telegrams of the 18th, 23rd, 24th, and 27th April. So far, no Treaty has been concluded, under the sanction of your telegram of the 9th January, with the Upper Yaffai, originally owing to their dissensions and subsequently because of the effect of Turkish appeals to their fanaticism, but a considerable effect has now been produced on them by the evacuation of Jalala.

From the correspondence ending with your despatch of the 5th September, 1902, you will see that the Government of India have always contemplated, and the Bombay Government concur in their opinion, that, if the advance of the Turks to the Hadramaut is to be stopped, it would be necessary to include Beda and Lower Behan, which is understood to be under Aulaki protection, in our system of Protectorate Treaties, and thereby to carry the frontier to the desert. We do not know at present exact position of the tribal boundaries. General Maitland advocates concluding Treaties and sending an officer to ascertain tribal limits. As Beda territory is wedged in between Upper Yaffai and Upper Aulaki, and as the Chief is now at Aden, we consider that it will be well to conclude a provisional Treaty with the Chief and send with him an officer to ascertain and report on the facts regarding the boundaries of Beda and of Behan. No delay in the demarcation would be caused by this.

No. 131.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
PERSIAN Loan.

Foreign Office, April 30, 1903.

With reference to the telegram from the Viceroy of India of the 27th April, please inform me whether, in your opinion, any further assurances from the Persian Government, or any declarations to them are necessary, and, if so, in regard to what points they are required.

No. 132.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Musurus Pasha.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1903.

AT an interview which Mr. Block, Chief Dragoman of His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th ultimo, he informed his Excellency, in accordance with instructions from His Majesty's Ambassador, that the attention of His Majesty's Government had been called to a paragraph in the "Ikdam" of the 27th November last, to the effect that the Turkish Government contemplated the appointment of Mudirs at Zobara, Wakra, and El Odeid, on the coast of the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Block stated that he was instructed by Sir N. O'Connor, under orders from me, to warn the Turkish Government against any changes or disturbances of the *status quo* in those regions, and to remind them of the representations and declarations which had been made by His Majesty's Embassy on the subject at various times since 1883.

On the 22nd ultimo Mr. Block had an interview with the Grand Vizier, and was assured by his Highness that the statement in the "Ikdam" was erroneous, and that the Porte did not contemplate any administrative changes or appointments in the region in question. His Highness added, however, that he had applied to the Minister of the Interior for fuller information, and that he proposed to submit the question to the Council of Ministers that day.

On the 23rd March Sir N. O'Connor called upon Tewfik Pasha and inquired whether the matter had been considered by the Council of Ministers, and, if so, what decision had been arrived at. In reply his Excellency stated that the subject had not been brought before the Council, but that he had learnt from the Grand Vizier that there was no intention of making the appointments mentioned in the "Ikdam." Sir N. O'Connor having informed Tewfik Pasha that it was very important that I should receive accurate intelligence on this subject, his Excellency stated that as he had obtained the information which he had given him direct from the Grand Vizier he was ready to authorize him to report it to me.

On the 30th ultimo Sir N. O'Connor reminded Tewfik Pasha of the formal assurances given to His Majesty's Government that Mudirs would not be sent to Zobara, Wakra, or El Odeid, and begged his Excellency to impress on the Grand Vizier that any attempt to evade this promise might lead to serious consequences. His Excellency repeated his previous assurances and said that he would inform the Grand Vizier of Sir N. O'Connor's observations.

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A paragraph having appeared in the "Moniteur Oriental" of Constantinople on the 31st ultimo, to the effect that the Turkish Government had appointed a certain Arab Effendi and another to the Mudirihs of Adeda and Zebeir respectively, in the district of Kattar, Sir N. O'Connor instructed Mr. Block to call Tewfik Pasha's attention to the announcement.

Mr. Block ascertained that the "Moniteur Oriental" had taken the information from the newspaper "Malumat" of the 30th ultimo. On the 1st instant he showed both papers to Tewfik Pasha, who stated that he had no knowledge whatever of such appointments having been made, and repeated that the Grand Vizier had informed him that there was no intention of sending Mudirs to the places mentioned. His Excellency promised, however, to make further inquiries of the Grand Vizier. Mr. Block informed his Excellency that he was instructed by Sir N. O'Connor to warn the Porte that a departure from the assurances given to His Majesty's Embassy in the matter would be viewed by His Majesty's Government in a very serious light, and that if Mudirs actually proceeded to the localities in question, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to take steps to remove them.

On the 2nd instant Tewfik Pasha informed Mr. Block that he had acquainted the Grand Vizier with the communication made by him on the previous day. Both his Highness and the Minister of the Interior had stated that the information given by the "Malumat" was incorrect, and that they had no knowledge of any intention of sending Mudirs to the places named.

The announcements in the Turkish press referred to above would, however, appear to have had some basis of fact, since Sir N. O'Connor reported on the 14th instant that he had been informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that orders had been sent to the Governor of El Hasa cancelling the appointments of Mudirs on the El Katr coast.

I should be obliged if your Excellency would inform the Imperial Ottoman Government that I have received with satisfaction the assurances given to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in regard to this matter and have taken note of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE

No. 133.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

(A.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 29th instant, relative to the creation of Turkish administrative posts on the Katr Coast.

India Office, April 30, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 133.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 29, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 25th instant. Sir N. O'Connor reports that instructions were telegraphed by Grand Vizier on the 27th instant not to allow *status quo* to be disturbed in any way in Katr. Grand Vizier is now being pressed to instruct the Vali to sent orders to Yusuf via Bushire not to take up his appointment at Wakra. Should Grand Vizier refuse, steps will have to be taken to stop Yusuf at Bahrein, and such orders as may be necessary to make this course possible in case of need might now be given.

No. 134.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

(B.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 29th instant, relative to the French flag question at Muscat.

India Office, April 30, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 134.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 29, 1903.

YOURS of the 16th instant, Muscat. Were French flag-holders apprehended by "Perseus" steam-launch within Muscat territorial waters?

No. 135.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

(B.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated to-day, regarding the new Mudir of Wakra.

India Office, May 1, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 135.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 1, 1903.

EL KATR. Pending further orders, Colonel Kemball has been instructed that, unless Yusuf Beg returns to Bussorah, he should be detained under suitable and honourable conditions at Bahrein.

No. 136.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

Sir,

India Office, May 1, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter of the 25th April on the subject of the policy of concluding Treaties with the Upper Yaffai, Upper Aulaki, and Beda with a view to the demarcation of the Aden frontier north-east to the desert, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to forward, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th ultimo,* supporting the views already expressed by the Resident, and to say that Lord George Hamilton concurs with the opinion expressed by the Viceroy that it will be desirable to include Lower Behan among the tribes with whom the Resident should be authorized to conclude Treaties.

I am directed to add that, having regard to the Viceroy's suggestion that an officer should be sent with the Chief of Beda to report on the facts as to the limits of the territories of Beda and Behan, Lord George Hamilton will be glad to receive at an early date Lord Lansdowne's views on the question of concluding Treaties with the tribes concerned.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

* See India Office, April 30, 1903.

No. 137.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 1, 1903.

WITH reference to the proposed definition of the term "Fars and Gulf ports," mentioned in your Lordship's telegram No. 44 of the 30th ultimo, I am of opinion that the points suggested by the Viceroy had better not be raised, at least until we can treat them in connection with the "Règlement Douanier" on which, under our respective commercial Declarations, Persia has to agree both with us and with Russia, and which she is now discussing with the Russian Legation, the Russian Declaration being anterior to ours. The late advance is, in theory, a non-political one by the Imperial Bank, and it would, in any case, be better not to formulate them in connection with it.

I doubt that we should gain much in practice by reminding the Persian Government again about their pledge to us as to the customs of "Southern Persia," for the following reasons:—

1. They have not replied to my note of May last on the subject, and may therefore be deemed to have acquiesced in it.
2. The Imperial Bank receives the revenues of the entire customs of the south, including Mohammerah, &c.
3. The limitation does not affect our security, as the customs of Fars and the Gulf, in the narrowest sense, would bear another loan of over 1,000,000*l*.
4. If we oppose those doing it, the Russians cannot foreclose or control any southern customs houses.

The Russians, I have no doubt, construe the terms "Fars and Gulf" in the narrowest sense, and, until absolutely obliged to do so, the Persian Government would almost certainly prefer not to commit themselves to any definition. Until, therefore, the practical necessity arises, I would not press them to do so, but, when we come to discuss the "Règlement Douanier," it might be prudent to make a formal reservation to the effect that the separation of the Arabistan customs from those of Fars does not, in our opinion, render the former available as security for a Russian loan. I should not insist on the Persian Government replying to it should they, as I expect would be the case, not do so.

M. Naus hopes that the balance of the 300,000*l*., which your Lordship informed me, in your telegram No. 35 of the 3rd April you were ready to lend through the Bank, may balance his Budget till next year, and I hear that the Persian Government are likely soon to apply for it.

The Grand Vizier has refused a loan which the Russians offered on the 21st ultimo, in order to extinguish our advance.

No. 138.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 1, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, relative to the instructions to be given to the British Commissioners on the Aden frontier with regard to the delimitation of the Amiri territory.

Lord Lansdowne concurs in the views expressed by the Secretary of State for India on the subject of those instructions.

The understanding as to the procedure to be followed has been that those points in regard to which the British and Turkish Commissioners may be unable to come to an agreement should be reserved for discussion between the two Governments. For the purpose of facilitating the investigation of such points and the actual work of delimitation, His Majesty's Government have insisted, and the Porte has agreed that all Turkish forces and irregular levies should be withdrawn outside the green line, which has been marked on the joint map of the Commission as indicating approximately the extent of the British claim. Lord Lansdowne considers that the British Commissioners may fairly demand full opportunities for ascertaining the facts as regards the proper course of the boundary-line, and that they are not bound to adhere to the actual trace on the maps especially in those portions where it was marked by a

broken line to indicate uncertainty as to its exact position. But, as proposed in your letter, they should be careful to advance no claim to variations of the line except where such claim is supported by conclusive evidence, and to propose no readjustments which are not obviously fair and based on considerations of mutual convenience.

In view of the obstructive tactics still employed by the Turkish Commissioners, Lord Lansdowne is prepared to instruct Sir N. O'Connor to make a fresh communication to the Turkish Government stating that unless within a reasonable period the British Commissioners find their Turkish colleagues ready to lay down the line by joint agreement, subject to such reservations as have from the first been contemplated, the British Commissioners will be authorized to mark out independently the line claimed on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and which line will, thereafter, be protected against aggression.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 139.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 1, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 28th instant and of this day's date relative to the renewed request received from the Resident at Aden that he should be authorized to conclude Treaties with the Chief of Beda and with the Upper Aulaki tribes.

It appears to Lord Lansdowne that, in the circumstances reported by General Maitland, and in view of the strongly expressed opinion of the Government of India in favour of the course proposed, His Majesty's Government have no alternative but to give it their sanction. If Beda, as is now stated, though not absolutely forming part of the nine cantons, is geographically wedged in between two of the groups of tribes classed under that denomination, it would be clearly most objectionable that it should be left as an enclave open to Turkish aggression.

Lord Lansdowne understands that the stipulation as to British protection would be similar in terms to that inserted in the Treaties with the Atifi, Fadthli, Upper Aulaki, and other tribes, which is couched in very general terms.

It appears to his Lordship that the course suggested in the Viceroy's telegram of the 29th ultimo, viz., the conclusion of a provisional Treaty with the Chief of Beda, and the dispatch of an officer to investigate the facts as regards the boundary would be desirable, if it is found to be practicable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 140.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office,—(Received May 2.)

*3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,
May 1, 1903.*

Sir,

IN dealing with the two despatches from Mr. Consul-General Preece to His Majesty's Legation in Tehran, dated respectively Naghun, the 5th June, 1902, and Isfahan, the 1st July, permit me in the first place to express the regret of my Board that these despatches, kindly communicated by you to us, have remained unanswered up to the present time. But it was necessary to refer them to our principal Manager in the Karun region, and he happened to be away on a journey to Isfahan at the time when they reached Ahwaz. It is only recently that we have received his reply.

It may be convenient to deal first with the statements contained in these despatches.

1. The Chiefs state, and Mr. Preece forwards their assertion to the Legation without comment, that our charges have been excessive when we have had occasion to send up an engineer to repair the road.

In reply I am directed to inclose a copy of the accounts in detail, and to refer you to pp. 3, 4, and 5 of Mr. Taylor's letter of the 16th November last, marked (A), also inclosed.

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2. They complain, and Mr. Preece forwards their complaint to the Legation without comment, that Mr. Taylor's salary was included in the expenses of the road.

We would beg to refer you to pp. 4 and 5 of Mr. Taylor's letter, and to add that Mr. Taylor was in supreme charge of the operations for their entire duration, that he was detached from our business at great disadvantage and inconvenience to ourselves, and that he has received the thanks of our Board, together with a substantial gratuity—not charged to the Chiefs—for the able manner in which he discharged his extremely onerous, trying, and quite exceptional duties.

3. Mr. Preece, writing in July 1902, gives it as his opinion that it was unnecessary to send an engineer that summer. As a matter of fact, it was essential, not only for repairs to the track, but also for the purpose of affixing clips to the suspension bridge at Godar-i-Balutak. The mission of the engineer was rendered practically abortive, so far as the track is concerned, owing to the fact that the Chiefs would not provide him with facilities in procuring labour.

4. The Chiefs contend that we are bound to provide more caravanserais. On this point we had thought our intentions had been made clear beyond cavil at the time of signing the Agreement. We inclose a copy of the correspondence which passed between ourselves and the Legation at the time upon this subject, marked (B).

5. As to the charges made by Mr. Preece of want of patience on our part, we would, with great deference, submit that these are scarcely fair in view of the fact that our interest and instalments are now several years in arrear, and that we have hitherto avoided enforcing our safeguards in the desire not to embarrass His Majesty's Government while their hands were so very full elsewhere. We would also refer you to p. 5 of Mr. Taylor's letter (A).

It would obviously not be possible for us to accept the settlement suggested by Mr. Preece. As regards the letter given to the Chiefs by Mr. Taylor, we have not the original, and are therefore unable to verify its terms; but Mr. Taylor had no authority of any kind to modify in any way the Agreement arrived at between ourselves and the Chiefs through His Majesty's Legation, and with the participation of the Persian Government. The letter was wrung out of him by the Chiefs at the very inception of the enterprise, at a time when it was impossible to estimate the cost except in a very rough way. We have looked up Mr. Taylor's letters to us written at the time, and we find that the inclosed letter, dated Isfahan, the 4th June, 1898, refers to this matter, marked (C). Mr. Taylor makes it plain that reference to the Chiefs was really only contemplated in case it were found necessary to spend sums on the road to the extent of two or three times the original estimate.

We have more than once pointed out that under our Agreement with the Chiefs it was not incumbent upon us to do more than erect the bridges, and spend the balance conscientiously upon the road. As events have turned out, it might have been better for us, but not for the Chiefs nor for the interests of the traffic, if we had erected the bridges before spending money on the road. Such a course would, indeed, have involved the Chiefs in heavier ultimate expense, and it would have retarded the traffic. But the extra sum would not have been spent.

It must also be remembered that at the inception of the enterprise, Mr. Preece's suggestion of building the bridges with old telegraph wire, to be supplied by the Government of India, for the moment held the field. When our Board came to a closer consideration of the question, they arrived at the conclusion that it would not be wise to erect such structures. They attached weight to the objections urged by the late Colonel Wells, who had great experience of the subject, and whom the Legation had requested to communicate with us. The bridges actually erected are the result of much thought and care; they are permanent structures, and are well spoken of by impartial and competent judges.

Our contention is that in all such matters we have done our very best by the Chiefs. This was not a case of a contract in the ordinary sense of the word; our services were gratuitous, and the profits were to go to the Chiefs.

The form of our Agreement with the Chiefs was neither of our own choosing nor suggestion; it was substituted by the Legation for a very different document which embodied our own views. We did our best to meet the views of the Legation. We were told that we must trust to the Legation to see us through.

The result of our work is that for the insignificant cost of about 8,000*l.* a good caravan road with solid steel suspension bridges has been built, extending across the most intricate mountain country for a distance of 270 miles. Since the early Middle Ages—and, perhaps, more probably since a much earlier period—no road has lain across these mountain fastnesses.

We submit that it is scarcely just in return for this service to British commerce that we should be mulcted in heavy damages, and be exposed to personal chastisement at the hands of one of His Majesty's officials.

It would be most improper for us to do more than defend ourselves; hence our relative positions are entirely unequal. Even were it possible to leave this consideration out of account, our personal relations with Mr. Preece would forbid any different course.

The true cause of this regrettable and symptomatic incident—a cause not unconnected with the attitude of the Chiefs—must be sought not in personal differences of any kind, but in the fact, patent to all, that for the moment at all events, Russian influence is in the ascendant in Persia and British influence on the decline. In such circumstances there is a great temptation among British officials and traders who are feeling the pressure to fall out between themselves.

The Chiefs and ourselves thoroughly understand one another. Far greater than their natural aversion to part with any money is their desire to use this question as a lever for quasi-political ends. One cannot help feeling a certain measure of sympathy for them; for this road, by opening their country, exposes them to influences some of old standing, others recent, but all now present with added force.

These are considerations which, no doubt, will receive the attention of His Majesty's Minister and Government. But we submit that the occasion might be made use of to place the administration of the road on a sounder basis.

It has become evident—as, indeed, we foresaw—that the maintenance of the road in repair is not a matter which can safely or conveniently be left in its present state.

We would, therefore, recommend that without prejudice to the guarantees of the Persian Government or to the responsibility of the Chiefs, the provisions of Article 10 of our Agreement should come into force and the collection of the tolls be placed in the hands of the new Transport Company.

After defraying the cost of repairs and depreciation, and providing for the payment of the yearly instalments, one half of the net profits would be paid to the Chiefs and the other half to the Transport Company, who would undertake the administration of the road, the Chiefs policing it.

Most apposite in the consideration of this proposal is the recent establishment of the Belgian Customs in the Karun Valley at Russian instigation.

It might seem that such a measure would be resisted to the utmost by the semi-independent Arab Chieftain who rules the Arabs far and wide in that extensive region. Such, indeed, was the opinion generally held, and not, we think, without reason.

As a matter of fact, the change has been suddenly and most quietly effected, the way having been paved beforehand by diplomacy.

The following is, we understand, the general outline of the settlement which has been arrived at by the Belgian Customs Administration with the Arab Chieftain in question, Sheikh Khuzzel:—

The Sheikh has received a written guarantee from the Persian Government of the territory now held by him and his tribe. That is to say, the Persian Government have bound themselves to maintain him, his family and his tribe, in the possession or headship of the tribal territories. The pecuniary losses which he incurs by the loss of the right to levy the customs is made good to him by a yearly payment and by the grant of the special privilege of exporting his own produce duty free.

Apply a similar principle to the case of the Bakhtiari Chiefs—who, however, have never been Collectors of Customs—and it will probably be found that it will be possible to arrive at a settlement with them on the basis of a guarantee by the Persian Government—a guarantee which would be officially communicated to His Majesty's Government—of the territories, comprising those traversed by the road, over which they now exercise authority. The facilities for the passage of the tribes over the road free of toll would be confirmed. We venture to think that under some such terms as these the Chiefs would be prepared to hand over the administration of the road to the new Transport Company. Should it be impossible to effect this change before the coming summer, it is, at all events, of urgent importance that the track should be placed in repair after the melting of the winter snows. On this subject we beg to refer you to pp. 1 to 3 of Mr. Taylor's letter dated the 16th November (A). It will be necessary to send up an engineer for the purpose; and the Chiefs should undertake to provide him with facilities for obtaining labour, and they should pay in a certain preliminary

sum to defray the out-of-pocket expenses. We trust that this may be arranged by the good offices of His Majesty's Minister.

In conclusion, permit us to inclose a copy of our account with the Chiefs up to date, and to enumerate the inclosures in this letter as follows:—

Mr. Taylor's letter of the 16th November, 1902, marked (A).

Intentions of Messrs. Lynch Brothers, marked (B).

Mr. Taylor's letter of the 4th June, 1898, marked (C).

Statement of account with the Chiefs, marked (D).

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANK BOTTOMLEY,
Acting Secretary.

Inclosure 1 in No. 140.

(A.)

Mr. Taylor to Mr. Lynch.

Dear Sir,

Ahwaz, November 16, 1902.

REFERRING to your inquiries as to the state of the Bakhtiari route, the repairs done by the Chiefs and the account of expenses rendered by us to them for engineers sent up to paint the bridges, &c., I beg to reply as follows.

The road in certain parts is falling into a very ruinous state. These parts are, Osten-i-polengi near Dopulun, the stretch from Shellil to Pul-i-Amarat, the Pul-i-Amarat Hill itself, also the zigs at Gundum Kar, many bits upon the road from Deh-i-Diz to Godar, the whole stage from Godar to Malamir Plain, including particularly the Malamir Hill, several places between Alaa Khursheed and Towla, and particularly the descent from Jaru Hills to the plain.

The worst of these places are Osten-i-polengi, Malamir Hill, Alaa Khursheed, and the descent to the plains from Jaru; these plains are getting so bad that if nothing effective be done the muleteers will soon get disgusted and stop using the road.

Mr. Preece wrote me that the Chiefs would do the work as well and much cheaper than we could; he also discussed this point with me when I was in Isfahan last month.

I agreed that they might be able to do it as well and cheaper, but affirmed that they never would do it properly.

So far, they have done nothing but clear away loose stones, but wherever a place is really bad they leave it alone entirely. They never dislodge any of the pointed stones sticking up in the roadway, and never think of making a waterway to lead the water away from the road. The consequence is that the road is fast becoming a watercourse itself, and the water rushing down the roadway washes away the earth, leaving only loose stores on the road instead of the firm path I made. I have travelled over the road three times since I made it and at intervals of a year or more between each journey, and I can trace the gradual deterioration.

This time we had to walk on foot down numerous descents which I have over and over again ridden down and galloped up when I was at work on the road.

From Dopulun to Godar the Chiefs have done a few repairs which consist mostly of stone clearing, but this side of Malamir they have never done even that.

Repairing the road properly, includes rather more merely than clearing away stones; it includes making waterways in places where they are needed, the gradual improvement of very steep pieces, and generally improving the track, and the Lurs employed by the Chiefs are quite ignorant of all such details and never will do the work properly except under competent European supervision.

The Chiefs' assertion that we were afraid to tackle the stretch on the top of Maulwari Hill is pure perversion of fact.

We had to leave the Maulwari (Amarat) Hill until we built the bridge, and by that time the funds had been so much exceeded that we could only do sufficient to the hill itself to make it possible for animals to get up, and we were unable for want of funds to touch the piece the Khans speak of.

Accounts of Expenses.—The account of Mr. Barlow's expenses to which the Khans allude amounts to 4,122 krans.

The chief items are his pay for forty-five days, that is from the day he left the

Tigris boat at Bussorah to come up the Karun and start to Malamir, up to the day of his rejoining again in Bussorah, and the mule hire.

He had with him a man sent by the Chiefs, and the arrangement was that he was to point out to this man all the parts of the road which needed repair and tell him how to do it.

Naturally, he went as far as Ardel, as our road extended to there. The assertion that he stayed five days at Ardel is a falsehood. He left Dopulun at 7 A.M., reached Ardel, had breakfast there, and returned to Dopulun that afternoon.

He stayed a day at Dopulun to take measurements of the brick bridge built by the Khans there and to sketch same for your information; then he re returned to Godar, painted that bridge, went on to Pul-i-Amarat and painted that one, and returned immediately.

When it is considered that Ardel is thirteen stages from Ahwaz and thirteen back, that he had to come up from Bussorah, make his arrangements for starting, paint the two bridges and return to Bussorah, waiting in Ahwaz three or four days for the steamer and five days in quarantine at Bussorah, the time is by no means excessive.

Every item of the account is out of pocket expenses. This is also the case with the accounts of Mr. Taylor's expenses last year to Isfahan, and Mr. Glanville's expenses to fix the clips at Godar and attempt to repair the road.

The Chiefs have at all times been treated by us with the greatest courtesy. They have never been charged anything but actual expenses at all times. We have never made any commission or profit upon any of the road transactions, and the Euphrates and Tigris Company's steamers have never received a penny freight upon all the material carried by them.

Personally I have devoted more time and trouble to this road during the last five years than I have to the firm's ordinary business, and yet, despite all these advantages received, the Chiefs have never even given us thanks for the work done upon their behalf.

On the contrary, they take every opportunity of making false statements to the Legation, to Sir M. Durand, and to Mr. Preece. Their accusations against us are all vague, nothing tangible is brought forward, but the impression is given that we have generally wasted money and feathered our nests at their expense. This is all done with the object of repudiating their liability for the extra 3,000*l.* which had to be spent on the road.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. B. TAYLOR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 140.

(B.)

Intentions of Messrs. Lynch Brothers as contained in Mr. H. F. B. Lynch's letter to Mr. Hopwood of January 18, 1898, and as understood by Her Majesty's Legation.

IT must also be clearly understood that all we undertake to do for 5,500*l.* is to erect the bridges and spend balance conscientiously upon track and caravanserais, and that this sum merely represents our opinion of outlay sufficient to induce traffic.

Dear Mr. Lynch,

Foreign Office, March 1, 1898.

The following is copy of telegram sent to-day to Mr. Hardinge:—

"Lynch considers the Agreement, as explained in your telegram No. 28, corresponds with alterations previously telegraphed, and is satisfactory. He agrees to omission of arbitration clause, but, inasmuch as the Legation are now practically sole arbiters, he considers it important Legation should clearly understand his intentions as telegraphed in my No. 17. Subject to this, please sign for him. He has deposited power of attorney here."

Yours very truly,

(Signed) C. A. HOPWOOD.

Paraphrase of Telegram from Mr. Hardinge, dated Tehran, March 3, 1898.

Mr. Lynch's intentions as telegraphed to me by your Lordship are perfectly understood by Her Majesty's Legation. I have to-day signed the Agreement with Ali Guli Khan, and am sending it to the other Chiefs near Shuster by special messenger to be signed by them. Within about twenty days I hope to hear of its signature.

Mr. Hardinge to Mr. Lynch.

(Extract.)

Tehran, March 2, 1898.

I fully appreciate the justice of what you say as to what should be expected of you in order to induce traffic upon the road, and were I here I would engage myself to defend your interests stoutly. I think, however, that there is no doubt that every other Head of this Mission would do the same. I am pleased to have had a share in this business, as I have really great hopes for the future of this road, and I think that in making it you will erect the only monument in this country to British enterprise.

Inclosure 3 in No. 140.

(C.)

Mr. Taylor to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Dear Sirs,

Ispahan, June 4, 1898.

I WROTE you from Malamir that I had seen Sirdar Asaad and the Sepah Dar, who had both promised their utmost assistance, and that it was arranged that I should go to Charkhor and there confer with the other Khans and settle the question of labour.

When we got to Dopulun the Sirdar ascertained that Haji-il-Khani and the other Khans were at Ardel, so we went there instead of going to Charkhor.

At Ardel I had a conference with all the Khans. Haji-il-Khani was unwell and did not attend, but, in addition to the Sirdar and Sepah Dar, there were present Shahab-es-Sultani, Semsem-es-Sultani, Amir Kuli Khan, Khosro Khan, and many others. I had anticipated some opposition from the minor Khans, but I was surprised at this Mejlis to find that not only were they virulently antagonistic, but that the Sepah Dar also shared their views.

They stated that the road would cost far more than 275,000 krans to make, including the bridges, and insisted that I should sign a document guaranteeing to complete the road for that sum. This was, of course, out of the question, and I could only assure them that the money would be spent to the best advantage, and that, in our opinion, it would suffice to improve the road sufficiently for caravans to pass. This did not content them, and the minor Khans (especially Khosro Khan) were so vehement, and talked so loud about never allowing the work to be started, that I feared for a time the meeting would break up and necessitate intervention from Tehran. However, after discussing the matter, I got to the bottom of their fears.

It seems that the Persian Agreement signed by Sirdar and Sepah Dar reads that if more money is needed for the road we are to supply it. This, I imagine, refers to the cart road which may afterwards be required; but they understood it to mean that we could spend as much money as we pleased upon the road, say three or four times the above amount, and that they would be bound to repay it, interest and capital, and, to use their own words, that we would "eat them up and take their country from them in satisfaction."

I assured them that we had no intention of spending any more than the amount specified in the contract, and that if, when this was spent, any places needed improvement, they could do it themselves.

They then asked me whether I would give them a letter to say that we would not spend more than 300,000 krans upon road and bridges without their consent. This I assented to, and gave them the desired undertaking in writing. There is no harm in

doing this, seeing that we have no intention of advancing more than the amount specified in contract.

With them it is not a question of 50,000 krans, more or less, but they feared that we might exceed the amount two or three times.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. B. TAYLOR.

No. 141.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 2nd May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 2, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 141.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 2, 1903.

MUSCAT. Your telegram of the 29th.

Flag-holders in question are stated by Major Cox to have been overtaken about 30 miles from Muscat by steam-cutter of His Majesty's ship "Perseus," on the approach of which Cox understands that they ran ashore at Ras Abu Daud, in Muscat territory, and that they were apprehended while trying to escape over the rocks.

No. 142.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

(C.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 1st May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 2, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 142.

The Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 1, 1903.

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Connor's telegram to Mr. FitzMaurice, dated the 28th April, Colonel Wahab telegraphs as follows:—

"No. 261. Sultan's Irade does not authorize delimitation on basis of green line, but requires that line should be strictly applied to the ground. A great part of the green line on the map is only dotted, and as I pointed out in my telegrams Nos. 256 and 260, it is an absolute impossibility to interpret the Irade in this strict manner. These delays are inevitable, so long as no instructions are issued to the British Commissioners beyond those given and interpreted by the Turkish Government."

In documents Nos. 7, 8, and 13 accompanying my Memorandum of the 2nd December last, the country of the Dakkam tribe is styled by its official name of Fajra.

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 143.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st May, relative to the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia in Seistan.

India Office, May 2, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 143.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 1, 1903.

MY telegram of 24th March.

Can arrangements for establishment of Seistan branch of Imperial Bank of Persia be expedited, in view of fact reported by Whyte on 7th April that the Russian Bank is sending accountant from Meshed to open a branch bank in Seistan?

No. 144.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 2, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 2nd instant, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, relative to affairs at Muscat.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 144.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Trincomalee, May 2, 1903.

ACUTE stages have been reached Muscat relative to protection of Sultan's subjects under French flag, and have heard French ship "Infernet" had been recalled from Suez, and was expected to arrive at Muscat 3rd May. Have temporarily detached "Naiad" to Muscat to join "Perseus."

No. 145.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 50. Commercial.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 2, 1903.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN Commercial Declaration.

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 31, Commercial, of yesterday's date, I have been informed by the Ministry of Customs that the Persian Government have taken in hand the preparation of the Shah's ratifications, and as soon as those of the King arrive here we can doubtless exchange them.

No. 146.

Foreign Office to Mr. H. Lynch.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 2, 1903.

WITH reference to previous communications in regard to the provisions relative to the levy of road dues in Article 4 of the Declaration signed between the Russian and Persian Governments on the 27th October, 1902, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you, confidentially, that he has recently been in correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject, and that with his Lordship's authorization, Sir A. Hardinge has stated in an official note to M. Naus the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Article.

The statement is to the effect that His Majesty's Government understand that the rahdari taxes which the Persian Government bind themselves to abolish are the duties which were formerly levied by the Government for keeping up the public roads, and which were consolidated into a duty of 22 shahis per load collected by the Customs at the frontier; and that the stipulation that no road dues or tolls are to be established on other than carriageable roads refers to the future only, and cannot be made to apply retrospectively to any British enterprise without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government.

Sir A. Hardinge also pointed out in his note to M. Naus that it would be contrary to all rules of equity that the Concessions obtained for you and guaranteed by the Declarations of the Sadr Azam and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh of the 19th October, and the 19th December, 1897, should be modified in any way without a fresh Agreement between the two parties.

Sir A. Hardinge had previously explained the views of His Majesty's Government, as stated above, to M. Naus verbally, and had been assured by him that if the question were ever raised whether the tolls on the Bakhtiari road were not contrary to the Russo-Persian Declaration, he would support the view of the matter taken by His Majesty's Government.

As regards the road from Tehran via Sultanabad to the Karun, Sir A. Hardinge is of opinion that it is useless to endeavour to obtain for the new Transport Company the right to levy tolls on those parts of it which are not passable by carriages. He suggests, however, that if the Company raised the tolls on the carriageable sections of the road, i.e., from Tehran to Sultanabad and on the bridges, and granted a rebate or reduction to merchants willing to pay on their goods a voluntary toll for the upkeep of the non-carriageable parts, they might obtain the same amounts as if they charged on all portions of the road, whether carriageable or not, the low tolls hitherto levied by the Imperial Bank of Persia. No objection could be taken to the Persian Government allowing the Company to raise their tolls on the carriageable sections of the road to the scale in force on the Resht road, which is stated to be eight times higher than that on the Kum road. Such an excessive raising of the tolls would, however, lead to a great diminution of the traffic, and Sir A. Hardinge therefore suggests that the Company might raise their rates just sufficiently to make it cheaper for caravans to pay voluntary tolls on the non-carriageable portions of the road in return for a reduction on the carriageable parts.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 147.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 90.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, May 3, 1903.

KATR coast Mudirs: Your Lordship's telegram No. 94.

I am glad to learn from Resident, Bushire, that he has been instructed by Indian Government to detain Yusuf, if necessary, at Bahrein, as Grand Vizier has refused to instruct Vali to send Yusuf orders through the Resident.

Consul Sykes to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord,

Kerman, March 25, 1903.

SINCE writing my last despatch, I have the honour to report the arrival of a new Governor-General in the person of his Highness Aziz Ulla Mirza, Zafar-u-Saltana.

Owing to the fact that the Central Persia telegraph line is rapidly approaching this province and will eventually cross the entire breadth of Persian Baluchistan, it is evident that, at this juncture, the appointment of a friendly Governor-General is of considerable importance.

Some weeks before the arrival of his Highness I was visited by his Deputy, who conveyed the most friendly messages to the effect that the Zafar-u-Saltana knew many of my Persian friends, and hoped shortly to make my acquaintance. This forerunner indulged in violent diatribes against Russia, which may or may not have been genuine, but, at any rate, they showed that his Highness was anxious to be considered Anglophil.

Upon the arrival of the Zafar-u-Saltana, I sent Mirza Nasrulla Khan Nawab with two sowars to welcome his Highness, who, by stopping his carriage for a considerable period, showed in the most marked and public manner that he was anxious to establish friendly relations with this Consulate.

When I paid my official call his Highness met me in the garden, and, during the course of a protracted conversation which was carried on in French, he was good enough to say that he had heard from every quarter how I had helped successive Governors-General in their efforts to ameliorate the condition of affairs in the province, and that he intended to ask my advice constantly, especially with regard to Baluchistan. His Highness then inquired about Kerman and Baluchistan, but more especially was he anxious to obtain information about this latter province. When I terminated my call, I did so with the feeling that the most cordial and friendly attitude of his Highness was genuine.

Upon returning my visit, the question of Baluchistan was again referred to at length, and I was finally asked to suggest a suitable man for the post of Governor. The matter being one of such immense importance, I asked his Highness to give me time for reflection, and I finally recommended Wāli Khan, a member of the Wakil-ul-Mulk family, and one of my oldest and most intimate Persian friends.

A few days later Wāli Khan dined with me, when he thanked me for his appointment, which he owed to this Consulate, and he said that he was prepared to render me every service which lay in his power.

The importance, my Lord, of this appointment can hardly be over-estimated, as, hitherto, Governors of Baluchistan have been of a very low type—with few exceptions they have been inhabitants of Bam—and as their sole idea has been to enrich themselves at the expense of the Baluchis and any Hindu traders, they have necessarily been in opposition to this Consulate, which has had to exercise all its influence to obtain the settlement of cases.

The Wakil-ul-Mulk family, on the other hand, has been strongly Anglophil since the days when its chief was Sir John Malcolm's entertainer or "mehmandar." Sir Frederic Goldsmid maintained the most cordial relations with the second and third generations, while the fourth and fifth generations are my most intimate friends. They supply Governors to half the province, and the head of the family has been commissioned to build the telegraph quarters for Kerman.

The difference then will be enormous, as, in Baluchistan, supplies are frequently unobtainable except through the Governor, and my considerable experience of Baluchis points to the fact that, without the Governor's cordial and strenuous efforts, the telegraph material may take months to reach its destination. In this connection it is most important that I should be informed, as soon as possible, of the course which the telegraph line will follow east of Bazmān. Not only is it desirable to prepare the minds of the Baluchis, but it will also be necessary to make special arrangements for dealing with the lawless Chiefs of Sarhad or Sarawān. If the line runs to Guetta the former district must be crossed, and if it crosses Southern Baluchistan to Karachi—this is the alignment I favour—Sarawān is traversed.

However, it is only by the appointment of a friendly and intelligent Governor, who will also reap the advantage of having been Governor of Bam, and, in addition,

of being a member of the Wakil-ul-Mulk family, that any satisfactory arrangements could possibly have been effected, and as this appointment entirely depended on the will of the Zafar-u-Saltana, I venture to think, my Lord, that his Highness has given a most signal proof of his genuine desire to co-operate with this Consulate, and that his action in this particular case augurs well for the future.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

P. MOLESWORTH SYKES.

No. 149.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 49. Secret.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 14, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, as a French courier is leaving tomorrow for Trebizond and Constantinople, a copy of the French text and Agreement for an advance of 200,000*l.*, by the Imperial Bank of Persia to the Persian Government, the English substance of which I gave your Lordship in my telegram No. 55 of the 9th April. The original document remains for the present, pending further instructions from your Lordship, in the custody of the chief manager of the Bank.

As I have already had the honour to report by telegraph, the Russian Legation became aware, on or about the 5th instant, that there was a likelihood of the acceptance by the Imperial Bank of Persia of the Persian Government's offer of the fisheries, and on the evening of the 7th M. Vlassoff proceeded to the Grand Vizier's with the intention of demanding that before any Agreement was concluded on the subject, it should be referred to St. Petersburg, so as to satisfy the Russian Government that it contained nothing inconsistent with their own Loan Contract. His Highness coolly replied that he feared it was too late for this, as the Agreement had been signed three days previously, *id est*, on the 4th, the date on which I had accepted in principle the amended draft proposed by M. Naus, in place of the one inclosed in my despatch No. 47 of the 6th instant. He then, on the principle that the offensive is the best defensive, turned on the Russian Minister and reproached him bitterly for having attached such hard conditions to the small loan for which he had asked him, that he, the friend of Russia, had been driven to negotiate with the English as the only alternative to seeing himself dismissed from office and an anti-Russian Ministry installed in power. This attack seems to have silenced remonstrance on the part of M. Vlassoff, who merely said that the conditions had been insisted upon, not by himself but by M. de Witte.

Under these circumstances it was necessary that the Agreement should be signed forthwith without the further modifications or amplifications which I should personally have wished to introduce into it, and M. Rabino having received the necessary authority at an early hour on the following morning, the formality took place the same forenoon (8th April). It was arranged that subsidiary questions and details should be dealt with in a subsequent exchange of notes between M. Rabino and M. Naus, and respecting these I shall have the honour to address a further despatch to your Lordship.

Rapid action was absolutely essential, as the Grand Vizier, hard pressed by the Court party, was under the necessity, in order to save his position, either of accepting the terms offered by the Russian Government, or confronting the latter with an accomplished fact, in the shape of an Agreement signed with us. Had he failed to provide the Shah with money his overthrow was a question of a day or so; in fact, so confident were the Opposition of it that they had actually distributed, it would appear, with His Imperial Majesty's acquiescence, the various offices among the new Ministers, and were only waiting for the conclusion of the "Ashura" on the 11th instant to strike the blow.

The Russian Minister, I believe, promised the Grand Vizier, on the 31st ultimo, to obtain the Caspian Fisheries advance for him without conditions, and was, I think, sincerely desirous of doing so. Indeed, it was currently believed for a day or so afterwards, that he had succeeded in this, and the Atabek-i-Azam thus obtained a brief respite, but M. de Witte declined to abate his terms, and M. Grabe, his Agent here, expressed his confidence that an appeal for help to England would be in vain.

The proposals made by the Banque d'Escompte on which the whole question turned, were that, in consideration of a loan of 200,000*l.* for six months, the Persian Government should:—

(a.) Close its Mint to the public and make its coinage a State monopoly.

(b.) Grant to the Banque d'Escompte for the duration of all Russian loans the exclusive privilege of the supply of bar silver to the Mint at invoice price with charges and a commission of 2 per cent.

The effect of this arrangement would have been disastrous to the Imperial Bank of Persia, against which there can be little doubt that it was directly aimed.

The continued existence of the Bank's note issue depends upon a constant supply of coin, i.e., of newly-minted silver. This supply would have become intermittent and might frequently have stopped altogether; so that the note circulation would have had to be reduced or perhaps abandoned. The Russian Bank, moreover, whilst claiming the right to the exclusive supply of silver, refused to give any assurance that such supply would in all cases be forthcoming. It would therefore have been sufficient for it to stop importing during a few months to place the Imperial Bank in jeopardy.

It must be remembered that the Mint turns out about 500,000*l.* or 600,000*l.* worth of silver coins a-year, often defective and badly struck; that this output is so much below the requirements of trade that the Persian kran has a purchasing power of 20 to 25 per cent. above its intrinsic value, and further, that there is a constant outflow of Persian coins into Russian Central Asia and an equally constant dearth of currency in Northern Persia itself.

As a result of the cessation of the Imperial Bank's profitable silver imports, its advances to the Persian Government must have been so reduced that it would not have been difficult for the Russian Government to extinguish the existing ones altogether, and demand as a condition of their own next advance to Persia that her borrowings from the Imperial Bank should cease, thus entailing a decrease in the earning power of the Bank which would almost have put a premium upon liquidation, and placing the Persian Government more than ever under the heel of its only other creditor.

These grave perils have happily been averted for the present by your Lordship's decision, and that of the Viceroy to afford the Grand Vizier assistance in the only form in which he deems it open to him under the Loan Contract of 1900 to accept it. Not only has he thus been placed by us under a distinct obligation, but the spell of Russian financial tutelage has been to some extent broken, and the foundation laid, I hope, for its ultimate destruction. I have informed him that the Bank had been placed in a position, owing to assurances received by it from your Lordship, to advance to the Persian Government the sum of 300,000*l.*, and that I might, indeed, mention to him privately that even more might be provided upon certain conditions, but that I thought it best at first only to treat on the basis of an advance of 200,000*l.* M. Naus was also of opinion that this would be easier because the sum of 200,000*l.*—the only one as to which it would be necessary to make any communication to the Russians—represented the value of the Caspian royalties, on which the offers, both to the Russian and Imperial Banks, had turned and which were, as he expressed it, "la façade" of our arrangement. But I hope your Lordship will authorize me to offer the remaining 100,000*l.*, which His Majesty's Government are prepared to lend the Bank, when the Persian Government next applies for it, on conditions similar in principle, though perhaps better expressed, to those of the present Agreement. That the Grand Vizier will do so is certain, as the whole of the present advance is being applied to the repayment of debts, including 35,000*l.* owed to the Banque d'Escompte, 60,000*l.* owed to the Imperial Bank (partly on account of a recent advance of 40,000*l.*, and partly on account of interest on the advance of 200,000*l.*, made in 1901), which the latter will, however, relend immediately. When this extra 100,000*l.* has been advanced, Persia's total debt to English creditors will be 500,000*l.*, payable out of the Gulf Customs, a sum the repayment of which, even if it were possible under the Contract, would seriously reduce the value to Persia of any fresh Russian loan on the Northern Customs, if not entirely absorb it.

M. Vlassoff has expressed to an informant of mine his extreme dissatisfaction with the Grand Vizier for having taken our advance, adding that never in the course of a long Oriental experience had he had to deal with so false and slippery a person as his Highness, and although M. Grube professes to regard the matter with indifference, I am told to-day that M. de Witte has sent him a telegram intimating that the Russian Government will, to let Persia feel its displeasure, now put high duties on the Persian Caspian fish.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 149.

*French Text of the Agreement for an advance of 200,000*l.* by the Imperial Bank of Persia to the Persian Government.*

CONTRAT entre, d'une part, le Gouvernement Persan, représenté par son Altesse l'Émir Atta Beg Azam, Amine-Sultan, et son Excellence M. Naus, Ministre d'État, dûment autorisé par Sa Majesté le Schah; et, d'autre part, M. Joseph Rabino, Chief Manager de l'Imperial Bank of Persia, dûment autorisé par la Direction de cette Banque.

L'Imperial Bank of Persia fait au Gouvernement Persan une avance de 200,000*l.* productive d'intérêts à raison de 5 pour cent l'an.

Le Gouvernement Persan s'engage à rembourser la dite avance à l'Imperial Bank en vingt années, capital et intérêts, au moyen du produit des redevances qui lui sont dues pour les pêcheries de la Mer Caspienne.

Il est convenu si les revenus des pêcheries de la Mer Caspienne étaient insuffisants pour assurer le paiement régulier du remboursement prévu ci-dessus, le Gouvernement Persan s'engage à prélever et à payer les sommes nécessaires à cet effet sur les revenus des Postes et des Télégraphes, et en cas d'insuffisance de ceux-ci, sur les revenus des Douanes du Fars et du Golfe Persique.

Pour les contestations pouvant survenir au sujet du l'interprétation du présent Contrat, le texte Français prévaudra.

Ainsi fait en double expédition en Français et en Persan à Téhéran, le 4 Avril, 1903.

On Persian text (signature and seal).

(Autograph of Shah.)

This writing is correct.

Date: Garden of Gulistan.

(Signed) ATTABEG AZAM.

(Signed) J. NAUS.
J. RABINO.

No. 150.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 24th April, relative to the Russian quarantine cordon in Persia.

India Office, May 2, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 150.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

QUARANTINE cordon in Persia.

Your telegram of the 14th.

Sir A. Hardinge states that Grand Vizier can hardly be expected at present, his position being still precarious, to take strong measures against Russian interests. He has, however, now received a reminder to the note Sir A. Hardinge addressed to him on the 23rd March, and has promised to reply officially after seeing the Shah.

India Office, April 24, 1903.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 4.)

(A.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd May, relative to the reported murder of a merchant of Sana by a Haushabi.

India Office, May 4, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 151.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May 2, 1903.*
INFORMATION has been received by the Turkish Ambassador that early in February last a merchant of Sana, Ghanima by name, was murdered by a Haushabi on his way to Aden. Ambassador desires arrest and punishment of murderer. Resident should report, and, if necessary, take action.
(Repeated to Aden.)

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 4.)

(B.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd May, relative to the new Mudir of Wakra.

India Office, May 4, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 152.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May 3, 1903.*
YOUR telegram of the 1st May.
There is no intention, I presume, to do more than prevent Yusuf from embarking for Wakra, or for some port from whence he could reach that place. This is certainly desirable in my opinion.

Memorandum respecting Trade with the Karun River.

Year.	Imports from Great Britain.	Imports from India.	Total Imports from All Countries.
	£	£	£
1895	430	21,399	28,751
1896	8,631	21,343	72,498
1897	250	13,036	26,030
1898	226	35,990	72,817

The imports into the Karun ports are not given for the various countries separately after 1898.

Lord Curzon to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 6.)

(Confidential.)

My dear Lansdowne,

Viceroy's Camp, April 12, 1903.

I THINK that I had better send to you direct the following rather important correspondence. The writer is a Mr. Dobbs, a young civilian who was at one time Private Secretary to Sir A. MacDonell, and whom I took into the Political Department. He has served for a time in Beluchistan, and is now returning from leave via Persia. He is an intelligent and reliable young man, and his testimony is worthy of serious consideration.

I know nothing about the D'Arcy Concession myself beyond what I have read in the Foreign Office print. But I have not the slightest objection to Mr. Dobbs' letter and Memorandum being shown to Mr. D'Arcy or to the Directors of the Syndicate in England. It is at any rate the opinion of an intelligent and disinterested observer.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) CURZON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 154.

Mr. J. Dobbs to Sir W. Lawrence.

Dear Sir Walter Lawrence,

Kermanshah, March 4, 1903.

IN view of the great interest which his Excellency the Viceroy is known to take in Persian affairs, I am venturing out of my sphere in asking you, if you think proper, to bring to his notice, by placing the inclosed Memorandum before him, the danger which I humbly conceive to exist of a serious blow being inflicted on British prestige by the ignominious collapse of the D'Arcy oil scheme in Persia.

I know that Major Newmarch has recently visited Kasr-i-Shérén, and has presumably reported his impressions to Government, and I only desire to supplement any such report from my point of view as an outsider; as I have perhaps had special facilities for forming a judgment on the situation, owing to the fact that I have been able to mix with the Kurds in their houses and speak with them in Persian, and have also cautiously obtained information on the state of the tribes and the attitude of the authorities during my stay here in Kermanshah. I have also by chance come into contact with Cesari, a Customs official on the Perso-Turkish border, whom I believe to be an active Russian agent, and have heard him over his wine boasting of his influence and exhibiting an almost unconcealed hostility to England. Moreover, I have sat in tea-houses and heard political matters discussed.

As you will see from the inclosed Memorandum, the Directors of the Oil Concession Syndicate in England have been induced by misrepresentations to believe that Mr. Reynolds, the engineer in charge of the works, has caused hostility by his inexperience in Persian affairs, and is likely to cause the undertaking to be a failure. They have in consequence overridden his authority, made his position intolerable, and made it exceedingly probable that a failure will result. My main object, therefore, in addressing his Excellency is to bear independent testimony to the great tact which Mr. Reynolds has exercised in his dealings with the wild Kurdish tribes. My second object is to bring to his Excellency's notice the political importance attached to the D'Arcy undertaking in the eyes of the people of the country. I am aware that his Excellency is probably already in possession of most of the facts set forth in my Memorandum, but I have thought it possible that some facts may be new, or at all events set forth in a new light; and it has occurred to me that he might be disposed, in view of the importance of the matter, to cause the present state of affairs to be communicated to the Directors of the D'Arcy scheme in England, in order that things may be set straight and the danger of a failure avoided.

I know that I am running the risk of being charged with impertinence in meddling with matters which do not concern me; but I trust that, if his Excellency takes this view of the case, he will kindly regard this letter as only an ill-considered effort of patriotism.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) J. DOBBS.

P.S.—I go from here via Kangavar and Sultanabad to Ispahan, which I shall reach about the 22nd March. I shall be in Kerman about the 20th April, and hope to arrive at Quetta about the 1st June.

J. D.

Inclosure 2 in No. 154.

Note on the D'Arcy Oil Concession in Persia.

(Confidential.)

A CONCESSION to prospect for work and refine oil throughout Persian Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Luristan, and Arabistan was originally granted by the Persian Government to Mr. Kitabji, former Director-General of Persian Customs. The latter went to England, and was introduced by Sir Henry Drummond-Wolf to Mr. D'Arcy, who has since financed the Concession. The interest in the Concession retained by the Kitabji family is not known. A certain sum was paid down to the Persian Government when the Concession was granted, and the principal conditions of the Concession are that a Company shall be formed for working the Concession, and an additional sum of 20,000*l.* paid to the Persian Government before the 3rd June, 1903, failing which the Concession will lapse, and will on no account be renewed. If a Company is duly formed and work carried on by it, the Concession is to last for sixty years.

2. In the beginning of 1901 Mr. Burls, a geological expert, was sent out by the holders of the Concession to inspect the country. He found that continuous oil-bearing strata stretch from the neighbourhood of Kasr-i-Shérén, close to the Perso-Turkish frontier in the Province of Kermanshah, down through the Kalhur and Lur country to a spot south of Shuster; and he reported that the most favourable point at which to commence drilling for oil would be at Kasr-i-Shérén, close to two natural oil-springs which have long existed on the land of the Bajlan Kurds, producing about 10 gallons of oil a-day, which are refined at the small village of Saklavon near by. The practical direction of the business in England was placed in the hands of Mr. Redwood, the leading British petroleum expert; and Mr. Reynolds, formerly of the Indian Public Works Department, who has also managed various non-Government engineering and mining concerns in India, and others in Jumatra and Mexico, was sent out at the end of 1901 to begin the work of boring for oil. At the same time Mr. Paul Kitabji, son of the retired Director of Customs, was appointed Commissioner in Tehran on a salary of 1,000*l.* a-year, to look after the interests of the concern at the Persian capital. Mr. Paul Kitabji is a young man who has been brought up chiefly in England, and has little experience of Persia.

3. When Mr. Reynolds arrived at Kasr-i-Shérén, duly furnished with all necessary permits and instructions from the Persian Government, he found the following state of affairs existing among the Kurd tribes in the neighbourhood of Kasr-i-Shérén. The point at which boring was to commence was situated in the land of a section of the small Bajlan tribe ruled over by Aziz Khan. This chief is practically independent of the control of the Persian Government, since he is within an hour's ride of the Turkish frontier (the Bajlans have no separate "sardsér" and "garmsér"), and is closely connected with the powerful tribe of the Jaff Kurds in Turkish territory, under the leadership of Mahmud Pasha. If the Governor of Kermanshah were to attempt to coerce Aziz Khan in any way the latter would at once take refuge among the Jaffs, and the whole of this portion of the frontier would be thrown into confusion by the raids which the Jaff tribe would certainly undertake as reprisals upon Persian territory.

Aziz Khan was at first bitterly hostile to Mr. Reynolds, and the latter at once perceived that he would be powerless unless he could conciliate this Chief. After some inquiry into local politics, he found that Aziz Khan was heavily in debt to the Governor of Kermanshah, and he determined on the bold stroke of paying off the whole of Aziz Khan's debt, and thus securing him as a friend. This device succeeded completely, and Aziz Khan is now a firm friend of Mr. Reynolds, whom he looks upon as his protector. Mr. Reynolds then set himself to winning over the neighbouring tribes, who could at any moment wreck the works by a sudden raid, and in whose land it may be subsequently necessary to bore for oil. By friendly intercourse and judicious presents he has now won over Mahmud Pasha of the Jaffs (across the Turkish border); Mauzin-ul-Mulk, of the great Goran tribe, to the immediate north of the oil-works; Samsam-ul-Mamalik Sher Khan, of the Sinjawi tribe round Kasr-i-Shérén, and Daud Khan, of the Kalhurs, to the south.

Among these tribes he has now acquired an influence which I do not hesitate to

compare to that of Sir Robert Sandeman among the tribes of Thal Chotiali and Zhob, and which is producing a very great political effect. I speak Persian, and found it possible to converse freely with the Kurds (who all speak that language, though imperfectly) on my recent journey from Bagdad to Kermanshah. Moreover, I made a point of not halting at the regular stages in caravanserais, but of passing the nights in Kurd houses, and of visiting as many of the principal men as I could, being accompanied only by a Kurdish servant and a Persian muleteer. I can, therefore, speak from personal experience of the light in which the people of the country regard Mr. Reynolds. They all know him as the great "Raes-i-Nafat" or "master of the oil springs." They praise his generosity and kindness, which they contrast with the behaviour of their Persian Rulers; and they look upon him as the representative of the power of Great Britain.

The following incidents among others in my journey illustrate the position which he has won among the Kurds. I started from Kasr-i-Shérén after a night of heavy rain to visit the oil-works 12 miles away. The small River Kuratu, which I had to cross by a ford opposite Aziz Khan's fort, was in heavy flood, and a large number of the Bajlans came down to the opposite bank to watch me struggling across. When I had gained the opposite bank a man came up and asked me whether I was a Russian. I said, "No; I am an Englishman, and am going to see the Raes-i-Nafat." The man replied, "That is good. We want only the English. Why is the Raes-i-Nafat going away, and a new Raes of another country taking his place?" (He referred to the impending departure of Mr. Reynolds, and the temporary substitution of Mr. Rosenplanter, an American, of whom more hereafter.) I replied that the new Raes was a man of a country peopled by the English race, and was to all intents and purposes an Englishman. With this he seemed satisfied, and I proceeded on my way. The second incident to which I refer is the following: When I was returning from the oil-works the next day, women with bowls of milk ran out from their houses in two villages which I had to pass, having mistaken me in the distance for Mr. Reynolds. They were evidently disappointed when they found that I was a stranger, and explained that they always brought bowls of milk to Mr. Reynolds when he passed. A third incident, of which I have heard accounts, is still more striking. Aziz Khan, with an armed band, recently came by accident face to face near Mr. Reynolds' camp, with his deadly enemy, Kader Khan, who killed two of Aziz Khan's sons last year. A regular pitched battle was impending, when Mr. Reynolds managed to persuade the two parties to return peacefully to their homes. The result of all this has been (a result possibly not contemplated by the promoters of the Concession) that the undertaking has, so far, powerfully increased the influence of Great Britain over the whole neighbourhood. The Jaffs, the Gorans, the Sinjavis, and the Kalhurs all wander widely, their "garmsérs" and "sardsérs" being far apart. They carry the news of this great undertaking and of its beneficent English Director over a large extent of country, and the collapse or mismanagement of the concern would be looked upon throughout this region as a signal political defeat of England. It is, therefore, of the very greatest importance that such a result should be prevented.

4. Having described the position won by Mr. Reynolds among the Kurds, I return to the history of the undertaking. After arranging matters with Aziz Khan, Mr. Reynolds set to work to bring up the drilling machinery from Bagdad to Kasr-i-Shérén. This has proved a terribly slow business. Parts of the machinery were at first brought from Bussorah by Turkish steamers to Bagdad, and were completely smashed in the process. The carriage was then intrusted to Messrs. Lynch and Sons, but the accumulation of goods at their Bussorah depôts was so great that immense delays took place. Then a track passable for carts had to be discovered from Bagdad to Kasr-i-Shérén, the usual caravan track being quite impracticable for heavy traction. And, when this was at last accomplished, various difficulties arose with the officials in Turkish territory. All these difficulties have at last been surmounted by the indomitable energy of Mr. Reynolds, who has had practically no trained office staff under him, and has had to conduct all correspondence and keep accounts with his own hands. His staff has consisted of a Canadian drilling engineer, an English transport agent, and several Galician oil-drillers, with a certain number of miscellaneous Persian servants and orderlies. Drilling for oil at last commenced last October, and has proceeded as quickly as possible, in view of the fact that it has been constantly delayed by the non-arrival of iron-sheeting or other important material. A depth of 700 feet has been reached, and Mr. Reynolds confidently expects to strike any day a gush of oil which would amply prove the value of the Concession, and justify the formation of a Company before the date on which the Concession lapses. If oil is struck, it is intended to

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convey it by an immense pipe-line, 8 inches in diameter, and capable of transporting 25,000 barrels a-day, over hill and dale as far as Ahwaz, 285 miles off. The line for the pipe has been surveyed by Mr. Cruddar, an Indian Government surveyor; but he does not seem to have quite understood the possibilities of pipe-laying, and it is feared that great parts of the line will have to be re-surveyed. It is calculated that the pipe-line, as projected, would weigh 21,000 tons, the cost of transport of which alone would average 20*l.* per ton. In addition to this, the line crosses numerous hills, at the foot of each of which reservoirs would have to be made, and pumps set up at each reservoir to force the oil over the hills. The cost of transport of the pumping apparatus also would be very heavy; so that the initial cost of the plant alone would probably amount to not less than 1,000,000*l.* Arrangements would then have to be made for paying subsidies to the tribes (Kalhurs, Lurs, &c.), through whose territory the pipe would pass, a measure which would produce a great political effect. A second geological expert, Mr. Dalton, was recently sent out by the holders of the Concession, and he is now examining the country, especially the region in the neighbourhood of Shuster.

5. I now approach a matter which, apart from any financial consideration, threatens to ruin the scheme under consideration. All was going well, and Mr. Reynolds was overcoming all local opposition, when the concessionnaires in England sent out a Persian, named Sheikh-ul-Mulk, with instructions to Mr. Reynolds to consult him in dealing with the Persians. This man is a native of Kerman, is believed to have been for a long time a journalist in Paris, and has no particular position in Persia, nor has he any knowledge of the Kurds. Titles, such as that of Sheikh-ul-Mulk, are obtained from Government by the local Governors in Persia in return for small cash payments, and mean nothing. The Sheikh-ul-Mulk arrived at Kasr-i-Shérén, and gave practically no advice to Mr. Reynolds, but occupied himself in telegraphing and writing home reports to the concessionnaires in England over Mr. Reynolds' head. He soon became a centre of intrigue in the camp, representing that he had the ear of the powers at home, and tried to get all the payments of gifts, salaries, &c., into his own hands, with the obvious desire of enriching his friends and acquaintances. The line which he took up was that Mr. Reynolds was exciting hostility in the neighbourhood by not employing Persians exclusively, and by not dispensing money with sufficient liberality. To any one who has seen anything of the Kurds (who are the only people who matter in this connection), such an allegation is an absurdity; for they care no more for the Persians than for any other race. The concessionnaires in England, however, apparently under the advice of Mr. Kitabji, believed in the Sheikh's representations, and sent out numerous telegraphic orders over-riding Mr. Reynolds' authority, ordering him to reinstate petty menials, such as farrosches, whom he had dismissed for incompetence, to employ various persons suggested by the Sheikh (such as a useless interpreter named Nasrulla Khan, who receives the absurd salary of 25*l.* a-month). The contents of every telegram of this sort were at once known through the length and breadth of the land, and Mr. Reynolds' authority was undermined in every possible way. Finally, in addition to the Sheikh-ul-Mulk, young Mr. Edward Kitabji (brother of the Commissioner in Tehran), who has passed most of his life in Europe, and is quite inexperienced, came to Kasr-i-Shérén, and tried to interfere in the management. As an instance of the interfering attitude which he took up, I may mention that he desired Mr. Reynolds not to be so friendly with the Jaff Chief, whereas it is essential to the success of the project that the Jaffs should be friendly. Old Mr. Kitabji recently died in England, and Mr. Edward Kitabji has now left Kasr-i-Shérén; but the position of Mr. Reynolds has become so intolerable, his authority being constantly overridden, that he has sent in his resignation, and is about to return to England. Mr. Rosenplanter, whom I have already mentioned, and who was originally sent out with instructions to begin separate borings near Shuster, has been temporarily sent up to take Mr. Reynolds' place at Kasr-i-Shérén. He is an American citizen, who has, however, long been identified with British concerns (it was he who superintended the Assam oil-drilling operations in their initial stages), and he seems inclined to carry on Mr. Reynolds' policy; though I do not think that he is so well fitted to deal with the tribes, and win their confidence, as Mr. Reynolds is. He also feels, however, that he cannot remain if the concessionnaires in England override his authority in petty matters, as they have done that of Mr. Reynolds; and, if he goes, the whole affair will be a miserable failure, and a severe blow will be dealt to British prestige in this part of the country.

6. The opinion of competent Judges on the spot now seems to be that the pipe-line will be so enormously costly that it can only be made to pay by: (1) working up from near the coast, beginning with the oil-strata near Shuster, and pushing further up as business develops, next tapping the oil-strata in Kalhur territory near the Turkish

frontier town of Mendeli, and finally arriving at Kasr-i-Shérén, when the whole length of the pipe-line would be able to work to its full capacity; (2) by obtaining a separate Concession from the Turkish Government to work oil on the Turkish side of the frontier along the same strata, so as to have oil fully sufficient to supply the pipe. The obtaining of such a Concession is the more necessary, as the Perso-Turkish frontier is loosely defined, and it is doubtful whether the richest oil-strata at Mendeli are in Turkish or Persian territory. If this view were adopted the drilling at Kasr-i-Shérén, even if successful, would have to be looked upon for the present as only a costly experiment, carried out with the object of proving the existence of large deposits of oil in the strata; and the works at that place would have to be left unattached to the pipe-line until it is carried gradually up from the coast.

7. My conclusions are as follows:—

(a.) The success of the D'Arcy Concession depends, of course, primarily on the finding of oil in paying quantities, the cost of transport, &c., being considered. The experts seem to have little doubt that this will be done, and it is to be hoped that it will be done before the lapse of the Concession on the 3rd June, 1903, so as to enable a Company to be formed.

(b.) Apart from the question of the existence of oil, the undertaking will certainly fail if the concessionnaires at home refuse to completely trust the man on the spot, and undermine his authority by listening to the tittle-tattle of interested persons like the Sheikh-ul-Mulk. A strong man, with the instincts of an Indian frontier officer, is wanted, who will pursue a policy of winning over the tribes to his side, and supporting the Chiefs in opposition to the Russian policy. Such a man I believe to exist in Mr. Reynolds.

No. 155.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 16th April, relative to the new Mudirs for the Katr coast.

India Office, May 4, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 155.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, March 23, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my telegram, dated the 12th March, on the subject of El Katr, that, on the 16th instant, the mail-steamer from Bussorah arrived in Bushire. Abdul Karim Effendi, the Mudir-designate for Odeid, was on board, en route to Bahrein. I had him interviewed, and he stated that his destination had been altered. He was to have gone to Odeid, but he knew what a desolate place Odeid was, and he had managed to arrange a transfer to another place called Alayun, which I am unable to locate, but which is, I believe, somewhere near Katif or Al Hassa, and he was on his way to Al Hassa to obtain orders from the Mutessarif. As regards Odeid, he stated that another officer, whose name he did not know, had been appointed as Mudir. He was of Kurdish origin, and was now in Bussorah, and would probably come to Bahrein by the following mail. He stated that Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani had asked the Porte to establish administrative units at Zobara, Wakra, and Odeid, and that Arabi Effendi, who had gone to Bahrein by the preceding mail-steamer, was nominated to the Zobara Mudirich, and that Yusuf Beg, now at Al Hassa, was to go to Wakra.

He did not know the number of soldiers to be stationed at the new posts.

2. It is, I think, very probable that Sheikh Jasim has recommended to the Porte the establishment of these posts. The Turkish authorities have, I believe, been for some time anxious to get hold of Sheikh Jasim, and I gather that they wish to hold him responsible for the recently disturbed state of the country between Ojair and Al Hassa. Sheikh Jasim has therefore, in order to absolve himself from responsibility,

recommended the Turks to establish posts at several points on Katr, knowing that we should not view with equanimity any occupation of Zobara and Odeid, and wishing to embroil the Turks with us.

3. It is, in my opinion, absolutely essential for the security of the Bahrein islands that Zobara should not be occupied by the Turks. Apart from the fact that the occupation of Zobara would be viewed with the greatest concern by the Chief of Bahrein, who considers the place to be an appanage of his, and whose rights we are bound to maintain, the prestige which the Turks would gain throughout the countryside by the occupation of this place, in opposition to the well-known views of the British Government, would be so great that an attack on Bahrein from Katr could at any time be organized, and the continual presence of a ship of war in Bahrein waters, and perhaps even a military occupation of the islands, would be required. Regarding the occupation by the Turks of other places on El Katr it is not, I think, necessary for me at the present time to add anything to what has already been said on the subject.

No. 156.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of letters from the Resident, Aden, dated the 5th April, and inclosures, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 5, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 156.

Resident, Aden, to India Office.

(Confidential.)

COPY of Colonel Wahab's Secret letter, dated Camp Sanah, the 2nd instant, forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London. It covers the political diary of the Commission from the 6th the 31st March last inclusive.

(For Political Resident Aden),
(Signed) H. M. ABUD,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Note.—Copies of the diary have been forwarded to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and the Government of Bombay; also to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Inclosure 2 in No. 156.

Diary.

(March 6 to 31, inclusive.)

March 6 to 12.—Nothing of importance to record. Business mostly at a standstill, owing to the Id festival.

March 13.—Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar writes that disturbances continue among the Yafa, that Seid Ahmad Mohsin is preaching Jihad, and that some of the people of Juban have appealed to some of the Yafa to join the Turks in war against the British.

March 14.—Mr. Fitzmaurice started for Hardaba to meet General Maitland. News from Kataba that Emin Bey, Mutessarif of Taiz, has arrived there; also that Saleh Zendani and others of his family are visiting the Turks in Jalela. Interviewed Sheikh Muslah Ali of Khalla, who declared that the people of Khalla were not concerned in the affair at Al Husen on the 3rd March, but that it was caused by Nagi Sef and Yahiya-bin-Nashir of Husen Shuka; he said he would gladly receive us at Khalla at any time. Interviewed Sheikh Hariz-bin-Nasir, who brought a letter from his brother, Al Khulakai, to the effect that there was much discord among the Shaibi Sheikhs, who were offended with him for visiting the British without consulting them.

March 15.—Mutlak-bin-Nasir, of Mafari forwarded a letter from Nagi Mohsin Abu Hadal, of Jihaf, to the effect that Saleh Zendani has repudiated his acquiescence in the British visiting Jihaf, and is throwing in his lot with Muhammed Nasir Mukbil, replied, promising Abu Hadal support.

General Maitland arrived, accompanied by Mr. Fitzmaurice and the Amir.

The Mutessarif of Taiz is reported to have visited Jalela.

March 16.—The Amir came, accompanied by Seid Muhammed Taha, of Jihaf; he brought a letter from Sheikh Mus'ad Yahiya Said Maharraz, of the Halmin, cautioning him that all the Halmin and Aj'ud country was combining against the British, at the instigation of Seid Ahmad Mohsin.

Sheikh Ahmad Nagi, of the Al Yaba (west of Kataba), fled into Amiri territory from Markaza, owing to some difference with the Turks.

March 17.—Mr. Fitzmaurice visited Jalela, and remonstrated with the Turkish Commissioners for having sent a distorted account of the Al Husen incident, and about the Mutessarif of Taiz's visit to Jalela in disputed territory; also inquired about the flag incident at Al W'ara in October 1901, whether the flag had been traced.

Sheikh Ali-bin Ali Nagi Zendani came, bringing a letter, sent by Seid Mohsin to Sheikh Saleh Zendani, Nakib Ghalib, and the people of Jihaf, inciting them to Jihad against the British.

Seid Muhammed Taha wrote that the recent action of Saleh Zendani and Nakib Ghalib in collecting Zedi mercenaries was due to their being elated by too free indulgence in "Kat," and that they are now more reasonably inclined.

March 18.—Saleh Zendani sent down one of his Zedi soldiers to feel the way for coming in to the British.

March 19.—Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi and Dr. Innis paid an informal visit.

March 21.—Mr. Fitzmaurice visited the Turkish Commissioners at Jalela, and found that they had just received orders to evacuate Jalela, and to demarcate the Amiri border on the basis of the green line. In the evening, Colonel Mustafa Ramzi wrote to say that they would evacuate Jalela to-night, and that they would be at Kataba; he asked me to let them know when we would be ready to proceed with the work of demarcation. Replied that we would communicate with them as soon as possible. Hubesh Saleh of Jalela wrote that the British should not approach Jalela nor the Shairi country without previously consulting him. Replied requiring him to come at sunrise to-morrow morning.

Major Tod left to start the survey in the Humedi country, and to reconnoitre the Tiban Valley route.

March 22.—The Turks withdrew completely from Jalela very early in the morning. Mr. Fitzmaurice, hearing that Arabs were destroying the buildings evacuated by the Turks, went over to Jalela with a party of Bombay Infantry. He was met in front of the village by a considerable number of Arabs, headed by Hubesh Saleh. The latter parleyed, requiring that none should be put in authority over him; replied that there was no intention of this, and that a post of 100 men would be stationed at Jalela to preserve order. The Turkish post was then occupied by a detachment of the 23rd Bombay Rifles, under Major Delamain, and the Union Jack hoisted on the flag tower.

General Maitland left for Aden.

March 23.—The Amir went over to Jalela of his own accord, and was found holding a meeting in Hubesh Saleh's house, at which, besides Hubesh Saleh, there were present Sheikh Saleh Zendani of Jihaf, Sheikh Ahmad Nagi of the Al Yubi, and the Sheikhs of the Shairi.

Sheikh Shaif Mulbil, of the Humedi, came in to the Commission and claimed to be recognized as Sheikh of the Humedi, as he feared that, on account of his having taken the side of the Turks, Husen-bin-Hassan might be made sole Sheikh of the Humedi, and would do him harm.

Assured him that if he remained quiet he would not be molested, and would be recognized as a Sheikh, but that he could not expect to be made the paramount Sheikh, as under the Turks.

March 24.—Colonel Wahab and Mr. Fitzmaurice rode out to Sanah where they found the Turkish Custom-house officials awaiting orders and not collecting dues. Then went on to Kataba, and visited the Turkish Commissioners and discussed with them the question of demarcation.

It was agreed that a large scale map should be made to show the actual frontier-line, and a smaller scale map to show a wider strip of country.

Captain Warneford arrived to take up the duties of Political Officer with the Aden column.

Major Tod returned, having marched down the Tiban to near Musemir, met Sheikh Awas, of the Ahmadi, and the cousin of the Haushabi Sultan, and came back by the Mashwara Pass.

March 26.—Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar, of the Mawsatta, wrote warning us of Husen Ali Askar intriguing with the Turks against the British.

March 27.—Reported that 100 Turkish troops have marched from Kataba to the Al Haiki country *en route* to Taiz; also that Sheikh Ahmad Nagl, of the Al Yubi, who had returned to Markaza, has fled to Jabal Hesha, and his house has been occupied by Turkish troopers.

March 28.—A Turkish trooper murdered in the Al Haiki country.

March 29.—Mr. Fitzmaurice, Major Tod, Lieutenant Tandy, and survey party marched, with an escort of eighty of the 23rd Bombay Rifles under Major Delamain, to Sanah, near Kataba, and encamped 200 yards of the custom-house.

March 30.—Mr. Fitzmaurice and Major Tod visited the Turkish camp at Kataba.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi and Suliman Bey came over to the British camp to inquire about the mapping operations. Ibrahim Seifi came again about the settlement of the custom-house affairs.

March 31.—Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi and Kadri Bey, Director of Customs, again came over about the settlement of custom-house affairs preparatory to the withdrawal of the Turkish officials.

Colonel Wahab and the rest of the Commission arrived at Sanah from Dthala.

One hundred Turkish troops are reported to have occupied Al Husen, in the Al Haiki country, to punish the murderer of a Turkish trooper.

Wrote to the Turkish Commissioners protesting against the illegal levying of a 4½ per cent. duty on coffee exported from Yemen.

(Secret.)

Camp Sanah (near Kataba), April 2, 1903.

Forwarded to Resident at Aden.

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB, Colonel.

Inclosure 3 in No. 156.

Resident, Aden, to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Aden, April 7, 1903.

COPY of despatch dated Camp Sanah, the 5th April, 1903, from Mr. G. M. Fitzmaurice, Joint Commissioner to his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir N. R. O'Connor, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, forwarded to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London.

(For Political Resident, Aden),
(Signed) H. M. ABUD,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Note.—A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to the Government of India and the Government of Bombay.

Inclosure 4 in No. 156.

Mr. Fitzmaurice to Sir N. O'Connor.

Sir,

Camp Sanah (near Kataba), April 5, 1903.

IN my despatch of the 22nd December I had the honour to refer to the gross irregularities of the Turkish Customs at this village in the vicinity of Kataba and on the British side of the Amiri border. The Sanah Customs was merely an organized system of brigandage, and its officials, not being regular Customs officers dependent on the Central Customs Administration at Constantinople, are appointed by the Vali of Yemen or his subordinates, into whose respective Treasuries the proceeds are paid.

The Customs at Mafallis, near Mavia, and on the road from Taiz to Musemir, is a similar institution, and I need only mention that its officials are mostly members of the family of Muhammad Nasir Mukbil.

Before the evacuation of Jalela frequent instances of their high-handed proceedings forced me to bring this state of things to the notice of the Turkish Commissioners, who admitted it and, by their representations, mitigated the evil to a certain extent.

Immediately after the evacuation of Jalela Colonel Wahab and myself visited the Turkish Customs here, and expostulated with them on their peculiar methods. As reported in my telegram No. 10 of the 25th March to your Excellency, they agreed to levy only the 1 per cent. fixed by Treaty except on coffee, on which, in virtue of orders received some four to five years ago, they levy, in addition to the Treaty 1 per cent., 3½ per cent. export duty for the up-keep of Turkish schools in Yemen. As your Excellency, in your telegram No. 10, thought it inadvisable to raise the question at Constantinople before delimitation of the Amiri border, I stated in reply (my No. 11 of the 27th March) that, as the matter considerably affected the trade of Aden, I would try to make some temporary arrangement locally.

Although the Turkish Government accepted the green line and the Turkish forces retired behind it on the 22nd March, their Customs at Sanah, over 2 miles on our side of the border, had received no instructions to retire, and we allowed them to continue to levy their dues even after the arrival of our camp here.

On the 31st March, Kadri Bey, the Head Director of Customs on the frontier, arrived and withdrew his officials on the following day. We took the opportunity of impressing on him and the Turkish Commissioners the anomalous nature of the 3½ extra export tax on coffee, but they stated that, without instructions from their superiors, they must continue to execute their orders on the subject. We then wrote to them requesting them to telegraph and obtain authorization to cease levying tax, which is contrary to Treaty, at the same time urging them not to levy it pending the arrival of such authorization. To the latter they could not accede, but they telegraphed to the Vali of Yemen at Sanah, pointing out our objections and asking for instructions, and the Vali has doubtless referred the matter to the Minister of the Interior.

I am convinced that representations from your Excellency at the latter Department would materially contribute towards the removal of a tax which is both arbitrary and illegal, at the same time that it constitutes a serious hindrance to Aden-bound traffic.

The argument that this heavy export duty naturally tends to decrease the cultivation of Yemen's staple product is one that may not appeal to the pre-economic régime of its Sultan's Government, but as it is against Treaty, we are entitled to demand its abolition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. FITZMAURICE.

No. 157.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 5th May, relative to the distribution of Turkish troops in Arabia.

India Office, May 5, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 157.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 5, 1903.

SEE my telegram of the 21st April.

1,500 Turkish troops are reported by British Consul to have landed at Hodeida about the 20th April, of whom 500 proceeded south-eastwards to Zaranik country, 500 were distributed between ports of Khorwahla and Medhytte, and the remainder were sent to take place of troops dispatched to Taiz.

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 158.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

(C.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th instant, relative to the new Mudir of Wakra.

India Office, May 5, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 158.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 5, 1903.

INTERPRETATION in your telegram of 3rd instant regarding detention of Yusuf at Bahrein is correct. I have informed Resident in Persian Gulf accordingly.

No. 159.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 6th May, relative to the murder of a trader from Sana, in Haushabi country.

India Office, May 6, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 159.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 6, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 2nd May.

The murder in Haushabi territory of a trader, Bind Ghanina by name, coming from Sana, in February last, is a fact. Two persons, a father and son, were implicated. An attempt was made to arrest them by Amir of Dthali in his territory, whither they had fled to the Sayads of Dthubiyat, but they again escaped, and all trace of them was lost after they had reached Yaffai country. Probably they will be captured if heard of. I will have look out kept for them.

No. 160.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, relative to inquiries made by the Russian Consul, Bushire, regarding Bassidore.

India Office, May 6, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 160.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, March 23, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a report from the Agent at Lingah regarding certain inquiries made by the Russian Consul when he visited Lingah recently in the Russian cruiser "Boyarin."

The flag is flown daily at Bassidore, but apparently the French Agent does not know this.

Inclosure 2 in No. 160.

Residency Agent, Lingah, to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.

(Translation.)

HAJI ABDUL RAHMAN-BIN-MUHAMMAD KAZEM, the French Agent, was asked by the Russian Consul (Bushire) whether there was anybody at Bassidore on behalf of the British Government, and Haji Abdul Rahman replied that the limit of the place in Bassidore which is held by the British Government is known. Asked: "Do they have a flagstaff at Bassidore?" Replied: "There is a flagstaff, and a flag is flown on Sundays." The Consul said he had wished to go to Bassidore, but he could not manage to do it. He then went to the Custom-house and sent for Haji Abdul Hadi Lari, and made inquiries from him about the state of affairs in Laristan and the route to Lar. He said he had been to Shiraz and places near it, and wished to go to Lar. He also said that he was going to Bunder Abbas, whence he would go to Muscat, and thence would return to Bunder Abbas, where he would pass a week, and then come overland to Lingah, and after passing a week go to Bushire. This is what I have heard from persons who were present.

No. 161.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

(C.)

Sir,

India Office, May 6, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 1st May relative to the proposal to conclude Treaties with the Chiefs of Beda and of the Upper Aulaki tribes, including, if necessary, Lower Behan, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to inclose herewith, for Lord Lansdowne's information, a copy of the instructions sent to the Government of India and repeated to the Resident at Aden on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 161.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 4, 1903.

RESIDENT at Aden's telegram of the 18th and yours of the 29th April.

His Majesty's Government sanction the proposal that Resident should negotiate Treaties, on the lines of Lower Yaffai Treaty of 1895, with Beda and with Upper Aulaki, including Lower Behan if necessary; but he should take care that pledges likely to cause difficulty in actual demarcation are avoided. As authorized in my telegram of the 9th January, he may also negotiate a similar Treaty with the Upper Yaffai. The immediate conclusion of a provisional Treaty with the Chief of Beda, and your suggestion in your telegram of the 29th that an officer should be sent to ascertain and report on facts as to borders of Beda and Behan, are also approved. As to stipends, I would leave the matter to your discretion.

(Repeated to Aden.)

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott.

(No. 112.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1903.

THE Russian Ambassador observed to me to-day that he had read with interest the statement which I had made in the House of Lords last night on the subject of British interests in Persia. He saw nothing in that statement to which exception could be taken. His Excellency said that I had not mentioned Russia, although I probably had Russia in my mind: that Power, however, had no idea of establishing a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

I replied that I was under the impression that my speech did not contain much that was new, and that I had merely reaffirmed propositions which had on previous occasions been made or implied on behalf of the British Government. I had certainly never heard that Russia or any other Power contemplated the acquisition of a naval base in the Gulf, but, as his Excellency was aware, there were many people who could not be persuaded that she had not such designs.

His Excellency went on to say that, in his opinion, things were hardly ripe for a discussion between our two Governments as to affairs in Persia. It would be difficult to draw a hard and fast line between British and Russian interests without raising questions which might give trouble. His instructions were to the effect that Russia accepted free commercial competition in Persia, and that was all.

I said that I fully realized the difficulty of laying down spheres of influence, but that I thought it would not be amiss that his Excellency and I should, if not to-day, perhaps on some other occasion, consider whether it would not be possible to arrive at an understanding upon certain points concerning the policy of the two countries in Persia.

We in this country recognized the preponderance of Russia in north Persia. On the other hand, we had special interests in the Gulf, in the south ports, and also in Seistan. With regard to the latter, I said that we should certainly regard with serious apprehension any attempt on the part of Russia to construct a railway from the north, so as to threaten the frontiers of India on the Beluchistan side.

His Excellency said that he fully understood our feelings on these subjects, and that he would be glad to discuss them with me unofficially whenever I liked. In the meanwhile, he expressed the opinion that it was most unlikely that railway schemes of the kind which I had described would be undertaken by the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 163.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Resident, Aden, dated 15th April, and inclosure, relative to the flag incident at Al Wara in 1901.

India Office, May 6, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 163.

Resident, Aden, to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Confidential.)

Aden Residency, April 15, 1903.

COPY of Colonel Wahab's Secret letter, dated Camp Sanah, 12th April last, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London.

(For Political Resident),

(Signed) H. M. ABUD,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Note.—A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to the Government of Bombay and His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Colonel Wahab to the Government of India.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Camp Sanah (near Kataba), April 12, 1903.

WITH reference to the Resident at Aden's telegram of 18th March last, from Dthala, commenting on the insult to our flag perpetrated by the Turks, and first reported in the Resident's telegram of 26th October, 1901. The facts of the case have not been fully reported to His Majesty's Government, and I beg to forward an account of the incident as ascertained by this Commission.

When first reported by the Resident in October, 1901, Major Davies was sent to Dthala, and ordered to inquire into the matter.

The Turks, however, were determined to shirk any real inquiry, and appear to have taken steps to prevent his visiting the village of Al Wara, the scene of the outrage, and situated just beyond the line from Jalela to the foot of Jihaf, i.e., the cordon which they kept drawn round this Commission for over a year. To remove any pretext for his crossing that line and visiting the place, Rahmi Effendi, the Kaimakam or Sub-Governor of Kataba, arranged to meet Major Davies between Jalela and Dthala. Rahmi Effendi did not deny that the British flag had been pulled down at Al Wara, but declared that it had been done by Arabs. Major Davies' subsequent investigations pointed to the inaccuracy of this version, and he again visited the Kaimakam, who refused to discuss matters, declaring that as Al Wara was on Turkish territory, he could not answer questions concerning it without the previous sanction of the Wali of Yemen.

Whether Rahmi Effendi took up this attitude of his own initiative or on instructions from his Chief, it was certainly not the correct line to take in a matter connected with the flag of a friendly Power, and it is obvious that he had something to hide. As this Commission was appointed soon after, Major Davies was recalled and the matter dropped for the moment, the Commission itself until quite recently being prevented by the Turks from visiting Al Wara.

The village of Al Wara was undoubtedly Amiri, and is situated about two miles from Dthala itself, where the Amir resides. When the Turks were pushing out their frontier preparatory to the work of delimitation, they began advancing their posts close up to Dthala, and the Amir's son, in his endeavours to stop their encroachments, as a last resort hoisted the British flag at his village of Al Wara. The Turks early the next morning sent out from Jalela a party of Turkish soldiers accompanied by some Arab levies, who hauled down the flag and took it to Jalela. It is only recently that the villagers of Al Wara and Jalela, when no longer gagged by the presence of the Turks, dared to freely give evidence on the subject, and they declare that at Jalela the flag was torn to pieces which was thrown into the latrines (the proper Turkish treatment for an infidel emblem).

Rahmi Effendi, the Kaimakam, responsible for the occurrence has since been removed from Kataba, and is now at Constantinople.

I represented the above to the Turkish Commissioners and said that, though their own officer Rahmi Bey admitted the pulling down of the flag, it was still open to them to disprove the latter part of the story by producing the flag, and I desired them to inquire into the matter and have it restored.

They apparently made inquiries, but reported that they were unable to trace it, owing to the absence in Constantinople of Rahmi Effendi, and to the recall of Husen Hilmi Pasha, till recently Governor-General of Yemen.

As the incident has not tended to enhance our prestige on this frontier, I feel it my duty to report the facts of the case in order that His Majesty's Government may demand what reparation they think fit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB, Colonel,
Commissioner, Aden Boundary Commission.

Note.—Copy forwarded to Political Secretary, India Office.

No. 164.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 7.)(B.)
Sir,*India Office, May 6, 1903.*

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st May as to the instructions to be given to the British Commissioners on the Aden frontier with regard to the demarcation of the green line laid down on the joint map of the Turkish and British Commissions.

In reply, I am to forward, for Lord Lansdowne's information, copy of a telegram, dated the 4th instant, which has been sent to the Viceroy and repeated to the Resident at Aden, embodying, for the guidance of the British Commissioners, the views expressed by Lord Lansdowne.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 164.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 4, 1903.

RESIDENT at Aden's telegram of the 23rd April.

It was originally understood, with regard to the Amiri boundary, that the British and Turkish Commissioners should reserve for discussion between their two Governments any points as to which they could not agree. The green line in the map, in the view of His Majesty's Government, merely indicates approximate extent of British claim, and does not debar the British Commissioners from demanding full opportunities for ascertaining facts, and basing proposals thereon, especially in regard to dotted portion of line. They should not, however, propose any variations from green line unless supported by conclusive evidence, nor any readjustments, unless mutually convenient and obviously fair.

Instructions will be issued to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to inform the Porte that, unless (subject, of course, to the reservations originally contemplated) readiness is shown by the Turkish Commissioners to demarcate line by joint agreement within reasonable time, the British Representatives will be instructed to mark out by themselves the line claimed by us, and that thereafter His Majesty's Government will protect from any aggression the line so demarcated.

No. 165.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 5th May, relative to the new Mudir of Wakra.

India Office, May 7, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 165.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 5, 1903.

MY telegram of 29th April.

Telegram dated 3rd has been received from Constantinople stating that Grand Vizier has declined to comply with the proposal that he should telegraph via Bushire ordering Yusuf not to take up his appointment at Wakra. Please issue instructions accordingly, upon my telegram of 3rd May, for detention of latter at Bahrein.

No. 167*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ADEN delimitation.

Following telegram sent the 4th May to Viceroy by Secretary of State for India:—

“Resident at Aden’s telegram of the 23rd April.

“It was originally understood, with regard to the Amiri boundary, that the British and Turkish Commissioners should reserve for discussion between their two Governments any points as to which they could not agree. The green line in the map, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, merely indicates approximate extent of British claim, and does not debar the British Commissioners from demanding full opportunities for ascertaining facts, and basing proposals thereon, especially in regard to dotted portion of line. They should not, however, propose any variations from green line unless supported by conclusive evidence, nor any readjustments, unless mutually convenient and obviously fair.

“Instructions will be issued to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople to inform the Porte that, unless (subject, of course, to the reservations originally contemplated) readiness is shown by the Turkish Commissioners to demarcate line by joint agreement within reasonable time, the British Representatives will be instructed to mark out by themselves the line claimed by us, and that thereafter His Majesty’s Government will protect from any aggression the line so demarcated.”

You are authorized to make a communication in the sense of paragraph 2 to the Turkish Government.

[1617]

2 M*

No. 166.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 7.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Foreign Secretary, India, dated the 6th May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 7, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 166.

Resident, Aden, to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 6, 1903.

COLONEL WAHAB telegraphs as follows, for transmission:—

“Without warning the Turks have established Customs post south of Selat Kataba, and are imposing export duties at a much higher rate than 1 per cent. They detained for three days six camels belonging to British Commission, which were released only after payment of exorbitant dues. I beg that Porte may be moved to issue instructions to Wali of Yemen that duties levied at these frontier custom-houses should not exceed the rate of 1 per cent. which is imposed at the Yemen and other Ottoman ports. With reference to my telegram No. 260, Turks protest officially against our surveying within Dakkam limits; but to avoid delay surveying is being continued.”

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 167.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 7, 1903.

LOAN. My telegram No. 60 of the 1st May.

The Imperial Bank has received an official application from the Persian Government for the additional 100,000*l.* forming the balance of the 300,000*l.* mentioned in your Lordship’s telegram No. 35 of the 3rd April.

They propose the introduction of an additional Article, providing, on the same terms, and with the same guarantees, for the increase of the advance of the 4th April to this amount, and, in order to strengthen our position against repayment, we shall arrange for its taking the form of an annuity. The Russians need not be informed of this Article.

I am informed by M. Naus that the effects of the new Tariff on the customs are already perceptible, the receipts from the Bushire customs during the last fortnight having amounted to 12,000*l.*, and he therefore hopes that the extra 100,000*l.* should carry him on to next April. Of course, this increase in the customs receipts is exceptional, as, during the first weeks of the new régime, imports were temporarily checked, but the southern customs, even exclusive of Mohammerah, should bring in about 200,000*l.* a-year, as the higher duties on non-Russian products will doubtless greatly increase their value.

[1617]

2 M

No. 168.

Foreign Office to Association of Chambers of Commerce.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 7, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 29th ultimo, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that negotiations for a direct commercial arrangement with Persia are going on and are proceeding satisfactorily. His Lordship does not, therefore, consider that any useful end would be served by his receiving a deputation, and he hopes before long to be able to make a communication to you on the subject.

His Lordship begs that in the meanwhile the above-mentioned information may be treated as strictly confidential.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 169.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th May, relative to the Persian Loan.

India Office, May 8, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 169.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 7, 1903.

WE regard situation, shown in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram of 1st May and recent telegrams regarding Persian Loan, as extremely unsatisfactory. Situation appears to be this: 200,000*l.* have already been advanced to the Imperial Bank of Persia, and another 100,000*l.* is expected from us. Further, the Government of India are stated, in Lord Lansdowne's telegram of the 4th April, to be ready to advance a total sum of 500,000*l.* We never have been, and we are not now, prepared to advance so large a sum for no return, and through the whole correspondence we have pressed for Southern Customs as first security. It now appears that Customs rank only as third security, and are confined to Customs of Fars and Persian Gulf, a phrase which we thought extremely ambiguous. Sir A. Hardinge's reply to our inquiry on this point seems to us most unsatisfactory. We fail to see why we who are conferring a favour should be treated throughout as though we were receiving one, or why the transactions should not be conducted in ordinary business form. We think it essential that next 100,000*l.* should not be advanced till we have seen and have had opportunity of making observations on full text of the contract in regard to both advances, and that, unless some political return is obtained, such as that previously discussed between ourselves and His Majesty's Government, the balance of 500,000*l.* should not be given at all.

No. 170.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 8, 1903.

ADEN delimitation.

You should address a remonstrance to the Turkish Government against the proceedings described in the telegram from the Resident at Aden of the 6th May.

No. 171.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th May, relative to the new Mudir of Wakra.

India Office, May 8, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 171.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 8, 1903.

MY telegram of 5th May.

Following telegram of 5th May has been received from Colonel Kemball, who is informing British Ambassador at Constantinople to same effect:—

"Information has arrived from Bahrein that Yusuf Bey succeeded on night of 27th April in leaving Bahrein, and went to Wakra; it is reported, however, that he was turned out of that place by the people, and returned on 30th to Albida [*sic*]. I am requesting the Commander of His Majesty's ship 'Lapwing,' which is at Bahrein to go to Wakra and ascertain facts."

No. 172.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 3rd May, relative to troops with the Aden Delimitation Commission. Copy has been sent to the Intelligence Division, War Office.

India Office, May 9, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 172.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 3, 1903.

IN the opinion of my military advisers, after consideration and consultation with Colonel Wahab, the mountain batteries, whether required for Somaliland or not, might be withdrawn. They can reach Aden in ten days by easy marches, and, as the weather is now very hot for marching, even for natives, it is advisable that they should begin to move as soon as possible. By their withdrawal, difficulties of supplying force at Dthali would be appreciably relieved. Provision for carrying mules should be provided if transport is sent from Bombay.

(Repeated to Military Secretary, Government of India; Secretary of State, Bombay; and Constantinople.)

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) P.
ADEN frontier.

Constantinople, May 9, 1903.

The following telegram, No. 18, dated 9th May, 1903, sent to Mr. Fitzmaurice:—

"The Sublime Porte hear from their Commissioner that Wahab now insists on preparing a map to extend 4½ kilometres on Turkish side of green line, instead of 2 kilometres on each side, as at first proposed.

"They further complain especially as to your claiming water-courses to the north and west of Kataba as frontier, and refusing to accept green line as boundary between Sanah and Kataba.

"Apprehension of our raising a claim to Kataba seems to me the main cause of present difficulties; and I believe work of delimitation south-west down the Tibar would be greatly facilitated, and some latitude given to Turkish Commissioners in interpreting green line, if I could give the Porte satisfactory assurances that you were ready to accept green line as boundary south of Kataba.

"You should, however, abstain for the present from making any definite declaration to the Turkish Commissioners, so that I may use Kataba as a leverage, if we must have part of Dakkam beyond Wadi Tibar."

I presume a claim to Kataba would not be supported by His Majesty's Government; it would now be difficult to justify, but might be useful in arranging about Dakkam, if abandoned at the proper moment.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 99: Subject to your Lordship's approval, I propose to postpone action on these instructions.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 100: I am in communication with the Sublime Porte as to the export duty referred to.

No. 174.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 9, 1903.

LOAN. Telegram from Government of India of yesterday's date:

"With regard to the term 'Fars and Persian Gulf,' used in the Loan Agreements with Russia and with the Imperial Bank two years ago, I have always thought it wise to assume that it included all the southern ports of Persia as distinct from land stations, which are under a separate administration, such as Kerman. It is thus possible for us to contend that all ports are excluded from the Russian Loan Contract altogether, whilst the Russians, in view of Persia's anterior promise to us, cannot exercise actual control over the southern land customs, even though their revenues are assigned as security for the Russian Loan. But the best time for raising this question will be after our Commercial Agreement has been ratified, when, in connection with the "Règlement douanier," we can discuss the separation of the Customs Administration of Arabistan from that of Fars. Even then, some care will have to be exercised in handling it.

I would, however, propose, if the Government of India insist on raising the point now, as a condition of completing the advance, that the Imperial Bank should receive the indirect assistance of His Majesty's Government in raising another 50,000*l.*, to be lent to the Persian Government on account current, in lieu of a direct Government advance. The Bank can re-lend the 50,000*l.* repaid it last month out of our advance, and the requirements of the Persian Government would be met by these two sums.

In fact, for the sake of political appearances, the Grand Vizier originally asked that the balance of 100,000*l.* should be lent them on account current, and only incorporated with the remainder of the late advance in the event of their failing to repay it within the year out of the customs—which, of course, will be the case.

I said that I doubted your Lordship finding the money on these terms, as you particularly desired to avoid immediate repayment.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 9, 1903.

PERSIAN Loan.

I have received your telegram No. 61 of the 7th May.

We consider it most desirable to take advantage of the additional Loan, in order to strengthen our hold upon the southern customs of Persia. Would it not be possible to arrange that this should be the exclusive security for the advance?

Is it the case that you intend to arrange for the extinction of the Loan by means of a sinking fund, spread over a long term of years, in order to strengthen the precautions against repayment?

Though we do not underrate any temporary diplomatic advantage which you may be able to obtain through the Anglo-Indian advance to the Persian Government, it must be borne in mind that a permanent lien on the southern customs, and predominant influence in the south and east of Persia are the chief objects of our policy.

No. 176.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, May 10, 1903.

ADEN delimitation.

Following telegram No. 19 sent to Mr. Fitzmaurice, dated the 10th May:—

"How much do you claim west of the Tibar River as Amiri-Dakkam territory. It seems unfortunate you cannot accept the river as frontier. What are the objections?"

No. 177.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 14, 1903.

THE Moin-ut-Tujjar called on me on the 4th instant, and, after talking of the formation of a new Company for the development of the Arabistan trade route, said he would be prepared to undertake, under certain conditions, the construction for it of a good caravan road over the section from Khorremabad to Dizful for 30,000 tomans (6,000*l.*). I said that if he would put his proposal on paper, I would send it home through the Foreign Office for the consideration of the Company, and I have now the honour to transmit herewith a letter which I have received from him embodying it.

If the new transport Company think it desirable to utilize the Moin-ut-Tujjar, who has been for many years past rather a thorn in Messrs. Lynch's side, or think that it would be worth while to neutralize his possible obstruction, I would suggest their entering into direct communication with him. His co-operation may be worth purchasing, as he has considerable powers of hampering any enterprise, but I think it is essential that provision should in this case be made for buying him out, should his interference in the affairs of the Company become a nuisance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 177.

Moin-ut-Tujjar to Abbas Kuli Khan.

(Translation.)

Tehran, April 6, 1903.

WITH reference to the conversation which I had the honour to have with his Excellency the Minister, and the suggestion he made that, in order to prevent any

misunderstanding, I should put my proposal on record, I beg to make the following proposals:—

I undertake to have a caravan road constructed by contract between Dizful and Khorremabad for the sum of 30,000 tomans. The road will be better constructed than that which has been constructed by Messrs. Lynch through the Bakhtiari country. One half of the expenses, that is to say, 15,000 tomans, will be paid by myself, and I will be a partner for one-half.

I am prepared to have the necessary caravanserais for men and animals as well as forage shops built along the road at my own expense. The Company can pay, if they like, one-half of the expenses of these buildings, otherwise I will pay myself.

If the road is not finished in the first year, it will be ready for caravan traffic the next year.

The matter being very simple, the Minister may telegraph to London if he thinks it desirable. The sooner the work is begun the better, because it will be very difficult to work in that part of the country in winter.

(Signed) MOIN-UT-TUJJAR.

No. 178.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 16, 1903.

I HAD a long conversation on the 10th instant with my Russian colleague respecting the political situation here, which he regards with considerable anxiety. His view is that the fall of the Atabeg-i-Azam would be the beginning of serious troubles, as neither the Ain-ed-Dowleh and the Court or Turkish party properly so called, nor even the Amin-ed-Dowleh, whose return to office is being worked for by another section of the Opposition, would be equal to coping with the financial difficulties. He thought that the advance which the Persian Government had obtained from the Imperial Bank would, instead of strengthening the Atabeg, have precisely the contrary effect, as the one thing which had hitherto deterred the Opposition from taking office was the knowledge that the Treasury was empty, that Russia would not give them money, and that the Shah would therefore be compelled in a few weeks' time to recall the Atabeg on his own terms, and though M. Vlassoff did not say so he probably meant, also on those of Russia. As it was, the money which we had provided had removed that difficulty, and had, therefore, stimulated the intrigues of the Court party, which he heard were more active than ever; and if this party came into power the last chance of preventing a crash, by financial reform and by restraining reckless expenditure, would disappear. He saw no man who could take the Atabeg's place, except perhaps at some future date the Ala-ed-Dowleh, now Governor-General of Fars, who appears to have made a good impression upon him. Of the Amin-ed-Dowleh he spoke very disparagingly, denying him even the virtue of honesty, with which he is usually credited.

I said that although the policy pursued by the Atabeg since his return from Kum had not been, to put it gently, conspicuously friendly to our interests, I quite realized that his fall might well prove to be a change for the worse. But my personal belief was that no Persian statesman, not even the Atabeg, would be able to carry out the reforms which were necessary in order to prevent the financial and political collapse of Persia unless our two Governments, as alike interested in averting, at any rate at the present juncture, that catastrophe, could arrive at some friendly understanding with this object. I was, of course, speaking without authority, but my private opinion was that as far as His Majesty's Government was concerned, there would be every readiness to discuss the basis of such an understanding, whether in London or at St. Petersburg, in the frankest and most friendly spirit. A year and a-half ago, when the second Russian loan was being negotiated, your Lordship had approached the Russian Government with a suggestion of co-operation which, however, had not been received in such a manner as to encourage its repetition, and it was, therefore, I thought for the Russian Government rather than for that of His Majesty, to intimate a desire for discussion. If Russia and Austria had been able to come to an "entente," notwithstanding their traditional jealousies in the Balkan Peninsula, with a view to preventing a conflagration there, it ought not to be impossible for Russia and Great Britain to arrange, if only provisionally, a similar "entente," and to work it in the

same spirit, and with similar objects in Persia. These objects would, in my opinion, be the putting of the finances of the country in order, the cessation of the ruinous extravagance of the Court, and of rival political loans made by the Russian and English Banks in order to meet it, with the only result that had debts were piled up every year and that each successive year the deficit grew larger. If Russia and England were agreed to recommend some such programme to the Shah (as Russia and Austria had done in the case of the Macedonian reforms to the Sultan), the Court party would not be able to oppose it; but so long as the Persians could play one Power off against another and use our antagonism for their own purposes, no Persian Minister would, in my opinion, be strong enough, with a weak vacillating Sovereign and powerful and selfish vested interests, to avert national bankruptcy, with all the internal and foreign complications which must attend it, within the next few years.

M. Vlassoff said that he entirely agreed with me, and that he would report our conversation to his Government; that he had already told them that in his opinion a discussion on the Persian question with England was most desirable, and that if there was as much "bonne volonté" in London and St. Petersburg as existed between ourselves, an "entente" such as that which I had sketched out might not be difficult of attainment.

On my observing that such an "entente" would be doubly desirable because it would mean a "détente" elsewhere and might pave the way for an increased Anglo-Russian cordiality in all parts of the world, he said he feared that the effects of the Japanese alliance, and the attitude which we had taken up with regard to the Bagdad Railway, might prove even more serious obstacles than our rivalry in Persia, and the conversation passed to other questions.

I do not know to what extent M. Vlassoff's representations—supposing he is sincere in making them—may induce the Russian Government to modify the attitude adopted by them in 1901 of evading any serious discussion of Persian affairs with us. They were then so confident that the game was entirely in their hands that they could afford to neglect our remonstrances. But they are, I think, beginning to realize (1) that the Shah is going too fast for them, and (2) that Great Britain is not so negligible a factor in the Persian problem as they were disposed two years ago to imagine; and inasmuch as a break-up here, coincident with other serious complications both in the Near and Far East, and with the somewhat anxious domestic situation in Russia itself, would not suit them, it is just possible that they may find it convenient to reconsider the situation and agree with us at least upon an armistice.

It is, at any rate, quite evident to me that M. Vlassoff is extremely anxious about the future here, and views it, which I do not—at least not to the same degree—as one fraught with imminent danger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 179.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 234.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 5, 1903.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 71 and 73 of the 10th and 13th ultimo, respecting the trial at Hodeidah of the pirates captured by His Majesty's ship "Harrier," I have been informed by His Majesty's Vice-Consul at that port that the evidence for the prosecution and the depositions of the witnesses from the "Harrier" had been concluded on the 25th April, and that the conviction of the prisoners seemed probable.

The trial had, however, been adjourned by the Court to await the arrival from Assyr of certain persons of doubtful identity, whom the Court had itself summoned, and whose testimony, should they ever appear, would, according to Mr. Richardson, be unnecessary.

I accordingly spoke to the Grand Vizier yesterday on the subject, and his Highness promised to send instructions to the local authorities not to allow delay in bringing the trial to a conclusion and in delivering sentences on the pirates when found guilty.

A further telegram from Mr. Richardson states that the "Harrier" had, in the meantime, sailed, leaving an officer with the necessary witnesses.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 106.)

My Lord,

Berlin, May 5, 1903.

THE "National Zeitung" of the 2nd May contains an article on the situation in Persia, where, the correspondent of this paper thinks, the financial conditions are from day to day more precarious. The millions borrowed from Russia last year have been spent on the Shah's European journey, without any attempt at payment of arrears, and now further loans are in prospect. Russia, however, in view of the outside margin in the way of customs guarantees being nearly reached, is less ready to advance money. The consequent scarcity of funds is put down to the administration of the Grand Vizier, who is all the same indispensable as the only man in whom any confidence is placed either by the country or the foreign Representatives. Great changes were expected at the Persian New Year, but nothing important has occurred. On the contrary, Prince Ein-ed-Daulch, whom the German press believed to be in danger of banishment for English intrigues, continues for another year to be Governor of Tehran. All that is certain is that the negotiations for a new loan are proceeding on the basis of the engagement of the revenues of the Caspian fisheries.

The article in a second paragraph compares the Russian with the British position in Persia, to the disadvantage of the former. Sir Arthur Hardinge is described as a "ruhiger Herr," likely to prejudice the Russian prestige, and who has already succeeded in making an Agreement in his country's favour on the Tariff question. Another point is the formation of a new English Company to take over the Concession of the Karun River Road from Tehran from the Imperial Bank.

The correspondent concludes by noticing the retirement, in spite of his great influence and many valuable services, of the Russian General Kassagowski, Commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade. He is replaced by Colonel Tschernosaboff, who is described as a smart soldier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

No. 181.

Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 110.)

My Lord,

Berlin, May 8, 1903.

YOUR Lordship's speech delivered in the House of Lords on the 5th instant has attracted considerable attention in the German press, and I have the honour to bring to your notice in particular an article in the "National Zeitung" entitled "England and the Persian Gulf."

This article begins by quoting your Lordship's declaration that Great Britain would "regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified post in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests." This warning cannot be directed against Germany, who has no territorial ambitions on the Persian Gulf, and the statement that British "policy should be directed to protect and promote British trade in Persian waters" without excluding the legitimate trade of other Powers is not only in accordance with British tradition, but from a German point of view satisfactory.

Note is then taken of the formulation of the axiom, as it is called, that political supremacy in the Persian Gulf is a vital interest of Great Britain. This the "National Zeitung" reviews in connection with the growth and strength of Russian influence in Persia. It regards your Lordship's language as a proof that a change is in process, and that the commercial negotiations at present taking place at Tehran will result in a manner favourable to our position in Persia.

In North Persia it is too late for us to try to weaken Russian supremacy. In the South it is otherwise. The question of South Persia is bound up with that of the railways in future to be built there. Whatever, from an objective point of view, may be the legality of the British claim on Persia to build such railways, one thing, the article considers, is certain in fact. Your Lordship has declared to the world our

intention to build them. For this reason the question of the Bagdad Railway is all important for Great Britain. It will certainly be built, and it is for us to see that below Bagdad it shall be under British control. This has already been remarked in England. Hence the proposal which appeared in the "Times," to agree to the project on condition that the building of the line is begun at both ends at once. Further the needs not only of Indian defence but of Indian expansion, as recent utterances of Lord Curzon have limited, make the English lay particular value on the lands about the Persian Gulf. And in the same connection engineers of repute have lately made an appeal to British enterprise representing the irrigation of Mesopotamia as a proper field for the outlay of capital. Everything in fine points to the preponderance of British interests in the Persian Gulf, and your Lordship's speech laying emphasis on these will be well received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

No. 182.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 9, 1903.

WITH reference to note and inclosure of the 24th ultimo, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extract of a telegram, dated the 9th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 182.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Trincomalee, May 9, 1903.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 77, "Lapwing" reports:—
"Have received reliable information that Mudir for Alwakra has arrived there."

No. 183.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 11, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 183.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 9, 1903.

RESIDENT at Aden's telegram of the 6th May. Question of rate of general customs duty might perhaps be considered by His Majesty's Government, but we consider that the Aden Boundary Commission itself should, like the Seistan Mission, be exempted from customs duties.

No. 184.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 8th May, relative to the Persian Loan.

India Office, May 11, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 184.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 8, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 7th May, which, if you have not already done so, please repeat to Tehran. Your criticisms and proposals regarding advance to Persia are under the consideration of the Foreign Office.

No. 185.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 11, 1903.

LOAN. With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 45 of the 9th May, I have suggested to M. Naus that the balance of the advance should have the southern customs as sole security. The Grand Vizier is away, but when he returns we shall see him about it. The chief objection to the proposal is that the letter of the Russian Agreement, which forbids Persia from borrowing for a long term without Russia's consent, would thus be violated. It was for this reason that we fell back upon the fiction of a discount of the Caspian Royalties for the twenty years of the fisheries concession, with the southern customs as nominally collateral, though real because only certain, guarantee, when you required security against repayment of the advance. It is true that the customs alone were the security for the Imperial Bank's loan of 1901, but the latter is repayable at short notice. Our advance, on the other hand, contemplates a term of twenty years plus the sinking fund, arrangement to which your Lordship refers in the above quoted telegram. I hope that we shall have no difficulty in agreeing upon the latter.

With regard to the Viceroy's criticism on these expedients, I admit that it has some force, but an incomplete success is surely a lesser ill than a fresh reverse, and our choice lay between adopting them or letting Persia succumb altogether to Russian tutelage. We must still, I think, move with caution, although we are quietly rebuilding our position here. It is for this reason that, although I am most ready to fight the point as to "Fars and the Gulf" against the Russians, once our Commercial Agreement is safely ratified and I deal with the new customs arrangements, I deprecated raising it in connection with our loans. I should be sorry, by an attempt to establish an abstract principle at a not very opportune moment, to risk concrete gains; and our case is not as strong as I should wish. The important ports are Bushire and Bunder Abbas, and it is in these that by completing our advance I should wish our stake to be strengthened. The practical value of the customs which might possibly be excluded is small.

That the "telegraphs might be the first security and the customs the second" for a combined Anglo-Indian loan of half-a-million was suggested by the Indian Government themselves in their telegram of the 11th February. I think, however, that, apart from this, it is an advantage to have prevented the pledging to a Russian advance of the posts and telegraphs.

No. 186*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 11, 1903.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 45 of the 9th May, and your telegram No. 62 of the same date, you do not appear to have understood that our special desire is that no further financial assistance should be given to the Persian Government unless our hold upon the Southern Customs is distinctly strengthened by the conditions on which the money is advanced. We consider that the insistence of the Government of India on this point is fully justified.

We understand the plan which you now propose to involve a further advance of 50,000*l.* on current account, that is to say, without any security at all. Both from our own point of view and from that of the Government of India, this proposal is objectionable.

In my telegram No. 45 of the 9th May, I mentioned two conditions the fulfilment of which you should endeavour to obtain. They are, first, a lien upon the Customs of Southern Persia, and, secondly, precautions to prevent early repayment by the Persian Government.

No. 186.

Question asked in the House of Commons, May 11, 1903.

Mr. Schwann,—To ask what had been done during recent years to improve and extend the River Karun navigation by means of a canal to pass the Ahwaz Rapids, or in other ways to increase facilities for water-borne traffic between the Gulf and the fertile districts of Western Persia, and whether His Majesty's Representative at Tehran had tried to induce His Imperial Majesty the Shah to co-operate in this public work, and thus facilitate commerce in that portion of his dominions.

Answer.

His Majesty's Government are not aware that the construction of a canal at Ahwaz is contemplated. His Majesty's Representative at Tehran, however, reported at the end of last year that the Persian Government were sending an engineer to the Karun to study the best means of improving the navigation. I need hardly say that, subject to proper conditions, any proposal intended to give increased facilities to commerce in Southern Persia will have the support of His Majesty's Legation.

No. 187.

Consul-General Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 11. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Odessa, May 8, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9, Commercial, of the 13th April last, I have the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, translation of an extract from the "Odessky Listok" of the 25th April (8th May) last, relating to the proposed building of two new steamers by the Russian Steam Navigation Company for the Persian Gulf, and the establishment of agencies and warehouses at all Persian ports, with a special staff of Russians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. S. SMITH.

Inclosure in No. 187.

Extract from the "Odessky Listok, April 25 (May 8), 1903.

(Translation.)

THE Administration of the Russian Steam Navigation Company has determined to furnish two special ocean steamers for the new Persian line, which are to be ordered shortly. The Administration is already in negotiation with Russian ship-building yards with reference to the building of the two new steamers. Special agencies and warehouses of the Russian Company are to be established in all Persian ports, with a staff of clerks of Russian nationality especially appointed for Persia. A complete reorganization of the regular voyages to the Persian Gulf will be arranged in the course of the present year.

No. 188.

Musurus Pasha to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 12.)

MUSURUS PACHA présente ses compliments au Marquis de Lansdowne, et a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de sa Seigneurie que, d'après un télégramme du Vali *ad interim* du Yémen, adressé à la Sublime Porte, Ahmed Salihul Latife, de la tribu de Sabili (neuf Cantons), et ses acolytes armés, ont tué le 27 Avril les nommés Monhiddin Anbere et Moume Amouvcité, de la tribu de Hakem, du district de Moha

(Yémen), et un domestique Abyssin et enlevé leurs armes, ainsi que 100 chameaux et 200 moutons leur appartenant.

Les autorités Impériales ont recommandé à la tribu de Hakem de s'abstenir de tout acte de représailles en leur déclarant qu'elles ont déjà avisé au nécessaire. Mais, comme tout retard qui serait apporté au règlement de cette affaire pourrait donner lieu à des incidents fâcheux, Musurus Pacha a l'honneur de prier le Marquis de Lansdowne de vouloir bien faire transmettre à qui de droit des ordres propres à assurer au plus tôt tant l'arrestation et la punition des coupables que la restitution des armes et animaux enlevés.

*Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
le 11 Mai, 1903.*

No. 189.

Musurus Pasha to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 12.)

MUSURUS PACHA présente ses compliments au Marquis de Lansdowne, et a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de sa Seigneurie qu'il résulte des télégrammes successifs du Gouverneur-Général intérimaire du Vilayet du Yémen, adressés à la Sublime Porte, que les Commissaires Anglais continuent à soulever toutes sortes de difficultés quant à l'exécution des travaux de délimitation, conformément au tracé indiqué sur la carte signée par les Commissaires des deux pays. En effet, les Délégués Ottomans ont fait observer que le tracé qui doit servir de base à la ligne de démarcation entre Daali et Cataba, passant par l'est de Cataba dans la direction du sud et à une distance d'un kilom. du côté de l'est de Silletulecataba, on ne devait pas prendre en considération les sillons qui passent par l'est, le nord, et l'ouest de Cataba, quels qu'en soient les noms, et qu'on devait examiner le tracé servant de base à Silletulecataba comme ligne de démarcation depuis le point où ce tracé coupe Silletulecataba, c'est-à-dire, le point où se rencontrent Silletulecataba et Wadiussafie jusqu'à Wadiyaban; mais les Commissaires Anglais n'ont donné aucune réponse et ne prennent pas part depuis trois semaines aux travaux de la Commission. En outre, après la décision prise par la Commission de Délimitation de cesser les opérations topographiques jusqu'à l'arrivée de nouvelles instructions, le Colonel Wahab a proposé de dresser la carte des territoires sis à une distance de 2 kilom. des deux côtés de la ligne verte. Cette ligne verte avait été déjà proposée par les Commissaires Anglais eux-mêmes et acceptée par les deux Parties après deux longues discussions entre la Sublime Porte et l'Ambassade Britannique à Constantinople. Mais, à la suite de la prétention élevée plus tard par le Colonel Anglais de dresser la carte d'un territoire d'une superficie de 4½ kilom. en deça de la dite ligne, les Commissaires Ottomans ont dû refuser de participer à cette opération.

De plus, des soldats Anglais et des topographes ont été envoyés dans certains villages dépendant de Dékiam, ainsi que dans d'autres villages situés dans le Hacha et le Billadi Yafli, dépendant du district de Cataba, bien que ce district soit placé en dehors de la région où s'effectue la délimitation et que tous les villages susmentionnés soient placés en deça du tracé. Le Colonel Wahab a exigé aussi que la Douane, qui avait été reportée précédemment en deça de la ligne de démarcation, fût transférée ailleurs, en prétendant que l'endroit où elle se trouve est un point contesté.

La Sublime Porte a fait des démarches à ce sujet auprès de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre à Constantinople.

En signalant au Marquis de Lansdowne cette attitude des Commissaires Anglais, qui est contraire tant à l'entente intervenue entre la Sublime Porte et la dite Ambassade qu'aux relations d'amitié existant entre les deux pays, Musurus Pacha a l'honneur de prier sa Seigneurie de vouloir bien faire transmettre aux Commissaires précités des ordres leur enjoignant de procéder dorénavant avec leurs collègues Ottomans aux travaux de délimitation, conformément au tracé déjà arrêté.

*Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
le 11 Mai, 1903.*

No. 190.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 23rd April, relative to the French flag in Oman.

India Office, May 12, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 190.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, March 7, 1903.

IN view of the fact that the season for the annual sojourn of the French Consul and French men-of-war at Sur is drawing near and that his Excellency the Viceroy will shortly be going on tour, I venture to make another reference to Government on the subject of the French flag in Oman.

2. It is close upon a year now since the Marquess of Lansdowne held the conversation with the French Ambassador mentioned in his Lordship's despatches of the 16th and 23rd April last to the address of Sir E. Monson, and I would remind the Government of India in this regard that M. Cambon has now been fencing with this question at the London Foreign Office for three years, and that nothing practical has resulted from the informal expression of his views and promises, except that postponement of the issue which it is the express object and advantage of the Government of the Republic to effect and maintain.

Meanwhile the relations between the Sultan and his Suri subjects, which two years ago had improved considerably in the desired direction, are, as was to be expected, drifting gradually backwards; the reason being that the long delay in the negotiations since the question was taken up by His Majesty's Foreign Office, and the absence of any patent result during the years which have since elapsed, is unintelligible to his Highness, or, worse still, interpreted by him to portend that the British Government are not in a position to see him through this difficulty by putting any pressure on the French Government.

On the other hand, the Suri community, knowing that the question of their French papers was specifically raised three years ago, and that in the interval there has been no result affecting them while French ships and the French Consul sojourn with them and encourage them as heretofore, must be expected to increase in their disaffection towards the Sultan. I have reason to believe that it is only the imprisonment of a large number of them and the death of not a few at Mozambique twelve months ago that has given them something else to think of during the past year and kept them from being actively hostile to the Sultan.

Lastly, as I have before pointed out, whereas when the matter had not gone beyond the local officers, I was able to do a good deal locally to support the Sultan's position, since His Majesty's Government have taken it up, my hands have been tied, and I have been obliged to desist from personal activity in the matter for fear of vitiating negotiations which may possibly be going on at home. This, again, has been interpreted to our detriment.

3. In view of the above considerations, and with our position strengthened by the Mozambique and Somali Coast captures of Oman dhows, I trust that the Government of India will feel warranted in again pressing upon His Majesty's Foreign Office the importance of a speedy settlement of the question with the French Government, and the undesirable extent to which our interests and influence are suffering here by the delay of the issue season after season.

[Here follows telegraphic correspondence between India and Muscat, 10th to 21st April, already printed.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 190.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, April 11, 1903.

IN continuation of my telegram, dated the 10th instant, stating that the question of the French flag in Oman has just been acutely raised, I have the honour to report the circumstances thereof in detail.

2. It is necessary, in the first place, to go briefly into tribal politics in order that the Government of India may be acquainted with the exact position.

The tribes of Oman are divided into two great racial divisions—Ghafiri and Hinawi. Tribes of both divisions are settled indiscriminately in the vicinity of one another throughout the country, but their interests and organization are distinct, and some sections of the one division are almost invariably at war with sections of the other.

Sur is inhabited by Ghafiris, primarily of the tribe of Beni Abu Ali, subject to whom are another Ghafiri tribe, the Jenebeh. Most of the French flag-holders are recruited from the Jenebeh sub-tribe, but some also from the main tribe of Beni Abu Ali.

Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salim of the Beni Abu Ali is the head Sheikh of all the Beni Abu Ali, calls himself the Ghafiri "Amir"; and, apart from the more remote sovereignty of the Ruler of Oman, which Sheikh Abdulla loyally acknowledges, the latter holds absolute practical sway over all the Ghafiri tribes of that part of Oman which is known as the district of "Jalaan" (see map, Inclosure No. 9).

Sheikh Abdulla, who is a very old man, and his Bedouin followers (as opposed to the sea-going population of Sur), ever since the time when they were defeated by a British force, in March 1821, have always been good friends to the British.

Sheikh Abdulla is well known to me, has repeatedly invited me to come and stay with him at his home, about 70 miles inland of Sur, and two years ago, when Dr. von Kraft and I were "held up" by the Hinawi while endeavouring to get to the coal-bearing country, offered to muster the entire following and forcibly introduce us into the coal-bearing tract from the south side.

It was Sheikh Abdulla also who, in June 1900, came into Sur with 1,000 armed followers to greet the Sultan, and afterwards so materially assisted His Highness in obtaining from the French flag-holders the written undertaking which they afterwards broke.

3. For some weeks past active hostilities have been going on between the Ghafiris under Abdulla-bin-Salim and the Hinawi tribes of the district, especially a tribe called the Hijreen. Now, the poorer part of the populace of Sur partly make their livelihood by transporting rice and other provisions to the villages of the hinterland, not only Ghafiri but also Hinawi, when there is no war and also at other times, so long as the risk is not too great; but Abdulla-bin-Salim, not being able to terminate current hostilities and bloodshed by other means, and becoming incensed at his fellow-tribesmen of Sur continuing to supply his enemies with provisions, came down to Sur about the 16th March with a force of 500 armed men, camped in the Eigh quarter of Sur (*vide* sketch map accompanying), and proceeded to hold all the roads leading to the interior, until such time as he could obtain satisfactory assurances from the elders of the port that they would cease to allow their transport to take provisions to his enemies. Sheikh Abdulla at the same time wrote to the Sultan, asking him to come down and help him arrange the affair, but at the moment no ship was available for the journey, and ten days later, when the Resident kindly undertook to drop His Highness there in the "Lawrence," if he could find his own way back, he thought it would be too late to be of use, and that in the meanwhile the matter would have adjusted itself. In fact, that was the news which he received from Sur.

Subsequently, the Sheikh wrote to me also complaining that the Banian community were assisting his enemies by sending provisions to their villages, and asking me to put a stop to it. His letter and my reply form Inclosures Nos. 7 and 8.

The details of what passed between Sheikh Abdulla and the elders of Sur will be found in the news-letter sent to me by a confidential agent at Sur (Inclosure No. 1), from which it appears that the dhow owned by one Mubarak-bin-Hamed which carries French papers made out in the name of his son, and not himself, was lying in the creek behind Sur, and was ready to go to sea. The owner, fearing that he might be forced to subscribe to the money payment demanded by Abdulla-bin-Salim, and that if he refused, his dhow might be detained, ordered the French flag to be run up and endeavoured to run the gauntlet past Sheikh Abdulla's camp out of the creek. The position will be quite clear

from a reference to the map. After due warning, the dhow was fired at. It seems unnecessary to go into the ethics of Sheikh Abdulla's proceedings, which were clearly the result of ordinary inter-tribal complications peculiar to the conditions of life in Oman. The main point is that the man Mubarak-bin-Hamed made use of the French flag in the territorial limits of Sur in order to evade his tribal obligations. His son, Khamis-bin-Mubarak, hurried to Muscat as soon as he could get away, and laid his complaint before M. Dorville, the new French Consul, who relieved M. Laronce three weeks ago. According to the statement of an informant who is generally reliable, M. Dorville was at first disinclined to take the matter up, but the flag-holder said that he would return his papers if he was not supported, whereupon M. Dorville sent for Goguyer, and after consulting him addressed to the Sultan the letter, copy of which forms Inclosure No. 2. His Highness the Sultan forwarded his letter to me and also a copy of his own reply thereto, also attached. My own protest, M. Dorville's reply, and my final rejoinder (Nos. 4, 5, and 6) explain themselves.

4. Just as I am concluding this letter His Highness sends me a further letter which he has received from the French Consul, demanding compensation in the sum of 1,500 dollars for the detention of the dhow, and saying that he is referring the question of the damaged flag to his Government.

The second incident I am reporting in a separate letter for facility of record.

Inclosure 3 in No. 190.

Confidential Agent at Sur to Major Cox.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

March 27, 1903.

(The arrival of Abdulla-bin-Salim from the interior was reported by the writer in a previous correspondence.)

March 21.—Four of Abdulla-bin-Salim's men were passing down the Sikaikera road, when they met some women slaves going to fetch water. The women, seeing the men, started shouting, whereupon a number of Suris rushed out with their rifles to Sikaikera and fired off some shots. On hearing this, some hundred men belonging to Abdulla-bin-Salim sallied out to meet the Suris, but four of the Suri elders thereupon came upon the scene and settled the matter. After this the Suris kept a guard, night and day, in Sikaikera, as they feared that Abdulla-bin-Salim would prevent the Suris from going there for water.

March 22.—About thirteen Suris went to visit Abdulla-bin-Salim, among them being Sheikhs Muhammad-bin-Mubarak and Nasir-bin-Muhammad Gelani. When they approached the encampment, Abdulla-bin-Salim sent word by his slave to say that only Sheikhs Muhammad-bin-Mubarak and Nasir-bin-Muhammad should come in, and that he had no concern with the rest. The Sheikhs above mentioned visited Abdulla-bin-Salim, whom they interviewed. Abdulla-bin-Salim told them to stop supplying all provisions to the Hijreen, and also forbade them to ship or bring anything for them in their buglas, or to warehouse their goods. Finally, it was settled, after a deal of discussion, that, as the present season was over, nothing could be done now, but that, for the coming season, the Suris would respect the wishes of Abdulla-bin-Salim.

March 23.—Nothing transpired.

March 24.—Sheikh Muhammad-bin-Mubarak sent 100 dollars to Abdulla-bin-Salim, for the expenses of his followers and transport animals, which Abdulla-bin-Salim accepted.

March 25.—Abdulla-bin-Salim sent word to Muhammad-bin-Mubarak that he could not accept the 100 dollars, but that he wanted 200, failing which relations would be broken off, the Khor (Sur Creek) would be closed, and no boat would be allowed to enter or leave it. The Suris replied that the four local tribal sections would consider the matter and send a definite reply the next day. The 100 dollars sent to Abdulla-bin-Salim were only subscribed by two men, the general public knowing nothing about it; but when the dollars were returned, everybody came to know what had transpired. Of the 100 dollars, 50 were paid by Muhammad-bin-Mubarak and 50 by Nasir-bin-Muhammad. At night representatives of the four sections met and discussed the question. All save Muhammad-bin-Mubarak and Nasir-bin-Muhammad said that they would not pay Abdulla-bin-Salim a pice, but this was all bravado, as they were, from all accounts, frightened of Abdulla-bin-Salim, and only made a pretence of refusal. The only ones really against payment were Abdulla-bin-Khamis Mussalim and Salim-bin-Mussalim of the Mukanneh section, French

flag-holders. Ali-bin-Saiyid of the same tribe, however, declared his willingness to pay for the whole section, and paid 50 dollars, the reason being that he has a new bugla, and was frightened lest, in the event of things going wrong, his bugla would be destroyed. Of the remaining 50 dollars, the Ghelani tribe paid half and the Arama the rest. The 200 dollars were thus collected.

March 26.—There was a bugla belonging to a man owning French papers in the Khor. It was about to start for Bombay, and belongs to Mubarak-bin-Hamed, Razeki. The papers are made out, however, in the name of Khamis-bin-Mubarak, his son. The owner of the bugla, not being aware that the 200 dollars demanded by Abdulla-bin-Salim had been subscribed, ordered his khallasies to hoist the French flag over his bugla. The khallasies were running up the flag when one of Abdulla-bin-Salim's men shouted out to him from a neighbouring hill not to hoist it; he replied that he had his master's orders, and ran it up. Then Abdulla-bin-Salim's man fired two shots at the flag, one of which took effect and rent the flag. It remained up, however, all the day. The owner of the bugla said he would go to Muscat and report the matter to the French Consul. Muhammad-bin-Mubarak advised him not to do so, as there was nothing to be gained by going to Muscat, and promised to consider the matter the next day.

The 200 dollars were sent to Abdulla-bin-Salim, but no answer was received from him as to whether he accepted the amount or not.

Muhammad-bin-Mubarak's bugla came in to-day, but could not enter the Khor, as Abdulla-bin-Salim's permission had not been obtained. At night word came from Abdulla-bin-Salim to the effect that he did not accept the 200 dollars, and that only Muhammad-bin-Mubarak's bugla could come in, but no other.

March 27.—The Wali of Sur, Hamood-bin-Hamed, came in from Bilad, and advised the Suris to give Abdulla-bin-Salim 300 dollars and three bags of rice. The Suris agreed, and word was sent to Abdulla-bin-Salim, but nothing has been heard from him. Abdulla-bin-Salim has sent for Sheikhs Muhammad-bin-Mubarak and Nasir-bin-Muhammad. No further news.

The owner of the bugla which was fired at has now left for Muscat to lay his case before the French Consul.

Inclosure 4 in No. 190.

M. Dorville to the Sultan of Muscat.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.)

Muscat, April 6, 1903.

I HAVE just received a complaint from Mubarak-bin-Hamed, Razaiki, to the effect that, while his dhow, the "Khazra," was leaving the creek of Sur, Abdulla-bin-Salim-Al-Hamudeh and his followers interfered with her and fired at her, and she was flying the French flag. They thus prevented her from leaving, and her journey was delayed.

I beg, therefore, that your Highness will assert yourself in (upholding) the rights of this man, who is one of those under French protection, and that you will prohibit Abdulla-bin-Salim from such improper action, and will disgrace him and obtain satisfaction from him for the detention of the dhow, and that you will take care for the future.

May you be preserved.

Dated Muscat, the 6th April, 1903, corresponding to 7th Muharram, 1321.

Inclosure 5 in No. 190.

The Sultan of Muscat to M. Dorville.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

YOUR esteemed letter, dated 7th Muharram, has duly reached me. In it you inform me regarding the interference by Abdulla-bin-Salim-Al-Hamudeh with the bugla belonging to Mubarak-bin-Hamed, Razaiki, in which there was a French flag. In this connection your Honour is aware that the question of the French flag in my territories is under discussion between the great Governments of France and Britain, the two Powers pledged from of old to preserve my independence. It is not hidden from you that the mainland of Sur and its creek are part and parcel of my territory and territorial waters, and it is impossible that I can admit that the French flag has rights within it, as I intimated to you in my letter dated 9th Shawal, 1317. And it is well known that the

tribes of Oman are turbulent and fighting always rife among them. How, therefore, can the French flag [be permitted to] enter into the internal affairs of my country, which concern no one but myself? And if your Honour will consider the matter, you will see what I say is right.

Then, again, you quote the name of the man above mentioned as possessing the right to fly the French flag, but I am quite unaware how he became entitled to the right of flying it, being as he is a native and a resident of Sur, and you have not given me any explanation on that point. In this connection I beg you will furnish me with a list of the names of those persons whom the French Government claims to protect in my territorial waters, explaining in each case upon what the right of the individuals to be considered under French protection is based, so that I may look into the matter. You will thereby oblige me, and salaam.

Dated 9th Muharram, i.e., 8th April, 1903.

Inclosure 6 in No. 190.

Major Cox to M. Dorville.

Muscat, April 8, 1903.

I LEARN that, in the course of disturbances at Sur among the tribesmen of Sur and Jan, the followers of a certain subject of the Sultan of Muscat, namely, Abdulla-bin-Salim, Sheikh of the Beni Abu Ali tribe of Jan and Sur, interfered with a bugla in the Sur creek belonging to another subject of his Highness Saiyid Feysal named Mubarak-bin-Hamed, Razaiki, resident and domiciled at Sur, and that the said bugla hoisted the French flag. I also learn from His Highness that you have called upon him for satisfaction in this matter on the grounds that the said Mubarak-bin-Hamed is under French protection, and that he considers such a claim is incompatible with his independence.

2. I have the honour to observe that the disturbances at Sur, during which the incident in question occurred, have been in progress for some little time past, and to my certain knowledge appertain purely to the inter-tribal feuds of Oman; and I therefore feel it incumbent upon me to protest most strongly against your action, which constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the Sultan's territory of a nature which is altogether inconsistent with His Highness' independence, and, pursuant, with the mutual Declaration of our Governments, dated the 10th March, 1862.

Moreover, in the absence of special instructions from my Government, I cannot admit the title of the said Mubarak-bin-Hamed, or of any other subject of the Sultan of Muscat, to rights under the French flag while in Oman territory or territorial waters, until favoured with an intimation from yourself giving a list of the persons and setting forth the title of each individual to fly the said flag, for the information and consideration of His Majesty's Government, which, under the Declaration aforesaid, is clearly entitled to be consulted in the matter.

3. It must, I think, be plain to you that, to avoid any misunderstanding between us, it is very necessary that the British Consul should be furnished by you with such an explanatory list; but I have not hitherto been favoured with one by your predecessors, and His Highness, likewise not having received one, is unable to furnish me with a copy.

Meanwhile, I am sure you will agree that a state of things which makes it possible for any subject of the Sultan, during the progress of internal inter-tribal disturbances in Oman, in which he or his tribes are concerned, to hoist a foreign flag and claim protection under it against his Omani fellow-subjects (and therefore against the Ruler of the country), constitutes a position which is a direct encroachment upon the integrity of the Muscat Sultanate—which my Government is bound to see preserved—and is, at the same time, incompatible with the terms of the Declaration of 1862 above referred to.

I have accordingly the honour to inquire whether you cannot see your way at the present juncture to favour me with a complete list of His Highness the Sultan's subjects over whom, as in the case of Mubarak-bin-Hamed, you claim to extend your protection within the territory and territorial waters of the Sultan's dominions, in order that I may be able, after ascertaining the Sultan's views in each case, to submit the matter to my Government.

Inclosure 7 in No. 190.

*M. Dorville to Major Cox.**Le 10 Avril, 1903.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 8 courant. Je suis fort étonné de voir qu'une réclamation adressée par un protégé Français à un sujet de Sa Hautesse puisse intéresser en quoi que ce soit le Consulat de Sa Majesté Britannique et que l'indépendance des États du Sultan s'en trouve par là menacé; car—et vous le dites très justement—l'Angleterre et la France sont liées par le Traité de 1862 et doivent en observer la teneur. Je ne vois, donc, pas matière à protestation.

Quant à la liste que vous me demandez, je regrette, M. le Consul, de ne pouvoir vous la fournir, n'ayant pas d'instructions à cet égard.

Veuillez, &c.

Inclosure 8 in No. 190.

*Major Cox to M. Dorville.**Muscat, April 10, 1903.*

I HAVE the honour to thank you for your communication of to-day's date in reply to my letter of the 8th instant.

2. I note that you feel unable at present to favour me with any list of the nature requested, not having received any instructions to that effect. Perhaps, however, I may look forward to receiving the information at a later date, after you have made a reference to your Government.

3. In the absence of such information, I can only repeat that I specifically impugn the title of the said Mubarak-bin-Hamed, or any other subject of His Highness the Sultan similarly situated, to any rights of protection under the French flag while in the territory or territorial waters of Oman, and that I must take objection to any action of yours implying a claim on your part to accord such protection.

Inclosure 9 in No. 190.

Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salim-Al-Hamudeh to Major Cox.

(Translation.)

(After the usual greetings.)

Sur, April 1, 1903.

WE arrived here at Eigh (part of Sur) in connection with a dispute outstanding between us and the tribes of the Jenebeh, Hasham, and Beni Rasib. As they all submitted to us we made peace with them, after getting what we wanted from them. Seeing that we closed, both against them and the Hinawis, the creek of Sur and all the routes from the interior, the Beni Ghafir came to us and made terms; but we are still blockading the roads leading to the Hinawi country, and hostilities are still going on between us and them.

Be it known to you, O friend! that your subjects the Banians are giving assistance to our enemies, the Beni-bu-Hassan and Hijrieen (i.e., Hinawis), by supplying all their villages with rice and dates. This is very hard upon us, and I beg you to deter them from this practice, in order that we may be able to weaken our enemies. I am sending this letter by my messenger Feroze, and I shall be obliged if you will send the answer by him, together with some cartridges—as many as possible, if you please. I am awaiting your answer in Eigh, and salaam.*

Dated Eigh, 2nd Muharram, 1321.

* Before letter arrived Abdulla-bin-Salim had left Sur for his villages in Jalan, having received news of the murder of five more of his tribesmen by the Hijrieen.—P. Z. Cox.

Inclosure 10 in No. 190.

Major Cox to Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salim.

(Translation.)

(After the usual greetings.)

Muscat, April 9, 1903.

I HAVE received your esteemed letter, dated the 2nd Muharram, and understood its contents, and am glad to hear you are well. Referring to what you say about our subjects, the Banians, assisting your enemies, I feel sure that they would not intentionally do such a thing; but remember they are traders, pure and simple, and pursue their calling without knowing anything of the tribal affairs of Oman. As you know, the Arabs in all parts of Oman are in the habit of fighting among themselves, and this is the will of God and cannot be helped; but British subjects have no concern with this. I will tell my people what you say, however, and am quite sure that they would not willingly help either one side or the other.

I hope I shall soon hear that the war between you and the Hijrieen is at an end, for it is not hidden from you that war is very bad for the country.

As for the cartridges which you ask for, I am sorry I have none that I can send, but your Sultan, the Saiyid, no doubt looks after your wants in the matter.

May you be preserved, and salaam.

Inclosure 11 in No. 190.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, April 11, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report the details of the second incident mentioned in my telegram of the 10th instant to your address.

2. On Wednesday, the 8th instant, there arrived by the mail steamer from Bombay five Arabs of Sur. Three had paid second-class fares in order to escape being sent to the quarantine station, and two came as deck passengers.

The three second-class passengers were allowed on shore, subject to daily medical inspection by the Sultan's Health Officer; the other two were sent with the rest of the deck passengers to the quarantine station in the bay some 3 miles from Muscat.

The three second-class passengers duly came for medical inspection on the morning of the 9th, and got no permission to leave Muscat; on the contrary, they are stated to have asked permission, and, as a matter of course, to have been refused it. In the evening, however, after conferring with Khamis-bin-Mubarak, Razaiki, the man who had come to complain of molestation by Abdulla-bin-Salim (vide my letter No. 132 of to-day's date), these three second-class passengers, whom it now transpires all claim French protection, left in a hired native craft for Sur. In the morning the guard on duty at the Sultan's quarantine station reported that two deck passengers had disappeared during the night, and, on further inquiry, it was found that the three second-class men had also decamped from Muscat by sea during the night.

His Highness thereupon sent his quarantine Superintendent over to the Consulate to inform the Health Officer (the Agency Surgeon) and myself, and to ask me what course I recommended. As the night had been windless, it was improbable that the dhow in which the parties were believed to have absconded could have made much progress. Accordingly, at the Sultan's desire, I addressed Captain Pears, commanding His Majesty's ship "Perseus," and requested him to send his steam-cutter after it, and this he was good enough to do.

3. The steam-cutter was accompanied, on behalf of the Sultan, by the official in charge of the local quarantine station, and the parties were in due course overtaken about 30 miles from Muscat. On the approach of the steam-cutter, they are understood to have run ashore and endeavoured to escape over the rocks, but were apprehended and brought back to Muscat. They were handed over at this Consulate about 9.45 P.M., and the Sultan was informed; but, owing to the lateness of the hour, he requested that they might remain here, and they were accordingly kept in the guard-room of the Consulate till morning. Soon after day-break this morning (the 11th April), His Highness wrote to me officially, asking me to express his thanks to the Commander of the "Perseus" for his effective action, and begging me to keep the men a little longer until he had been able to make arrangements for their safe reception. This I acquiesced in, and at a later hour duly handed them over to an official and guard sent by the Sultan to receive them. They were

taken direct to the quarantine station to complete their term, on the expiry of which His Highness intends to prosecute them. Before they left, and the Agency Surgeon being indisposed, after obtaining the Sultan's acquiescence, I took the statements of all five men. Three of them claimed to be French subjects out and out.

M. Dorville has addressed me protesting at my having "imprisoned" three French protégés, and I have replied that five Suri subjects of the Sultan broke quarantine, and have been apprehended, and that I am unable to admit his right to address me on a matter which concerns only the Sultan and his Health Officer.

Time does not admit of my sending copies of the correspondence, as the mail is just leaving.

No. 191.

Questions asked in the House of Commons, May 12, 1903.

Mr. R. Lucas.—To ask the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether he could announce any intention on the part of His Majesty's Government of encouraging British railway enterprise in South-West Persia so as to insure that the development of those regions might not be carried out by foreign capital and energy to the detriment of British trade and interests.

Answer.

My honourable friend is aware of the answer which I made in this House on the 25th March last year. A fuller statement was made by Lord Lansdowne in another place last week on the same subject. For the moment there is no question of the development of railway enterprise in Persia.

Mr. Gibson Bowles.—Will the Noble Lord give us any indication of what that answer was?

Answer.

The more important answer was delivered by the Secretary of State himself in the House of Lords last week, and I happen to know that my honourable friend was a very attentive listener.

No. 192.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 12, 1903.

LOAN. With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 46 of yesterday, I fear that the meaning of my telegrams may have been obscured by my desire to condense them agreeably to your recent instructions. What I said was that I had already informed the Grand Vizier that his proposal would not be acceptable to His Majesty's Government, and I advised him to re-borrow from the Imperial Bank the 50,000*l.* which he had just repaid them out of our advance. The Imperial Bank could, I think, probably raise another 50,000*l.* on the lines suggested in your Lordship's telegram No. 28 of the 3rd August, 1901. If this were done, it would be possible for any further advance from Imperial funds to be deferred until the question has been more fully considered by His Majesty's Government. The point as to "Fars and the Gulf" involves very complicated issues, and I am anxious not to raise it just at present. I cannot explain these issues by telegraph as they are too long, but amongst others I may mention that the Persian text of the engagement of 1897 as to the control of the southern customs is lacking both in clearness and strength.

I understand, meanwhile, that your Lordship's position is that, on condition that the southern customs are made the only guarantee and that repayment before twenty years is prevented, you are ready to complete the advance.

No. 193.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 12, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon in Khorassan. My telegram No. 59.

I have just received from the Persian Government the reply given by the Russian Legation to the proposal for the abolition of the cordon made them by the Grand Vizier. The note argues that it was via Herat and not via Beluchistan that the cholera was introduced into Khorassan from India in 1893, and that, therefore, quarantine against plague is not necessary on the Seistan frontier, but on the former route. It ends with a veiled threat to inflict financial loss on Khorassan by closing the Russian frontier to Persian trade.

We can easily refute the arguments, but two things are clear—(1) that the Russians will not withdraw their cordon, and that they cannot be forced to do so by Persia, and (2) that we cannot let the question drop, having raised it officially.

I should be glad to be furnished with your Lordship's instructions in the matter.

No. 194.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Musurus Pasha.

THE Marquess of Lansdowne presents his compliments to the Turkish Ambassador, and, with reference to his note of the 28th ultimo, has the honour to inform his Excellency that His Majesty's Secretary of State for India has received a telegram from the Resident at Aden in regard to the murder of Ghanime, a trader of Sana, in Haushabi territory, in February last.

The Resident states that two persons, a father and son, were implicated in the murder, and that they fled to the Sayads of Dhubiyat, in the territory of the Amir of Dhal. The Amir endeavoured to arrest them, but they again escaped and entered the Yaffai country, where all trace of them was lost. The Resident adds that a look-out will be kept for the culprits, and that if anything more is heard of them steps will be taken to have them arrested.

Foreign Office, May 12, 1903.

No. 195.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 125.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 12, 1903.

AT the close of my conversation with the Turkish Ambassador to-day, I mentioned to his Excellency that I had heard with regret that Yusuf, the Turkish official who had at one moment been designated to act as Mudir at Wakra on the El Katr Peninsula, had arrived at that place presumably for the purpose of taking up his appointment there. I reminded his Excellency of the discussions which had taken place at Constantinople between yourself and the Turkish Government upon this subject, and of the assurances which you had received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Vizier, to the effect that it was not the intention of the Turkish Government to send officials to this part of the coast.

I pointed out to his Excellency that you had distinctly warned the Minister for Foreign Affairs that a departure from the assurances given to you in the matter would be viewed by His Majesty's Government in a very serious light, and that if Mudirs actually proceeded to the localities in question, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to take steps to remove them.

I said that in these circumstances we should certainly not acquiesce in Yusuf's appointment, and that I hoped the Turkish Government would lose no time in withdrawing him. I added that you had been instructed to demand his withdrawal.

Musurus Pasha observed that he could only conjecture that Yusuf had gone to

[1617]

Wakra on his own account, and that there seemed to be no evidence to prove that the Turkish Government were responsible for his movements.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 196.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, May 12, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 7th instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople* relative to complaints made by the Turkish Commissioners on the Aden frontier of the attitude of the British Commissioners in regard to the delimitation of the territory of the Amir of Dthali.

Sir N. O'Connor expresses the opinion that the difficulties which are being raised by the Turkish Commissioners are mainly due to their apprehension that the British Commissioners may claim Kataba on behalf of the Amir of Dthali.

This apprehension would appear to be founded on the recent proceedings of the British Commissioners, reported in the telegram from the Resident at Aden of the 27th ultimo.

Lord Lansdowne had never contemplated the possibility of Kataba being included in the territory of the nine tribes, and during his discussions with the Turkish Ambassador, he has always assumed that it was situated, as shown on all the maps which Lord Lansdowne has seen, within Turkish territory.

He therefore unhesitatingly concurs in Sir N. O'Connor's view that such a claim would now be difficult to justify, and should not be supported by His Majesty's Government. As, however, Sir N. O'Connor suggests that use might be made of a possible claim to Kataba for the purpose of obtaining satisfactory arrangement at other points, his Lordship proposes, if the Secretary of State concurs, to authorize his Excellency to defer for the present acting on the instructions sent to him in the telegram No. 99 of the 7th instant.

I am to add that Lord Lansdowne is of opinion that it is highly desirable that the British Commissioners should refrain, as far as possible, from raising fresh claims or suggesting extensive departures from the "green line," any such departures, except for the purpose of bringing about a reasonable "give-and-take" arrangement, can only lead to further delay in the settlement of the frontier question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 197.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

Sir, I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th April, forwarding a copy of a letter from the Imperial Bank of Persia stating the terms on which the Bank will be prepared to establish a branch in Seistan.

The terms are those described in Sir H. Walpole's letter of the 3rd April, viz., a maximum subsidy of 1,500*l.* a-year for a period of five years, that maximum being reduced by the amount of any net profits actually made by the branch in each year. The expression "net profits" means the profits after deduction of all ordinary expenses including interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum on the capital allotted to the branch, which, as stated in the letter from the Bank of the 29th April, forwarded with your letter of the 2nd instant, is estimated at 10,000*l.* for a commencement, to be increased if required.

I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to state, for Lord Lansdowne's information, that the Secretary of State in Council accepts these terms, and will be glad if the necessary arrangements with the Imperial Bank of Persia can be made in accordance with the last two paragraphs of Sir Horace Walpole's letter of the 3rd April.

* No. 173.

I am also directed to forward copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st May, from which it will be seen that it is desirable, having regard to the action of the Russian Bank, that the establishment of the branch of the Imperial Bank in Seistan should be expedited.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 198.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

Sir,

India Office, May 12, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to inclose a copy of a further telegram from the Viceroy on the subject of the extension of Turkish jurisdiction to the El Katr coast.

Lord Lansdowne will see that the Turkish Mudir, Yusuf Beg, has succeeded in establishing himself at Wakra; and Lord George Hamilton is of opinion that the Porte should be strongly urged to issue instructions for his immediate withdrawal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 198.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 10, 1903.

MY telegram of the 8th instant. Following telegram was received on the 9th from Colonel Kemball, who is informing His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople:—

"On arrival at Bahrein, the Commander of His Majesty's ship 'Lapwing' learnt that Gaskin had received information, which he considered quite reliable, that Yusuf had succeeded in establishing himself at Wakra, through intervention of Sheikh Ahmed, who feared getting into trouble with the Turks if he refused. Commander in these circumstances returned to Bushire at once to report the news, instead of going to Wakra."

See your telegram of the 26th March. Yusuf's withdrawal will, I presume, be insisted upon by His Majesty's Government.

No. 199.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th instant, relative to the French flag question at Muscat.

India Office, May 13, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 199.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 12, 1903.

MUSCAT. We trust that His Majesty's Government will in no case agree to any settlement by which flagholders will be released till they have completed their sentence of three months' imprisonment. Effect of supporting Sultan in carrying out full sentence is likely to be satisfactory, and may deter his subjects in future from using the French flag. French man-of-war "Infernet" arrived yesterday.

No. 200.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1903.

EL KATR. With reference to the telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf of the 9th May, you should make a communication to the Porte stating that His Majesty's Government cannot allow Yusuf Bey to remain at Wakra, and that they trust that the Turkish Government will take steps to withdraw him without delay.

No. 201.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1903.

HIS Majesty's Government are ready to complete the advance to the Persian Government on the conditions described in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 64 of the 12th May.

No. 202.

Memorandum communicated to M. Cambon, May 13, 1903.

IN the course of his interview with Lord Lansdowne on the 27th ultimo M. Cambon stated that, in his opinion, subjects of the Sultan of Muscat who are entitled to use the French flag could not be arrested by the Sultan without the concurrence of the French Consul.

Lord Lansdowne would be much obliged if M. Cambon would inform him of the grounds on which this view is based.

Is it contended that the French flagholders are French-protected persons within the meaning of the French Treaty of 1844? If so, this contention would not appear to be well founded, as, on reference to Article IV of that Treaty, it will be seen that it only provides that "subjects of the Sultan of Muscat *actually in the service of the French* shall enjoy the same privileges which are granted to the French themselves"; it can scarcely be contended that French flagholders are persons actually in the service of the French within the meaning of the Treaty.

It is further to be observed that the French Consul at Muscat, on the 5th March, 1902, stated in writing to Captain Cox that French officers had no intention of subjecting Muscat subjects to French jurisdiction, and that they only claimed the right conferred by the Brussels Act, namely, a right of surveillance and police over dhows carrying the French flag.

His Majesty's Government understood that the French Government were in agreement with them on the point that no right of protection on shore or in the territorial waters of Muscat was claimed by the French Government in respect of subjects of the Sultan holding licences to fly the French flag, and that within the Sultan's territory they were to be regarded as subject to his ordinary jurisdiction.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1903.

No. 203.

Memorandum communicated to Musurus Pasha, May 13, 1903.

THE complaints against the British Commissioners, as stated in the Turkish Ambassador's note of the 11th instant, are as follows:—

1. That the British Commissioners are raising vexatious difficulties in the way of the progress of the work of delimitation, notably in connection with the demarcation of the line in the neighbourhood of Kataba.

2. That after the Commission had decided to defer survey operations until the receipt of fresh instructions Colonel Wahab at first proposed to prepare a map of the country situated at a distance of 2 kilometres on either side of the green line, and that he subsequently insisted on extending this limit to $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilometres on the Turkish side.

3. That British soldiers and surveyors had been sent to certain villages in the districts of Dakkam and Kataba outside the line.

4. That Colonel Wahab had insisted on the removal of a custom-house, which had previously been transferred to the Turkish side of the line, on the ground that it was situated in disputed territory.

As regards the first two subjects of complaint, it may be stated generally that, according to the instructions sent to the Turkish Commissioners, as communicated by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, on the 13th February last, it was arranged that, "as regards localities on which the Commissioners may not be able to agree at the time of delimitation, they will be reserved for agreement between the two Governments."

Subsequently, on the 18th March the Turkish Government agreed "to proceed with the delimitation, in accordance with the configuration of the land, of the line shown by the British Commissioner on the joint map."

His Majesty's Government have always regarded the green line as merely indicating the approximate extent of the British claim, and not as debarring the Commissioners from having full opportunities of ascertaining the facts as to the configuration of the ground, and basing thereon proposals within reasonable limits to obtain a satisfactory and serviceable frontier. It has never been the intention of His Majesty's Government to propose any extensive or wholesale departures from this line, but merely to adopt such modifications of it as would be obviously fair and mutually convenient to both parties on a give-and-take principle.

It is not possible to follow the geographical details of the proposal contained in the note in regard to the frontier in the neighbourhood of Kataba, but, according to the information received by His Majesty's Government, it appears that Colonel Wahab has done no more than propose that a joint survey should be undertaken by the two parties to settle the point at issue. This proposal is entirely in accordance with the views of His Majesty's Government as to the principal on which the delimitation should proceed.

Colonel Wahab's proposal to survey the country for a short distance on either side of the line seems to have been made with the object of bringing about a settlement on the above principle.

Any independent surveys which may have been made by Colonel Wahab in the Dakkam district appear to be entirely justified on the ground that a doubt exists as to the proper limits of Dakkam, as is proved by the fact that the frontier is shown in this neighbourhood on the map by a broken line, the object being to indicate that the line is only provisional, and that the actual facts as to the limits of the territory have still to be ascertained. The British Commissioner is entitled to full facilities for ascertaining these facts.

The information received by His Majesty's Government as to the establishment of a Turkish customs post in the Kataba district does not entirely correspond with the account furnished by the Turkish Ambassador. Colonel Wahab has reported that, not only has a customs post been established by the Turkish authorities south of the Selat Kataba in territory which cannot be admitted to be Turkish, but also that excessive export duties have been levied there, and that camels belonging to the British Commissioners have been improperly detained, and only released on payment of the excessive duties demanded. His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is in communication with the Turkish Government on this subject.

*Foreign Office,**May 13, 1903.*

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 127.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 13, 1903.

THE Turkish Ambassador asked me for an interview yesterday, and handed me the communication, of which a copy is inclosed, on the subject of the Aden delimitation.*

I told his Excellency that I was quite unable to follow the geographical details which he had laid before me in connection with the delimitation of the border in the neighbourhood of Kataba, and that several of the other places mentioned by his Excellency were not marked upon my map. As for the statement that Colonel Wahab had at first suggested that the frontier might be laid down at any distance not exceeding 2 kilom. on either side of the green line, and that he had subsequently asked to extend these limits to 4½ kilom., all I could say was that it had been from the first understood by His Majesty's Government that the green line was only an approximate description of the frontier, and that the Commissioners were to be free to vary it within reasonable limits in order to obtain a satisfactory and serviceable frontier. It had, however, never been intended that there should be wholesale or extensive departures from the green line, and I added that in my view any modifications of the line which might be indispensable should be on the "give and take" principle, so that the parties might obtain satisfaction at one point for concessions made at another.

As for the statement that British surveyors had been sent into certain villages belonging to Dekiam, which I imagined to be the same as Dakkam on our maps, I believed it was the case that parts of Dakkam, which it would be difficult to separate from the rest, were to be found beyond, *id est* to the west of the Tiban River along which the green line had been drawn. I would, however, inquire into this, and the other points mentioned in his Excellency's communication, and let him know the result.

I subsequently sent his Excellency a Memorandum, of which a copy is attached to this despatch.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 215.)

Sir,

Foreign Office May 13, 1903.

I HAD a further conversation with the French Ambassador to-day in regard to the recent seizure of dhows flying the French flag at Muscat.

His Excellency called my attention to two letters addressed to M. Dorville, the French Vice-Consul at Muscat, by Major Cox, dated respectively the 8th and 10th April. His Excellency showed me a French translation of the former and a copy of the latter document.

He told me that in the view of the French Government Major Cox had no right to address official remonstrances of this kind to the French Consul, and that he was certainly not in a position to write such a sentence as that in which (*vide* letter of the 10th April) he says: "I can only repeat that I specifically impugn the title of the said Mubarak-bin-Hamid, or any other subject of His Highness the Sultan similarly situated, to any rights of protection under the French flag while in the territory or in the territorial waters of Oman, and that I must take objection to any action of yours implying a claim on your part to accord such protection."

Major Cox wrote as if he was himself the Government of Muscat, and was entitled to lecture the French Representative for his conduct. If such remonstrances were to be made, it was the Sultan who should make them, and not Major Cox.

I replied that as both Great Britain and France had agreed to uphold the independence of the Sultan, it seemed to me natural and desirable that, in cases where the Sultan's rights were apparently infringed, our Representative should freely discuss the situation with his French colleague. His Excellency said that he did not disagree with me, but that such discussion should be of an unofficial character, and not

* No. 189.

† No. 203.

couched in the extremely official style which Major Cox affected. His Excellency begged that I would picture to myself the feelings of His Majesty's Government if the converse case were to arise, and the French Consul were to address Major Cox in not less peremptory language for some alleged interference with the rights of the Sultan.

I told his Excellency that Major Cox's tone might perhaps have been too severely official, but that in substance I held that he was right in objecting to M. Dorville's demands.

I said that, after our conversation on the 27th ultimo, I had referred to the Treaty, in which I found no authority for his Excellency's contention that owners of dhows flying the French flag could not be arrested by the Sultan for violations of the municipal law of Muscat, without the concurrence of the French Consul.

Under Article IV of the Treaty, it was provided that "subjects of the Sultan of Muscat actually in the service of the French shall enjoy the same privileges which are granted to the French themselves." It could scarcely be contended that these French flag-holders were persons actually in the service of the French within the meaning of the Treaty.

His Excellency admitted the correctness of my quotation from the Treaty, but said that the provision which I had cited, and which dealt specially with persons in the service of the French, did not in any way affect the rights enjoyed by other persons who were entitled to fly the French flag, and consequently to claim French protection.

I said that this seemed to me a doubtful contention, and I reminded his Excellency that the French Consul at Muscat on the 5th March, 1902, stated in writing to Major Cox that the French authorities had no intention of subjecting Muscat subjects to French jurisdiction, and that they only claimed the right of surveillance and police over dhows carrying the French flag.

I pointed out to his Excellency that the persons who had been recently imprisoned by the Sultan for breach of the Local Quarantine Regulations had committed their offence and been arrested within the territorial waters of Muscat.

I had certainly been under the impression that the French Government were in agreement with us in holding that no right of protection on shore or in the territorial waters of Muscat could be claimed by the French Government for subjects of the Sultan holding licences to fly the French flag, and that such persons within the Sultan's territory were admitted to be subject to his ordinary jurisdiction.

I gave his Excellency a note of the statement which I had made to him, and he promised that he would consider it. He added that the French Government were anxious that any rights arising from the possession of the French flag should not lead to abuse. It was, however, impossible for them to take back the flags from the persons who had already been given them. On the other hand, the French Government had been quite ready to fall in with our suggestion to the effect that a list of such persons should be prepared, and such a list in fact had been made out, and would have been handed to the Sultan when the recent incident arose.

It would, his Excellency said, be easy for the Sultan to communicate the list to our Consul, so as to avoid misunderstandings.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 13, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a note from the Turkish Ambassador,* stating that the Acting Vali of Yemen has reported that a party of men belonging to the Subaihi tribe in the Aden Protectorate recently murdered two members of the Hakem tribe of the district of Mokha, in the Vilayet of Yemen, and their servant, an Abyssinian, and carried off their arms and 100 camels and 200 sheep belonging to them.

* No. 188.

Musurus Pasha asks that steps may be taken without delay to have the persons guilty of this outrage arrested and punished and the stolen property restored.

I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that inquiry should be made of the Resident at Aden in regard to this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 207.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 14.)

Sir,

India Office, May 13, 1903.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, ending with Sir H. Walpole's letter of the 4th April last, on the subject of the reported intention of the Turkish Government to create administrative posts at Zobara, Wakra, and Odeid, on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to request that you will draw Lord Lansdowne's attention to the inclosed copy of a letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India, dated the 23rd March last, with special reference to the importance of Zobara to the security of Bahrein.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 207.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, March 23, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my telegram dated the 12th instant, on the subject of El Katr, that on the 16th instant, the mail-steamer from Bussorah arrived in Bushire. Abdul Karim Effendi, the Mudir-designate for Odeid, was on board *en route* to Bahrein. I had him interviewed, and he stated that his destination had been altered. He was to have gone to Odeid, but he knew what a desolate place Odeid was, and he had managed to arrange a transfer to another place called Alayun, which I am unable to locate, but which is, I believe, somewhere near Katif or Al Hassa, and he was on his way to Al Hassa to obtain orders from the Mutessarif. As regards Odeid, he stated that another officer, whose name he did not know, had been appointed as Mudir. He was of Kurdish origin, and was now in Bussorah, and would probably come to Bahrein by the following mail. He stated that Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani had asked the Porte to establish administrative units at Zobara, Wakra, and Odeid, and that Arabi Effendi, who had gone to Bahrein by the preceding mail-steamer, was nominated to the Zobara Mudirieh, and that Yusuf Beg, now at Al Hassa, was to go to Wakra.

He did not know the number of soldiers to be stationed at the new posts.

2. It is, I think, very probable that Sheikh Jasim has recommended to the Porte the establishment of these posts. The Turkish authorities have, I believe, been for some time anxious to get hold of Sheikh Jasim, and I gather that they wish to hold him responsible for the recently disturbed state of the country between Ojair and Al Hassa. Sheikh Jasim has, therefore, in order to absolve himself from responsibility, recommended the Turks to establish posts at several points on Katr, knowing that we should not view with equanimity any occupation of Zobara and Odeid, and wishing to embroil the Turks with us.

3. It is, in my opinion, absolutely essential for the security of the Bahrein islands that Zobara should not be occupied by the Turks. Apart from the fact that the occupation of Zobara would be viewed with the greatest concern by the Chief of Bahrein, who considers the place to be an appanage of his, and whose rights we are bound to maintain, the prestige which the Turks would gain throughout the countryside by the occupation of this place, in opposition to the well-known views of the British Government, would be so great that an attack on Bahrein from Katr could at any time be organized, and the continual presence of a ship of war in Bahrein waters, and perhaps even a military occupation of the islands, would be required. Regarding the occupation by the Turks of other places on El Katr it is not, I think, necessary for me at the present time to add anything to what has already been said on the subject.

No. 208.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 14.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 12th May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 13, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 208.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 12, 1903.

BRITISH Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to remonstrate against proceedings described in Resident at Aden's telegram of the 6th May relative to Turkish customs duties.

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 209.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 14.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 14, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 14th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 209.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Trincomalee, May 14, 1903.

FOLLOWING telegram has been received from "Naiad" at Muscat dated the 13th instant:—

"I have been informed by Consul: The Sultan's brother, Regent during the temporary absence of the Sultan, returned French Commodore's visit this morning. Commodore, in the presence of witnesses, demanded release of the men imprisoned for breaking quarantine; laid his sword on the table, saying it was either compliance or the sword, when the Regent refused to consider the matter, and told him to write whatever he had to say to the Sultan; Commodore hesitated, but wrote letters in modified language demanding Sultan's presence and absolute satisfaction for their imprisonment. In view of the effect of the menace, Consul informed French Consul that he is preparing to maintain Sultan's authority in the matter. Uncertain whether Sultan is coming; if he does, he may be overawed."

No. 210.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 14, 1903.

THERE have recently been some bread riots at Meshed, and the Governor-General, against whom the Russians have been working for some time, has resigned in connection with them. This is held by His Majesty's Consul-General to constitute a

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victory for the Russians, to which we should make a vigorous reply, and he urges that we should send strong quarantine detachments to Seistan and the southern ports unless the Russian quarantine cordon is withdrawn within a definite period. I agree with Colonel Whyte, whether this proposal is accepted or not, that the moment has now come when we should insist on the Russian cordon being removed, and support our insistence by some such step as that suggested by him.

No. 211.

Mr. Cave to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 15.)

No. 29. Zanzibar.)

My Lord,

Zanzibar, April 21, 1903.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram No. 6 of the 18th instant, calling for a report on the history and character of a person named Salim Khemri.

I also received on the 18th instant from the Rev. J. C. Young, of the Keith-Falconer Mission at Aden, and from Salim Khemri himself letters, of which copies are inclosed herewith, relating to the circumstances under which the latter left Zanzibar, and requesting my assistance with a view to the recovery of the property of which he claims to have been possessed.

The past history of Salim Khemri, with which, for reasons which will appear below, I am fairly well acquainted, is as follows:—

Salim Khemri, or, to give him his full name, Salim-bin-Abdullah Salim-el-Khemri, is the son of a Shihiri Arab, who was settled in Zanzibar in the reign of Seyyid Barghash; he (the father) was not a merchant in the ordinary acceptance of the term, but made a respectable income by hamalage contracts and by various commissions, such as the supply of Circassian and other concubines, which he executed for the Sultan; he died in the reign of Seyyid Khalifa.

His son, Salim, was employed as a writer in the Palace until the death of the last-named Sultan, but lost his position when Seyyid Ali came to the throne; Seyyid Hamed engaged him for a short period but quickly dismissed him, and it was not until the accession of Seyyid Hamoud-bin-Mahomed that he definitely resumed his clerical duties at the Palace. When His Highness was about to proceed to Lamu at the end of 1898 Salim was ordered to precede him, but refused, and, on being remonstrated with, made use of offensive expressions towards the Sultan, both in his own house before other Arabs and in His Highness' presence. For this he was punished and his salary was reduced. After this he was known to be in communication with an official of the German Consulate, who was noted for his anti-English tendencies, but nothing definite occurred until in May 1899 he suddenly and surreptitiously left Zanzibar by the French mail for Djibouti.

Two months later the Sultan received a grossly scurrilous letter with the Cairo post-mark, containing the most infamous suggestions respecting His Highness and his family and various English officials in Zanzibar, and a threat that, if a sum of 2,000*l.* down and a monthly allowance of 20*l.* was not paid to an agent in Cairo whose name and address were given, the writer would blacken His Highness' character wherever he went. The letter was anonymous, but from the handwriting and from certain references which it contained it was abundantly clear that it had been written by Salim Khemri.

At the Sultan's request I telegraphed to His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, asking that the man might be arrested for attempted blackmail, and shortly afterwards His Highness sent an Agent to Egypt with full powers to conduct the prosecution. In the meanwhile a question had arisen as to jurisdiction, and by the time that this had been decided Salim Khemri was found to have left the country.

For further details with regard to this chapter of Salim's history I would beg leave to refer your Lordship to the Marquess of Salisbury's despatch to me No. 19, Treaty, of the 12th August, 1899, and to the note which was addressed to me by the Under-Secretary of State on the 31st of the following October.

Until more than a year later no further news of Salim Khemri reached Zanzibar. It was reported when he left Cairo that he had proceeded as a teacher of Arabic to Berlin. It is stated, on the other hand, in the accompanying letter from Mr. Young, that he was taken by M. Piat, formerly French Consul here, to Paris. If he did go to France it is not likely to have been in company with M. Piat, for that gentleman left Zanzibar in February 1899, three months before Salim himself. Further information on this point,

No. 210*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 14, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

Is the "Grand Vizier's proposal" mentioned in your telegram No. 65 of the 13th May to be understood as a formal demand by the Persian Government that the cordon should be withdrawn? Upon this must greatly depend the action to be taken.

I understand that you have a copy of the text of reply sent by the Russian Legation. I should like to see this.

however, may possibly be obtained from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, who would appear, from Mr. Young's statement, to have been acquainted with Salim's proceedings.

In December 1900 the Sultan received a letter from Salim Khemri, praying that he might be forgiven for what he had done. To this Petition a gracious reply was sent, and Salim was informed that he would be allowed to return to Zanzibar. He has not at present, however, availed himself of His Highness' clemency.

The statement in Salim Khemri's letter to me that his property had been seized by the Sultan is not true. A house belonging to him is on the point of being sold for debt by an Order of the Court, which was only issued after all the formalities required by the Mahomedan law had been complied with, but I am informed that in all other respects his property remains as it was when he quitted Zanzibar.

I am replying to Mr. Young's letter in this sense, and am asking him to inform Salim Khemri that, if he should elect to return here to see after his own affairs, his personal liberty will be in no wise interfered with.

I am afraid that, in view of Salim Khemri's local record, I can hardly indorse the good character which is given to him by Mr. Young. His dastardly attempt to blackmail the Sultan was not an eloquent testimony to either his respectability or his veracity, and, apart from that, the character which he bore in His Highness' service would not lead me to describe him as either loyal or particularly reliable. It was, perhaps, an unnecessarily harsh measure on the part of the French authorities to incarcerate him in a lunatic asylum, from which unpleasant predicament Mr. Young would appear to have rescued him, but he is said to have been always somewhat eccentric, and I should be inclined to regard with some suspicion any statements which he might make to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BASIL S. CAVE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 211.

The Rev. J. C. Young to Mr. Cave.

Honoured Sir,

Keith-Falconer Mission, Aden, April 3, 1903.

ONE of our converts, named Salim Khemri, has begged me to petition you on his behalf, and as I feel that I cannot do so better than in his own words, I beg to append an exact translation of his own statements.

I have known Salim for over two years, and can speak of him as a thoroughly honest, truthful man.

Perhaps you may have heard of him through Sir Edmond Monson, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Paris. For Salim had a hard and curious experience there, suffering much on account of his loyalty to the British Government.

M. Piat, a gentleman who used to be French Consul in Zanzibar, took him to Paris, ostensibly to teach Arabic, but in reality to sub-edit an Arabic newspaper, published with a view to suborn British subjects in India, Arabia, and East Africa. As soon, however, as he discovered the nature of the work he refused to do it, and was first threatened with imprisonment by M. Piat, and then put into a lunatic asylum, from which I rescued him.

If, then, you can help this man to recover his property, you will be helping a good man and a loyal subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN C. YOUNG.

Inclosure 2 in No. 211.

Salim Khemri to Mr. Cave.

Honoured Sir,

I WAS a clerk with Seyyid Hamoud, Sultan of Zanzibar, and was beloved of him until he wished me to go to Mombasa, and, on account of illness, I refused to go. Then he became angry, and ordered me to give the key of my desk to Ali Mohammed, one of his servants, which I did, and departed to my house; but he sent soldiers after me, who haled me to prison, where they kept me with shackles on my legs till the afternoon.

In the afternoon, however, I was released, and that night Sherif Mamboyah, the servant of General Mathews, came and said that the Sultan did not want me to return to my work, but he did not give me any pay.

Next day Ali Mohammed and a friend came to my house, and said that the Sultan would give me 20 rupees a-month, and if he found suitable work for me he would give me it. I was angry, however, and said that I neither wanted his money nor his work. My friends, however, advised me not to speak thus; for if the Sultan heard it he would send me back to prison, or otherwise injure me. It would, they said, be far better for me to become tractable and do what the Sultan wished. Upon this I took the money.

Formerly my pay was 70 rupees a-month, but the Sultan always gave me a present every month of from 50 to 100 rupees in addition to my pay. He used also to give me clothes, &c.

These 20 rupees a-month, however, injured me much, as they were not sufficient for my upkeep, and yet I was unable to go and work in any other place.

Because of this, I wrote to the Sultan while he was in Mombasa, and again after he returned to Zanzibar, asking him to cease from his anger and become conciliated. He, however, gave me no answer until one night Ali Mohammed came and said that the Sultan did not want me to write to him again.

When I heard this I left Zanzibar, leaving my father's wife in my house and with a portion of land that belonged to me upon which reed houses were erected. I also left 550 rupees with Abdoo Rub, son of the late Sultan of Makulla, which was part of a larger debt. He having only paid a part, 550 remained unpaid.

I also left all papers relating to these with Saed-bin-Maabud, and told him to take charge of the houses and gather the rents for me, but now I never get news from him.

When I was Cadi in Jibuti I heard that the Sultan Hamoud had seized a house which belonged to me, but which was bonded with a man, Salem-el-Badee, for 8,250 rupees; the time being six years. When, however, the Sultan took possession of the house there remained nearly four years of the time.

This house is still in the Sultan's possession, and I have never got any rent for it. I, therefore, beg of you, as one who loves not dark transactions, to help me as you did the children of Hamed-bin-Suleiman, and get my house out of the Sultan's possession, together with the rent for it from the time that he took possession.

When I was in Zanzibar I used to receive 75 rupees a-month for the house; but since I left I have not received anything.

My friends in Zanzibar would willingly help me, but they are afraid from the Sultan, and are therefore not able to do what I require. I am, therefore, under the necessity of appealing to your honour, and of begging you to be good enough to take possession of the houses and to sell them, as well as the portion of the land which belongs to me in what is called Ardh Melindi. There are twelve sheds on this piece of land, one of which belongs to my father's wife, and one to a poor woman to whom my father gave leave to erect a house. All the rest belong to me, and I have papers from the time of the Sultan Majid bearing witness to the fact that the land is mine.

Will your honour, therefore, be kind enough to take possession of and sell these houses and land, except those houses of my father's wife and the poor woman to whom my father gave leave to erect a dwelling. Will you also be kind enough to take the 550 rupees from Abdoo Rub and to return to Salem-el-Badee his 8,250 rupees out of the proceeds of the sale and to others their bonds of 1,200 rupees.

The house I bought for 12,341, and afterwards I spent 1,500 on repairs, but, as yet, I have received no return.

I wish you also to understand that the Sultan was conciliated to me before his death and wrote to me in Lahj. I, therefore, humbly beg and entreat you to do whatever you see best for me, as I know no other person that can help me on earth. By doing this act of kindness you will help and bless yours, &c.

(Signed) SALIM KHEMRI.
(C/o Dr. Young, Keith-Falconer Mission,
Sheikh Ottoman, Aden.)

No. 212.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 14th May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 15, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 212.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

MY telegram of 12th May: Muscat.

May 14, 1903.

Following telegrams have been received from Captain Cox:—

May 12.—“French Commodore states that he awaits return of Sultan from interior, as he must make personally an important oral communication to him from the French Government. Probably, in the first instance, the Sultan will press that the communication should be made in writing. Commodore has, meanwhile, met me unofficially, and seems anxious for a discussion of the question between us. Personally, I am sceptical of utility or finality of such discussion between us at the eleventh hour, and am of opinion that the matter would be better settled between the two Governments in Europe; but, if it is considered unobjectionable that I should enter into discussion with the Commodore, it is important that I should be informed what is the present attitude of the Foreign Office, and as to the exact position of the negotiations in London; and, further, if matter is to be discussed locally, I think that the Sultan and the British Government are entitled to require the presence of the British Representative at the interview if the Sultan is compelled to be content with oral communication.”

May 13.—“This morning the Sultan's brother returned official visit to French flag-ship, when the Commodore, in spite of his attitude yesterday, made on behalf of his Government peremptory demand that the prisoners should be released; on the Sultan's brother replying that in the Sultan's absence he was unable to comply, the Commodore used most unjustifiable threat, to which several unimpeachable witnesses can testify, and, laying drawn sword on the table, said that it must be compliance or the [? sword]. The Sultan's brother remained firm, and requested the Commodore to write to the Sultan the words he had just addressed to himself; after demurring to this course the Commodore did write in modified tone demanding the Sultan's immediate presence and absolute satisfaction regarding the imprisoned protégés. In view of disturbing effect of the threat used, I have intimated to the French Consul that as the question is being discussed in Europe, I am prepared meanwhile to support the Sultan's authority.”

The Sultan deliberately went into the interior so that, during King's visit to Paris, he should not meet the French Commodore. We have intimated to Cox that his action has our entire approval, and have suggested that, till we receive your Lordship's orders, it is advisable that Sultan's absence from Muscat should be prolonged. His Majesty's Government will doubtless make strong representation to French Government regarding the unwarrantable violence of French Commodore's action, resulting in so serious a situation, and will approve our intermediate reply to Cox. Please telegraph as soon as possible.

Inclosure 2 in No. 212.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 14, 1903.

COX telegraphs to-day, in continuation of his telegrams communicated in my previous telegram of to-day, that Sultan has returned to Muscat and expressed his determination that so long as he is not deserted by British Government he will not be intimidated into yielding to French demands.

No. 213.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 14th May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 15, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 213.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 14, 1903.

COLONEL WAHAB forwards following telegram sent from Sana on the 11th May, with reference to telegrams Nos. 18 and 19 from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople for transmission :—

"There is the usual distortion in the Turkish complaints, as shown by Wahab's telegrams Nos. 256, 260, and 262. The claims of the Amir of Dthali to the villages of Kataba, Dakkam, and others are such that they cannot be surrendered by the Commission without submission of the case to His Majesty's Government. The green line map, which was drawn from map of Turkish Commission, affords unworkable basis, as indicated in telegram from Constantinople No. 17 and Secretary of State's telegram of 4th May. Full facts and fresh corrected map are being communicated by next mail to England. Meanwhile we are taking line indicated in last paragraph of Constantinople telegram No. 18. Dakkam, with its few square miles on further side of green line, has, as a whole, always belonged to the Amiri. The village of Ukla (see Resident at Aden's telegram of the 5th May) is also Amiri, not Mares, and it should be included in our boundary, both on account of configuration of ground, and to be the starting-point of the delimitation north-eastwards.

"The Turkish Customs still refuse, unless expressly ordered by Constantinople, to reduce their duties to 1 per cent. on exports and 8 per cent. on imports; the situation is becoming intolerable; incidents occur daily; their Arab levies yesterday killed one of the Amir's men and wounded two dangerously close to our camp. It was difficult to restrain Amir's men from reprisals."

No. 214.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 15, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram of this date, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 214.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Trincomalee, May 15, 1903.

GOVERNMENT of India informs me situation of affairs at Muscat is critical, and presume that I have sufficiently strong force to meet all possible contingencies. I have informed them that I have ample naval force as matters now stand, but if "Pobyeda" is ordered to Muscat from Colombo I have not sufficient force available.

My No. 83. "Highflyer" returns Trincomalee 20th May. "Fox" due at Mauritius about 17th May, ordered to Karachi to await further instructions. She should arrive at Karachi about 27th May.

No. 216⁰.*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.*

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1903.

A COMPLAINT was made on the 12th instant by the Turkish Ambassador regarding alleged recent proceedings of the British Commissioner on the Aden Delimitation Commission, which, his Excellency stated, had formed the subject of representations to you by the Porte.

With some additional points the substance of this complaint is identical with the first paragraph of your telegram No. 94 of the 9th May.

I have addressed a note to his Excellency to the following effect [see note to Musurus Pasha the 13th May].

No. 215.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 15, 1903.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of yesterday, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 15th instant from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, relative to affairs at Muscat.

My Lords would be glad to know what answer Lord Lansdowne would wish to be sent to the Commander-in-chief.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 215.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Trincomalee, May 15, 1903.

MY No. 90. Following telegram received from "Naiad" Muscat 14th May:—
"Sultan returned and expressed himself determined not to be intimidated by French demands as long as British Government does not desert him. Commodore visits Sultan this evening."

As British Consul informed Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, that British Government had promised to support Sultan in this question, I propose to direct Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, to assist in maintaining Sultan's authority.

No. 216.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 14, 1903.

LOAN. Your Lordship's telegram No. 47 of yesterday.

The Grand Vizier, to whom I explained the position to-day, has decided to borrow on account current from the Imperial and, if necessary, from the Russian Banks, deferring his request for the completion of our advance.

No. 217.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 219.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 15, 1903.

THE French Minister called upon me to-day at my invitation, M. Cambon being absent from London.

I told M. Geoffray that, since my conversation with the Ambassador on the 13th instant, I had received from the Admiralty a report to the effect that the French Commodore in command of the "Infernet," now at Muscat, had had an interview with the Sultan's brother, who was acting as Regent during the Sultan's absence on board that ship. We were informed that the Commodore, in the presence of witnesses, had demanded the release of the men who had been imprisoned for breaking quarantine, and that he had laid a drawn sword on the table saying that "it was either compliance or the sword."

The Regent had, we understood, asked for a written communication, upon which the Commodore had in writing demanded the Sultan's presence and absolute satisfaction for the imprisonment of the men.

I said that it seemed to me that the Commodore's conduct was unjustifiable, and that it was preposterous that there should be a prospect of a breach of the peace in consequence of the comparatively trivial incidents which had taken place.

I went on to say that I could not believe that the French Government were fully

informed as to the actual circumstances of the case. I had had an opportunity of reading the report of the British Political Agent at Muscat, from which I gathered that they were as follows:—

Five Arabs of Sur had arrived at Muscat from Bombay on board the mail-steamer, on the 8th April. These men, in order to avoid the local quarantine regulations, had made their escape in the night, using for the purpose a hired native craft. The men had been pursued, overtaken, brought back to Muscat and handed over to the Sultan, who had imprisoned them.

M. Geoffray here observed that none of these details had been supplied to the French Embassy. He was himself under the impression that five dhows flying the French flag had been seized by the Sultan for an alleged breach of the quarantine regulations.

I observed that I could find no evidence whatever that the men arrested were entitled to French protection. It seemed highly improbable that they were in the French service, and entitled to claim the benefit of the Treaty. The ship in which they had arrived at Bombay was the mail-steamer, and they had fled in a local craft which presumably had no right to fly the French flag. It appeared therefore that, to begin with, their claim to French protection had yet to be made good. But besides this, even if it should be the case that some of them were French flagholders, we contended that they could not in consequence claim a protection from arrest within the territorial waters of Muscat.

M. Geoffray said that he was inclined to think that if the right to fly the French flag could be established, that right conferred upon the holder of the flag the privilege of trial before the French Consul.

I said that we were prepared to dispute this position, and we should also require to know whether, supposing the privilege to exist, it was limited to the owner of the vessel, or whether it was held to extend to the whole of the persons who might happen to be on board his ship. If this view were to prevail, it would follow that any Arab who happened to have obtained a French flag might secure immunity for any number of ruffians who happened to form part of his crew.

M. Geoffray was, evidently, not inclined to maintain this theory, and asked me what could be done in order to put an end to the tension which, unfortunately, existed.

I suggested that as both the facts and the law were in dispute, the reasonable solution was that the men should be allowed to remain in the Sultan's custody, pending further discussions between the two Governments. They had evidently been guilty of an offence, and I did not suppose for a moment that the French Government desired to shield them from punishment. The only question seemed to be whether the culprits should be locked up by the Sultan or by the French Consul. It would be easy for the French Government to reserve its right to raise hereafter the question of the legality of the Sultan's action.

M. Geoffray agreed with me that this was a reasonable solution, and told me that he would at once write to M. Cambon and put him in possession of my statement as to the facts and of the suggestion which I had just made. In the meantime he thought as I did, that both Governments should endeavour to calm the local excitement which had apparently been the result of this incident.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 218.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 15, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your Confidential letter of to-day, inclosing a copy of a telegram from the Commander-in-chief on the East Indies Station relative to the demands made by the French Naval Commander at Muscat upon the Sultan of Muscat for the release of certain natives claiming French protection who have been imprisoned for breaches of the Quarantine Regulations.

I am directed by Lord Lansdowne to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a telegram which the Secretary of

State for India has addressed to the Viceroy of India on the subject,* and which Lord Curzon has been asked to repeat to the Commander-in-chief on the East Indies Station.

I am to request that instructions may be sent to the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf to support the Sultan of Muscat in giving effect to the advice of His Majesty's Government, but to endeavour to avoid any action calculated to precipitate a crisis.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 219.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 15, 1903.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, the contents of which I have duly submitted to the Secretary of State for his consideration.

I am now directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to express to you his Lordship's views upon some of the points raised by you in connection with the Ahwaz-Ispahan Road.

As regards the claim put forward against the Bakhtiari Chiefs for the sum of 3,817 kran for the expenses incurred by Mr. Taylor on a journey in 1902 from Ahwaz to Ispahan and back, I am to point out that if the Company will study the Contract concluded between the Bakhtiari Chiefs and Messrs. Lynch of the 3rd March, 1898, they will note that although Messrs. Lynch enjoy "the right of sending Inspectors to examine the road, in order that they may be able to advise the concessionnaires in regard to repairs or other questions," no mention whatever is made of the Chiefs being in any way liable for the expense of such inspections, their only liability being for the cost of repairs, "such as the concessionnaires cannot execute themselves," and carried out under the superintendence of Messrs. Lynch's engineers. In this case no repairs were executed under the charge of Mr. Taylor, and there appears to be no valid grounds for preferring such a claim against the Bakhtiari Chiefs.

Lord Lansdowne has read with much surprise the claim put forward for 8,500*l.* for the construction of the bridges and road between Ahwaz and Ispahan. I am to point out to you that in the Contract which I signed at Tehran on behalf of Messrs. Lynch in March 1898, it is distinctly stated that Messrs. Lynch undertook "to execute the works aforesaid for a sum not exceeding 5,500*l.*" During the protracted negotiations, covering a whole year, which preceded the signature of the Contract, no allusion was, it is believed, ever made to the possibility of the sum of 5,500*l.* being exceeded, that figure having, in the first instance, been agreed upon by Messrs. Lynch themselves.

Further, in a document given to the Bakhtiari Chiefs on the 5th Moharrem, 1316, and signed by Mr. Taylor, it is stated:—

"We officially inform you that we undertake not to spend a dinar more than the 30,000 tomans, and if we spend without the consent of your Excellency and Haji Ali Kuli Khan, and the Sipahdar, we, ourselves, will be responsible for the increase of the above sum.

"(Signed) A. B. TAYLOR."

It can hardly be urged that the above letter was an unauthorized modification of the agreement arrived at between Messrs. Lynch and the Chiefs through His Majesty's Legation, since it is in complete accord with the terms of the Contract; nor, in view of the account given of the proceeding by Mr. Taylor in his letter of the 4th June, 1898, can it be fairly said that "the letter was wrung out of him by the Chiefs."

Under the circumstances alluded to above, it is quite intelligible that the Bakhtiari Chiefs have so far refused to pay the instalments and interest computed on the basis of an initial expenditure of 8,500*l.* for the road; and in Lord Lansdowne's opinion it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to assist in any way in pressing upon the Chiefs a claim estimated upon that basis. Nor would it be possible for His Majesty's Government to press for interest at the rate of 12 per cent. on the arrears, since such a rate is not in accordance with the terms of the Contract, where it is clearly stated that the Chiefs agree to pay Messrs. Lynch 6 per cent. per annum on their outlay.

* To Government of India (Telegraphic).

Lord Lansdowne is anxious, however, that the Bakhtiari Chiefs should fulfil the obligations entered upon by them towards Messrs. Lynch, and I am to state that if his Lordship is furnished with a statement of the sums due to Messrs. Lynch in accordance with the views expressed above, and of which his Lordship can approve, His Majesty's Minister in Tehran will be instructed to bring them to the notice of the Chiefs, and to point out to them the penalty that they will incur in the event of the non-fulfilment of their Contract.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 220.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 15, 1903.*
I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that he communicated to the Secretary of State for India your letter of the 15th ultimo, stating the terms on which the Imperial Bank of Persia will be prepared to establish a branch in Seistan.

Your further letter of the 29th ultimo, furnishing explanations on certain points in regard to which information was desired by the India Office, was also communicated to that Department.

I am to transmit to you a copy of a letter which has now been received from the India Office,* stating that the Secretary of State for India is prepared to accept the terms proposed by you.

I am to request that you will be so good as to address to Lord Lansdowne a letter reciting the terms of the Arrangement agreed upon, and signifying their acceptance by the Imperial Bank.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLEMENT L. HILL.

No. 221.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 30th April, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 16, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 221.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Muscat, April 18, 1903.

IN continuation of my letters dated the 11th instant, I have the honour to forward copies of further documents relating to the two incidents under report connected with the French flag.

2. They are as follows:—

(i.) Copies of five letters which have passed between the French Consul and His Highness or myself since last mail left.

(ii.) Copies of the statements of the five persons who absconded from quarantine.

(iii.) Copy of the statement of the Sultan's quarantine Superintendent.

The statements of the three Suris claiming French protection throw a good deal of light upon the dubious methods by which the French flag is distributed among the Sultan's subjects, and I respectfully commend them to the attention of the Government.

* No. 198.

Inclosure 2 in No. 221.

M. Dorville to Major Cox.

Muscat, le 11 Avril, 1903.

J'APPRENDIS que par une mesure de police sanitaire vous avez fait emprisonner hier trois protégés Français qui avaient contrevenu au Règlement: les nommés Abdallah-ben-Khamis, Salem-ben-Abdallah, et Abdallah-bin-Moubarak. Tout en reconnaissant leur culpabilité, je proteste néanmoins contre leur emprisonnement, qui est abusif en ce qu'ils ne ressortent pas de votre juridiction et que vous devez au préalable m'en informer; de plus, ces gens-là venant de pays contaminés leur envoi à la quarantaine était tout indiqué. Je serai donc obligé d'en référer à mon Gouvernement.

Veuillez, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 221.

Major Cox to M. Dorville.

Muscat, April 11, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter of to-day's date.

2. Five Suri subjects of His Highness the Sultan broke out of quarantine the night before last, and I regret that I am unable to admit your title to address me in such a matter, which appears to me to have interest for no one but His Highness and his Health Officer.

Inclosure 4 in No. 221.

M. Dorville to the Sultan of Muscat.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.)

Muscat, April 11, 1903.

I LEARN that among the five Suris who have been lodged in the fort three are under French protection. I beg, therefore, that you will be good enough to release these French protégés this very day. Their names are Abdulla-bin-Khamis, Salim-bin-Abdulla, and Khamis-bin-Mubarak, and I shall be obliged to your Highness. May you be preserved, and salaam!

Inclosure 5 in No. 221.

M. Dorville to the Sultan of Muscat.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.)

Muscat, April 11, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Highness' letter, dated the 9th Muharram, and beg to inform you that I do not accept anything that you have said in it. This right of protection has existed from of old, and your Royal ancestors agreed to this French protection, and honoured and respected the French flag. And now I call upon your Highness to pay up 1,500 dollars as compensation for the detention by Abdulla-bin-Salim of the bugla before mentioned, that being the amount claimed by the owner. And with regard to the piercing of the flag with bullets, that matter is in the hands of my Government.

This is what had to be explained, and salaam.

Inclosure 6 in No. 221.

The Sultan of Muscat to M. Dorville.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Muscat, April 12, 1903.

YESTERDAY your Honour addressed me two official letters: one on the subject of the interference by Abdulla-bin-Salim with the dhow of Mubarak-bin-Hamed. Kazaiki, and the other regarding the Suris who absconded from quarantine.

In the first connection you demand of me the payment of 1,500 dollars as an indemnity for the delay said to have been caused to the dhow, and in the second case

you require of me the release of three of the quarantine breakers, whom you claim to "protect."

In the first case I had before replied to you that I failed to comprehend how the giving of your flag to certain subjects of mine, for purposes of security during the in-voyages to foreign seas and ports, can possibly be allowed to enter into questions of a purely internal nature, such as was the incident which recently occurred at Sur.

As for the second matter, the facts are as follows:—

Five adult men belonging to Sur most flagrantly and lawlessly violated the whole of the Quarantine Regulations which I had introduced in consultation with the Consuls of all Powers concerned, in the interests of public health and safety, and on the advice of my Health Officer, who superintends the preventive arrangements on my behalf, I used every means in my power to effect the capture of the offenders and to bring them to justice. Yesterday, at the Health Officer's recommendation (after having recovered them), I gave orders about noon for them to be taken back to the quarantine station to complete their time there, and after they have done so, it is my intention to punish them proportionately to their offence, as a warning to others not to follow their example. And now you peremptorily demand their release on the grounds that three of them are under your protection. It is exceedingly difficult for me to entertain either of your demands, for it is quite impossible for me to see how compliance with either of them can be reconciled with the preservation of my independence.

Your Honour must not imagine that it is any pleasure to me to oppose your Government in any manner whatever, for the case is quite the reverse. The great English Government and your great Government have been bound by ties of cordial friendship with me and my ancestors of old, and I am innocent of any other wish than to preserve that same friendship with both Governments to the end. Then what good purpose is served by allowing this claim to the introduction of your flag into my territory (a practice which does me the utmost harm) to become time after time the cause of unpleasantness between myself and you and between your Governments, as I see it does?

Let it be known to your Honour in this connection that the great British Government informed me positively some thirteen years ago that, having regard to the law of nations, the employment by any of my subjects of a foreign flag (for use during their journeyings to foreign parts) carried no rights whatever as against me and within my own territories, and that I had every right to punish any subject of my own for violating the laws of my administration, no matter what country's flag he flew; and, moreover, that I was, without the slightest doubt, fully entitled to take any measure I chose for the improvement of my administration and the better control of my own subjects in my own territories and seas. Both before and after that expression of opinion, I have repeatedly, both verbally and in writing, and to the utmost of my power, such as it is, protested against your contention that rights under your flag extend to my territory and its seas. The English Government, moreover, which made a Treaty with your Government in 1862, also has an interest and a right to interfere in this flag question, which assails my independence to its very foundation.

Now your Honour knows well that the great British Government and your great Government have been on terms of friendship from old time, and I, too, am an old friend of both, and I know positively and specifically that the Ministers of your two Governments in London and Paris have for a long time past been discussing this question in its bearing upon the Treaty above mentioned, and I am willing to accept the result of their discussions and their joint decision. Meanwhile, these petty incidents which have been occurring among us here of late cannot affect the final adjustment of the matter between them in Europe, what therefore is to be gained by our corresponding about them here in Muscat? Can you not refer to your Government and leave these questions and the general question to them to deal with? If so, I will address the British Consul to the same effect. Then there will cease to be any danger of unpleasantness arising among us all here, and, moreover, the matter will be adjusted according to the principles of right and justice and the laws of nations. In conclusion, I request the favour of your forwarding a copy of this communication to your Government, whereby I shall be obliged to you.

This is what had to be written. May you be preserved, and salaam!

Inclosure 7 in No. 221.

Statements of Persons who broke out of Quarantine on the night of April 9, 1903.

(Taken at the request of the Sultan.)

No. 1.—Musallim-bin-Sultan states under examination:—

"I am a native and resident of Sur, and belong to the Mukanna section of the tribe of Jennebeh. I came from Bombay as a deck passenger by last mail in company with Saeed-bin-Mubarak, who also was a deck passenger, and Abdullah-bin-Khamis, his son Salim and Khalfan 'Wd. Bilal,' who came second class. On arrival I was sent to the quarantine station at Haramal with other third-class passengers. The night before last when the moon was well up, I and my companion absconded to Bunder Jisseh, over the rocks, and there we found Abdullah-bin-Khamis waiting for us with a 'badan' (country craft), and he took us on board. I do not possess a French flag, and am a subject of the Sultan."

Before me,
(Signed) P. Z. Cox, Major.

April 11, 1903.

No. 2. Saeed-bin-Mubarak-bin-Rashid states, under examination:—

"I am a native and resident of Sur and belong to the Faris section of the Jennebeh. I went to Bombay in the 'Chindwara' mail-steamer, and returned by her with Abdulla-bin-Khamis-el-Rubeyeh, whose servant I am. I was a deck passenger. Khalfan-bin-Hamed 'Wad Bilal' and Salin-bin-Abdulla (son of above Abdulla) also accompanied Abdulla-bin-Khamis, and all three were second-class passengers. They were allowed to land at Muscat, subject to doctor's inspection, but I and Musallim-bin-Sultan were sent to the quarantine camp. We escaped, however, the night before last. We slipped away about 8 P.M., and were not stopped by any guard, and made our way over the rocks to Bunder Jisseh, arriving there tired about midnight. There we found Abdulla-bin-Khamis and a 'badan' (country craft) lying waiting. With him were his son, Khalfan Wad. Bilal, and Khamis-bin-Mubarak,* Razeiki, of the Aramah section."

Before me,
(Signed) P. Z. Cox, Major.

April 11, 1903.

No. 3. Khalfan-bin-Hamed-bin-Muhammad "Wad. Bilal" states, under examination:—

"I am a native and resident of Sur and belong to the Mukana section of the Jennebeh. I came from Bombay last mail, and travelled second class in order to avoid going to the quarantine station. I was allowed on shore by the doctor, and was ordered to report myself for medical inspection. I cannot say how I came to quit Muscat without leave. We left here in a 'badan' at dusk—the vessel belonged to a man at Taiwi, and we went as passengers. There was very little wind, so we went to sleep, and went into Bunder Jisseh to wait for a breeze. The two deck passengers, Saeed and Musallim, who came with us from Bombay, came on board at Jisseh, but I was asleep and know nothing as to how they found their way there."

"I am a French subject, having flown the French flag for five or six years. I got it at Jibuti, where I own a house. There is no one belonging to me residing in it. It is made of mud, and I have an agent who lets it for me. I share the ownership of it with my cousin, Juma-bin-Saeed 'Wad. Bilal.' I go as nakoda in Juma-bin-Saeed's bugla. Juma's name is entered in the articles as owner, and my name as nakoda. I am under the belief that under those articles I and Juma and all the members of our families come under French protection wherever we may be, in Oman or Bombay or

* The man who had been in Muscat complaining to the French Consul about the detention of his dhow at Sur.—P. Z. Cox.

Jibuti or anywhere else. The bugla hands also come under French jurisdiction, at least the permanent employés do, not temporary ones, perhaps.

"I cannot exactly explain what grounds I have for believing that we are all French protégés. My cousin, Juma, knows most about it, and he says so. I made a mistake in stating that I share the ownership of the house at Jibuti; it belongs really to my cousin, Juma, entirely, but we are a united family and look upon it as a family concern. Juma and I were both born and bred in Sur; neither of us, nor any of our family, have ever lived in Jibuti. As to the house, I have never lived in it, and cannot say that I have seen it myself. Juma has not been to sea for four or five years."

Before me,

(Signed) P. Z. Cox, Major.

April 11, 1903.

No. 4. Salim-bin-Abdulla-bin-Khamis-el-Rubeyeh states, under examination:—

"I am a native and resident of Sur. I reached Bombay about a month ago from Aden, and returned to Oman by last mail, with my father, Abdulla-bin-Khamis, and three others from Sur. I came second class, and was allowed on shore under orders to appear for medical inspection. We hired a 'badan' belonging to Taiwi to take us to Sur, and did not get any permission from the doctor to go. We left evening before last, about sundown. Khamis-bin-Mubarak, Ruzeiki (whom we found here on our arrival), my father, and Khalfan Wd. Bilal formed the party. After leaving here we put into Jisseh Harbour and lay up there. I went to sleep. While there we were joined by Saeed and Musallim from the quarantine camp. They came on board during the night, but I was asleep and do not know when they came. I saw them in the morning.

"I am a French subject pure and simple. I cannot explain how I became one, but just like the other French subjects in Sur. I have no French papers. My father has. He possesses three dhows—the 'Marseilles,' the 'Taoos,' and the 'Saad-el-Karim.' Each dhow has its own articles, but the nakodas constantly change. All I know about the articles are that they give French protection. My father, my family, and I have lived at Sur all our lives, and have never lived anywhere else. My father got his articles at Jibuti. I have never been to Jibuti, and I don't think my father has, but he may have."

Before me,

(Signed) P. Z. Cox, Major.

Muscat, April 11, 1903.

No. 5. Abdulla-bin-Khamis-bin-Ali states, under examination:—

"I belong to the Mukamma section of the tribe of Jennebeh, and am a native and resident of the port of Sur, as were my ancestors. I have never lived anywhere else.

"I journeyed to Bombay about two months ago by mail, and returned by the mail-steamer which arrived here on the 8th April. I took a second-class ticket, in order to avoid being sent to the quarantine station, and was in due course allowed by the doctor to come on shore, and was told to report myself for medical inspection.

"I came in company with four other Suris, namely, (1) my son, (2) Khalfan Wd. Bilal, (3) Musallim-bin-Sultan, (4) Saeed-bin-Mubarak. The last two were deck passengers. If Saeed-bin-Mubarak said he was a servant or employé of mine, he lied, for I have no servant with me. We three second-class passengers left Muscat in a hired 'badan' belonging to the port of Taiwi, this side of Sur, about dusk the night before last. Khamis-bin-Mubarak, Razeiki, also joined us, and there were also two askaris in the vessel on their way to Sur.

"When we got outside the harbour, there was so little breeze that we put into Bunder Jisseh Harbour (about 7 miles away—P. Z. Cox) to wait for the wind. While we were there, in the early morning we were joined by the two deck passengers before mentioned—Saeed and Musallim; they had seen the light of our 'badan' (class of vessel) and swam off to us. First one came and then the other. We started out from Bunder Jisseh before day-break, and when we were near Ras Abu Daud (about 27 miles away—P. Z. Cox), the man-of-war's steam-boat bore down upon us. We did not make

for the shore in order to evade her; we had just landed when she came up and were going to cook our food. None of us attempted to escape, and as soon as Ali Salman called to us to come to him, we came. We five Suris were taken on to the steam-boat; Khamis-bin-Mubarak and the two askaris were allowed to proceed.

"I am not a subject of the Sultan at all. I consider myself an out and out subject of the French Government, and possess two sets of papers given me by that Government. One being a set of articles for my three dhows, and the other a paper setting forth my status as a French subject. It has been signed by the Commanders of all the men-of-war (French) that have visited Sur. It was originally given me by M. Ottavi about eight years ago. He said to me, 'You are a French subject, and here is your paper.'

"I got the three sets of articles for my three dhows at Jibuti. In those articles my own name is entered as owner, and other persons' names are entered as nakodas.

"No. 1 dhow is named the 'Marseilles,' she having been christened by M. Ottavi. My son, Salim-bin-Abdulla, is her nakoda. She should be at Makulleh-Shahr at this time.

"No. 2 dhow is called the 'Taoos' (peacock), and my son Mahammad's name is entered as her nakoda. She is now due at Sur.

"No. 3 dhow is called the 'Saad-el-Karim.' Her nakoda is Saeed-bin-Saleh, of my clan.

"All the nakodas are also entitled to French protection.

"I got my articles fourteen years ago at Jibuti. I bought a house there, and a man named Musa-bin-Saleh (grandfather's name not known) lives in it. He pays me rental yearly, but at no fixed rate. He is a small shopkeeper, and sells cloth and dates. I have never resided in Jibuti myself. I and my family and my ancestors have all been born and bred in Sur. I visited Jibuti two years ago."

Before me,

(Signed) P. Z. Cox, Major.

Muscat, April 11, 1903.

Inclosure 8 in No. 221.

Statement of the Quarantine Superintendent of His Highness the Sultan, regarding flight of five Suris from quarantine on the night of April 9, 1903.

ALI SALMAN, Arab subject, states:—

"I am in charge of the Sultan's quarantine arrangements, under the direction of His Highness' Health Officer.

"I have now acted in this capacity for three years past—first under Captain Smith, then under Captain Grant, and now under Captain Lethbridge.

"The Detention Rules are briefly these:—

"Deck passengers are sent to the quarantine station direct from the mail-steamer and remain there a week, i.e., until the morning, or eve, of the arrival of the following mail-steamer.

"Second-class passengers (native), who really only pay second-class fare to escape going to the quarantine station (but who otherwise mix with the deck passengers throughout the journey), are allowed on shore, but have to report themselves daily at the hospital for medical inspection for a week. Occasionally, when second-class passengers are bound for distant Oman ports by dhow, and the journey takes several days, they have been allowed, after three or four days in Muscat, subject to medical inspection, to spend the remainder of their time at sea.

"By last mail there arrived five Suris. They were all of one party and fed together, but two had deck passages and three second-class passages. Abdulla-bin-Khamis was the chief man of the party. He came to me on board, and in the presence of several other passengers said: 'If you can accept anything, and not send these two men of our party to quarantine, I am ready to give it to you.'

"I said: 'No; I was not for anything of that sort.'

"Next morning, at 8 o'clock, all three came to hospital together for inspection. It was there.

"After inspection Abdulla said to me: 'We want to go away to-day.'

"I replied: 'No; how can you possibly go—you have only just arrived. Wait a few days and then see if the Saheb will let you go a day or two before the time.'

"They replied: 'Very well; we will do as you say.'

"I did not know of their departure without leave till next morning, when the quarantine sepoys came over from the quarantine station and reported that two Suris had absconded during the night. I at once went to the bazaar and made inquiries, and found that the three second-class passengers had gone, too (in a Taiwi 'badan'), and it was plain to me that they had all gone together.

"It is quite evident that the whole thing was planned previously, because the two men who went to quarantine took nothing with them but what they stood up in. They left all their kit with Abdulla, obviously so that they might have no impediments when breaking out of quarantine.

"I reported the matter to His Highness, and he told me to report to the doctor and say that this sort of thing could not be allowed and desired him to consult with Major Cox as to what ought to be done. As the doctor was sick with fever when I went to his quarters, I was taken on to Major Cox.

"In the result the 'Perseus' steam-cutter was sent after the truants, and His Highness sent me in her to represent him and to identify the persons. We overhauled one 'badan' en route, but found it was not the one. When nearing Ras Khairan, we spied a 'badan' coming our way from the direction of Sur, so we got alongside and asked if they had met the Taiwi 'badan.' They said 'Yes, but they have gone right along close to the shore.'

"They gave us the direction and we followed it. In the course of time I made out the sails of the 'badan' in the distance. As we approached, the occupants hauled down their sails and I saw them disembarking with my field glasses. This looked suspicious. The Lieutenant in charge thought this might be a fishing-boat, but I said, 'No; these must be the men we want.' The place where we came up with them was overhung by the steep sides of a cliff and they could get nowhere. One pretended to be going off to make water, one was doing something else, &c., but they could not get away. Two or three khalassis of the 'badan' were left by them in the boat. When I called them they said—'What's up; what do you want?' I called out the name of each and said we had come for them, and they came without further trouble, seeing that we were armed.

"The rest is known to your Honour."

Before me,

(Signed) P. Z. Cox, Major.

April 13, 1903.

No. 222.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, relative to the detention of His Majesty's ships at Aden in connection with the Aden delimitation.

Copy has been sent to the Admiralty.

India Office, May 16, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 222.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 16, 1903.

ADMIRAL in Mediterranean has ordered His Majesty's ships "Hermione" and "Intrepid," with all three torpedo-boats, to proceed from here to Malta. They sail on the 18th, and one is to call at Hodeida. Unless they are to be replaced by others, the departure of the cruisers seems to me premature, in view of obstructive attitude still maintained by the Turks.

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 223.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 16, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram of this date from the Commander-in-chief East Indies.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR

Inclosure in No. 223.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Trincomalee, May 16, 1903.

FOLLOWING telegram received from Senior Naval Officer, Muscat, 15th May:—

"Yesterday evening Sultan returned Commodore's visit, and was detained three hours. Commodore at first besought Sultan, out of regard for old friendship, to release the prisoners. Sultan refused. Commodore then threatened him, and gave him till 2 o'clock to-day to reconsider. Sultan replied final answer already given. French Consul then threatened to haul down his flag and go on board 'Infarnet.' After begging and threatening for two hours they let him go. Sultan's suite present throughout. Now that Sultan has been assured of support of British Government he is steady."

No. 224.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 16, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 48 of the 14th May.

I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that my last communication to him on the subject was sent by him to the Russian Legation in an official note, in which he intimated the desire of the Persian Government for the removal of the cordon. I am also informed by the Grand Vizier that he spoke to the Russian Minister in the same sense.

The text of the Russian note should reach your Lordship in a fortnight, as I am sending it by post to-day.

No. 225.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 16, 1903.

FOLLOWING is substance of report from Consul-General at Bushire, has been telegraphed by Viceroy of India:—

"On the 3rd March, a Turkish officer named Arabi Effendi arrived by mail steamer at Bahrein. He stated that he had been appointed Mudir of Zobara, and that the Turkish Government proposes the establishment of a series of guard-houses from Zobara to Ojeir. He left Bahrein on the 5th March for El Hassa, to receive orders from the Governor before taking up his appointment. He further stated that another Turkish officer, Abdul Karim by name, had been nominated Mudir of Odeid. Abdul Karim's family arrived by the same mail steamer, and await him at Bahrein, where he is expected shortly. It is suggested by the Consul-General that he should send His Majesty's ship 'Sphinx' to visit Odeid and Zobara. The effect of such a

visit might be useful, and the Commander would be able to get information in case, later on, it might be necessary for us to take action."

The following is the reply which the Viceroy proposes to send:—

"Proposed dispatch of 'Sphinx' to visit Odeid and Zobara has my approval. Turkish official should not be permitted to land pending settlement of question in Europe. In case of necessity His Majesty's ship 'Perseus,' from Muscat, can co-operate. Resident in Persian Gulf and Admiral have been informed. You should keep them acquainted with course of events."

I should wish to have your observations before I approve.

No. 226.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 221.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 16, 1903.

I MET the French Minister last night at the Prime Minister's reception. M. Geoffray took me on one side and told me that he had communicated to the French Ambassador the substance of our conversation on that day, and that instructions had been sent by telegraph from Paris to the French authorities at Muscat to the effect that, pending the result of the discussions now proceeding between the French and British Governments, they were to be careful to avoid any action which might have the effect of precipitating a crisis. M. Geoffray added that the French Government remained of opinion that Major Cox had been interfering in matters which did not concern him.

I observed that we, on our side, were no less convinced that the Sultan had been entirely justified in his action.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 227.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 14. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 5, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 6, Commercial, of the 16th February, the exact copies of the Tariffs annexed to the Anglo-Persian Commercial Declaration of the 9th February, which M. Naus, in his letter of the 13th February, undertook to supply to me in place of the altered and corrected ones originally sent by me to your Lordship.*

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 228.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 17. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 27, 1903.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches Nos. 13 of the 28th ultimo, and 14 of the 3rd instant on the subject of the new Persian Tariff.

With regard to Messrs. Cutler, Palmer, and Co.'s complaint, it is, I think, out of the question for me to attempt to obtain the refund for which they ask. The assumption which pervades their letter, as well as that of Messrs. Coddington and Lamb, that the Persian Government has suddenly and without reason sprung upon them new and greatly increased duties, is hardly well founded. It is two years ago since the Grand Vizier opened negotiations with a view to Tariff revision with a special Representative of the Russian Government, whose arrival here, and the object of whose mission, were a matter of public notoriety. The outlines of his proposals were sent home by me, on the authority

* Not printed.

of M. Naus, in June or July 1900, and the actual text of the Tariff in March 1901, and so widely was their general character known in commercial circles in England that it was discussed in July last between your Lordship and a deputation from Manchester, whose views and arguments, together with your own replies, were given immediately afterwards to the public press. It was, moreover, known by all the merchants here soon after the Shah's return from Europe that the new Tariff had been accepted in principle by Turkey, and would be brought into force in the spring, and that one of its chief features would be a greatly increased duty on tea, wines, and spirits; and although, as a matter of fact, it became operative a month earlier than was generally expected, it cannot be contended that this made a very serious difference. It is to be regretted that the local agents of Messrs. Cutler and Palmer and Messrs. Coddington, who must have been aware for many months past that these important changes were imminent, did not advise those gentlemen of them, and thus enable them to import all the stocks required before the new duties were actually imposed. As it is, it is extremely difficult to obtain any modification of them now, as the assent not only of the Persian but also of the Russian Government is necessary, in view of the fact that, by the Russo-Persian Declaration, the new duties must be applied simultaneously in all the ports and at all the frontiers of Persia, and cannot, moreover, under the Loan Contract of 1900, be reduced by Persia without a special agreement with Russia. Thus, even if the Persian Government were willing to sacrifice any of its Customs receipts to oblige us, it must get the Russian Government also to agree to a diminution of those receipts which are the security for the payments of its loans. It is for this reason that the petitions of the Persian traders to which Messrs. Cutler and Palmer allude, for a three months' respite in order to enable them to clear out existing stocks, were doomed to failure, the Persian Government being precluded by its Treaty engagements from granting them, however much it might itself have wished to do so. It was, no doubt, very foolish of the Persian Government to allow its hands to be tied in this manner; but this was the price which it had to pay for financial help from Russia, and these compacts having once been entered into, it may regret, but it cannot now break them. That Russia's object, or one of her subsidiary objects, was, as Messrs. Cutler and Palmer put it, "to cripple if not stop altogether European business in wines, spirits" (and, for that matter, all other articles in Persia), may, I think, quite freely be conceded.

Turning next to the complaint of Messrs. Coddington and Lamb, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have asked M. Naus whether there is any foundation for the rumour that Russian traders received earlier information than others as to the date of the introduction of the new Tariff. His Excellency, as I expected, denied it, as far as the Persian Government, for which he is alone competent to speak, was concerned; and although it may be said that he was bound to do so whatever the true facts of the case, common-sense would, I think, suggest that he was speaking the truth, since the effect of such an intimation as is alleged to have been given would have been injurious to the Persian Treasury. Russian merchants would have imported under the old régime large stocks of the articles, such as tea, which are destined to pay a higher duty, and would have held back their sugar, their petroleum, and so forth, till they could claim the new and lower duty on them. It is, of course, possible, that the Russian Ministry of Finance, in its zeal to push Russian commerce, may have privately conveyed some such hint to important Russian houses dealing with Persia; but this is a matter as to which it would be impossible to obtain proof, and of which proof, even if it were obtained, could not fairly be pleaded against the Persian Government. That some corrupt Persian or Russian officials may have taken advantage of their knowledge of the date at which the new Treaty was to come into force in order to sell the information to merchants and to give large orders on their own accounts is, I think, extremely likely. A well-known Persian diplomatic Representative is alleged, for example, to have imported large cargoes of goods now subject to increased duties just before the new Tariff was enforced, and to be selling them through his agents here at prices very slightly lower than those which they would have fetched if imported under the present régime. But of any official, avowed or legally demonstrable action of the kind suggested in Messrs. Coddington and Lamb's letter, there is not, I believe, the slightest evidence or trace.

As regards the samples of tea inclosed with Messrs. Coddington and Lamb's letter of the 28th ultimo, I showed them this afternoon to M. Naus and pointed out the injustice of taxing sample No. 2 as white or China tea. His Excellency, after inspecting it, said that it contained a mixture of white and black tea, and corresponded with a sample which had been sent him from Bushire and as to which the importers contended that the black tea-leaves greatly predominated over the white. It was a rule of the Customs in all countries that when two different articles were mingled so as to constitute one, the duty was calculated on the more valuable component part, on the ground that the Treasury,

i.e., the public, rather than an individual private importer, should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

I observed that this might be a good general rule, but that the "observations" attached to the Anglo-Persian and Russo-Persian Declarations provided for a special treatment, to be agreed upon between the Persian Government and the British and Russian Legations respectively, in the case of "marchandises non dénommées," and that I considered that that designation might well apply to a class of teas, which are neither "white" nor "black" but a mixture of the two with a decided preponderance of the latter. He admitted this, and said he would agree to regard these "mixed teas" as a "marchandise non dénommée" for the purposes of the Tariff, but that the exact duties to be imposed on them would have to form the subject, under our respective "Declarations," of special arrangements with both the British and Russian Legations. He would write to me officially on the subject, and in the meantime would direct the Bushire Customs as a provisional measure to place a special duty, after discussion with the agents of the firm, on teas imported by Messrs. Coddington, and he promised me to instruct them to calculate it in as fair and liberal a spirit as possible. I hope that a compromise may thus be arrived at which will mitigate the grievance complained of.

I have the honour to return herewith the two samples which accompanied your Lordship's despatch No. 14.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople informs me that Mr. Weakley, Commercial Attaché there, has been authorized to come to Tehran. I have told his Excellency, inasmuch as he can probably be here only for a limited time, that he had better defer his arrival a little longer, as the "Règlement Douanier," which has according to our two Declarations to be negotiated first with Russia and then with us, is still unconcluded with the former Power, owing to the constant amendments suggested by M. Vlassoff to M. Naus' drafts and his insistence on referring every point of disagreement to St. Petersburg. We need not, I think, take exception to these Russian amendments, as we shall get the full benefit of them; but the new system will not be in working order until they are settled, and in the meanwhile few questions calling for the help of a commercial expert are likely to arise here, though they will be numerous enough once traders, both Persian and foreign, fully realize that the new Tariff is not likely to be modified, and that they must, for good or evil, import their merchandize under it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 229.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 22, 1903.

MR. BARKER, the Director of the Persian section Indo-European Telegraph Department, having consulted me unofficially as to the question of reducing the staff of the telegraph officials between Tehran and Bushire, which has a political as well as a purely departmental character, I thought it advisable before replying to him to ask the opinion of His Majesty's Consul-General at Isfahan, whose long connection with the Telegraph Department and experience of the influence exerted by it in Southern and Central Persia gives his views on a matter of this nature special weight.

I have now the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received on this subject from Mr. Preece, and his opinion is, as I expected it would be, that the suggested reduction is to be deprecated on political grounds. At a moment when our rivals are striving in every way by new roads, by banking agencies, by the presence of Consular officers in places where they have no commercial interests, and by attaching, as they have done in Seistan, Russian telegraphists to Persian telegraphs, to extend an influence unfriendly to ours, we ought not, I think, to relax in any degree such hold as our past efforts may have given us over the country traversed by the great southern highway. We ought, indeed, rather, in my opinion, to do all we can to strengthen the indirect influence which (as Lord Curzon, in his book on Persia bears witness) we derived in former times from the presence at various points along it of English officials, and of their intercourse with the natives, and which, as Mr. Preece observes in his despatch, we are, unfortunately, now allowing to decline.

Should your Lordship deem these views deserving of attention, I would venture to suggest that they should be submitted to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India

before any further reduction is sanctioned, and that the opportunity should be taken of reconsidering the policy which Mr. Finch is described by Mr. Preece as having initiated, of sacrificing all other interests, including political considerations, to the paramount one of economy.

I have shown this despatch confidentially to Mr. Barker.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 229.

Mr. Preece to Sir A. Hardinge.

Sir,

Isfahan, April 14, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 2 of the 3rd instant, forwarding a letter from Mr. Barker, the Director of the Persian Section, Indo-European Telegraph Department, relative to the question of reducing the staff of the telegraph officials between Tehran and Bushire, which he says cannot be defended departmentally.

It seems to me that this is a question that can only properly be answered by the Government of India. Is it their wish that the Indo-European Telegraph Department should be run on purely commercial lines, or should it be administered as a certain political force, as was originally intended?

It must be obvious that each Englishman taken out of the country helps to diminish our political prestige. It is noted by the Persians, who think we are losing interest in the country, and, consequently, slacken in their friendship for us. Any reduction in the south is, to my idea, to be deprecated now when Russia is becoming so much more active,—it savours so much of retreat.

Mr. Finch, upon whose heels Mr. Kirke seems inclined to closely tread, was obsessed with the idea of effecting economy in the Persian section and carried it out to the utmost, so that to-day what with swamping the Department with low-class Armenian clerks, underpaying the men who are brought out from home, restricting the journeys of inspection by superior officers and inspectors (no superior officer to my knowledge has been over the line for five years, and inspectors' journeys have been cut down from six per annum to two), thus no longer keeping alive the influence and knowledge of the English service throughout Persia from Tehran to Bushire.

That influence is reduced to the lowest level. In the last ten years nothing has helped to reduce our prestige in Southern Persia more than this.

As pertinent to this, it is only the other day when returning to Isfahan I was travelling with the Kawam-ul-Mulk, who asked me whether the new Central Persian line was meant to do away with the line to Bushire. He deprecated the way that the old line was now administered compared with old days. He thought it was a pity that we should lose our hold on the country in this way.

I have the honour to draw your attention to a Memorandum which I drew up in 1897-98 at the request of Sir M. Durand on this subject.

In reply to the question which you have done me the honour to put in your despatch quoted above, I have no hesitation in saying that I am most distinctly of opinion that to further reduce the staff of the Persian section is positively detrimental to our political interests in the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

No. 230.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 25, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 44 of the 4th instant respecting the repression of piracy within Persian territorial waters, and to report that I have to-day addressed to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh a note in accordance with the instructions therein contained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 281.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 25, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report, in reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 29 of the 28th February respecting the arrangements for the collection of customs duties on the Karun, that I have again drawn the attention of M. Naus to the arguments adduced in the letter of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company of the 23rd February in favour of the re-establishment of a custom-house at Shuster as well as at Ahwaz.

His Excellency agreed some weeks ago (as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 10 of the 14th February) to my proposal that a custom-house should be provisionally reopened at Shuster, and he has now consented to its permanent re-establishment.

The effect of this decision is to restore the old custom-houses, both at Ahwaz and at Shuster, and to rescind the orders abolishing them of which the Company complained last autumn.

I trust that this result of the representations which I have made with this object, in obedience to your Lordship's orders, will prove satisfactory to Messrs. Lynch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 232.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 25, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my telegram No. 57 of the 21st instant, that M. Grube a week ago informed M. Naus that, although the Banque d'Escompte did not ask at the present juncture for a Mint Contract, he should strongly object to one being given to the Imperial Bank of Persia, and threatened that if this were done he would, by buying up and presenting all the notes he could lay hands on, put both the Bank and the Persian Government to the most serious inconvenience. He, at the same time, further weakened and demoralized the money market (rates having already been affected by rumours of the advance), by selling, both here and at Bushire, at extremely low rates (55—3 months' date).

When reproached by M. Naus for injuriously affecting the Government exchange, he defended himself by saying that he sold because he wanted funds to open new branches in Southern Persia, an argument which seemed scarcely convincing in view of the fact that the Russian Bank has for some time past been accumulating money with a view to the advances asked of it nearly four months ago.

The Chief Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia is in the meantime getting in as rapidly as possible all the silver he can to cover a possible run on his note issue, and has deferred, until he is strong enough to defy M. Grube's threats, negotiations with M. Naus for a Mint Contract. I have informed him that I had your Lordship's orders to support the Bank, for which he expressed his gratitude, adding, however, that he did not regard the danger as grave or pressing, and believed that with patience and perseverance he would get his Mint Contract in good time.

There seems to be no doubt, though M. Grube has implied to me that M. de Witte was tired of making loans to Persia without adequate return, at a moment when Russia had her hands so full elsewhere, and that our advance was a matter of no consequence to him; that both he and M. Vlassoff are at bottom a good deal annoyed at its having been made. It appears that M. Vlassoff was from the first in favour of discounting the Caspian fisheries on easy terms, largely in order to help the Atabeg-i-Azam, whilst M. Grube, who professed to regard his Highness' fall with comparative indifference, and, moreover, doubted whether a fresh Russian advance would really avert it, recommended that political conditions advantageous to Russia and to the Banque d'Escompte should be insisted on. This latter view was shared by M. de Bark, the President of the Bank, whose visit I reported last February, and who was misled by the Grand Vizier's ironically quiet manner, at an interview at which he indicated to his Highness the probable conditions of a fresh

Russian loan, into supposing that the Persian Government would make no serious difficulty about accepting them.

The upshot of these differences of opinion between the Legation and the Bank was that the Russian Government eventually authorized the latter to make the advance, without insisting for the present on the abolition of free minting or the exclusion of the English Bank from Mint Contracts on condition that M. Vlassoff took the responsibility of declaring this Concession to be absolutely necessary on political grounds. The authorization, however, came, or was acted on by M. Vlassoff, too late, as the arrangement between the Persian Government and the Imperial Bank, which M. Grube had always declared to be in the highest degree improbable, had in the meanwhile been concluded.

I now learn, on the authority of M. Naus, that on the 21st instant, M. Grube and M. Ostragradsky, his deputy Manager, paid a visit, first to his Excellency and afterwards to the Grand Vizier, and intimated that M. de Witte was prepared to make a large loan on easy terms to the Persian Government, presumably with the object of extinguishing its debt to the English Bank. The Atabeg-i-Azam replied, however, that he was not at present desirous of contracting any further loans.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 233.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 62.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 27, 1903.

M. NAUS stated to me this afternoon that he had received a report from M. d'Hoet to the effect that the heavy rains of last winter had so affected the courses of the so-called Mirjawar and Talab Rivers as to obliterate their former point of junction, and to render the task of demarcating, by reference to them, the "Holdich frontier" in the neighbourhood of Mirjawar much more difficult than had previously been the case.

I am telegraphing the above information, which may be useful, to Colonel MacMahon, through His Majesty's Consul in Seistan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 234.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 63.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 27, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my telegram No. 59 of the 22nd instant, that I asked the Grand Vizier this evening whether he was yet in a position to give me a reply to the note which I had addressed to him on the 23rd ultimo respecting the Russian quarantine in Khorassan.

His Highness said that he had not lost sight of this question, and was in communication with respect to it with my Russian colleague. He had informed M. Vlassoff of the substance of my note, and had suggested that, as it would be very difficult for the Persian Government to find funds both for the Russian cordon in Khorassan and for the corresponding one which we had demanded in Seistan, it would be better if the Russian Government could see its way to withdraw the former. The Russian Minister had promised to telegraph on the subject to St. Petersburg.

I observed that I felt sure that your Lordship did not wish to place his Highness in an embarrassing position towards Russia, and that we had, as he knew, been very patient in this question; but that the report that the Russians were contemplating the erection of permanent barracks at Karez made it impossible for me to regard with indifference a step which might tend to perpetuate an abnormal, and, from our point of view, most objectionable state of affairs. He replied that he had made inquiries as to this last point, and believed that the report was unfounded. Such a step as I suspected would require the sanction of the Persian Government, and this, he intimated (without saying it in so many words), would not be given.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 27, 1903.

THOUGH the Atabeg-i-Azam still retains his office as Grand Vizier, it is universally believed here that his position has since the beginning of the present month been more precarious than at any previous time since his return from Kum. This is due in part to the fact that the whole of the Shah's *entourage* is now bent on bringing about his overthrow, and is supported by two powerful harem influences, that of Hazret-i-Uliya, the sister of the Ferman Ferma and the Shah's favourite wife, and that of His Majesty's favourite daughter, who is married to a son of the late Grand Vizier; and in part, I believe, to the Atabeg's having betrayed too plainly his opposition, on financial grounds, to the proposed Royal journey to Khorassan. There is also a somewhat absurd story that when the Shah recently ordered a pension of 3,000*l.* a-year, besides a large lump sum down, to be paid to his favourite astrologer, because His Majesty had dreamt that he had saved him from drowning, the Atabeg, who was struggling at the time with the usual loan difficulties, lost his temper and said that he had raised large sums to pay for the Shah's tours and toys, but must protest against paying for his dreams. Whatever the immediate cause of the Royal estrangement, it is certain that the Grand Vizier himself is extremely uneasy about his prospects, and there is reason to believe that he only keeps his position partly owing to the Shah's apathetic dislike to taking a step which will occasion him a good deal of trouble, and partly owing to the revival of disagreements between his enemies as to the composition of an alternative Ministry. The Opposition is, indeed, agreed in the decision that the Grand Vizierate should be put into Commission, and its power vested in a Council of Ministers, but the majority, led by the Hakim-ul-Mulk, are for making the Amin-ed-Dowleh, the exile pro-British Grand Vizier, President of this new Council, whilst a minority, among whom the Vizir Afkham is described to me as the most active, favours the candidature of the Ain-ed-Dowleh. This latter party have of late been drawing or affecting to draw nearer to the Grand Vizier, to whom their opposition is personal rather than political, but I am assured, on fairly good authority, that the Amin-ed-Dowleh's professions of willingness to work with the Atabeg are insincere.

I have had secret overtures made to me by one of the most active leaders of the Opposition, who assured me that they could bring about the downfall of the Atabeg by means of the Court and clergy, provided the British Government would assist them, both now and after they took office, financially, and who gave me the following message from his Highness the Amin-ed-Dowleh:—

"I deplore the fall of my country into the clutches of Russia, and cannot understand how it is that you are so silent. Are you not aware of the actual facts, or, being aware of them, is the British Government content to see Persia turned into a Russian dependency like Bokhara? I am neither a partisan of England nor am I the servant of Russia, but I am proud to be a patriot. If I am not personally known to your Excellency, Sir Mortimer Durand knew me and the British Government ought to know me."

I replied that I could not, as a Foreign Minister accredited to the Shah, assist a movement for overthrowing his present Prime Minister, and that in the interests of my Government I had to cultivate good relations with the Atabeg, and was precluded whilst doing this from working secretly with his enemies. The Amin-ed-Dowleh must not, however, suppose that Great Britain was indifferent to the dangers which threatened Persia, but we could only help her if she herself asked for our assistance. In the latter case I would support either the present or any new Ministers to whom the Shah might give his confidence with all my might in prosecuting the common and identic interests of the two countries, and I added that I believed that your Lordship would be ready, under certain conditions and within certain limits, to afford financial help to the Persian Government.

Although it is probable that the Amin-ed-Dowleh, if he returned to office, would pursue as friendly a policy towards our interests as he possibly could, his task would be one of great difficulty, whilst a Ministry of courtiers with the Ain-ed-Dowleh at its head, bent mainly on the plunder of the revenues, might land the country in a very few months' time in a serious crisis. M. Naus anticipates, and I can see that this is also M. Vlassoff's fear, that the seizure of office by the Court party would be followed by failure to pay the interest on the Russian debt, and by misgovernment, which would produce widespread anarchy, and I think, without, perhaps, going quite as far as they do, that these gloomy forebodings are not entirely without justification.

Meanwhile, the increased price of all the necessities of life, which the traders have raised on the pretext of the new Tariff, and the excessive dearness of bread and meat, owing (1) to the arbitrary taxes levied on bakeries and slaughter-houses by the Ain-ed-Dowleh, Governor-General of Tehran, for the purpose of filling his own pockets; and (2) to the wheat rings in which he and other great officials are interested, have caused deep discontent among the masses of the people, and on the 25th instant there was a bread riot in Tehran, in which a baker was nearly killed by the populace. A more serious outbreak has occurred at Meshed, where the rabble have sacked the house of the Begler-beggi, an unpopular local official; and Colonel Whyte anticipates that if the disorders continue, the Russians may send troops to protect their subjects. I have urged the Grand Vizier to telegraph energetic orders for their suppression, and to insist that the large holders of grain, many of them priests belonging to the Shrine, who are storing it in view of the Shah's expected visit, and are engineering an agitation against the rates fixed for its sale by the Governor-General, should be obliged to sell it at a reasonable price. His Highness has promised to do his best with this object, and if the riots continue, to call the troops out to put them down.

Major Sykes also reports slight disturbances at Kerman, which have, however, for the time being, been quelled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S.—I have to-day verified a report which I hesitated to mention to your Lordship till I was certain of its truth, viz., that the Shah was recently persuaded by the Anderoon section of the Opposition ("le parti des femmes," as M. Naus calls it) to telegraph to the Amin-ed-Dowleh to come to Tehran, but that His Majesty cancelled this summons a day or two later under the influence of the Ain-ed-Dowleh.

A. H. H.

No. 236.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 28, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia.

I should add to it that the news from Meshed continues somewhat serious, the local troops, who are still unpaid, having refused, in spite of orders from Tehran, to act against the mob. The Grand Vizier is temporizing with the latter until he can get from Kuchan, Sarakhs, and other outlying parts of Khorassan, a sufficient force of cavalry to restore order, which he is determined to do at any cost, so as to afford no pretext for Russian interference. He has informed M. Vlassoff that he will be personally responsible for the safety of all Russian subjects in Meshed, but the latter are not likely to be in any danger as the clergy, who are leading the rioters, have given out that Russia sympathizes with them, and the Russian Bank has bought and distributed bread among them, thus giving some colour to this assertion.

It is anticipated that the news from Meshed may prove the signal for bread riots here. Yesterday, while the Shah was driving, a crowd, containing some 200 women, surrounded his carriage, and demanded, with loud cries, redress against the oppression of the Ain-ed-Dowleh. His Majesty's attendants dispersed them, but not till he had promised that an inquiry would be held into their grievances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 236.

Monthly Summary of Events in Persia not reported in separate despatches.

Tehran.

THERE is great scarcity of bread at present, and prices are very high. The Shah has, however, ordered that steps be taken to force those who are storing wheat to sell it at once to the bakers at a fixed rate of 11 tomans per kharvar.

[1617]

3 B

Ispahan.

M. Petrosian, agent of a Russian firm who import cotton goods by way of the Persian Gulf, left a few weeks ago on an inspection tour to Yezd, Kerman, and Bunder Abbas, and thence to Russia.

M. von Roosebroeck, Inspector-General of Persian Posts, has left for Yezd, Kerman, and Bunder Abbas, to reorganize the postal arrangements in those districts.

Shiraz.

The town is reported to be quieter, owing to the action of the authorities in punishing a number of robbers, but the province remains in a very disturbed condition.

Mohammerah.

News has been received from the Sirdar Cerfa's camp that the Beni Truf have practically submitted, and that the revenue is being collected.

The Prince-Governor has informed the Lieutenant-Governor of Arabistan that he is leaving Burujird with ten regiments of infantry and 3,000 horses to restore order in Arabistan.

Mirza Ferajulla and staff left on the 5th March to establish a custom-house at Shuster.

The floods on the Karun have subsided, and only a portion of the wheat crop has been damaged. It is hoped that the remainder of the crop will be unusually good.

Bushire.

The Russian and French cruisers "Boyarin" and "Infernet" arrived on the 28th February, and official visits were exchanged between the Governor and the Commanders.

They reached Lingah on the 10th March, and left for Bunder Abbas on the following day.

Seistan.

Major Benn complains of the way he has been treated by the Customs authorities, who, on every occasion he has crossed the frontier in connection with the Helmund Arbitration Commission, have insisted on examining his baggage.

He has also had great difficulty in procuring supplies for his camp, as the Hadkhudas of the villages are still afraid to sell them to him.

M. Maurice has informed him that he was acting under distinct orders from Tehran in confiscating twenty camels and supplies belonging to the Commission.

The Hishmat-ul-Mulk, in a private conversation with Major Benn, inveighed very bitterly against the Russian Consul and the Yemen-i-Nazam, who, he said, were both working for his removal and the destruction of British influence in Seistan. He welcomed the arrival of the Commission, and said that everything would be done to show them the respect due to them.

Meshed.

Captain Fisher reports that he reached Karez on the 17th March, and that he was met on the Afghan frontier by an escort of cavalry, who brought him a letter from the Commander-in-chief inviting him to come to Herat, which place he reached on the 20th March. He was well received there, and treated with every mark of honour, and he says that nothing could exceed the cordiality and attention of the Commander-in-chief and his officers. He fears that the Commander-in-chief's left eye is almost entirely lost, but hopes to save the right eye.

On the 25th March he called on the Governor, and was well received, but the latter has not yet returned his visit. No reply having been received from Cabul to the request

of the Commander-in-chief for permission to invite Captain Fisher to Herat, the Governor is evidently not sure as to how the Amir will view his presence at Herat.

In the meantime, the troops are coming to him for treatment in numbers. Colonel Whyte has received a letter, signed both by the Governor and the Commander-in-chief of Herat, thanking him for having sent Dr. Fisher.

The Russian authorities at Bokhara are said to have announced that Russia will shortly have direct trade relations with Afghanistan, and that Russian merchants will be allowed to go to Afghanistan for trade purposes.

Khusro Khan has been appointed Governor of Kueban. His relations with the Russians have not been good, and his appointment cannot be agreeable to them.

The Karez Agent reports that the Russian officers at Turbat-i-Haidari and Karez had been told that an officer and thirty Cossacks were shortly coming from Russia, twenty of whom were to be for service at Karez, and ten at Turbat-i-Haidari. The Russian officers at Karez had consequently been collecting supplies, but orders have now come countermanding those first sent, and they have been told that no fresh troops are being sent. Colonel Whyte thinks that the Russians intended to bring in these extra Cossacks without previously warning the Persian Government. The Governor-General, however, tells Colonel Whyte that he had heard nothing of the matter.

The new Karguzar at Turbat-i-Haidari has informed the British Agent that his own and the latter's appointment had much annoyed the Russians, who had previously regarded themselves as masters of that part of the country, the late Karguzar having been their obedient servant. He also complained of the proceedings of M. Spinella, the Customs officer at Turbat-i-Haidari, who, he said, was another tool of the Russians, and who has been in the habit of flogging and fining Afghans.

Colonel Whyte holds that everything tends to prove the absolute necessity of obtaining the removal of the Russian quarantine cordon. He considers that the position has greatly improved during the last few months, chiefly owing to the change of Karguzars at Turbat-i-Haidari, but he thinks that to fully regain the confidence of the Afghans, the quarantine cordon must go. The ill-treatment to which Afghans had been subjected at Turbat-i-Haidari had sunk deeply into their minds, and had no doubt become widely known in Afghanistan to the detriment of our interests, and they will feel that, by the eventual punishment and degradation of the late Karguzar, a decisive blow has been struck on their behalf.

The Secret Agent at Sarakhs reports that the Russians have brought seven guns to Russian Sarakhs.

The Russian Bank is shortly sending a large quantity of Russian goods—lamps, glassware, ironware, cotton goods, &c.—to Seistan.

A Secret Agent, who is travelling in Transcaspia and Russian Turkestan, reports that the Russians are collecting railway material at Doshak, and have built an engine-shed there. Two hundred labourers were also at work on a canal, which is said to be for the purpose of bringing water to Doshak from Kelat.

Tehran, April 28, 1903.

Notes on Russian Military Movements in Transcaspia for the week ending March 28, 1903.

The following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

February 28.—139 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 9 guns, 83 boxes of ammunition, and 23 waggon-loads of supplies passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 14 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 1.—32 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 3.—18 infantry and 20 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 9 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 4.—39 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 10 waggon-loads of supplies, and 6 waggon-loads of clothing, were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 11 infantry and 3 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 6.—135 boxes of ammunition and 2 waggon-loads of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

The news-writer at Krasnovodsk gives the [number of troops at present at Krasnovodsk as follows:—

Infantry	2,500
Customs guards, mounted,	250

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, March 28, 1903.

Notes on Russian Military Movements in Transcaspia for the week ending April 11, 1903.

The following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

March 7.—12 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 11 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 19 infantry and 6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 8.—4 infantry left Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 2 waggon-loads of clothing and 3 guns were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

March 11.—40 infantry and 10 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 16 infantry and 8 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 2 waggon-loads of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

March 13.—80 boxes containing rifles and 2 waggon-loads of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 11 infantry and 8 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 14.—8 infantry and 2 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 35 packages of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 9 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 15.—11 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 2 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

March 16.—7 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 10 waggon-loads of fodder were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

March 17.—4 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 18.—8 boxes containing rifles and 42 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 15 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 5 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

March 20.—13 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 19 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General

Meshed, April 11, 1903.

No. 237.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 261.)

My Lord,

Pera, May 12, 1903.

ON hearing from the British Resident at Bushire, on the 9th instant, that Yusuf Bey had not been intercepted at Bahrein by orders from the Vali, and had proceeded to, and taken up his post at, Wakra, as Turkish Mudir, I made immediate representations to the Grand Vizier. I reminded his Highness of the repeated assurances given to His Majesty's Government by himself and the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Mudirs would not be appointed to any of the places I had mentioned on the El Katr coast, and that there would be no change in the *status quo*. I added that, if he had accepted my proposal and authorized the Vali of Bussorah to send orders to Yusuf, through the British Resident at Bushire, not to proceed to Wakra, this incident would not have

happened; and the Imperial Government were therefore entirely responsible for what might take place.

His Highness again asserted that the Porte had no knowledge of the appointments; that they had sent positive instructions to the Vali of Bussorah that there should be no change in the existing state of things; and that the Mutessarif of the Nejd (who resides at El Hasa, and who was an intriguing and worthless individual) was probably the originator of this trouble. He had spoken to the Sultan on the subject, and he would lay the matter before the Council of Ministers to-morrow, and insist upon the dismissal of Talib Pasha, the Mutessarif of the Nejd. His Highness concluded by begging me to feel assured that the Mudir would be recalled.

I will insist upon the fulfilment of this promise; but if Colonel Kemball considers that Yusuf ought not to be allowed to remain in possession of the post of Mudir, even for a short time, and that there would be no difficulty in removing him under the pressure exercised by a British war-ship, I see no objection to this course, provided the operation can be speedily and successfully performed without giving rise to local difficulties. This must depend in great measure upon the feelings of the inhabitants, about which Colonel Kemball is, perhaps, in a position to form a correct judgment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 238.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 262.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 13, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 234 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that I took an opportunity last week of urging upon the Grand Vizier the necessity of bringing the trial of the pirates captured by His Majesty's ship "Harrier" to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion, and of dealing severely with them.

His Highness replied that so long as the trial was proceeding he could not interfere, but he agreed to address a telegram to the Vali of the Yemen (and did so in my presence), stating that if the sentence of the Court is too lenient the offenders should be punished administratively. With regard to the captured dhows His Highness would only consent to instruct the Vali to deal with them "in the customary manner."

On the 11th instant Mr. Vice-Consul Richardson reported by telegraph that judgment had been delivered, and consisted merely of a sentence of three months' imprisonment against the captains of two dhows to date from January 18.

I at once communicated this most unsatisfactory result to the Grand Vizier, who promised to renew the instruction to the Vali as to administrative punishment of the pirates, but stated that he could not order the dhows to be burnt.

Mr. Richardson reports that the latter are still in charge of the British naval authorities, and I venture to suggest that in view of the Turkish Government's refusal to act summarily in the matter, the naval officer in charge should be authorized to dispose of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 239.

Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 69. Commercial.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, May 13, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from the Russian press by Mr. Mitchell, His Majesty's Consul-General at St. Petersburg, reporting the decision of the Russian Steam Navigation Company of Odessa to establish regular sailings of its steamers between Odessa and Persian Gulf ports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

Inclosure in No. 239.

Extract from the Russian Press.

ACCORDING to a statement recently published by the "Odessa News," and reproduced in the "Journal of the Ministry of Finance," the Russian Steam Navigation Company of Odessa has decided to establish regular sailings of its steamers between Odessa and all the ports of the Persian Gulf. The experimental voyages of the steamers of the Company made last year and in the course of the present season having, it is said, yielded satisfactory results, two large goods and passenger boats will be placed on this line, and orders for them will soon be issued to a Russian ship-building firm. The "Odessa News" further states that special agencies, wharves, and depôts of the Company will be established at all the ports of the Gulf, and that regular sailings of the steamers will be finally organized by the end of this year.

No. 240.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 15, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 14th March relative to the complaint made by the Turkish Government that His Majesty's ship "Harrier" has carried out gunnery practice in the Straits between Salil and Kamaran without previous notice to the port authorities, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a report from the Commanding Officer of His Majesty's ship "Harrier," dated 5th April, relative to torpedo and gunnery exercises having been carried out in Kamaran Bay.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 240.

Commander Tower to Admiral Sir C. Domville.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

"Harrier," at Perim, April 5, 1903.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 15 relative to a complaint made by the Turkish authorities that His Majesty's ship "Harrier" had carried out torpedo and gunnery exercises in Kamaran Bay without permission having been obtained, I have the honour to report that the complaint in this instance is justified, and I regret the occurrence.

Weighing from Kamaran on the 6th March last, for the purpose of carrying out turning trials in Kamaran Bay, on their completion, the weather being suitable, I seized the opportunity of carrying out towing target practice with my small steam cutter, a practice from which I have been debarred for many [sic] owing to the continuous heavy seas on this coast during the winter season, and being 5 miles from Kamaran I had hoped that the practice would have passed unnoticed, but I regret my indiscretion, and will be more careful in future to observe more closely paragraph 2 of Article 584 of the Station Order Book.

During the last few months, plant has been arriving from Constantinople for the creation of a small arsenal at Kamaran, as mentioned in my Confidential letter to you No. 15 of the 26th December, 1902, and, though of slow growth, it is making progress.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CYRIL TOWER,

Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Division.

No. 241.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

Sir,

India Office, May 16, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th May on the subject of the Aden delimitation, and to say, in reply, that he agrees in the views expressed by Lord Lansdowne.

The rights of Turkey in the possession of Kataba have never been contested, and any claim to the place on behalf of the Amir of Dthali would be inconsistent with the principle on which the proceedings of the Delimitation Commission have been conducted. Having regard to the considerations discussed in the telegram of the 9th May from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord George Hamilton concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposal that Sir N. O'Connor should be authorized to delay for the present making any communication to the Porte in the sense of the instructions conveyed to him in Lord Lansdowne's telegram of the 7th instant.

As to the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the demarcation of the green line laid down on the joint map of the Turkish and British Commissions, I am directed to inclose the copy of a telegram which, with the concurrence of Lord Lansdowne, Lord George Hamilton has sent to the Viceroy for the guidance of the British Commissioners.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE

Inclosure in No. 241.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 15, 1903.

MY telegram of the 4th May. Colonel Wahab's claim to survey watercourse north-west of Kataba has alarmed Turkish Government, who interpret it as implying that we intend to claim Kataba, and disregard green line. In view of Turkish alarm, Sir N. O'Connor has been authorized to postpone conveying to the Porte a warning in the sense of the last paragraph of my telegram above quoted, which he thought would be inexpedient at present.

As regards reference in Resident's telegram of the 14th May to villages of Kataba, Dakkam, &c., His Majesty's Government are not disposed to put forward any claims inconsistent with Turkish retention of Kataba.

Object of His Majesty's Government is to obtain as soon as possible a practical settlement. It is therefore desirable, in order to avoid as far as possible causes of friction with the Turks, to limit in every possible way the Commission's proposals to depart from the green line.

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 242.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 17th May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 18, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 242.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 17, 1903.

COX telegraphs from Muscat on the 15th May as follows:—

"Yesterday evening French Commodore paid a visit to the Sultan, accompanied by twelve officers. There was no political discussion, but the Sultan was asked to visit French flag-ship the next day for an interview to last four hours for the discussion of

important business. Accordingly, at 8 o'clock this morning he went and remained on board three hours. At interview, during whole of which Sultan's retinue were present, French Commodore commenced by dropping minatory tone he had used towards Sultan's brother, beseeching Sultan to regard old friendship, and forgive and release the prisoners. When Sultan refused, he threatened, giving Sultan till 2 o'clock for reconsideration. His Highness replied that he had already given his final answer, which he did not intend to reconsider. Thereupon the French Consul threatened to haul down his flag, and go on board the flag-ship. After two more hours of alternately begging and threatening, during which the Sultan remained obdurate, His Highness was allowed to leave. Sultan remains perfectly steadfast and undismayed, and now that at last assurance of effectual support of His Majesty's Government has been given, implicitly relies on it."

Goguyer is reported by Cox to have been telegraphing movements of British ships of war and all news to Russian Consul at Bushire since commencement of present complications.

No. 243.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 15th May, relative to the new Mudir of Wakra.

India Office, May 18, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 243.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 15, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 10th May.

Foreign Office have instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to inform Porte that Yusuf cannot be allowed to remain at Wakra, and that His Majesty's Government trust that steps for his withdrawal will at once be taken by Porte.

No. 244.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 15th May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 18, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 244.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 15, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 14th May regarding Muscat.

The French Ambassador being absent in Paris the Chargé d'Affaires called at Foreign Office at Lord Lansdowne's request. Lord Lansdowne pointed out that French Commodore's action was unjustified, and made reasonable settlement, as desired by both Governments, more difficult; after stating facts, as reported by Cox in his letter of the 11th April, he pointed out that quarantine Regulations had been clearly broken; that obviously the offenders deserved punishment; that there was no evidence whatever

to show that the offenders really were entitled to use of French flag or to French protection, and that even if they were, we disputed contention that, in case of offence committed in Muscat territorial waters, possession of French flag carried immunity from municipal law. Lord Lansdowne added that it seemed only reasonable in these circumstances that prisoners should remain in Sultan's custody pending further investigation both of facts and of legal aspects of the case, but that the French Government could put in a protest reserving its rights if it desired. Chargé d'Affaires concurred in this suggestion, which he undertook to communicate at once to the French Ambassador, who returns on Sunday after seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In his letter to the French Consul of the 8th April, Sultan contends that pending discussion of the question between the British and the French Governments, he is justified in disputing immunity of holders of French flags from municipal law of his country. In this contention His Majesty's Government are prepared to support him; and Cox may assure him of our support, advising him so that he may avoid any action likely to prejudice position taken up in the above-quoted letter. At the same time, Cox should be cautioned not to take up position of spokesman, or ostensible representative of Sultan. We strongly objected to French Consul, Ottavi, assuming similar rôle, which is inconsistent with position of Consul.

This telegram should be repeated to Naval Commander-in-chief.

No. 245.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

Sir.

India Office, May 18, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th April, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to forward, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a telegram from the Resident at Aden, dated the 16th May,* reporting that the "Intrepid" and "Hermione" have received orders from the Admiral in the Mediterranean to return to Malta at once, and stating that the withdrawal of the ships seems to him premature, having regard to the attitude of the Turks in the matter of the delimitation of the Aden frontier.

Lord George Hamilton was not aware that the question of withdrawing the ships had been raised again, and he certainly thinks that both he and the local authorities should have been consulted before any decision was arrived at.

In his opinion the withdrawal of the vessels at this time is premature, and may lead to a recrudescence of the disquiet and obstruction associated with the delimitation which their presence had partially overcome.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 246.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 16, 1903.

EXPECTATIONS of His Majesty's Government regarding Aden delimitation have not been fulfilled, owing mainly to the disturbing effect produced on the tribes by the prolonged resistance of the Turks and by the intricacies of tribal occupation. His Majesty's Government had been led to believe that the settlement of a frontier on the basis of the green line, leading to no further difficulties with the Turks and yet satisfying the Amiri, would have been rendered easy by the evacuation of Jalela and the Turkish withdrawal north of green line.

The country in which these disputes have arisen is easy of access from Aden; we have comparatively full information of its geography; the Sheikh of the principal tribe concerned has been co-operating with us, and our Commission has the support of an overwhelming military force.

His Majesty's Government cannot but feel anxiety as to the situation which may arise when the course of delimitation to the desert leads to similar disputes in a country quite unknown, where the attitude of the tribes is doubtful, and where communications with our base will be difficult.

* No. 222.

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They therefore think it necessary to consider the question whether, in the circumstances, and seeing that demarcation would take a long time, and that the consequences of a collision would be serious, it is prudent to proceed with the delimitation north-eastwards to the desert.

The immediate cause of our difficulties with the Turks will be settled by demarcation up to the furthest point of green line. His Majesty's Government are inclined in these circumstances not to insist on immediate delimitation to the desert, but to propose to the Turkish Government that, if they on their part will undertake not to interfere with the Upper Yaffai and other tribes under our protection, we will postpone the further delimitation of the frontier of the nine tribes. I shall be glad to know your views on the question of proceeding with the delimitation to the desert.

No. 247.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 222 A.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 18, 1903.

THE French Ambassador asked me to receive him to-day for the purpose of further considering the incidents referred to in my despatches No. 190 of the 27th April and No. 215 of the 13th May, 1903.

His Excellency began by saying that he had, during his recent visit to Paris, discussed these questions with M. Delcassé, whom he had found most indignant with regard to the conduct of Major Cox, His Majesty's Political Agent at Muscat. Major Cox's behaviour in all matters concerning French interests had, for a long time past, seemed to the French Government uncalled for and objectionable. He had made mischief between the French and British Governments in the year 1899, when the Sultan of Muscat had offered the French Government a coaling station in the neighbourhood of Muscat. The matter might have been settled without any ill-feeling had it not been for Major Cox's intervention. In another case he had actually taken upon himself to write to M. Laronce, then French Vice-Consul at Muscat, forbidding him to go to Sur on board the French man-of-war "Catinat."

In the case which was now before us his action had been even more indefensible. His Excellency begged me to understand that, although they complained of Major Cox's behaviour, the French Government admitted that they were bound, as we were, to recognize the independence of Muscat. They were also perfectly aware that we had special arrangements with the Sultan which gave us a "political interest" in Muscat. They had no desire whatever to thwart us in those regions ("nous contre-carrer"). They were, however, bound not to refuse their protection to persons who had obtained French papers or were entitled to the use of French flags.

I observed that we were by no means satisfied in the present case that the persons arrested were really entitled to claim French protection, and that the evidence in our possession pointed to the conclusion that French flags were often improperly given to persons who had no right whatever to French protection.

His Excellency replied that the French Government had satisfied themselves that the men whom the Sultan had imprisoned were fully entitled to French protection. One of them, Abdallah Ben Khemis, was the owner of a dhow flying the French flag. Selim Ben Abdallah was the son of the first-named, and sailed with his father. Kalfen Ben Ahmed was captain of another dhow; and all three men were included in the list of French flag-holders forwarded to the French Foreign Office on the 18th June, 1899, and subsequently on the 3rd September, 1902.

His Excellency said that if there was a grievance as regards the use of the French flag by these owners of dhows, it was a grievance which would in time disappear. As he had already informed me, the French Government were fully prepared to make out a list of the persons who, after investigation, proved to be entitled to the use of French flags. They had, indeed, already made out such a list, and were ready to hand it to the Sultan for his information and guidance. It contained about 200 names, of whom only a few were natives of Muscat. They were also ready to discuss with us the extent of the immunities or privileges which followed from the possession of the French flag.

I told his Excellency that this point seemed to me to be one of the utmost importance. I thought it, for example, intolerable that an Arab ship-owner should qualify himself for French protection by acquiring a scrap of land at Jibuti or

No. 246^o.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 112.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 18, 1903.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 94 of the 9th May relative to the Aden delimitation.

Your proposal to defer action on the instructions contained in my telegram No. 99 of the 7th May has my approval.

elsewhere, and then claim immunity, not only for himself, but for other members of his ship's company, and this even within the territorial waters of Muscat.

His Excellency said that these were all subjects which the French Government were prepared to discuss fully with us. But what they could not admit was that persons actually entitled to the use of the French flag should be retained in prison by the Sultan on the advice of the British Consul. French protection had been claimed for these men by the French Vice-Consul, upon which Major Cox, who had himself been instrumental in the capture of the men, and had even gone the length of detaining them for some time in his own custody, had intervened with the assertion that the men had no title to French protection, and had directed the Sultan not to surrender them.

At this point I called his Excellency's attention to M. Dorville's letter of the 11th April, in which he stated that he admitted the guilt of the prisoners, although he protested against their imprisonment by the Sultan.

His Excellency had evidently not seen this document before, and appeared surprised at the admission which it contained.

He said, however, that, whether the men were guilty or not, M. Dorville was within his rights in demanding that they should be surrendered to him, and he informed me that he had been desired by M. Delcassé to request formally that I would give directions to Major Cox to withdraw his opposition to their release, and to advise the Sultan to hand them over to the French Vice-Consul. As soon as this was done, the French Government would gladly consider what measures should be taken in order to bring about a clear understanding for the future. His Excellency explained that in his view the action which he proposed would be in accordance with precedent, and he cited a case which took place in 1896 when two dhows enjoying French protection were seized by His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," and afterwards surrendered to the French Vice-Consul at Muscat, who instituted proceedings against the owners for slave-trading. The men were found guilty by the French Court at Réunion, and condemned on the 28th August, 1897. I reminded his Excellency that in this case the seizure took place upon the high seas, and not in territorial waters.

His Excellency, speaking with much earnestness, begged me to believe that it was "impossible" for the French Government to allow the men now in the Sultan's prison to remain there. He said that considerable local indignation had been created, and that it was not unlikely that an attempt to liberate the prisoners would be made by the people of Sur, who threatened to come to Muscat on board their dhows for the purpose. In France the question was sure to attract attention, and it would be impossible for the French Government to meet the attacks to which they would be subjected. They would be told that this was a case of humiliating subservience to Great Britain, and that it justified the sinister predictions which had been made in certain quarters as to the result of His Majesty's recent visit to France.

I told his Excellency that the account which had been given to me of the circumstances under which the men had been arrested differed in many respects from that which he had given me. The depositions of the prisoners threw considerable doubt upon their right to French protection. It was perfectly clear that they had broken the law, and the French Consul himself admitted their "culpability." We had, I reminded him, never admitted that a subject of the Sultan who had obtained French protection could appeal to that protection to shield him from the municipal law within the territory of Muscat. The imprisonment of the men was, therefore, well deserved, and, *primâ facie*, it seemed to me that they should be in the custody of the Sultan. We might, I thought, agree that they should remain where they were, and that the French and British Governments should endeavour to come to an understanding in regard to the future.

His Excellency said that this would not satisfy the French Government. It would not be equivalent to the maintenance of the *status quo ante*. The men were *primâ facie* entitled to French protection, and it was impossible for the French Government to forego its claim for their surrender.

I told his Excellency that it was impossible for me to accept his view of the case, or to give him the undertaking for which he asked, but that I would carefully consider the statements which he had made, and bring the matter before my colleagues. He implored me to lose no time in dealing with it, and I agreed to see him again to-morrow.

I asked his Excellency whether it would not be possible to find a way out of the situation which had arisen by arranging that the men should be tried in the Sultan's Court, but in the presence of the French Consul. His Excellency said at once that

that would be an admission of the Sultan's jurisdiction, which the French Government disputed.

Throughout the interview his Excellency spoke with much earnestness, and at moments with some warmth.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 248.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 18, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 18th instant, inclosing a telegram from the Resident at Aden in regard to the departure of His Majesty's steam-ships "Intrepid" and "Hermione" from Aden.

I am directed by his Lordship to inform you that it has been ascertained from the Admiralty that orders were given for the withdrawal of the two vessels from Aden, in consequence of a message from the Commander-in-chief on the East Indies Station that he had a sufficient naval force at his disposal to deal with the situation without the co-operation of any vessels of the Mediterranean Squadron.

Lord Lansdowne understands that the disposition of the vessels composing the East Indies Squadron is at present as follows:—

His Majesty's steam-ships "Cossack" and "Hussar" are at Aden. His Majesty's ship "Pomone" is at Muscat, but about to proceed to Aden. His Majesty's steam-ships "Naiad" and "Perseus" are at Muscat. His Majesty's steam-ships "Lapwing," "Redbreast," and "Sphinx" are in the Persian Gulf. His Majesty's ship "Highflyer," the flag-ship, is at Trincomalee, and His Majesty's ship "Fox" will shortly be at Kurrachee.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 249.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 264.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 15, 1903.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 94 and 95 repeating those I had lately sent to Mr. Fitzmaurice, I have now the honour to inclose herewith a paraphrase of Mr. Fitzmaurice's telegram No. 19 in reply thereto.

In order to understand the question, I ought to explain that the Porte, upon being pressed to retire behind the green line, decided not only to do so and to withdraw from Jalala, but apparently to accept this line as the frontier in the hope, no doubt, that in doing so they would protect themselves from further demands, and especially from a demand to include Kataba in the Amiri territory.

I have frequently explained to the Porte that the green line was meant merely to indicate that the country south of it was in dispute, and that whether the ultimate frontier should run north or south of the green line must depend upon further examination and the proofs produced as to ownership.

I entirely share the opinion expressed in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 4th instant, that no variations from the green line should be proposed unless supported by conclusive evidence and found to be conformable to fair and mutual convenience. I would go still further and say that our Commissioners should only insist upon a readjustment of the green line for grave reasons such as that its acceptance would leave within Turkish territory villages which are, and have always been, considered as Amiri, and subject to the authority of the Emir's nominees, or because for topographical or other reasons it would be clearly unsuitable for a permanent frontier.

If I obtain permission of His Majesty's Government to assure the Porte that, from friendly feelings towards the Ottoman Government, we waive such claims as we may possess to Kataba—claims which seem to me just now rather doubtful and certainly impolitic—I may be able to persuade the Grand Vizier to instruct the Ottoman Commissioners to recognize Ukla as within Amiri country, and also to get

certain concessions in regard to Dakkam if it should be established, contrary to what seems to me evident, that it is better to have a land frontier than to accept the Wadi Tiban as the boundary-line.

But any readjustment of the green line may be outside the power of the Grand Vizier without the fresh Imperial Iradé with its inseparable difficulties and delays; and for various reasons I think it more desirable that the Commissioners should get through with the Amiri boundary as speedily as possible, so as to proceed with the delimitation on the north-east to the desert.

I do not propose to discuss the frontier question again with the Porte until I receive your Lordship's instructions and a new map, which Mr. Fitzmaurice says has been forwarded to me. I shall, however, make strong representations in respect to Mr. Fitzmaurice's complaint against the Ottoman Customs officials, and ask for their punishment.

I am glad to be able to report that the Grand Vizier telegraphed yesterday to the Vali of the Yemen instructing him only to levy in future 1 per cent. export duty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 249.

Resident, Aden, to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 14, 1903.

MR. FITZMAURICE requests me to telegraph to your Excellency as follows:—

"With reference to your telegrams Nos. 18 and 19 of the 9th and 10th instant respectively, it will be seen from Colonel Wahab's telegrams Nos. 260 to 262, and also No. 256, that the usual distortion of facts appears in the complaint of the Turkish Commissioners. The claims to include the villages of Kataba, Dakam, &c., in Amiri is such that, without previously submitting the case to His Majesty's Government as indicated in the India Office telegram of the 14th May, and in your telegram No. 17, it would be impossible for the Commissioners to surrender them.

"As a basis of delimitation the green line on the map, which was based on Turkish surveys, is unworkable, and a fresh correct map with the full facts will be sent by next mail; but, in the meantime, we are adopting the line indicated in your Excellency's telegram No. 18 of the 9th.*

"The village of Dakam, including also the few square miles beyond the green line, has always been considered as a whole as being in Amiri territory.

"With reference to the telegram from the Resident at Aden of the 5th instant, the village of Ukla is not in Maras but in Amiri, and should remain on our side, not only according to the 'configuration of the land,' but also as a starting point for the line to the north-east.

"The officials of the Turkish Customs are now intolerable. An Amiri man was killed and two others were dangerously wounded yesterday close to our camp by the Turkish Arab levies, and there are disagreeable incidents daily. The Amiris are being restrained from making reprisals.

"The Customs decline, without orders from Constantinople, to levy only the 8 per cent. import and 1 per cent. export duties."

No. 250.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 16th May, relative to a reported attack by Subaihis upon members of the Hakem tribe.

India Office, May 18, 1903.

* i.e., abstaining from making any definite declaration.

Inclosure in No. 250.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 16, 1903.

MY despatch No. 3 of the 13th February, 1903. Further complaint of an attack on the 27th April last by Subailis upon Hakems has been made by Turkish Ambassador, who asks that plunder may be restored and culprits punished. Please reports facts.

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 251.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th May, relative to the Persian Loan.

India Office, May 19, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 251.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 18, 1903.

SIR A. HARDINGE'S telegrams Nos. 66, 67, 68, and 71, relative to Persian Loan.

We consider that Persian Government and the Shah personally, if necessary, should be addressed in very strong terms in regard to Grand Vizier's attempt to refuse to make Southern Customs collateral security of our loan, in default of Caspian fisheries and posts and telegraphs; also that Persian Government should be informed of our interpretation of "Customs of Fars and Persian Gulf," as equivalent to "Customs of all Southern ports," as to which interpretation we can neither now nor at any future time admit question. Meanwhile, Imperial Bank should be deterred from making any currency advance.

As to definite meaning of phrase "Customs of Fars and Persian Gulf," we cannot understand Sir A. Hardinge's objection to bringing it pointedly to notice of the Persian Government, seeing that no difficulty was experienced about allowing loan by Imperial Bank with Customs of Southern ports for security, as stated in telegram from Foreign Office of the 3rd August, 1901. Moreover, since Shah's pledge of the 23rd October, 1897, covers whole of Southern Customs, and this phrase has been consistently used throughout present negotiations, it is not apparent why they could not have been made security for our loan. For present purposes, however, we shall be content if it be recognized that all Southern ports are included in the term Fars and Persian Gulf; and, on the understanding that His Majesty's Government continues to share the risk in regard to both principal and interest, we will advance on this security the balance of 100,000l.

No. 252.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 18th and 19th May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 19, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 252.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 18, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 16th [? 15th].

As to growing demands of our Commissioners we have already expostulated with Resident at Aden, and we fail to see how at this late stage of negotiations His Majesty's Government could sustain any claim to Kataba; but the extension of our survey to a reasonable belt of country on either side of green line is desirable, in view of reported inaccuracy of Turkish topography. Indeed, the Sultan's Iradé (see O'Connor's telegram of the 18th March) cannot be carried out, and the green line properly applied to the actual topography, without an accurate map. We, therefore, think that the Dakkam country and the Selat water-course should be included in the survey operations.

(Repeated to Aden.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 252.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 19, 1903.

DELIMITATION north-eastwards to the desert was first ordered by your Lordship, in telegram of the 19th July, 1902, without reference to us. We have always been in favour of concluding Treaties with the tribes in that direction before proceeding with delimitation, but His Majesty's Government last year refused, and have only lately permitted these Treaties to be concluded. We are in favour of postponing this portion of demarcation till the Treaties are concluded, and till we have obtained more definite information about the tribes in that direction and their country. Resident agrees. But as Turks are probably scheming for breakdown of operations, which it is our policy to avoid, it would be well, as soon as Amiri boundary is settled, to demarcate boundary down to the coast at Tarba. We will, of course, retain troops at Dthali if you approve this course.

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 253.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

(C.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th May, relative to the detention of His Majesty's ships at Aden.

India Office, May 19, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 253.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 19, 1903.

WE agree with the Resident at Aden (see his telegram of the 16th May), and consider it desirable, at any rate pending satisfactory settlement of difficulties at Muscat, to retain ships of war at Aden.

(Repeated to Aden.)

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 19th May, relative to attacks by Subaihis on the Hakim tribe.

India Office, May 19, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 254.

Resident, Aden, to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 19, 1903.

I AM making inquiry, with respect to your telegram of the 16th instant, as to alleged further attacks by Subaihis on Hakims. Please see reply to your despatch to Government of India of the 13th February last, which was sent by post on the 28th April last.

(Repeated to Government of India and Bombay.)

No. 255.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 19, 1903.

LOAN. I have to-day telegraphed to the Viceroy, in reply to his telegram of the 18th May, that it is useless to deter the Imperial Bank from advancing to the Persian Government money on account current, or to hold strong language to the Shah or Grand Vizier about their reluctance to assign the southern customs. Such a policy would have only one effect, i.e., to discourage them from again coming to us, and to throw them more completely than ever under Russian influence, from which I am trying to withdraw them. The Shah is not amenable to reason, and it was he and not the Grand Vizier who attempted to make difficulties about securing the advance on the security of the customs. The expression "Fars and the Gulf" was the one actually used in the loan by the Imperial Bank of 1901, it having been held steadily, then as now, by the Persian Government that it is the only one which they are allowed by their engagements with Russia formally to employ, whatever may be its meaning.

Our advance would have been upset altogether had we raised a discussion as to its meaning, and Russia would probably have obtained a mint monopoly fatal to our Bank in return for providing the money. Why not leave me to raise the Fars question in connection with the Customs Regulations, there being now no immediate prospect of a fresh advance by Government. Next week, as soon as the Commercial Treaty is ratified, I can begin its discussion.

No. 256.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 19, 1903.

WITH reference to the telegram from the Viceroy of India, repeated to you in my immediately preceding telegram, you should, if not too late, endeavour to meet his Excellency's wishes as far as possible, bearing in mind the promise regarding the inclusion of Mohammerah among the southern ports of Persia, which was made to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran on the 27th March, 1900, by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 226.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 19, 1903.

I RESUMED this afternoon my discussion of the Muscat case with the French Ambassador.

I began by telling his Excellency that I had repeated to the Cabinet the statements which he had made to me on the previous day. I said that my colleagues had expressed their astonishment at the character of the claim advanced by the French Government. They were quite unable to understand that it should be possible for an Arab subject of the Sultan of Muscat, trading to a French Colony, to acquire a scrap of land in that Colony, and by this means to obtain from the French authorities French papers and a French flag, in virtue of which he could claim, with the support of the French Government (and apparently not only for himself, but for members of his family and of the ship's company), privileges and immunities within the territorial waters of Muscat.

I told his Excellency that, in order to clear the ground, I had been instructed to ask him again whether I was right in supposing that the French Government did not contend that the men now undergoing imprisonment at Muscat were French subjects or persons in French employment ("Français, ou au service des Français") within the meaning of the Treaty of 1844.

His Excellency replied that my supposition was correct. The Treaty of 1844 was not designed to meet the case of these owners of dhows ("ne visait pas le cas des boutriers"), whose rights in many cases were anterior to the date of the Treaty. The French flag-holders were altogether "outside the Treaty," and protection was claimed for them not under the Treaty, but because they had been given French papers and were entitled to fly the French flag.

I said that I understood that the French Government were in possession of evidence to show that the men now undergoing imprisonment were entitled to use French flags and French papers, and that we should expect to be fully informed with regard to the character of this evidence, which had led the French Government to include them in their lists of French flag-holders. The two Governments, however, differed widely in their view as to the extent of the privileges which could be claimed for persons entitled to the use of such flags or papers. The French Government contended that protection of this kind carried with it immunity from the Sultan's jurisdiction even in Muscat territory and within the territorial waters of Muscat. We had always maintained the contrary, and we had supported the Sultan in his contention, which corresponded with ours. We desired, however, to find some means whereby the present situation should be brought to an end, and we accordingly proposed that the Hague Tribunal should decide what privileges the possession of French papers and flags carried with it, and, *inter alia*, whether such privileges are limited to the owner and captain of the dhow, or whether they could also be claimed by their families, their heirs, and by members of the ship's company. If arbitration should be accepted, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to advise the Sultan to release the prisoners, who might be required to give an undertaking to submit themselves hereafter either to the Sultan or to the French Consul, according as the Hague Tribunal might decide.

It would be part of the arrangement that the French Government should give an undertaking that they will, within a short delay, furnish the Sultan with a list of all persons who have received French papers, or are believed by the French Government to be entitled to fly the French flag.

M. Cambon replied that he felt little doubt that the French Government would not disapprove of the idea of referring to the Hague Tribunal the questions which I had raised, but it was in his opinion a *sine quâ non* that the prisoners should first be released by the Sultan and handed over to the French Consul.

I told his Excellency that this was a point which the Cabinet had carefully considered, and that my instructions were distinct with regard to it. We were prepared to advise the Sultan to release the men, but not to hand them over to the French Consul. To do so would involve an admission that the Sultan had acted illegally, and that the justice of the French claim was admitted, and we were not prepared to make any such admissions.

M. Cambon replied that it would be impossible for M. Delcassé to accept such a

proposal, although it might be arranged that the men should be handed over by the Sultan to the French Consul, and, perhaps, that the Consul might liberate them, or even go the length of asking the Sultan to take charge of them on his behalf.

I repeated that I could not accept this suggestion. The alternative which we had proposed seemed to me absolutely fair. The men were claimed, on the one hand, by the Sultan, and, on the other, by the French Consul. There was a difference of opinion as to the rights of the case, and we accordingly proposed that the principle should be disposed of by arbitration, and that in the meanwhile the men, who had already been in prison for more than a month, should be held by neither side. Their offence had been committed against the laws of Muscat, and, if the Sultan chose to consider that they had sufficiently expiated this offence, no more need be said.

I could not persuade M. Cambon to accept this view of the case. He said that he would refer my proposal to M. Delcassé, but that he could not advise him to accept it. It would, indeed, for Parliamentary and other reasons, be out of the question that he should do so. His Excellency feared that we had arrived at an *impasse*.

I begged his Excellency to remember that if M. Delcassé had to think of French Parliamentary difficulties, we, too, had to think of the case which we should be able to lay before Parliament here. I was afraid that even the solution which I had suggested would seem to many somewhat of a surrender.

M. Cambon observed that our position in Muscat and in Eastern waters was so strong, that we could well afford to make the slight concession for which he had asked.

As he left the room I asked him, explaining that this was a personal suggestion of my own, whether it might not perhaps be arranged that the Sultan should, in view of the controversy which had arisen and the decision of the two Governments to refer the issue to arbitration, inform both the Consuls of his decision to release the prisoners. Such an intimation might, I thought, be regarded as a sufficient recognition of the right of the French authorities to interest themselves in the matter.

M. Cambon repeated that nothing would satisfy the French Government but some step which formally recognized the right of the French Consul to take charge of the men.

I subsequently sent his Excellency a private note, of which the inclosed is a copy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

Inclosure in No. 257.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, May 19, 1903.

I PROMISED that I would send you a short note of the substance of the communication which I made to you this afternoon.

It was not contended by you that the men imprisoned by the Sultan of Muscat have any right under the Treaty of 1844, but you explained that, in the view of the French Government, they were entitled to French protection, not under the Treaty, but in consequence of their possession of French papers or French flags. We understand that the French Government is in possession of evidence which shows, *prima facie*, that these men are entitled to use French flags and French papers. The two Governments differ, however, widely in their view as to the extent of the immunity which such protection confers upon persons who may be entitled to it. In these circumstances, I proposed to you that the Hague Tribunal should decide what privileges the possession of French papers or French flags carries with it, and, *inter alia*, whether such privileges are limited to the owners and captain of the dhow, or whether they could also be claimed by their families, their heirs, and by members of the ship's company.

If arbitration is accepted, His Majesty's Government are prepared to advise the Sultan to release the prisoners, who might be required to give an undertaking to submit themselves hereafter either to the Sultan or to the French Consul, according as the Hague Tribunal might decide.

It would be part of the arrangement that the French Government would give

an undertaking that it will within a short delay furnish the Sultan with a list of all persons who have received French papers, or are believed by the French Government to be entitled to fly the French flag.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

No. 258.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th May, relative to the Seistan Arbitration.

India Office, May 20, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 258.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 19, 1903.

SEISTAN: My telegram of the 24th April. Telegram, dated the 27th April, from Colonel McMahon, reported that survey of country between Takht-i-Shah and Siah Koh had brought to light unexpected difficulty, which necessitated his personal inspection of country, and consequent postponement of announcement of Award. The Persian Commissioners, on the ground that their instructions apply only to water disputes, and do not include already-settled questions of boundary, declined to accompany him. Owing to inaccuracy of existing maps, Colonel McMahon had great difficulty in locating Siah Koh, from which he returned on the 10th May. He proposes to obtain written statements from the Afghan and Persian Commissioners. It appears, however, that, notwithstanding the information given to Sir A. Hardinge, and reported by him in his telegram of the 9th March, the instructions issued to the Persian Commissioners do not direct them to furnish such a statement.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 259.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 20, 1903.

PERSO-BELUCH frontier:

The following is the substance of the instructions given to the Persian Commissioner, which I am sending to Colonel McMahon, in accordance with his request.

After recapitulating the history of the Holdich Boundary Commission, and of the frontier which it fixed, they go on to say that last year, in accordance with that settlement, a custom house was placed at Mirgawar by the Persian Government, and that an attempt was made by Captain Webb-Ware to prevent this being done, and that a point on Persian territory was occupied by him. That the British Government ordered him to withdraw from it, and at the same time proposed that a joint Commission should be appointed with a view to clear up matters of doubt with regard to the frontier.

Instructions are given to the Persian Representative on the Commission to notify his appointment to the British Representative, but his duty merely consists in placing frontier pillars along the existing line from pillar 11 to Kuli-i Malik Siah, and thence to Bund-i Seistan, *i.e.*, where no pillars yet exist.

All ground west of the summit of the Mirgawar range, which is the frontier, is Persian territory, as well as all ground adjoining the Ladis and Mirgawar Rivers.

Confidentially and unofficially I have learnt the contents of a secret supplementary instruction. This informs him that latest reports state that a tank has been

made by the British at Padsha, on Persian territory, and that they have appropriated 3,000 yards of Persian territory in the dried-up bed of the stream at the junction of the Mirgawar and Taleb Rivers. Instructions are given to the Persian Commissioner to see that the tank or reservoir is secured to Persia, and that the encroachment described is rectified.

No. 260.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 229.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 20, 1903.

THE French Ambassador attended my usual reception to-day, and discussed with me several matters of minor importance.

Towards the close of our conversation he mentioned to me that he had sent to M. Delcassé yesterday a full account of my conversation with him. His Excellency added that he was going to Paris and would probably see M. Delcassé.

I told his Excellency that I had very carefully thought over the observations which he had made to me in regard to the Muscat affair, and I remained firmly convinced that nothing would induce His Majesty's Government to consent to the surrender of the three prisoners to the French Consul. I added that the demand seemed to me the more unreasonable, because I learned from the papers which had been supplied to us by the Government of India that the French Vice-Consul had himself only demanded the release of those persons. M. Cambon said that that might be so, but that what was evidently intended was that they should be released and then handed over to the French authorities.

I then read to his Excellency M. Dorville's letter to the Sultan of Muscat, dated the 11th April, which runs as follows:—

"I learn that among the five Suris who have been lodged in the fort, three are under French protection. I beg, therefore, that you will be good enough to release these French protégés this very day (their names are Abdullah-bin-Khamis, Salim-bin-Abdullah, and Khamis-bin-Mubarak), and I should be obliged to your Highness. May you be preserved, and salaam."

I also called his Excellency's attention to the fact that, according to our reports, the French Commodore, on the occasion of his interview with the Regent on board the French man-of-war "Infernet," had also, in the presence of witnesses, asked for "the release" of the men, and had added, laying his sword upon the table, that "it was either compliance or that." It seemed to me extraordinary that, now that an arrangement had been suggested under which the prisoners were to be released in connection with a reference to arbitration, of which both Powers approved in principle, the whole negotiation should be allowed to break down on account of this new demand—that the prisoners should be not merely released, but handed over to the French Consul.

His Excellency apparently found some difficulty in meeting this argument, and asked me to let him take away with him a copy of M. Dorville's letter. With this I gladly supplied him, and after considering it he observed that it might perhaps be sufficient if the Sultan were to make a communication to the French Vice-Consul, informing him, with reference to the Vice-Consul's demand, that His Highness had decided to liberate the prisoners.

I reminded his Excellency that I had made a somewhat similar suggestion to him yesterday (see my despatch No. 226 of the 19th May), and I saw no reason why a solution should not be found in some such procedure as that which had apparently occurred to both of us. I added that I thought the Sultan should in this case make an identical communication both to the French and British Consuls.

M. Cambon replied that the French Government were not concerned with any communication which the Sultan might make to us. What they cared about was that the French Consul should receive an intimation in a proper form.

M. Cambon told me that he should probably see M. Delcassé on Friday morning, and that he would endeavour to arrange that the result of his interview should be made known to me on that day.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 260*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 20.)

Sir,

India Office, May 20, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to forward, for Lord Lansdowne's information, a copy of a letter from the Government of India inclosing, for such action as may be considered desirable, papers relative to the seizure on the 12th March last, by the Seistan Customs Department, of certain supplies and camels belonging to the Seistan Arbitration Commission.

Having regard to the statement of the attitude of the Persian Government in the matter contained in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram No. 33 of the 13th March, and to M. Naus' explanation reported in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram No. 39 of the 21st March last, Lord George Hamilton would leave it to the Marquess of Lansdowne to decide if any further action is necessary, or if the incident should be regarded as closed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 260*.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

My Lord,

Simla, April 23, 1903.

IN continuation of his Excellency the Viceroy's telegrams, dated the 23rd and 25th March, 1903, we have the honour to forward, for such action as your Lordship may consider desirable, copies of the letters specified in the accompanying list, containing a report of the seizure and confiscation, on the 12th March last, and the subsequent release, by the Customs Department in Seistan, of certain supplies and camels belonging to the Seistan Arbitration Commission.

We have, &c.
(Signed) T. RALEIGH.
E. FG. LAW.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 260*.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Camp Nad Ali, March 14, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to make the following report on an incident that occurred on the 12th instant.

2. On the strength of information conveyed in your telegrams dated the 20th and 28th February, 1903, regarding Customs facilities and exemption from Persian Regulations prohibiting export of supplies from Seistan, I sent twenty camels to fetch certain supplies, including flour, wheat, barley, and ghi, from the Seistan capital, which had been purchased for me there. Care was taken to send camelmén who were British Indian subjects and to provide them with the paper of which copy is inclosed.

3. On return, this convoy was accompanied from Nasirabad by a man belonging to the Customs Department as far as Milok. There, on the evening of the 9th, as they were leaving Major Benn's camp, the Customs Mirza turned out a crowd of armed men and attempted to detain them, but eventually, on a remonstrance from Major Benn,

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3 F*

allowed them to proceed to the river bank nearly opposite my camp, sending some fifteen men to prevent their being conveyed across the river.

4. I wrote a letter of protest, copy attached, and sent it the same night to the Persian Commissioners at the Seistan capital, where they had gone for the "Id" celebrations. I allowed no effort to be made to remove the supplies from the river bank, but Major Benn, thinking we were in especial need of it, paid the customs duty on 4 maunds of ghi and sent it across the river.

5. On the morning of the 12th I received information that the Customs Mirza had actually seized and confiscated not only the flour and grain included in the consignment, but also my twenty camels. He produced as his authority a written order signed by M. Maurice, and dated the 10th March. This order is in my possession and a copy is attached.

6. I sent Captain Ramsay to go and ascertain actual facts, and he and Major Benn interrogated the Mirza, who showed them other orders from M. Maurice, copies of which Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, who had accompanied Captain Ramsay, took down. Copies and translation are attached. No attempt was made to obstruct the Mirza in the execution of his orders, but the six camelmen were instructed to remain with their camels.

7. I would invite attention to the spirit of M. Maurice's instructions to his Mirza, to the orders for employment of armed force, to the implied confidence in ready co-operation by the Yamin-i-Nizam, and especially to the directions about reporting with support of local evidence, any misconduct on the part of the British Consul.

8. While this was occurring, a reply from the Persian Commissioner's letter, dated the 11th March, to my protest of the 9th was received. I attach a copy.

9. I wrote early on the 13th to the Persian Commissioners, who had returned to their camp at Pokak (about 2 miles from the opposite bank of the river) *vide* my letter dated the 13th March, copy attached. I demanded restoration of the confiscated property and camels and men, and a full explanation.

10. A reply to my letter has now been received, copy attached. From this it will be seen that the Persian Commissioners have directed the restoration of my supplies* (except the flour and grain) of which they state the export is prohibited. To avoid further trouble of this kind, I am to get through them passes for supplies (not including flour and grain) from the Customs officer before loads are dispatched to me. This procedure with regard to the stores already purchased for me and now lying in small quantities in a number of scattered villages, is, of course, impracticable and doubtless meant to be so.

11. I would invite attention to the references made to alleged misconduct on the part of Major Benn. These are easily explained by reference to paragraph 7 above.

12. The whole incident affords an instructive illustration of the so-called neutrality of the Customs Department in Seistan.

13. The action, which the continued prohibition of export and the evident intention of the Persian officials to make use of Customs restrictions for incidents of the above nature have now forced upon me, is being reported separately.

14. A copy of this letter and inclosures (both in English and Persian) are being forwarded to his Excellency the British Minister, Tehran.

Inclosure 3 in No. 260*.

Translation of a Paper given to the Camelmen, dated March 5, 1903.

(Seal of the
British Consulate,
Seistan.)

THE bearers† of this are men who belong to the Commission of the British Government. It is therefore requested that no one should hinder or obstruct them.

(Signed) R. A. E. BENN, Major,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Seistan.

March 5, 1903.

* These and my camels and men were surrendered by the Customs Mirza to-day.—A. H. McMAHON.
† Mohammed Yar, Sabdar, Jahan Beg, Kaim Khan, Harun, and Baluch; with twenty camels.

Inclosure 4 in No. 260*.

Colonel McMahon to the Karguzar of Seistan and the Yamin-i-Nizam.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

IT has just been reported to me that some camel loads of supplies belonging to this Mission have been forcibly detained by a Customs Mirza at Milok, who has turned out armed men to stop their crossing the river. I would be glad of a very early explanation of this improper proceeding. Am I to understand that this has been done with your knowledge or consent?

You have already received a copy of the Customs Minister's order with my letter dated the 3rd March, 1903.

Inclosure 5 in No. 260*.

M. Maurice to Mirza Ghulam Raza.

(Bureau de Sistan,
Sceaux.)

Seistan, le 10 Mars, 1903.

CONFORMÉMENT à la loi, j'ordonne à Mirza Golham Reza, employé des Douanes à Deh-Dost Muhammad Khan, de confisquer les charges de farine indigènes de blé et d'orge, ainsi que les chameaux transportant ces charges, qu'il a retenus à Milek.

(Venacular Seal.)

(Signé) J. MAURICE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 260*.

M. Maurice to Mirza Ghulam Raza.

(Translation.)

March 4, 1903.

ACCORDING to orders received from the Customs Ministry, the transit* dues, which formerly used to be levied on carriers at the rate of 2½ kranst per kharwar,† have been remitted and abolished. Therefore I enjoin you not to demand transit dues from any one in future. You should post up on the door of your room the notice which has been written to this effect for the information of the public.

Should the "Mamurs" (Agents) of the British Government (Commission) who are on the other side of the river wish to come into Persian territory, you should not interfere in any way with their work. According to orders, no customs dues should be demanded on their baggage§ and loads.

Give similar instructions to your subordinates, particularly to the footman who is at Milok, lest he should interfere.

No more injunctions.

Inclosure 7 in No. 260*.

M. Maurice to Mirza Ghulam Raza.

(Translation.)

March 10, 1903.

I HAVE received your report and understood its contents.

As regards the loads which the English Consul wished to export to foreign territory which you have stopped, you wrote to say that there were nine loads, but the foot messenger who has brought your letter says they are much more than this, and that there are about forty loads. In any case I write the following instructions for you:—

Do not stop the supplies on which no customs duty is leviable according to the new Tariff, and let them be exported. Levy duty on those that are liable to duty. For instance, levy 7 kranst per 10 "Tabreez man"¶ on clarified butter. First, ask

* Rahdari.

† About 2 rupees.

‡ About 12 annas.

§ Ashab wa barha.

¶ 1 Tabreez man = 659 lbs. ∴ 10 Tabreez man = 6590 lbs.

them to make out and give you a list giving the number and weight of loads, and levy customs duty on them accordingly. But regarding local wheat, barley, and wheat flour, i.e., wheat, barley, and wheat flour from Seistan, I have repeatedly sent you orders to the effect that their export to foreign territory, by any one, without any exception, is forbidden, and you should, of course, forfeit the wheat, wheat flour, and barley, with the animals carrying it, and send them to me, reporting in detail what happened. If you have not got a sufficient number of sowars (mounted men) to send with them, obtain the necessary number of sowars from the Yamin-i-Nizam and send with them. Go to Deh Dost Muhammad yourself, and then come to the town, so that we may draw up the proceedings. Should the (British) Consul or his attendants happen to say any improper words to you or other subordinates, reduce them to writing at once, and send them to me. Make your witnesses any persons who happen to be present. The report you send should contain full details clearly, so that they may be well understood.

Should they wish to export foreign flour—for instance, Indian flour—and in case you should be able to know for certain that it is foreign flour, and not Seistan flour, levy duty on it at the rate of 1½ kranas* per 10 "Tabreez man,"† as mentioned in the Tariff, and let it be exported. You should, of course, act according to these instructions.

No more.

Inclosure 8 in No. 260*.

"Mamurs" of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to the Chief of the Commission of the British Government.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Pukak, March 11, 1903.

YOUR esteemed letter, dated the 9th March, reached our respectful hands, through Sardar Gul Khan, to-day, the 11th March, at Nasratabad-Seistan, where we had found it necessary to go very hurriedly to see the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, Amir Tuman, Governor of Seistan, with a view to discussing with him some important matters. We at once communicated the particulars officially to the Chief of the Custom-houses in Seistan, and give below a true copy of the reply he has sent us in writing:—

"On receipt of a report from Mirza Ghulam Riza, an employé of the Customs Department, I have given him orders to confiscate the local wheat-flour and grain which they wished to export from Milok to Afghanistan. It has got nothing to do with me that this wheat-flour and grain belong to the Commission. The Commission of the British Government cannot export to foreign territory merchandise whose export is forbidden.

"I have written to the Chief of the Commission (to say) that whenever they may wish to enter Persian territory, their baggage will be exempted from customs dues, and that, besides this, every time they come in or go out of Persian territory on business connected with their Mission, the Customs Department will not enforce Customs Regulations."

You have inquired whether you are to understand that this action has been taken with our knowledge or consent. It will be seen fully from the contents of the Customs Officer's reply that this action was not at all taken with our knowledge.

Inclosure 9 in No. 260*.

Colonel McMahon to the Karguzar of Seistan and the Yamin-i-Nizam.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Camp Nad-i-Ali, March 13, 1903.

I HAVE received your letter dated the 11th last, regarding the detention of certain camel-loads of supplies belonging to this Mission by a Customs Mirza at Milok.

I am unable to accept the explanation which you have given of this matter as

* About 7 annas.

† = 10 Tabreez men = 65·9 lbs.

‡ Asbabha.

sufficient, for the responsibility of improper action with regard to the property of this Mission by Customs and other officials of your Government must rest with you.

Since I last wrote the said Customs Mirza, by written order of your Customs Officer, M. Maurice, which I now have in my possession, dated Nasratabad, the 10th March, the date on which you were also in Nasratabad has seized and confiscated the articles noted below:—

Articles.						Number.	
Tobacco	..	..	..	..	..	Gunny bags	6
Wheat-flour	..	..	..	..	..	"	15
Wheat	..	..	..	..	..	"	6
Rice	..	..	..	..	..	"	5
Turmeric	..	..	..	..	..	"	1
Spices	..	..	..	..	..	"	1
Gur (unrefined sugar)	..	..	..	..	..	"	1
Salt	..	..	..	..	..	"	3
Onions	..	..	..	..	..	"	2
Total	..	..	..	..	..	"	40
Clarified butter—							
Mashaks	..	..	..	..	..	Leather bags	36
Kuppas	..	..	..	..	..	Leather jars	2
Bags containing wheat-flour, cotton seed for camels, and kit belonging to camelmen						Bags	14
And also 20 of my camels, which had brought the same from Nasratabad.							

With the camels are the following six British Indian subjects:—

Muhammad Yar.
Sobdar.
Jahan Beg.

Kaim Khan.
Harun.
Baluch.

I write to request the immediate return of the above property, camels and men of this Mission, and to ask you for a full and early explanation of this extraordinary and discourteous conduct, in direct contravention of the orders of the Persian Government, towards a friendly Mission which has been sent here by His Majesty the King of England at the request of His Majesty the Shah.

Inclosure 10 in No. 260*.

"Mamurs" of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to the Chief of the Commission of the British Government.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

March 13, 1903.

WE have had the honour of receiving your esteemed letter, dated the 13th March last, regarding the loads of supplies stopped by the customs official. The Customs official has no obligation, except the carrying out of the orders of his Chief. In our opinion it would have been better if the Consul of your Government, instead of reprimanding the Customs Mirza, had sent beforehand to the Chief of the Customs of Seistan a list and particulars of the loads and obtained a pass.

In any case the Customs official has now been enjoined not to prevent (the passage of) any of the loads of your supplies early to-morrow morning with the exception of two items of wheat-flour and wheat, the export of which is forbidden by clear orders of Government. On the letter of recommendation which has been addressed to the Chief of the Customs, he may give a pass for the passage of the two items of wheat-flour and wheat, although according to the orders which have reached the Chief of the Customs of Seistan, the matter has been fully explained and ought not to have any singularity. Nevertheless, the Chief of the Customs has been written to be very careful in future in matters concerning your Commission. As has been stated,

however, it is necessary that hereafter a pass should be obtained from the Customs Department before the dispatch of the loads.

It is a matter of great regret that Major Benn, the Consul of the High British Government, instead of giving intimation to the Chief of Customs as required by law, should have severely and badly rebuked and threatened the Customs Mirza.

Inclosure 11 in No. 260*.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

(Secret.)

Camp Nad Ali, March 15, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 14th March last I have the honour to make a further report on the position of affairs regarding this Mission.

2. The continued prohibition by the Seistan officials of the export of flour and grain, and the fact that the Helmand River will commence its annual rise in the next few days, compelled me to decide upon taking my whole camp across the river at once into Persian territory. I accordingly addressed a letter, dated the 14th March, to the Persian Commissioners, informing them of this decision, copy attached.

3. I consider it necessary to place on record in fuller detail the reasons which have led to this decision, and which determined me to carry it out with or without the consent of the Persian officials.

4. We have now been nearly two months in Afghan territory and for three weeks of that time have been guests of His Highness the Ameer. Since the 24th February, when permission* to purchase supplies for ourselves was granted by the Afghan Commissioner, we have succeeded in obtaining sufficient wheat for our requirements, but at famine† prices. Barley, ghi, and other supplies are not obtainable, owing to the past bad season in this country. Fortunately the reserve of barley we brought from Quetta has lasted up to now, but our ghi was finished some time ago, and the want of it is badly felt by the many to whom it forms a very important article of diet. The Afghan Commissioner has given us willing and valuable assistance in buying supplies, but the drain on this famine-stricken country has been very great, so great that nothing but absolute necessity would justify its continuance.

5. Thanks to our excellent relations with the Afghan officials and people, no ill-feeling has been engendered on this matter. What might have been the case had our relations been less friendly and cordial are not pleasant to contemplate. As an illustration of the length to which efforts to assist us even at their own inconvenience have been carried, I should note that the cavalry squadron composing part of the Afghan escort, provided by His Highness the Ameer for this Mission, had yesterday to be sent back to Candahar owing to the impossibility of feeding the men and horses. This measure was most distasteful to the cavalry, and would not have been carried out by the Akhundzada without great necessity, as his action is likely to be found fault with at Cabul.

6. It has become very necessary therefore to get into Persian territory as soon as possible, and relieve the Afghan side of the Helmand of its present burden.

7. It has become still more necessary to cross the Helmand before it begins its annual rise. We had great difficulty in crossing the river at Mashi on the 19th February. Since then the Helmand rose in flood, and for a long time was absolutely impassable for animals except by swimming, which, though possible for horses, is attended by great difficulty and risk in the case of camels unaccustomed to river work. The flood has now gone down, and the river is at about the level at which it was when we crossed it at Mashi. It is daily expected to commence its annual rise, and any day now may find us cut off from Persian territory by an impassable river.

8. It is not possible to complete work connected with Arbitration from the Afghan side of the river alone, as both portions south and north of the points where the boundary follows the Helmand, are inaccessible from that bank. Not only would the completion of arbitration work be impossible, but in order to proceed onwards to commence the demarcation of the Perso-Baluch border, we would have to wait until the river fell again at the end of the summer flood, a period, the duration of which seems as indefinite as everything else connected with this historic stream.

* Before permission arrived from Cabul.

† Prices have now reached 8 rupees per maund of wheat.

9. The above is what I may term the physical aspect of the case. Its political aspect is equally important. We have been just a month on the Persian border, and have not yet been met by the Persian Commissioners. Our remaining longer on this bank is damaging to our prestige on both sides of the river. On the Persian side it corroborates many disparaging rumours carefully fostered in Seistan, and it encourages the Persian officials to create incidents of the nature reported yesterday, which must in time lead to serious consequences. On the Afghan side it would lead from astonishment to misunderstanding. To show us the way to deal with the despised Persian, the Afghan might take to spirited action on his own account. Opportunities are not lacking for the Persians, either emboldened by our attitude, or acting under sinister advice, are commencing with armed villagers to irrigate debatable lands further down the Helmand. References made to me on the subject by the Akhundzada have elicited the advice to let things be, that armed irrigation does not prove possession, and that the Afghans may have cause to thank the Persians for so kindly watering and sowing Afghan lands. This argument would no longer carry weight if the Afghans saw that arbitration was going to be a farce. They would assuredly take matters into their own hands, and the instigation and blame thereof would be charged by the Persians to this Mission. Moreover, in dealing with Afghans it is not wise to rely upon an indefinitely long continuance of any particular frame of mind. Fear of Cabul or orders from the Ameer, based on misrepresentations from the Akhundzada's ill-wishers (like every Afghan Governor he has many) might easily and at any moment cause an inconvenient change in our present mutual relations.

10. To sum up, the risks to be faced by staying in Afghan territory are too many, and the advantages, material and political, to be gained by entering Persian territory are too important to allow of indecision during the very few days in which action remains possible. I accordingly wrote to the Persian Commissioners yesterday acquainting them of this decision, and gave orders for the camp to enter Persian territory this morning.

11. I received a letter late yesterday evening demanding me, in somewhat peremptory language, to at once discontinue the construction of the bridge (then completed) across the Helmand at this place, copy attached. This did not lead me to expect a friendly reception on crossing the river, but it did not affect my resolution to cross.

12. To-day the whole aspect of the case has changed. While my camp was starting this morning I received two letters from the Persian Commissioners, copies attached, consenting to the entry of the whole Mission Camp into Persian territory, and exempting it from customs restrictions. The orders of the Persian Government quoted therein are said to have arrived yesterday evening. I would call attention, however, to the ambiguous nature of certain portions of the said orders. These will doubtless, if the Persians persist in petty annoyance, give opportunities for foolish obstruction.

13. My main camp has crossed to Pokak to-day, and it has been arranged for the Persian Commissioners to give me an official reception at the river bank to-morrow when I cross myself, and for them to conduct me thence with due ceremony to my camp.

14. The confiscated supplies, camels, and men, referred to in my Report of yesterday, have been restored to me to-day in full.

15. It may be asked why, things having turned out so satisfactorily in paragraph 12, I have dwelt so much on the "ifs" and "ands" of paragraphs 1 to 10. My object has been to place on record the embarrassing and dangerous position in which the action of the Persian Government and their officials, whether by accident or design, had placed this Mission at the conclusion of the first month (15th February to 14th March) of arbitration work.

Inclosure 12 in No. 260*.

Colonel McMahon to the Karguzar of Seistan and the Yamin-i-Nizam.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

March 14, 1903.

I HAVE received your letter dated the 13th March, 1903, from which it appears that the export of flour and wheat is prohibited even for the use of this Mission.

To avoid this restriction, and to avoid the petty annoyances on the part of customs officials, which you appear powerless to prevent, it is obviously necessary for me to cross the river.

Moreover, the river will begin to rise in a few days, and will soon become impassable for my camp and remain so for a long time, during which it will be impossible for me to cross in order to either complete my arbitration work, or commence the demarcation of the Perso-Baluch boundary.

My camp will therefore cross to-morrow, and I am sending Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh to you to arrange the details of my reception.

Inclosure 13 in No. 260*.

"Mamurs" of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to the Chief of the Commission of the British Government.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

March 14, 1903.

NEWS has been brought, and it has been verified after inquiry, that, by your orders, a bridge is being made across the Helmand River from the direction of Burj-i-As, and is approaching completion, and that on one side the jungle is being cut down. The hearing and proving to be true of this matter has caused us wonder and surprise beyond measure, because the construction of a bridge across a river, which is the separating boundary between two territories, is only dependent on special permission. We have the honour to request you to kindly explain. If you hold written permission from the powerful Persian Government for making this bridge, kindly send an attested copy thereof for our information. If not, kindly write to us clearly the reason for your taking this step without the permission of the High Persian Government, and without any intimation to us, so that we may know our obligations.

We expect and strongly hope that, after receipt of this letter, you will at once order the work to be suspended, for which we shall be thankful.

Inclosure 14 in No. 260*.

Commission of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to the Chief of the Commission of the British Government.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

March 15, 1903.

AS we repeatedly communicated verbally and in writing officially, we were waiting for the receipt of sufficient instructions from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding your arrival in Persian territory.

Yesterday at sunset we received a telegram in detail. We quote below some of its contents, which only concern your honoured Mission, for your further information:—

"1. Mention verbally to Major McMahon the expressions of the High Persian Government, and give him a copy thereof in writing.

"The principal and important matter which should be defined will be this. The boundaries of Seistan and Afghanistan have been fixed at the time of the Goldsmid Commission. Those boundaries and settlement should not be altered on any account whatever. The present dispute is regarding the change of the course of the Helmand River, and differences regarding water. The High Persian Government, in their official letter to the English Legation at Tebran, has originally made this arbitration conditional on its not being in any way contrary to the boundary settlement of the time of Goldsmid's Commission.

"2. As far as possible, give permission for supplies and necessities required for the English camp to cross (the frontier), and do not restrain yourself in giving the necessary aid and assistance.

"3. If Major McMahon should wish to come into Persian territory, do not in any way prevent his attendants from going about in the interior within the distance of a farsakh* or a farsakh and a-half from the frontier. Similarly, if he should wish to

* 1 farsakh about 4 miles.

pitch his tents and stay at any place, he will be at liberty to do so within a farsakh or a farsakh and a-half, keeping this in view that the place may be near water. But, if he should wish to go into the interior of Persian territory more than a farsakh or a farsakh and a-half, he should not take with him all his party. Twenty or thirty persons will be sufficient. You should, of course, have regular and well-arranged cavalry, infantry, and guards yourself, and take every care to provide for safety and comfort in Persian territory.

"4. As regards his loads, whatever he has with him are exempted from customs dues, and should not be examined. Similar orders have been sent to the Director of Customs by telegraph. Such loads, however, as should be brought into the interior of Seistan, and are not with him should, of course, be examined in the Custom-house as usual.

"These are your instructions which have been telegraphed from both sides."

Notwithstanding the fact that we would have been liable to be called to account if we had taken any steps in any work before the receipt of sufficient instructions, your justice can confirm that we have not restrained ourselves in rendering any assistance that lay in our power.

Now we have the honour to request that in any manner that may be in accordance with the friendship, unity, and amity existing between the High Governments of Persia and England, you will kindly aid and assist in carrying out these instructions, which are the result of united action of, and have been conveyed, from both sides.

We repeat and lay stress on our estimation of esteem beyond measure for you.

Inclosure 15 in No. 260*.

Commission of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to Colonel McMahon.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Pokak, March 15, 1903.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your esteemed letter dated the 14th instant.

Although the receipt of fresh orders from the Persian Government regarding the export of wheat-flour, wheat, and other necessities has removed all difficulties, yet, since you intend to come into Persian territory, we have the honour to state that, whenever you may wish, it is possible for you to come with all your attendants without any exception, and we shall show you every honour and render you every assistance.

Our kind and respected friend, Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, came this morning, and settled arrangements for your advent and reception.

Inclosure 16 in No. 260*.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Camp Pokak, March 18, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 14th instant, on the subject of recent interference with the property of this Mission by the Customs Department, I have the honour to forward, for information, a copy of a letter, dated the 17th instant, from Major R. A. E. Benn, His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan, reporting the substance of a conversation on the subject with M. Maurice, Director of Customs in Seistan.

2. M. Maurice's statement regarding the orders contained in the French telegram tend to corroborate the opinion I had already formed that the deliberate attempt which was made to tempt me into compromising action with regard to the Customs Department was dictated from Tehran.

3. M. Naus' injunctions to his local officer must, as understood by M. Maurice, have been meant to especially apply to this Arbitration Mission. The reference to the possible use of force in exporting cereals must be held to show that urgent need of exported cereals by this Mission was anticipated at Tehran, and, further, that the

employment, or rather complaints of the employment, of force in exporting them would be not unwelcome at Tehran.

4. The above seems easy to understand, but what is more difficult to comprehend is what friendly object could underlie this desire to prevent this Mission getting without force what it was expected it would urgently require, and, further, what justification had M. Naus and his neutral Customs Department in taking what cannot but be regarded as a distinctly hostile and unfriendly attitude towards this Mission.

5. M. Maurice's statements may explain to some extent his conduct, but no attempt has been made to explain his extraordinary action in seizing and confiscating by force, not only our cereals and the seven camels which carried them, but thirteen camels which were not carrying articles, of which the export was prohibited, and when the export of the whole consignment, cereals and all, had been deferred pending reference in a correct manner through the proper Persian officials. On this point I feel that I am justified in expecting a full and satisfactory explanation from the Customs Department, and I would suggest that this explanation be conveyed to me in a public and suitable manner by the local Customs officer in Seistan.

Inclosure 17 in No. 260*.

Major Benn to Colonel McMahon.

(Confidential.)

Seistan, March 17, 1903.

IN connection with the recent seizure and confiscation by the Persian Customs Department in Seistan of certain camels and supplies belonging to the Seistan Arbitration Commission, I have the honour to report, for your information, the details of an interview I have had with M. Maurice, Director of Customs in Seistan, on this subject.

2. In the course of conversation, M. Maurice explained to me that he was in receipt of most explicit orders regarding the export of cereals from Seistan. He stated that about one month ago, which date would just about coincide with the date of your arrival on the Persian frontier, he had received an "Express" telegram in French from M. Naus, the Administrator-General of Customs in Tehran, calling his careful attention to the orders which existed regarding the non-exportation of wheat and flour from Seistan, and instructing him to report immediately by telegram to Tehran any attempt to export these cereals by force from the country. In the latter case he was instructed to state the name of the offender and the exporter. It was also pointed out to him in this telegram that the prohibition regarding the export of cereals did not apply to Robat.

M. Maurice then remarked that, arriving as these orders did just about the time when you were expected on the Afghan side of the Seistan frontier, it was only natural to assume that they were intended to apply especially to the Arbitration Mission. As a result of these orders he had made a tour along the frontier, to establish a cordon of customs posts on the banks of the Helmand.

M. Maurice then stated that, shortly after the receipt of this telegram in French, he had received another in Persian (both of which he offered to show me if I wished), informing him that you would shortly arrive on the frontier, that he was in no way to interfere with your baggage on your entering Persian territory, and that he was to be "conciliatory" in his attitude towards you.

Thus, M. Maurice explained, he was, at the time of your arrival on the frontier, in possession, on the one hand, of most distinct and explicit orders to prevent the export of cereals, and, on the other, only an ambiguous telegram of instructions "to co-operate with you."

In these circumstances, M. Maurice said he found himself in a most difficult position, and he seemed desirous throughout the interview for me to convey to you his expressions of regret, hoping that you would understand that he had been made the victim of circumstances.

Inclosure 18 in No. 260*.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

Camp Khwaja Ahmed, April 3, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter of the 18th March, 1903, I have the honour to forward for information copies of the 28th and 31st March, 1903.

2. Further comment appears unnecessary.

3. A small clerical error in my letter dated the 18th March, 1903, has just been noticed. The opening words—"In continuation of my letter dated the 15th March, 1903," should be altered to "In continuation of my letter dated the 14th March, 1903."

Inclosure 19 in No. 260*.

Major Benn to Colonel McMahon.

(Confidential.)

March 28, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to my letter dated the 17th March, 1903, to your address, on the subject of the confiscation by the Customs' Department in Seistan of certain supplies and camels, the property of the Seistan Arbitration Commission.

2. Yesterday I asked Captain Plunkett, my Assistant, to pay M. Maurice a friendly visit, and to endeavour, in the course of conversation, to lead up to the above incident. I instructed Captain Plunkett, in the event of M. Maurice offering to show him the two telegrams referred to in my above-quoted letter, to accept the offer and make a note of their contents. This Captain Plunkett was able to do.

3. Captain Plunkett, in a note I asked him to write on the subject, states as follows:—"M. Maurice then showed me two telegrams. The first in French, was dated Tehran, the 20th January,* 1903, and addressed by M. Naus to Director of Customs, Meshed, and began as follows:—"Donnez ordre formel Douane Seistan s'opposer exportation." The remainder I cannot remember verbatim, but it was to the effect that all exportation of grain was to be prevented, except that authorized to be exported to Robat, and that, if exportation was attempted by force ("par force"), a *procès-verbal* was at once submitted to Tehran. The second telegram was of a later date and written in Persian, and stated in vague terms that Major McMahon [*sic*] would shortly arrive with a Commission on the Seistan frontier, and he was to be treated with all respect, and customs investigations dispensed with."

4. It will thus be seen that the result of Captain Plunkett's interview has been to corroborate in full the statements made by me in my Report on this subject.

Inclosure 20 in No. 260*.

Major Benn to Colonel McMahon.

March 31, 1903.

I HAVE just received the following cypher from Whyte:—

"Following from the Minister. M. Naus informs me that, under misapprehension, customs unwarned in Seistan have stopped Benn from exporting supplies for McMahon's Mission. He explained that fault lies with Persian Foreign Office which neglected to communicate to him or local customs arrangements made here with me, and that he is telegraphing to above effect to M. Maurice. He says that there is friction between latter and local authorities who do not acquaint him with their instructions from Tehran."

(Sent to India.)

"It is difficult to understand how M. Naus reconciles this statement with his telegram of the 20th January to Maurice (seen by Plunkett) and reported in my letter of the 28th March to you."

* *Vide* my letter No. 98. M. Maurice told me that he had received this telegram here about the 17th February. It was no doubt detained in Meshed by the Director-General of Customs there and dispatched so as to reach here at the time of your arrival.

No. 261.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 19th May, relative to the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia in Seistan.

India Office, May 20, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 261.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 19, 1903.

YOUR telegram of 1st May: Proposed branch bank in Seistan.

Please instruct Consul in Seistan to aid Imperial Bank of Persia in securing immediate possession or option of best and most suitable premises for branch bank at Nasratabad. Arrangement has now been practically concluded with Bank for opening the branch.

No. 262.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 23rd April, relative to Muscat affairs.

India Office, May 20, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 262.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.**Bushire, March 7, 1903.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter, dated the 25th ultimo, with inclosure, which I have received from the Political Agent, Muscat, giving particulars regarding the French cruiser "Infernet."

Inclosure 2 in No. 262.

*Major Cox to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.**Muscat, February 25, 1903.*

I HAVE the honour to forward particulars of the French man-of-war that called at Muscat on the 21st instant. A copy will be duly forwarded to the Naval Commander-in-chief, East India Station.

Information respecting Foreign Ships of War calling at Muscat.

Where seen	Muscat.
Arrival	February 21, 1903.
Departure	February 24, 1903.
Nationality	French.
Name and class	"Infernet," 3rd-class cruiser.
Armoured, wood, or composite	Steel sheathed.
Tonnage	2,452.
Number of men	234.
Number and description of guns	Two 5.5" Q.-F. Four 3.9" Eight 1.8".
General remarks as to why come, whither bound, where built, horse-power, &c.	Come to show French flag in company with Russian cruiser "Boyarin." Built, Bordeaux; horse-power, 8,500.

P. Z. COX, Major,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul and Political
Agent, Muscat.

Inclosure 3 in No. 262.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

Bushire, March 9, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter, dated the 25th ultimo, with inclosure, which I have received from the Political Agent, Muscat, giving particulars regarding the Russian cruiser "Boyarin."

Inclosure 4 in No. 262.

Major Cox to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.

Muscat, February 25, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to inclose particulars of the Russian cruiser "Boyarin" that called at Muscat on the 23rd instant.

A copy will be duly forwarded to the Naval Commander-in-chief, East India Station.

Information respecting Foreign Ships of War calling at Muscat.

Where seen	Muscat.
Arrival	February 23, 1903.
Departure	February 24, 1903.
Nationality	Russian.
Name	"Boyarin."
Armoured, wood, or composite	Steel.
Tonnage	3,200.
Number of men	334.
Number and description of guns	Six 4.7" Q.-F. Eight 1.8" Two 1.4" Three machine.
General remarks as to why come, whither bound, where built, horse-power, &c.	Come to show flag with French cruiser "Infernet." Built, Copenhagen; horse-power, 18,000.

P. Z. COX, Major,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul and Political
Agent, Muscat.

Inclosure 5 in No. 262.

Lieutenant Colonel Kemball to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, March 9, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter, dated the 25th February, 1903,* addressed to me by the Political Agent, Muscat, reporting the proceedings of the French and Russian cruisers "Infernet" and "Boyarin."

The cruisers arrived in Bushire on the 28th February, and, after exchanging the usual complimentary ceremonies with the Local Government and the French and the Russian Consulates, left for Koweit on the 4th instant.

The Acting Russian Consul-General has gone in the "Boyarin" to Koweit.

Inclosure 6 in No. 262.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, March 28, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of my letter, to the address of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on the subject of the visit of the Russian cruiser "Boyarin" and Russian Consul-General to Muscat.

Inclosure 7 in No. 262.

Major Cox to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, March 28, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 25th February, I have the honour to submit, for information, some details of what passed on the return of the French and Russian cruisers to Muscat.

The ships came back in company (as they started) on the 14th instant, the "Boyarin" bringing the Russian Consul-General from Bushire. The fact and times of their exchange visits having been duly reported in the weekly diary, I need not repeat them here.

2. His Highness the Sultan, on hearing from the Commander of the "Boyarin" on her first visit that they intended to bring their Consul-General from Bushire back with him, was, in the interval, considerably apprehensive lest the object of the Consul-General might be to force a Consul upon him for Muscat. We had several conversations on the subject during their absence up the Gulf, and I repeated to him verbally the views of His Majesty's Government as previously intimated to him. Eventually His Highness left Muscat for a short change of air to Seeb Birka, &c., thinking that, if they returned on the date which they had mentioned, they might thus miss him. Whether or not the French Consul or M. Goguyer had advised them at Bushire of the Sultan's departure, I am unable to say, but in any case their return was delayed a week, and by that time the Sultan had returned to Muscat.

3. His Highness visited the two Commanders on the morning of the 16th instant, and it is worth mentioning that, after the inspection of the ship was over, Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Saeed, the son of our good friend, the late Vazier Saiyid Saeed, who formed one of the Sultan's suite, was prevented by the French Dragoman, Abdul Aziz, ostensibly at the instance of the French Consul, who with Abdul Aziz acted as interpreter, from entering the Captain's cabin with the rest of the party when they retired there for conversation and refreshments. This was, no doubt, owing to the fact that Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Saeed, like his father, is known to have leanings towards the British. So far as I can learn, however, the conversation was confined to the subject of general politics, and nothing of special interest transpired.

4. The Sultan informs me that, contrary to his expectation, the question of the institution of a Russian Consulate at Muscat was not specifically introduced at all,

* Not printed

but that, during the Russian Consul-General's visit to him, he (Saiyid Feysal), by way of making conversation, asked him if he was alone at Bushire, or had any assistant to act for him while he was away. M. Passek replied that he had not, and added: "Does your Highness think it would be a good thing if I had an assistant for Muscat?"

The Sultan says he took no notice of the question, and changed the subject, and that, beyond the naive hint above quoted, the topic was not introduced in any way.

5. When the Russian Consul-General was about to land, a suggestion was made by the Vizier and others that it would be advisable to give him a salute, but I am glad to say that His Highness did not entertain the idea for a minute.

The two cruisers left independently.

The Frenchman before her departure was said positively to be going to Sur, but apparently changed his mind, the reason possibly being that His Majesty's ship "Perseus" was there.

No. 263.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

(C.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 30th April, relative to the proposed demarcation of the Perso-Baluch frontier.

India Office, May 20, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 263.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

[Dispatched from Dalbandin April 17.]

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Khwaja Ahmad, April 9, 1903.

PLEASE refer to your despatch to Tehran of the 10th February, 1902, and the inclosure to Hardinge's despatch of the 11th April, 1902, with particular attention to omission made therein of your paragraph No. 7. I understand that instructions of Persian Commissioners are strictly limited to actual demarcation of Holdich line, and do not recognize necessity of discussing any departure therefrom. With an independent fully-empowered Persian Commissioner, as hitherto hoped for, I might arrive at satisfactory result, but I foresee little prospect of success with a Russian Agent like Yamin-i-Nizam. Please draw upon latest 1/2-inch map a straight line from the highest peak, Kachakoh, to terminal pillar on Koh-i-Malik-i-Siyah, and note position of Robat Thana. I will do my best, but, under the circumstances, doubt possibility of obtaining either small concession required at Padaha, or a comfortable margin round Robat Thana.

(Addressed to Simla. Repeated Foreign with Viceroy.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 263.

Government of India to Colonel McMahon.

(Telegraphic.)

Viceroy's Camp, April 22, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 9th April.

We interpreted Holdich's highest point of the Kacha Koh, which he had not seen, as the true watershed, and you should stand out first for the line up the Dar-i-Giaban River to Duzdap, and thence to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siyah, and, failing that, for the western range of the Kacha Koh, which follows true watershed.

(Addressed McMahon, Seistan. Repeated Foreign, Simla.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 263.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

[Dispatched from Dalbandin April 19.]

(Telegraphic.)

April 15, 1903.

MY telegram of the 9th April.

Existence of two Persian Commissioners greatly increases difficulty of satisfactory mutual settlement of Baluchistan boundary. Recent increase of their mutual dislike and distrust of each other renders both very difficult to deal with, even in matters of social entertainment. I strongly urge appointment of only one Commissioner, even if that one be Yamin-i-Nizam. My telegram No. 306 refers only to Arbitration Commission.

(Addressed to Simla. Repeated Foreign with Viceroy.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 263.

Government of India to Colonel McMahon.

(Telegraphic.)

Simla, April 24, 1903.

YOUR telegrams of the 9th and 15th April.

Please explain why you would now prefer Yamin as sole Representative. If there are two, is there not some chance of getting one on your side? It may involve delay, but that does not seem to be of great moment.

No. 264.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th May, relative to quarantine arrangements in Persia.

India Office, May 21, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 264.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 20, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon. See Sir A. Hardinge's telegram of the 13th and 14th May. Movement of 300 Russian infantry and 500 Cossacks to Pulikhatun is also reported in telegram from Consul-General at Meshed. I think retaliation necessary, in view of Russian reply regarding proposed abolition of cordon, and that Persian Government should be at once informed that as plague can enter Persia from other directions besides Herat—for instance, from Baluchistan (though at present Baluchistan is no more infected than Herat is, and has been since 1893)—it is incumbent on us to co-operate with Russia and to establish a quarantine cordon in Seistan for the protection of Persia from any such risk, and that we propose accordingly to station a doctor with suitable escort in Seistan, that we claim for him precisely the same advantages as are enjoyed by the Russians, and that, as long as the Russians remain at Furbat-i-Haidari and Karez, we shall maintain our establishment in Seistan. Persian Government should also be informed that as danger of infection to Persia must always be great whilst there is plague in Bombay and the maritime provinces of India, we reserve our right to send quarantine doctor and guards to any port in Southern Persia. Indeed, we may be induced to take early action, as local danger

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already exists, cases of plague having been recently reported to have occurred at Bahrein. I feel confident that without some such retaliation as I have proposed no change will be effected in existing situation. By it our position in Seistan will at least be strengthened even if it does not cause the Russians to remove their cordon.
(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 265.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of telegrams, dated the 20th and 21st instant, relative to the detention of His Majesty's ships at Aden.

Copies have been sent to the Admiralty.

India Office, May 21, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 265.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 20, 1903.

YOUR telegram of 19th.

First intimation of recall of cruisers from Aden to Mediterranean reached me in Resident's telegram of 16th. I am now informed that orders for their recall were issued by the Admiralty in consequence of message from the Naval Commander-in-chief on East Indies Station that he did not require assistance of vessels from the Mediterranean, as the naval force at his disposal was sufficient to enable him to deal with situation.

(Repeated to Aden.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 265.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 21, 1903.

SECRETARY of State's telegram of 20th.

Since cruisers were withdrawn, there remain only two small vessels, of which one is constantly at Berbera. I presume it is intention of Naval Commander-in-chief, East India Station, to send other ships.

(Repeated to Secretary of State and Bombay.)

No. 266.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 20th instant, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 21, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 266.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 20, 1903.

I UNDERSTAND that Aden Boundary Commission's Report on Amiri boundary, as elucidated by local survey, with a map, and with the Commission's proposals, presumably in their final form, will be dispatched to reach Aden about the 28th instant.

Referring to Secretary of State's telegram of the 16th instant, Colonel Wahab telegraphs as follows:—

"See Commission's telegram No. 260.

"We have advanced no claim to Kataba, nor ever proposed survey of watercourse north-west of it;* 2 miles to the south-west of it the joint survey was stopped by the Turks. We have just completed alone general survey of whole Amiri country border; results will be transmitted to England at earliest possible date. With regard to custom-house mentioned in my telegram No. 262,† the Turks, while alleging that the matter has been referred by the Wali to the Sublime Porte, are, meanwhile, building permanent structure in its place, intending, no doubt, as in the case of their military occupation of Mafare and Jihaf last year, to settle the question by a *fait accompli*."

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 267.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

(D.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 21st instant, on the subject of the French flag question at Muscat.

India Office, May 21, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 267.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 21, 1903.

FRENCH Ambassador, immediately on his return from Paris, had interview with Lord Lansdowne on 18th, in which he demanded that the three prisoners claiming to be French subjects, in Muscat, should be released at once. He enforced this demand with much energy, almost investing it with the character of an ultimatum. Lord Lansdowne, without holding out any hope of acceding to the demand, promised to consult the Cabinet.

After discussion in Cabinet, he again had a conversation with French Ambassador, to whom he stated that His Majesty's Government failed to understand how it could be contended that an Arab subject of the Sultan of Muscat, who was able, by acquiring property in a French Colony, to obtain French flag and papers, could thereby claim within Muscat territorial waters privileges and immunities, apparently for his family and ship's company as well as for himself, and could be supported in this claim by the French Government.

French Ambassador replied that it was not under the Treaty of 1844 that protection was claimed for the French flag-holders, who were outside the Treaty, but because they held French papers, and were entitled to fly the French flag. In many cases they possessed these rights before the date of the Treaty.

He was informed that His Majesty's Government would expect to be made fully acquainted with the evidence on which the French authorities had included in the list of their flag-holders the men who had been imprisoned. The views of the British and French Governments were widely different in respect of the privileges to be claimed by holders of flags or papers. While French Government maintained that persons in this position enjoyed, even in Muscat territory and territorial waters, immunity from the Sultan's jurisdiction, His Majesty's Government had always held the contrary view, and had supported the Sultan, whose contention in the matter was the same as their own. It was, however, Lord Lansdowne proceeded, the wish of His Majesty's Government to find some means of ending the present situation, and they accordingly proposed that the Hague Tribunal should decide what privileges could be claimed by holders of French flags and papers, and, among other points, whether such privileges extend to families and heirs of holders of French flags, and to members of the ship's company, or are

* The expression used was "While not advancing any claim to Kataba, I proposed joint survey of both watercourses."

† i.e., Custom-house south of Selat Kataba.

confined to the owner and captain of the dhow. If the French Government would accept arbitration, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to advise the Sultan to release the prisoners, who might be required to submit themselves, according to determination of the Hague Tribunal, either to the French Consul or the Sultan. The French Government would undertake, as part of the arrangement, to deliver to the Sultan, within a short period, a complete list of persons holding French papers, or believed by the French Government to be entitled to fly French flag.

M. Cambon replied that he had little doubt that idea of referring question to Hague Tribunal would not be disapproved by his Government, but he held that the *sine qua non* of any arrangement was that Sultan should first release the prisoners and hand them over to the French Consul.

This point was stated by Lord Lansdowne to have been carefully considered by the Cabinet. His Majesty's Government, though prepared to advise Sultan to release the prisoners, could not advise their being handed over to French Consul, which would amount to admitting the justice of the French claims and the illegality of the Sultan's action.

M. Cambon replied that it would be impossible for M. Delcassé to accept this, but suggested that it might be arranged that Sultan should hand over the prisoners to the French Consul, who might liberate them, or even go as far as to ask the Sultan to take charge of them on his behalf.

But, Lord Lansdowne declining to accept this suggestion, he said he would refer Lord Lansdowne's suggestion to M. Delcassé, but he could not advise its acceptance. It appeared to him that they had arrived at an "impasse."

Lord Lansdowne concluded by asking, as a personal suggestion, whether an arrangement might not be agreed to by which Sultan, in view of controversy between the two Governments and the decision to resort to arbitration, might inform both Consuls of his intention to release the prisoners, thus affording a sufficient recognition of the right of the French authorities to interest themselves in the matter.

The conversation ended by M. Cambon repeating that only step satisfactory to the French Government would be one that formally recognized French Consul's right to take charge of the men.

The question now stands as stated. The object of His Majesty's Government is to find a solution which, without impairing Sultan's authority or our position in Muscat, can be accepted by French Government. This object will, to a large extent, be effected by the condition which His Majesty's Government will attach to any concession made to the French Government, that the whole question shall be submitted to the Hague Tribunal, the decision of which is likely to be adverse to the French Government, and therefore a considerable advantage to us.

Please let me have your views as soon as possible on whole question, including following solutions, which have been suggested to me:—

1. That prisoners should simply be released by the Sultan on his own authority as having been sufficiently punished. This would deprive discussion of its practical character, and as we should lose the means of inducing the French Government to accept arbitration, the general question of the French claims will not be forced to a decision.

2. That we should advise the Sultan to surrender prisoners to French Consul, the French Government undertaking that the latter will hand them back to His Highness for safe custody until Hague Tribunal has given its award.

I am advised by the Admiralty that there is no necessity for recalling the cruisers that left Aden for the Mediterranean, French ships at Muscat being of small size and strength.

No. 268.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

(E.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 21, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 268.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 21, 1903.

MY telegram of 15th. Cox reports on 16th that Sultan of Muscat excused his action to the French Commodore on two grounds: primarily, that the question was being considered between the British and French Governments, and, secondarily, because he considered it desirable that Health Officer should be supported in the matter.

No. 269.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, May 21, 1903.

I RECEIVED this morning your Lordship's despatches Nos. 217, 221, 222A (in draft form) and 226, having reference to the situation at Muscat.

I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday, but although he had plenty of opportunity of doing so, he did not mention the matter to me.

He observed that the religious debate in the Chamber might have ended in the fall of the Government, and I attributed his preoccupation to this cause.

Public attention here does not appear as yet to have been attracted by the Muscat question.

No. 270.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, May 21, 1903.

MINT control.

See my despatch No. 61 of the 25th April.

The Imperial Bank has received an order from the Grand Vizier for the purchase of 165,000*l.* worth of silver, the Chief Manager and M. Naus to arrange the terms. Russia is still pressing for making the coinage of silver a State monopoly, and this order is equivalent to a Mint Contract to the Imperial Bank to import silver to the above amount for its own account, expressed in such a form as not to give occasion to recriminations by the former.

The above arrangement, which is satisfactory to the Bank, averts any danger of injury to it in the matter of mintage for the next year. The 50,000*l.* repaid to the Bank out of the loan of the 4th April will now be readvanced to the Persian Government on account current.

I trust that your Lordship will allow me to postpone for the present any strong language with respect to the negotiations or conditions of our late advance, which the Persian Government might deem harsh or unfriendly, in view of this distinct mark of goodwill on the part of the Grand Vizier. The latter has been at pains to devise means of satisfying the Imperial Bank without occasioning a conflict with Russia.

No. 271.

Foreign Office to Law Officers.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, May 21, 1903.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Marquess of Lansdowne, to transmit to you the accompanying papers which relate to the protection afforded by France to dhow owners and others, subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, and natives and residents of Sur, in Oman, and to a claim recently advanced by the French Government for the release, on the ground that they are French protégés, of certain subjects of the Sultan,

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who, having committed breaches of the Quarantine Regulations in force at Muscat, were detained by the Sultan's authorities, and having subsequently escaped from custody, were pursued and rearrested in the following circumstances (Papers A and B):—

On the 8th April last five Arabs of Sur arrived at Muscat by a British mail-steamers from Bombay. Three of them, who had paid second-class fares, were allowed on shore; the other two, who were deck passengers, being sent to a quarantine station some 3 miles from Muscat. In the morning it was found that all five had disappeared, the three second-class passengers having chartered a native craft and left for Sur.

The Sultan sent his Quarantine Superintendent to consult his Health Officer (who is also the British Agency Surgeon) and Major Cox as to the course to be pursued. Finally, at the Sultan's desire, Major Cox requested the Commander of His Majesty's ship "Perseus" to send his steam-cutter after the dhow, which was overtaken in territorial waters about 30 miles from Muscat. The dhow was run ashore, and the Arabs, after an attempt to escape over the rocks, were brought back to Muscat. At the request of the Sultan they were kept for the night in the guard-room of the British Consulate, and on the following day they were handed over to His Highness, who sent them back to complete their term at the quarantine station, and announced his intention of prosecuting them as soon as that term should expire.

On the 11th April the French Consul addressed a letter to the Sultan asking for the release of three of the five Arabs (the second-class passengers already mentioned), who were described as under French protection. At the same time he wrote to Major Cox stating that, while admitting the culpability of these persons, he must protest against their "imprisonment" on the ground that they were not under Major Cox's jurisdiction, and asserting that the French Consulate should have been informed before any action was taken. (Paper B, p. 14.)

Major Cox replied on the same day stating that he could not admit the title of the French Consul to address him on the subject, as the matter was one which only concerned the Sultan and his Health Officer.

On the 12th April the Sultan answered the letter of the French Consul claiming that he had every right to punish any of his subjects for offences committed against the ordinary law within the territorial waters of Muscat, and urging that it was very expedient that the matter should be discussed in Europe by the British and French Governments rather than by their local Representatives. (Paper B, p. 15.)

Instructions were sent to Major Cox to discourage any action which might aggravate the local situation during the visit of the King to Paris, and the Sultan deliberately left Muscat for a time in order to avoid communication with the French authorities. During his absence, however, the Commodore in command of a French vessel of war (the "Inféret"), which had arrived at Muscat, demanded from the Regent, in most violent language, the release of the three Arabs, laying his sword on a table and declaring "that it must be either compliance or that." The demand was renewed by the French Commodore to the Sultan on his return, though in more conciliatory language. His Highness has refused to reconsider his decision, and has been assured through Major Cox of the support of His Majesty's Government in the position he has taken up, pending discussion between the two Governments in Europe.

An account of these incidents and of Lord Lansdowne's recent conversations with the French Ambassador in regard to them will be found in Papers (C) to (I).

On pp. 16 to 18 of Paper (B) will be found duly attested statements of the five Arabs who broke quarantine. Of the three who claim to be French protégés, or, as they express it, "French subjects pure and simple," one is the owner of three dhows, owner of a house in Jibuti, and possesses French papers which were granted to him fourteen years ago at that place.

The second is the son of the above.

The third is "nakoda" (ship's-master) of a bugla, owned by his cousin. He does not possess papers, and he has never been to Jibuti, but states that his cousin owns a house there. His claim to protection apparently rests on the fact that the vessel owned by his cousin has been granted a permit to fly the French flag.

In the only case, therefore, in which French papers are actually held they appear to have been granted in respect of house property at Jibuti, which the owner lets for a rental. All three claimants state that both they and their fathers and families are natives and residents of Sur, and that they have never lived in Jibuti.

The other question referred to in the course of this correspondence is a demand made by the French Consul for satisfaction and compensation from the Sultan in

respect of the molestation of the dhow of a French flag-holder during disturbances of a purely inter-tribal character within the precincts of Sur—a claim which appears to be inadmissible, but which does not directly affect the point upon which Lord Lansdowne is desirous of obtaining your opinion.

Since the latter part of 1901 Lord Lansdowne has been frequently in communication with the French Ambassador regarding the general question of French flag-holders in Muscat, and on the 16th April, 1902, a Memorandum (Paper K) was given unofficially to his Excellency, after consultation with the India Office, in which certain propositions were put forward on the main points of the question with the object of eliciting the concurrence of the French Government in the views expressed.

Among the propositions thus advanced, as being those on which Lord Lansdowne understood that the two Governments were agreed, was the following:—

"That no right of protection on shore or in the territorial waters of Muscat is claimed by the French Government in respect of subjects of the Sultan of Muscat holding such papers, and that within the Sultan's territory they are to be regarded as subject to his ordinary jurisdiction."

This view had been already stated by Major Cox to the French Consul, with the entire approval of the Government of India, as will be seen from the passages marked in the India Office letter of the 25th March, 1902 (Paper J), on which the Memorandum was founded.

No definite reply has, however, been returned to this communication. M. Cambon has hitherto maintained that his conversations were of an unofficial character, and that the Memoranda could not be accepted by him except as unofficial records of verbal communications which had passed between himself and Lord Lansdowne. At the same time, the view expressed above has never been seriously contested until the present occasion. Indeed, the French Consul at Muscat stated in writing, on the 5th March, 1902 (Paper L), that French officers had no intention of subjecting Oman subjects to French jurisdiction, and that they only claimed the right conferred by the Brussels Act—that is to say, a right of surveillance and police over dhows carrying the French flag.

The present contention of the French Government, however, appears to be that Muscat subjects who are entitled to the use of the French flag cannot be arrested by the Sultan when they have been guilty of a breach of the ordinary law within the territory or territorial waters of Muscat, except with notice to and the concurrence of the French Consul. (Papers D and U.)

Such a limitation upon the authority of the Sultan over his own subjects is not provided for in any conventional arrangement between France and Muscat except in one special and exceptional case, viz., by Article IV of the French Treaty of 1844 (Paper R), which expressly confines it to "subjects of the Sultan of Muscat actually in the service of the French."

With regard to this point, I am to invite your attention to a Report by your predecessors of the 4th August, 1898 (Paper P), the last paragraph of which expresses the opinion that—

"Every Government has the right to police its own territorial waters. We cannot read the French Treaty with Muscat as in any way interfering with that right."

Also to a Report dated August 1897 (Paper Q), in which the following passages occur:—

"It is quite clear that the IVth Article of the Treaty between France and Muscat can only apply to persons *bona fide* in the service of French subjects. . . . This is a question, not for the French Government exclusively, but of the application of the clause in the Treaty, and it cannot be determined by the mere assertion of the French Government."

Lord Lansdowne has addressed a communication to the French Ambassador (Paper F), pointing out that these dhow-owners can scarcely be claimed to be persons actually in the service of the French within the meaning of the Treaty, and recalling the statement of the French Consul of the 5th March, 1902, and the view suggested in the Memorandum of the 16th April, 1902, to which reference has been made.

Specimens of the "titres de navigation" granted by the French Government to these dhows will be found in the Paper marked (M); nothing in them would appear to justify the present contention of the French Government.

With regard to the legality of the grant of such papers it may be observed that Article XXXII of the Brussels Act (Paper T) provides that authority to fly the flag of one of the Signatory Powers shall only be granted to such native vessels as satisfy the

following condition:—"Their fitters-out, or owners, must be either subjects of or persons protected by the Power whose flag they claim to fly." There appears to be no reason for supposing that this is so in the case of the dhows in question. It will be seen from Papers (N) and (O) that His Majesty's Acting Agent and Consul-General was instructed on the 8th November, 1902, to exercise particular care in seeing that this condition is complied with in the case of native vessels in Zanzibar.

But quite apart from this wider question, no list has yet been furnished either to the Sultan or to British officers of the dhows entitled to fly the French flag, nor, even if the present claim is in any way admissible, does it appear that any proof was advanced by the French Commodore of the possession of French papers by the offending dhow-owners before preferring a forcible demand for their release. Indeed, it is apparently only in one of the three cases that such proof can be advanced. The French Ambassador has, however, stated that a list had been prepared for communication to the Sultan, and was, in fact, on the point of being communicated, containing the names of all those who, after investigation, were held by the French Government to be entitled to papers of protection for their dhows, and that the names of the three individuals now under detention appear upon that list.

I am to request that you will take these papers into your consideration and will favour Lord Lansdowne, at your earliest possible convenience, with your opinion as to the correctness of the view already expressed by his Lordship to the French Ambassador regarding the extent of the Sultan's authority over these dhows and dhow-owners within the territorial waters of Muscat, as well as with any further observations which you may have to make upon the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

List of Papers.

(A.) India Office	..	..	..	..	May	12, 1903.
(B.) " "	..	..	..	..	May	16, "
(C.) Telegrams	..	..	..	..	May	14-16, "
(D.) To Sir E. Monson	..	..	..	..	(No. 190) April	27, "
(E.) " "	..	..	..	..	(No. 215) May	13, "
(F.) Memorandum communicated to M. Cambon	..	..	..	..	May	13, "
(G.) To Sir E. Monson	..	..	..	..	(No. 219) May	15, "
(H.) " "	..	..	..	..	(No. 221) May	16, "
(I.) " "	..	..	..	..	(No. 222 A) May	18, "
(J.) India Office	..	..	..	..	March	25, 1902.
(K.) To Sir E. Monson, No. 159 (with Memorandum)	..	..	..	..	April	16, "
(L.) India Office	..	..	..	..	April	9, "
(M.) Specimens of "Titres de Navigation."	..	..	..	..		
(N.) Mr. Cave	..	..	..	..	(No. 75) September	19, "
(O.) To Mr. Cave	..	..	..	..	(No. 69) November	8, "
(P.) Law Officers	..	..	..	..	August	4, 1898.
(Q.) " "	..	..	..	..	August	21, 1897.
(R.) French Treaty with Muscat, 1844.	..	..	..	..		
(S.) Declaration between Great Britain and France	..	..	..	..	March	10, 1862.
(T.) General Act of the Brussels Conference, 1890.	..	..	..	..		
(U.) Memorandum by Mr. Davidson.	..	..	..	..		
(V.) Treaty, Great Britain and Muscat, 1891.	..	..	..	..		

No. 272.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 267.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, May 16, 1903.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 109 of the 15th instant [and to my despatch No. 264 of the 15th instant], I have the honour to report and to place on record that the Council of Ministers decided yesterday that only 1 per cent. duty should be charged on exports, including, of course, coffee, from the Yemen to Aden.

Subsequently the Grand Vizier informed me, through Mr. Block, that instructions had been telegraphed to the Vali of the Yemen to this effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 273.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 268.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, May 18, 1903.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 264 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report as follows:

Upon receiving Colonel Wahab's diary of the 5th-20th April, I telegraphed to Mr. Fitzmaurice to inquire whether the villages north of the Selat Kataba and those west of the Wadi Tiban have heretofore been under the authority of the Emir of Dhali.

In reply, Mr. Fitzmaurice says that these villages, as well as Fagra, which is mentioned in the Commissioners' telegram No. 261, and the Haiki and Yubi villages have, except since the Turkish usurpation, been subject to the Emirs of Dhali for more than a century, and that this fact is shown conclusively by authentic evidence, both oral and written, that the inclusion of Fagra implies a rectification of the frontier from something between two to seven miles, and greatly reduces the abuses of the Turkish customs authorities caused by their so-called suppression of smuggling; and that Kataba was similarly under the Emirs.

He adds that the Commission propose to renounce all claims to the Mares district, which, with its forty villages, is of Yaffai origin, and consequently properly comprised in the Irade of the 15th February last.

It is evident from this telegram that the Commission are considerably extending the scope of the delimitation and raising claims and pretensions to territory, which has been in Turkish occupation for the last 30 years.

I see no justification for this policy, which would end in dangerously weakening the authority of the Sultan throughout the Yemen or in a serious conflict with the Ottoman Government. Unless, therefore, the Commissioners' detailed Report and map, now on their way home, prove that these demands are absolutely necessary in order to secure a stable and permanent frontier, I sincerely trust His Majesty's Government will not support them, and that categorical instructions will be given to our Commissioners to confine their claims and operations to the delimitation of the actual frontier as recently existing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 274.

M. Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 22.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 22 Mai, 1903.*

Cheer Lord Lansdowne,

POUR faire suite à notre entretien du 20 courant dont j'ai rendu compte à M. Delcassé, je suis autorisé à vous dire que l'incident de Mascate peut être réglé par la mise en liberté immédiate des trois détenus que nous considérons comme nos protégés, mais il est nécessaire que cette mesure soit notifiée par le Sultan à notre Consul en réponse à sa lettre du 11 Avril dernier.

Mon Gouvernement est disposé à soumettre, ensuite, à l'arbitrage du Tribunal de La Haye, nos divergences d'interprétation de la Déclaration du 10 Mars, 1862, en ce qui concerne l'exercice du droit de protection.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
(Signé) PAUL CAMBON.

No. 275.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 21st May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 22, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 275.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 21, 1903.

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day.

Lord Lansdowne had a further conversation with M. Cambon, in which he pointed out that nothing more than the release of the prisoners had been demanded by the French Consul in his letter to the Muscat Sultan of the 11th April, or by him or the French Commodore in their subsequent personal interviews with the Sultan, and that no suggestion had been made of the prisoners being surrendered to the Consul. In the end M. Cambon thought that a written communication addressed by the Sultan to the French Consul, informing him of the release of the prisoners, would be sufficient, and he promised to submit this proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Lord Lansdowne observed that if the Sultan followed this procedure he should make an identical communication to the British Consul. To this the French Ambassador replied it did not concern the French Government whether the Sultan made a similar communication to the British Consul or not.

The procedure suggested, which we consider might be accepted by us and recommended to the Sultan without loss of credit to him or to ourselves, seems to afford a satisfactory solution. His Highness will have succeeded in asserting his authority within his own dominions by the imprisonment of the offenders. With no less success will he have resisted first the threats of the French Vice-Consul, and then those of the French Commodore. The prisoners will have suffered a term of imprisonment fairly commensurate with their offence, and the Sultan will have finally released them of his own free will, consenting to this act of clemency only on receiving an assurance from the French Government agreeing to dispose conclusively by arbitration of this troublesome question, the settlement of which they have so long evaded.

Clearly, as the controversy, though referring to matters of comparatively trivial importance, has reached a stage which might become acute at any moment, it is most desirable that some means for its termination should be discovered.

Pending receipt of a written engagement, which we shall endeavour to obtain from the French Government to refer the question to arbitration, the prisoners will be retained by the Sultan. But when this engagement has been obtained we think that the Sultan would do well to release the men immediately, and have them sent to Sur, and that he should inform the French Consul and ours that he has done so. If he acts thus, the French will be debarred from questioning the language used in His Highness' communication.

Please telegraph to me your views as soon as possible. I suggest that the Sultan might write to the French Consul as follows:—

"I understand that the question whether three of my subjects holding French flags are exempt from my jurisdiction is to be referred by the Governments of France and Great Britain to the arbitration of an impartial International Tribunal. This is most satisfactory to me; but the definite decision of the Tribunal may not be delivered for some time.

"Three of my Suri subjects alleged to hold French flags and thereby claiming exemption from my jurisdiction, were imprisoned by me on (date to be inserted). As a satisfactory means has been found for determining the question of principle, I do not consider the further imprisonment of these men necessary. I have accordingly ordered their release, but I have taken from them an engagement that when the question of jurisdiction in their case has been decided by the Arbitral Tribunal, they will surrender themselves to the authority declared to have jurisdiction."

No. 276.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 22, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 18th instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,* reporting that, on learning from the Resident at Bushire that

* No. 237.

No. 275*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 22, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

With reference to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 20th instant, His Majesty's Government propose to defer taking a decision on the course to be adopted until receipt of the text of the Russian note.

Yusuf Bey had taken up his appointment as Mudir of Wakra, he immediately made representations to the Grand Vizier on the subject, and was assured by his Highness that the Turkish Government had no knowledge of the appointment, and that Yusuf Bey would be recalled.

Sir N. O'Connor states that he will insist on the fulfilment of this promise, but that if it is thought that Yusuf should not be allowed to remain at Wakra, even for a short time, and Colonel Kemball considers that his removal under pressure exercised by a British man-of-war could be carried out without giving rise to local difficulties, he sees no objection to such a course being taken.

It will be observed that Sir N. O'Connor's despatch was written before the receipt of Lord Lansdowne's telegram No. 108 to him of the 13th instant.

I am to request that the Secretary of State for India will favour Lord Lansdowne with his observations on Sir N. O'Connor's suggestion as to the possible removal of Yusuf Bey from Wakra.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 277.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 22, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 21st instant, forwarding a telegram from the Viceroy of India, dated the 20th May, in which his Excellency makes certain proposals as to the course which it would be advisable for His Majesty's Government to take in view of the apparent determination of the Russian Government to maintain their quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

I am directed by Lord Lansdowne to inform you that he proposes to await the receipt of the text of the note from the Russian Legation at Teheran to the Persian Government, referred to in Sir A. Hardinge's telegrams No. 65 of the 13th instant, and No. 68 of the 16th instant, before deciding, in conjunction with the Secretary of State for India, what steps should be taken by His Majesty's Government in the matter.

The text of the note may be expected to reach the Foreign Office on or about the 31st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 278.

Imperial Bank of Persia to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 23.)

My Lord,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, May 22, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 15th instant, forwarding a communication from the India Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference thereto, to signify the acceptance by the Imperial Bank of Persia of the terms recited in Sir H. Walpole's letter of the 3rd April, and further elaborated in the present letter of Sir A. Godley of the 12th May, viz.: a maximum subsidy of 1,500*l.* a-year for a period of five years, that maximum being reduced by the amount of any net profits actually made by the branch in each year. The expression "net profits" means the profits after the deduction of all ordinary expenses, including interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum on the capital allotted to the branch, which is estimated at 10,000*l.* for a commencement, to be increased if required.

I would further observe that until the extreme heat has abated it is not possible to send an English officer to Seistan, nor has the telegraph line yet reached that distance from Meshed. I assume that the Indian Government desires the branch of the Bank to open at Nasratabad, and in order to forestall probable competitors it would be advantageous if the British Consul at Nasratabad be instructed by telegraph, as far as possible, to engage on behalf of the Bank, without any avoidable delay, the best premises available for the

purposes of the Bank and dwelling-house, and if no suitable house be procurable, to take over the best site on which to build. For banking business it will be necessary to have an office in the native bazaar, while for the residence of the Manager we should prefer a site adjacent to the British Consulate. Further, I should be much obliged if the Consul be instructed to engage and place in uniform two or three farashes as servants at the charge of the Bank, which will thus notify to all the world that the Bank is going to put in a speedy appearance. This will doubtless meet the wishes of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy.

I do not apologize for asking the assistance of the Foreign Office in these preliminary matters, as it is most advisable to take immediate action, and the British Consul is the only person who can carry out successfully the intentions of the Bank in pursuance of the policy of the British Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LEPEL GRIFFIN, *Chairman.*

No. 279.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 7th instant, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 23, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 279.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, April 25, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 18th instant, and subsequent telegram, I have the honour to forward the following further papers for information:—

(a.) Copy of a letter addressed to His Highness the Sultan by his Health Officer, dated the 14th April, and the latter's forwarding indorsement to me. The Sultan asked Captain Lethbridge for this, in order that it might strengthen his hands in maintaining the fact that the confinement of the five Suris, French flag-holders and others, was simply a necessary incident of quarantine administration. It must be admitted that it is no part of the business of the Health Officer to inquire which of the Sultan's subjects owns a French flag and which does not.

(b.) Translation of a letter received by the Sultan from Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salim, in which, at the Sultan's request, the Sheikh gives his explanation of the flag incident at Sur. It fully bears out what has been before reported.

2. As I informed Government in my telegram of the 22nd instant, since the five Arabs were confined in one of the forts, the French Consul has been exchanging frequent communications with his Foreign Office, and has paid three personal visits to the Sultan to endeavour to induce him to release the French flag-holders, or to deliver them to the French Consulate. He has also been visiting the two most Francophile of the Sultan's advisers, namely, the aged Vizier and Saiyid Badr-bin-Saif, and enlisting their sympathies. They in turn have done their best to talk the Sultan over and work upon his timidity.

Also, during the past week, His Highness has received from some source or other a lengthy manuscript in the Arabic handwriting of M. Goguyer, purporting to be a translation of the official report of a debate which took place in the French Chamber on the 11th March, in the course of which M. Deloncle stated that he had seen a statement in the English "Times" to the effect that "Great Britain intended to annex Muscat," and on the strength of it called upon M. Delcassé for an explanation and assurance that French interests and those of the French protégés would be upheld. The statement quoted as being "presumably true as it came from an English

paper" was merely the reproduction in English of one of M. Goguyer's contributions to the "Novoe Vremya." The Arabic version of what passed in the Chamber, which Goguyer had put into the hands of the Sultan, was, I need hardly say, freely manipulated to suit the present situation. The fact of the "annexation" statement having been made by an English paper was particularly impressed upon His Highness, and in that part of the debate dealing with the question of the French flag-holders, there were skilful interpolations of Goguyer's own, directed chiefly against the British Consul and enlarging on the measures which the French were prepared to take to protect their interests and those of their flag-holders.

As far as one can judge, however, by his outward bearing, the Sultan remains quite firm in the matter, and assures me that, at his several interviews with M. Dorville, he has given him no other answer than that which he gave in the first instance, namely, that the confinement of the five Suris was purely a matter of quarantine administration, and that he did not see his way to release any of them.

At the same time, he is in a very anxious frame of mind, and, knowing him as I do, it is a little difficult to me to be certain that he can have been interviewed three times by the French Consul without hedging somewhat, and discounting the possibility of ultimately being left alone to settle accounts with the French Government as best he can. The Government of India will, I think, agree that in view of the very limited and uncertain degree of support which his interests have received during the past three or four years from His Majesty's Foreign Office in directions where they have been especially impaired, namely, in the matter of the French flag and the non-suppression of M. Goguyer, there would be little ground for surprise if such a contingency came to pass.

3. I fully realize that it is particularly unfortunate that the two incidents in question should have occurred just before His Majesty the King's visit to Paris, but that can hardly be ascribed to any fault of the Sultan or myself, and I urgently hope that, as soon as the visit has been brought to a close, the Government of India will see their way to press for the speedy settlement of the whole question, including the present incidents, and will see that the Sultan's interests are duly safeguarded. If they are not, I am convinced that our own interests in these waters, which we can little afford to attenuate at the present time, will suffer to a greater extent than His Majesty's Foreign Office perhaps realize, having regard to the comparative unimportance in themselves of the incidents which from time to time bring the matter into prominence. Postponement of the issue now will simply mean that the Sultan will be obliged to trim, and will thereby weaken his own position, and, further, that M. Goguyer and his supporters in Paris will have time to force M. Delcassé's hands by means of newspaper agitation and misrepresentation of the facts.

4. The aged father of the French Dragoman, Abdul Aziz, having died suddenly, the latter obtained a few days' leave to proceed to his home, and M. Dorville has consequently delayed his departure for Sur. It is possible, too, that he is awaiting the arrival of a ship, but I have no information on that point.

Inclosure 2 in No. 279.

Abdulla-bin-Salim-al-Hamoodah to the Sultan of Muscat.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Muharram 7, 1321 (April 6, 1903).

I HAVE received your esteemed letter and understood its contents. With reference to the claim of the French Consul in connection with the recent incident between us and one of the Jennebeh, you are well aware of the fundamental custom (as to levy of tribute) prevailing amongst the Arabs. I have not demanded (from the tribesmen in Sur) anything in excess of my right due.

With reference to the question of the Khor (Sur creek), my authority over it has been in existence from ancient times until now, and there are certain rules and laws attached to the enjoyment of the use of this creek which are known to one and all.

This is as plain as the day to any person in his senses. Your Highness is also perfectly aware of the fact.

How is it, then, when you are fully cognizant of all the circumstances, you did not act and speak on my behalf and refute the French Consul's claim, especially seeing that I never do anything to displease you?

Reverting to my action against the Jennebeh, it was not directed especially

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against them, still less against the particular possessor of the French flag in question, who complained to the French Consul; on the contrary, it was a measure applied against all the tribes (who use the creek).

The incident of the French flag was entirely the fault of the owner of the vessel who purposely put his bugla in the way of being interfered with, simply in order to get a pretext for complaining to the French Consul and getting him to interfere. For the rest, your Highness is the best judge as to what answer to give the French Consul.

I am sending a letter to him herewith.*

No. 280.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 22nd May, relative to the Persian loan.

India Office, May 23, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 280.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.)

SEE telegram from Sir A. Hardinge of the 20th May.

May 22, 1903.

Commercial Agreement between Russia and Persia was signed so long ago as October 1901, and the two Governments have doubtless been discussing for a long time past the classification of the Bureaux. In view of fact of transfer to Arabistan of the Mohammerah Customs, we are afraid that, under clause 5 of the Persian Agreement with Russia, some previous arrangement may be arrived at, making it still more difficult for Persia to accept our interpretation of the phrase "Fars and Persian Gulf." We deprecate any further delay in defining this phrase. We think that our Minister at Tehran should at once commence discussion with Persian Government under corresponding clause of our Agreement. Persian Government cannot pretend to be ignorant of our interpretation of Customs of Fars and Persian Gulf as including those of Mohammerah in face of Mr. Spring Rice's note of March 1900, approved by Lord Salisbury in despatch of the 10th May, 1900, to which document Sir A. Hardinge might well refer in his communication to the Persian Government.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 281.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 23, 1903.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic, having mutually undertaken by the Declaration of the 10th March, 1862, to respect the independence of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat, and being desirous of coming to an agreement for the settlement of questions which have arisen as to permits granted to certain subjects of the Sultan of Muscat to fly the French flag on board their vessels, and as to the privileges and immunities which are conferred by these permits, the following points have been agreed upon between us as the result of a friendly discussion and exchange of views:—

1. The Government of the French Republic have undertaken, within a reasonable delay, to furnish His Highness the Sultan of Muscat with a list of all persons who are

* NOTE.—The Sultan says he should have stopped this letter, as Abdulla-bin-Salim had no cause to write to the French Consul, but Adulla's messenger stupidly delivered it at the French Consulate, or gave it to one of the French Consul's servants before he could get hold of him. His Highness presumes that his reply was to the same effect as that given to himself.

in possession of such permits and properly entitled to any privileges which may result therefrom.

2. The Government of the French Republic have further undertaken that no fresh papers of this nature shall be granted to subjects of the Sultan of Muscat who are not already in possession of them.

3. The two Governments agree that all questions which either of them, or the Sultan of Muscat, may desire to raise with regard to the nature and extent of the privileges and immunities to which the holders of such permits are entitled, shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague on the 29th July, 1899.

4. In consideration of the arrangements thus arrived at, His Britannic Majesty's Government undertakes to advise His Highness the Sultan of Muscat to liberate at once the three men now imprisoned at Muscat for breach of His Highness' quarantine laws, who are asserted to be entitled to French protection, and to intimate his decision to this effect in an official letter to the Vice-Consul of France at Muscat, in reply to the Vice-Consul's letter of the 11th April, 1903.

I shall be obliged if, in acknowledging the receipt of this note, your Excellency will record officially the Agreement which we have concluded on behalf of our respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 282.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 240.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 23, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 229 of the 20th instant, recording my conversation with the French Ambassador on that day, respecting the three men imprisoned at Muscat for breach of quarantine laws, whom the French Government claim as French protégés, I have to inform your Excellency that I received a note from M. Cambon on the 22nd instant, of which a copy is inclosed.*

I asked the French Minister to call upon me this morning. I told M. Geoffray that I was glad to find that the French Government were disposed to settle the difficulty which had arisen in a manner which seemed to us both reasonable.

I thought that the agreement at which we were prepared to arrive should be recorded in an official document covering the main points at issue, and I handed to him, for M. Cambon's consideration, the letter of which a copy is inclosed.†

M. Geoffray told me that he would forward it at once to M. Cambon, who was to return to London to-morrow, and who would receive it before his departure.

It was arranged that M. Cambon should call upon me at 12 on Monday.

I observed to M. Geoffray that it might be desirable, if the Sultan of Muscat should prefer such a course, that the men on obtaining their release should give an undertaking that they would when called upon submit themselves to the jurisdiction of His Highness or of the French Consul, according to the decision of the Hague Tribunal.

This, however, I said was not an essential feature in the arrangement, and I thought the point might well be reserved for the opinion of the local authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 283.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 23, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th instant and previous correspondence relative to the trial at Hodeidah of the pirates captured by His Majesty's ship "Harrier," I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.‡

* No. 274.

† No. 281.

‡ No. 238.

Sir N. O'Connor suggests that in view of the unsatisfactory result of the trial, and the refusal of the Turkish Government to act summarily in the matter, the British naval authorities, in whose charge the captured dhows still are, should be authorized to dispose of them.

I am to request that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will favour Lord Lansdowne with their opinion on Sir N. O'Connor's suggestion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 284.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, May 24, 1903.

THE application by the Grand Vizier privately mentioned to your Lordship, referred to in your telegram No. 52, was the original one which formed the subject of our recent telegraphic correspondence, and as to which the Grand Vizier was informed by me that His Majesty's Government could give him no assistance. Since then the Imperial Bank have lent him 50,000*l.* on account current, and he is in treaty with the Russians for another 40,000*l.* also on account current. He will probably come to us again should the latter refuse the money or ask for political conditions. In this case I will endeavour to carry out the wishes expressed by the Viceroy, but I think it will be best not to show any eagerness to provide him with the money. I propose the following course in deference to the strong views of the Viceroy with regard to the definition of the expression "Fars and the Gulf," and unless I receive contrary orders from your Lordship, I shall carry it out.

On Wednesday next—the day we have fixed for exchanging the ratifications of the Commercial Agreement—I shall send in a note to the Persian Government which I am now preparing, stating that I have learned from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire that the Customs of Arabistan have been separated from those of Fars, that on the strength of a statement by M. Naus, I have informed your Lordship that this step has been taken merely for convenience of administrators, but that I have received instructions from you, in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, to ask the Persian Government to give me an assurance that this separation does not imply that the Customs of Mohammerah or other ports in Southern Persia are available for the service of the Russian loans from which the engagement given to this Legation by the Persian Government in 1897 excludes them.

M. Naus informs me that the "Règlement Douanier" with Russia is still unsettled, and he does not believe it will be finished for several months, as the Russian Minister refers every point to St. Petersburg. He promises to communicate to me the Russian draft in about ten days, together with a counter-draft which he is preparing to the latest Russian proposals.

No. 285.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 270.)

My Lord,

Pera, May 18, 1903.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 262 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that the Grand Vizier sent me a message on the 16th instant to the effect that he had informed the Minister of Justice that the sentence passed on the pirates at Hodeida was inadequate, and should be revised, and that the dhows should not be restored to their owners, but should be destroyed, as I had demanded. His Highness

said that he could not, on his own initiative, quash the decision of a Tribunal, but he was sure that his instructions to the Minister of Justice would have the desired effect.

In reply, I gave the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to understand clearly that, if there is a miscarriage of justice in this case, the British naval authorities will no longer be able, out of deference to the Ottoman Government, to hand over the pirates they may capture for trial in a Turkish Court; and I also warned them that, if the dhows in question are not destroyed by the Turkish authorities, His Majesty's Government may authorize the British naval authorities to burn them.

The Grand Vizier, whom I saw this afternoon, further informed me that he had ordered the depositions to be sent here as soon as possible, that the pirates should be detained in prison and the dhows held in custody while the judgment was being examined, and that the dhows would be either confiscated or burnt, but in no case returned to their owners.

I told his Highness that, under these circumstances, I would refrain from advising that the dhows should be burnt by our naval authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 286.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 287.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 19, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 264 of the 15th instant, inclosing paraphrase of a telegram from Mr. Fitzmaurice, in which he states, *inter alia*, that Arab levies in the employ of the Turkish custom-house had killed an Amiri and wounded two others, I have the honour to report that yesterday I made representations to the Grand Vizier on this subject, and urged the expediency of withdrawing the customs post to a point further off.

His Highness replied that, according to reports received from the Vali of the Yemen, local feeling ran very high in consequence of the concessions recently made by the Turkish Government, and it was difficult to calm it all at once. The Vali declared that he was doing all that lay in his power, and begged for a little time to use his influence over the natives.

I told His Highness that, if incidents such as this occurred again, while the Vali was wasting his efforts on the natives, they might have serious consequences, and that, in any case, it would be better to remove the customs post to some less objectionable place.

His Highness took note of my remarks, and said that he would telegraph to the Vali in their sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 287.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 291. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Pera, May 20, 1903.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Block, in a confidential conversation on the 18th instant, that the Russian Ambassador had been pressing him to obtain authorization from the Sultan for a "scientific expedition," consisting of some ten or twelve persons, to visit Van, Diarbekir, Mossul, and Bagdad, for the purpose of making archaeological and geographical surveys, and to "study the country."

M. Zinoview said that his Government found difficulties in carrying out the project of a railway through Persia to Bushire, owing to the poorness of the country, to the sparseness of the population in the districts to be traversed, and he thought it might be found more suitable and advantageous also to the Porte that a line should be

[1617]

3 M

built through Turkish territory in connection with the Caucasus railways; the Russian Government, he added, would not be likely to require a kilometric guarantee.

Tewfik Pasha said that he gave no encouragement to M. Zinoviev; he told him that the Sultan would never consent, and pointed out that the Germans had already got their Concession for the Bagdad Railway; that a scheme such as he indicated would probably rouse the opposition of England, and that the Sultan would be averse to raising so delicate a question with these two Powers.

In reply, M. Zinoviev observed, "Comment donc, vous vous méfiez de nous?" and added that, as the expedition did not propose to start till June or July, there was still time to approach the Sultan.

It is difficult to gauge offhand the political importance of the Russian Ambassador's remarks, or to say whether they are to be regarded as a concrete proposition or merely as a tentative proposal, showing the compensation which Russia may require as a set-off to the Bagdad Railway Concession.

The intelligence is interesting, however, in so far as it indicates that the rumour of a Russian railway through Persia, abutting on the Persian Gulf in the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas, is unfavourably regarded at St. Petersburg.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 288.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 24th May, relative to advances to the Persian Government.

India Office, May 25, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 288.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 24, 1903.

I DISPATCHED my telegram of the 22nd May before receiving Hardinge's of previous day. My views remain unaltered.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 289.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd May, relative to the Seistan arbitration.

India Office, May 25, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 289.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 23, 1903.

GOVERNMENT of India have been asked by British Minister at Tehran, on behalf of Persian Government, to obtain from Colonel McMahon explanation of his reasons for visiting Siahkoh Pandon. I have repeated to Sir A. Hardinge my telegram of the 19th May, stating these reasons, and suggest that he should reply to Persian

Government in accordance with it, adding that Colonel McMahon's instructions and terms of Royal Commission justified his proceedings; that when British Government was invited by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh's letter to Mr. Des Graz of the 22nd July, 1902, to intervene, it was for purpose of defining Perso-Afghan boundary in Seistan as well as to settle water disputes, and that British Government has to consider the claims of Afghanistan as well as those of Persia.

The entire boundary in Seistan, and not merely the question of local water rights, will be dealt with in the Arbitrator's Award, and it is desirable that this should be understood by Persian Government.

(Repeated to Tehran and Seistan Commissioner.)

No. 290.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

(C.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 25, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 290.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 22, 1903.

LORD LANSDOWNE'S proposals to M. Cambon, explained in my second telegram of the 21st May, have been accepted by French Government. This is satisfactory. When an Agreement has been signed on behalf of the two Governments, embodying all the terms of the settlement, I will again communicate to you as to the mode in which the arrangement should be given effect to at Muscat.

No. 291.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 25, 1903.

PERSIAN Loan.

With reference to the telegram from the Viceroy of India of the 22nd May.

Great importance is attached by His Majesty's Government to the inclusion of Mohammerah in the term "Fars and the Persian Gulf," but we leave to your discretion the proper moment for the discussion of this formula with the Persian Government.

No. 292.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1903.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your private letter of the 22nd instant in reference to the Muscat incident.

I gather from that letter and from the conversations which have lately taken place between us, that there is no substantial difference of opinion between the two Governments as to the question at issue.

His Majesty's Government have, therefore, through the Government of India, advised His Highness the Sultan of Muscat to liberate, at once, the three men now imprisoned at Muscat for breach of His Highness' quarantine laws who are asserted to be entitled to French protection, and to intimate his decision to this effect in an official letter to the Vice-Consul of France at Muscat, in reply to the Vice-Consul's letter of the 11th April, 1903.

In order to avoid future misunderstanding, it has been agreed between the two Governments that all questions which either of them may desire to raise with regard to the nature and extent of the privileges and immunities to which the holders of French flags or papers are entitled shall be forthwith referred to arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at the Hague on the 29th July, 1899.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

No. 293.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1903.

THE India Office have suggested to the Government of India that the release of the three men might be conditional on their giving an undertaking that they shall surrender themselves again for further judgment either to the jurisdiction of His Highness or to that of the French Consul, according to the decision of the Hague Tribunal, whenever that decision has been renounced.

Such an undertaking would obviously prejudice neither your claim nor that of the Sultan. This point is, however, one which can most conveniently be disposed of on the spot.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

No. 294.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 241.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1903.

I HAD interviews with the French Ambassador to-day upon the subject of the settlement of the Muscat incident.

I found that there was no substantial difference of opinion between his Excellency and myself as to the manner in which the questions at issue might be disposed of.

We had some discussion with regard to the form of the documents in which the agreement arrived at might be recorded, and we eventually exchanged the notes of which copies are attached to this despatch.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

No. 295.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 58.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1903.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 60 of the 25th ultimo, informing me that M. Naus has consented to the permanent re-establishment of the custom-house at Shuster as well as of that at Ahwaz.

I have heard with satisfaction of the success of your representations to the Persian Government in regard to this matter.

The contents of your despatch are being communicated to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

* Nos. 292 and 299.

No. 296.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* relative to a suggestion which has been made that the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department between Tehran and Bushire should be reduced on grounds of economy.

Sir A. Hardinge points out the strong objections which exist, on political grounds, to any further reduction of the number of British officials in Southern and Central Persia, and forwards a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan, expressing a similar opinion.

Lord Lansdowne concurs in the view taken by Sir A. Hardinge, but he would be glad to be favoured with any observations which the Secretary of State for India may have to offer on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 297.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd March, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that he has received a despatch, dated the 25th ultimo, from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in regard to the arrangements for the collection of customs duties on the Karun.

Sir A. Hardinge reports that he again called the attention of Mr. Naus to the arguments stated in your letter of the 23rd February in favour of the establishment of a custom-house at Shuster as well as at Ahwaz, and that Mr. Naus has now consented to the permanent re-establishment of a custom house at the former place.

The effect of this decision is to restore the old custom-houses both at Ahwaz and at Shuster.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 298.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 23, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of despatches from the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, with inclosure, relative to the visit of His Majesty's ship "Harrier" to Hodeidah in connection with the trial of pirates captured in the Red Sea, together with an extract from the remarks of the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 298.

Admiral Sir C. Dornville to Admiralty.

(Extract.)

May 9, 1903.

IN submitting these final letters from Commander Tower, reporting his proceedings, I would bring to their Lordships' notice the excellent work done by him in the suppression of piracy in the Red Sea.

* No. 229.

Inclosure 2 in No. 298.

Commander Tower to Admiral Sir C. Domville.

Sir, "Harrier" at Hodeidah, April 26, 1903.

IN continuance of my Letter of Proceedings, dated the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that I left Perim on the 14th instant for Kamaran, and on arrival there the following day, I paid off No. 2 dhow immediately and sent her to Aden.

2. On receipt of your telegram, I left Kamaran on Saturday, the 18th instant, with three prize dhows in tow, at daylight, and with much difficulty succeeded in bringing them to Hodeidah, they being in a very leaky condition.

3. I arrived at Hodeidah the same day, and, after visiting the Governor, immediately took steps to press on the trial, and caused the prize dhows to be beached with permission from Turkish authorities.

4. I personally attended the preliminary trial, on conclusion of which on Saturday, the 25th instant, I learnt that the trial must be indefinitely postponed, the Turkish authorities summoning many native witnesses from the coast and interior, on the evidence given in preliminary trial. As it must be some time before these witnesses can possibly appear, and as some of them are not likely to be found, I telegraphed to you my 37 and 3 (serial No. to you when absent from Malta), having sent my 37 to you at Malta in case your flag-ship should have left Naples, and I now wait your instructions by telegraph.

5. I am sending Lieutenant Plowden to Malta by mail steamer with this despatch, and am retaining Lieutenant Hon. Leveson-Gower pending your instructions, he being required for the further trial of pirates.

6. The weather is very hot, mid-day shade temperature 93°; but the health of ship's company continues satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CYRIL TOWER,
Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Division.

Inclosure 3 in No. 298.

Commander Tower to Admiral Sir C. Domville.

Sir, "Harrier" at Suez, May 2, 1903.

IN continuance of my Letter of Proceedings dated the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that on receipt of your telegram No. 26 I left Hodeidah for Suez, arriving this morning, and shall proceed to-day for Port Saïd and Malta.

2. Before leaving Hodeidah, I left Lieutenant Hon. William S. Leveson-Gower and the necessary witnesses quartered at the Consulate, to await the conclusion of the trial of the pirates, which may be over by the 8th instant should the necessary native witnesses summoned from the coast and interior be forthcoming. I attach a copy of my orders to Lieutenant Hon. W. S. Leveson-Gower for your information and approval.

3. Should I not find one of His Majesty's ships stationed at Port Saïd, I am leaving the Senior Officer's box under seal in the care of His Majesty's Consul at that port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CYRIL TOWER,
Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Division.

Inclosure 4 in No. 298.

Memorandum to Lieutenant Hon. W. E. Leveson-Gower.

I AM leaving three A.B.'s, one marine, and one interpreter at Hodeidah in your charge to await the final trial of the piratical dhows, and with the courtesy of His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, they will be quartered at the Consulate.

2. I have placed them on compensation so they will victual themselves, and they have been paid up to the 30th instant, inclusive.

3. On the completion of the trial, you will request the Vice-Consul to engage

passages to Aden, and to acquaint the Senior Naval Officer, Aden, at the same time, by telegram, the date of your probable arrival, and also to request Senior Naval Officer, Aden, to pay for these passages. On arrival at Aden, report yourself to Senior Naval Officer, and request him, on my order herewith, to arrange passages to Malta for the three seamen and marine, to Port Saïd for the interpreter (where he will report himself to Senior Naval Officer, Port Saïd), and to England for yourself, and further request Senior Naval Officer, Aden, to advise Port Saïd and Malta of their departure and probable date of arrival.

4. As regards the prize dhows, which are now beached at Hodeidah, be guided by the Vice-Consul as to whether you place one of your seamen to watch over them in addition to the guard already placed by the Turkish authorities.

5. Be particularly careful of your men's dress and behaviour, and that they do not appear in the streets or Consulate improperly dressed.

6. You will be careful to sign any papers in connection with the trial of pirates which may be necessary, before leaving Hodeidah, as the Vice-Consul has been requested to transmit them to me.

(Signed) CYRIL TOWER,
Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Division.

"Harrier" at Hodeidah, April 27, 1903.

No. 299.

M. Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 26.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 Mai, 1903.

Cher Lord Lansdowne,

J'AI reçu votre lettre de ce jour m'informant des démarches que vous avez prescrites auprès du Sultan de Mascate en vue d'assurer la mise en liberté des trois protégés Français dont le Consul de France a réclamé l'élargissement. Je vous remercie de cette communication, et j'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer la déclaration contenue dans ma lettre du 22 Mai, relative à l'arbitrage sur l'interprétation de la Déclaration de 1862.

Mon Gouvernement accepte de soumettre au Tribunal Arbitral de La Haye toutes les questions relatives à la nature ou la portée des privilèges ou immunités revendiqués par les propriétaires, les capitaines, ou les équipages des boutres munis de patentes Françaises. Un compromis entre les deux Gouvernements déterminera ces questions.

Je profite de cette occasion pour vous faire connaître que, conformément à ce que je vous ai dit à plusieurs reprises, mon Gouvernement a fait procéder à la revision de toutes les patentes délivrées aux boutriers, et qu'il est disposé à remettre au Sultan de Mascate dans un bref délai la liste de nos protégés.

Cette liste sera complétée au fur et à mesure de la rentrée des boutres en ce moment en mer; j'ajoute, comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, qu'il n'est pas dans les intentions de mon Gouvernement de délivrer à l'avenir de nouvelles patentes de protection.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
(Signé) PAUL CAMBON.

No. 300.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

Sir, India Office, May 26, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 22nd May, inclosing a report of Sir N. O'Connor's communications with the Turkish Government with reference to the reported arrival of Yusuf Bey at Wakra.

In reply, I am to inclose the draft of a telegram which, with Lord Lansdowne's concurrence, his Lordship proposes to send to the Government of India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 301.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

(A.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 25th May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 26, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 301.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. May 25, 1903.

IN continuation of my telegram of the 22nd May, I am glad to say that Lord Lansdowne's proposals have been formally accepted by the French Government.

His Majesty's Government have undertaken that the Sultan should be advised to release the three prisoners; and the French Government have agreed to an immediate reference to the Hague Tribunal of the whole question of their right to grant their flag to the Sultan's subjects, and of the extent and nature of the immunities and privileges conferred by the grant on the recipients. The French Government also have undertaken that a list of their flag-holders shall be furnished, and that no more flags will be granted till the Tribunal has decided.

The Sultan's communication to the French Consul of his intention that the prisoners shall be released must be in reply to the Consul's letter to him of the 11th April last, and should follow the lines suggested in my second telegram of the 21st May. As to the concluding words after "released," M. Cambon has been informed that the point might best be settled locally. Should the Sultan demur we would not press it.

The foregoing decisions should be acted upon as quickly as possible.

No. 302.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

(B.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 26, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 302.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P. May 25, 1903.

WITH reference to the incident at Muscat, Cox apprehends that the release of the prisoners before the expiry of their sentence will disappoint the Sultan, and be objected to by him; but, he says, that if this is a condition of our support Sultan will have to comply. Cox, however, presses strongly that the "Infernet," which was sent to coerce the Sultan, should be moved from Muscat as a condition precedent to the release. If not, the worst possible effect will, in his opinion, be produced, as the release will be attributed to the action of the ship-of-war. Our ships might, if necessary, leave Muscat simultaneously. In the Sultan's letter Cox proposes that after the words "subjects who hold French flags" the following words should be inserted, viz.: "together with the whole question of the French flag among my subjects." In a letter Cox reports that the French Commodore, in his interview with the Sultan on the 15th instant, used most overbearing language, and distinctly

claimed that these flag-holders were French subjects on the ground that they possessed French flags and frequented French colonies. The Sultan strongly resisted this claim. The Government of India recommend that Cox's proposals be accepted. The action of the Sultan in this matter has been most loyal to us, and has probably put us in a position to settle the whole French flag question.

It seems that the claim of Abdulla-bin-Ali against Goguyer for 7,000 dollars has been upheld by the Réunion Court, but, until the Suri dhow incident has been closed, M. Dorville declines to enforce payment. Settlement of this claim and removal of Goguyer from Muscat should, in our opinion, be made further conditions in the settlement. Goguyer is a pestilent intriguer, and the French Government are as well aware of his character as we are. Until he leaves Muscat trouble between the two Powers will continue. The employment of so low an agent can hardly be justified by the French Ambassador.

No. 303.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, May 26, 1903.

I HAVE received a suggestion from His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed, with regard to the Russian quarantine cordon in Khorassan, that "neutrals," provided they are not Belgians, should supersede the Russian officers.

Colonel Whyte's arguments do not impress me as entirely convincing, but I am forwarding them by to-morrow's messenger.

No. 304.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 26, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th instant and your letter of the 20th instant, in regard to the proposed establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia in Seistan, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a letter from the Imperial Bank on the subject.*

I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that the further particulars given by the Bank as to the arrangements which they desire to be made at Nasratabad should be telegraphed to His Majesty's Consul in Seistan for his guidance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 305.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 26, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, relative to the proposed establishment of a branch of your bank in Seistan, and to inform you that his Lordship has communicated a copy to the Secretary of State for India.

Lord G. Hamilton requested the Viceroy of India, by telegraph, on the 19th instant, to instruct His Majesty's Consul in Seistan to assist your bank in obtaining immediate option or possession of the best and most suitable property for the branch at Nasratabad.

Lord Lansdowne has now suggested to Lord G. Hamilton that the further particulars, given in your letter of the 22nd instant, as to the arrangements which you desire to be made, should be telegraphed to His Majesty's Consul.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 306.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 27.)

(A.) THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 26th May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 26, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 306.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 26, 1903.

ADEN: See your telegram of the 19th.

Postponement of delimitation to the desert, which I am glad that you accept, involves the further question whether it is still expedient to conclude Treaties with Beda, the Upper Yaffai, and others, which were only sanctioned as necessary preliminaries to delimitation. To what extent has the authority given in my telegram of the 4th May been acted upon? Treaties, without delimitation, would render us liable to claims hereafter on the part of the tribes for protection against Turkish encroachments in circumstances like those which have caused so much difficulty in the Amiri country, and in a country where to assert our authority will be very difficult. I think therefore that, until a suitable occasion arises for resuming the delimitation to the desert, it is undesirable to incur the risks involved in these Treaties.

No. 307.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 27.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 23rd April, relative to the murder of Bahreinese, near Katif.

India Office, May 27, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 307.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Government of India.**Bushire, March 16, 1903.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 13th February, 1903, regarding the murder of certain Bahreinese near Katif, and to report that, when I visited Bahrein in November last, I informed the Sheikh that he was at liberty to negotiate directly in the matter with the Behaih tribe through Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani of Katr.

The Sheikh was recently questioned by the Assistant Political Agent on the subject, and informed him that, since my visit to Bahrein, no communication has reached him from Sheikh Ahmed relative to the matter, and that he cannot himself take the initiative, but will have to wait until Sheikh Ahmed approaches him again on the subject. The Behaih tribe are at present away to the north of Al-Hassa, but, as summer approaches, will probably move towards the vicinity of Katr, when it is probable that they will again ask Sheikh Ahmed to negotiate on their behalf with the Chief of Bahrein.

No. 308.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received May 27.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street,
London, May 26, 1903.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, informing us that M. Naus has now consented to the permanent re-establishment of a custom-house at Shushter.

In reply, I am directed by my Board to request that their thanks may be transmitted to His Majesty's Minister in Tehran for the action which he has taken in this matter, and which has been attended with this successful result. We assume that the assurances given by M. Naus were of a verbal nature; but in the contrary case, I should be obliged if you could kindly send me a copy of his despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANK BOTTOMLEY, *Acting Secretary.*

No. 309.

Questions asked in the House of Commons, May 27, 1903.

Mr. Labouchere.—To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether there is any Treaty between this country and Persia, or whether there exists any pledge given by Persia to this country, by which Persia is in any way restrained from dealing with her territories on the Persian Gulf or in any other part of her dominions as she pleases; and, if there does exist any such Treaty or pledge which has not already been laid upon the table of the House, whether it will be so laid.

Answer.

There is no Treaty of the kind indicated, but in regard to Southern Persia, His Majesty's Government enjoy certain rights admitted by the Persian Government. As the honourable Member is, no doubt, aware, there is an Agreement between this country and Russia for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Persia.

No. 310.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, May 27, 1903.

THE Shah has been prevailed on by the Grand Vizier to appoint the Hakim-ul-Mulk Governor of Resht, and the Vazir Afkham Governor of Yezd. The latter is another leader of the Court party. If their removal from Tehran actually takes place, it will be a serious blow to the Opposition and a triumph for His Highness.

The Shah's second son, the Shoa-es-Sultaneh, has suddenly fled from Tehran, his intention being to go to Europe. Orders have, however, been sent to arrest him and send him back from Enzeli.

Although he is also a strong opponent to the Grand Vizier, his flight has apparently no relation to the above-mentioned incident.

No. 311.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, May 27, 1903.

M. DELCASSE'S language this afternoon on the whole Muscat incident was most conciliatory.

Though the case was one in which Consular intervention was, in his Excellency's opinion, inexpedient, inasmuch as it could be more efficiently treated directly by the two Governments at home, yet there had never been, M. Delcassé stated, any intention on the part of the French Government to render the question needlessly serious, or to make an attack on the Sultan.

No. 312.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 71.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 16, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 68 of to-day, a translation of the note addressed to me by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, inclosing one from the Russian Legation on the subject of the Cossack quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 312.

Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Translation.)

May 12, 1903.

I HAVE received your Excellency's two notes of the 23rd March and 22nd April regarding the quarantine in Khorassan. Copies of the two notes were communicated to the Russian Legation, and now I have the honour to send you herewith inclosed copy of an answer which has been received on the subject.

I avail, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 312.

Russian Legation to the Persian Foreign Office.

[Undated.]

IN view of the increase of plague in India (in March last there have been 6,571 cases in Bombay and 586 cases in Karachi), it is necessary that travellers from India and Afghanistan should be more carefully examined than before. The cholera of 1893 was introduced into Khorassan not by way of Baluchistan, but, as everybody knows, it appeared at Kariz and Meshed by way of Candahar and Herat. It is also obvious that the cholera of 1882 was also introduced into Khorassan by the same route. This fact proves that the distance of an overland route does not make any difference as to the introduction of the epidemic, and that the route by which it is introduced is not Seistan, but Ghazni, Cabul, Candahar, and Herat. As the merchants and travellers use this route more often than the Baluchistan road, a quarantine cordon in Seistan will be useless for the protection of Khorassan against the epidemic. It is impossible for the people using the usual caravan route of Kerman, Yazd, and Khorassan, to pass Turbat Haidari and meet the quarantine, in the same way that the travellers from India and Afghanistan using the Baluchistan route cannot avoid Turbat Haidari and the quarantine. On the last occasion when cholera was introduced into Khorassan via Herat, the Russian Government was obliged to stop its frontier, and, although this did not last more than a month, Khorassan suffered a loss of 1,000,000 toman on account of its trade.

No. 313.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 26th May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, May 27, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 313.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 26, 1903.

THERE is no objection to the addition to the Sultan's letter of the words suggested in your telegram of the 25th May. The French Ambassador gave a personal undertaking that the "Infernet" should be recalled as soon as the release of the prisoners should be notified, and the order of procedure which has been agreed to cannot now be reversed. Prompt and decisive action was essential, for had the character of the controversy become known to the French and English press, a satisfactory arrangement would have been gravely endangered. Your acceptance of arrangement, about which the circumstances of the case made it difficult to consult you as fully as he would have desired, has been a source of much gratification to Lord Lansdowne. It is now too late, the Agreement having been signed, to include it in Abdullah-bin-Ali's claim, but it will be pressed upon M. Cambon's attention by Lord Lansdowne at an early opportunity.

No. 314.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of telegraphic correspondence relative to the withdrawal of the Abbottabad Mountain Battery from Dthali.

Copies have been sent to the Intelligence Division, War Office.

India Office, May 27, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 314.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 3, 1903.

I AM of opinion, after consideration and consultation with Colonel Wahab, that Abbottabad Mountain Battery, whether required for Somaliland or not, might be withdrawn. It can reach Aden in ten days by easy marches, and, as the weather is now very hot for marching, even for natives, it is advisable that it should begin to move as soon as possible. By its withdrawal, difficulties of supplying force at Dthali would be appreciably relieved. Provision for carrying mules should be provided if transport is sent from Bombay.

(Repeated to Military Secretary, Government of India, Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 314.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 13, 1903.

VICEROY'S telegram of the 7th May and mine of the 3rd.

As early monsoon is expected and heat is increasing daily, it is desirable that orders respecting movement of Abbottabad Mountain Battery should issue shortly. There is some pressure on the people from the presence of so many troops and animals at Dthali, and I do not think that the situation is materially affected by the arrival of the Turkish reinforcements.

(Repeated to Secretary of State and Bombay.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 314.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 15, 1903.

YOUR telegrams of the 7th and 13th May.

You will be informed when it has been decided whether the Abbottabad Mountain Battery will be required for Somaliland. Meanwhile, it may be withdrawn from Dthali.

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 315.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 28th May, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 28, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 315.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 28, 1903.

COLONEL WAHAB telegraphs, the 26th May, to the following effect:—

"The maps and report mentioned in my No. 260 go by post to-day. Instructions have been given to the Turkish authorities to make a telegraph line to Kataba. I recommend that the Porte be moved to defer this work until His Majesty's Government have come to a decision on my report, as the line will have to cross territory which is in dispute."

Copies of the report and maps were forwarded to London and Constantinople by to-day's mail; those for India will be sent by next mail.

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 316.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Musurus Pasha.

THE Marquess of Lansdowne presents his compliments to the Turkish Ambassador, and, with reference to the complaint made in Hamid Bey's note of the 10th January last as to firing of guns by one of His Majesty's ships at Hodeidah, has the honour to inform his Excellency that the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean has made careful inquiry, but has been unable to ascertain that shots were fired by

any of His Majesty's ships in Turkish waters near Hodeidah without previous notice being given to the Ottoman authorities.

With regard to the complaint made in Musurus Pasha's note of the 12th March last, it has been ascertained that His Majesty's ship "Harrier" did in fact carry out gunnery and torpedo exercises in the Bay of Kamaran on the 6th March without previously obtaining the permission of the Imperial authorities.

This action of the Commander of His Majesty's ship "Harrier" was taken without due consideration in consequence of the sudden occurrence of exceptionally favourable weather after a long period of storms, which had prevented the usual exercises. It is regretted by His Majesty's Government, who will again call the attention of their naval officers to the necessity of carefully observing the Regulations which exist on this subject.

Foreign Office, May 28, 1903.

No. 317.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 28, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 22nd instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,* relative to the proposals of the British Commissioners on the Aden frontier for the delimitation of the territory of the Amir of Dthali.

Sir N. O'Connor's views on the attitude of the British Commissioners are in accordance with those already expressed by Lord Lansdowne, and appear to his Lordship to merit the serious consideration of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 318.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 28, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 26th instant, relative to the reported arrival of Yusuf Bey at Wakra.

I am to inform you in reply that Lord Lansdowne concurs in the terms of the telegram which Lord George Hamilton proposes to send to the Government of India on this subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 319.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 28, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 20th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch from the Government of India, in regard to the seizure of supplies and camels belonging to the Seistan Arbitration Commission by the Persian Customs authorities in March last.

I am directed by Lord Lansdowne to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that, in his opinion, no further action is necessary, and that the incident may be regarded as closed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 320.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)

Sir,

India Office, May 28, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th May, transmitting a note from the Turkish Ambassador relative to the alleged murder by men of the Subaihi tribe of two members of the Hakim tribe in the vilayet of Yemen, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to inclose, for Lord Lansdowne's information, a copy of a telegram from the Resident at Aden on the subject.

Lord Lansdowne will observe that the views expressed by the Resident, with regard to responsibility for the actions of these tribes in their local feuds, are not inconsistent with the views held by his Lordship in his note to Hamid Bey of the 26th September last.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 320.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, May 23, 1903.

YOUR telegram of the 16th instant.

Blood feud exists between Atiffi Subaihis and Hakim, beginning sixteen years ago with the murder by the Hakim, for which they seem to have made no proper reparation, of the father of present Atiffi Sheikh. Raids and reprisals will continue while feud lasts. It is understood that in recent raid by Atiffi Sheikh several Hakims were killed, and some camels carried off; but for such incidents, due to local feuds, we cannot accept responsibility, as I have already pointed out in my letter No. 144 of the 28th April. On our part we cannot object to counter-attacks by the Hakim. The settlement of these private feuds must be left to the tribes themselves.

(Repeated to India and Bombay.)

No. 321.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 27th May, relative to the Seistan Arbitration.

India Office, May 29, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 321.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 27, 1903.

PLEASE inform me and the Minister at Tehran, with reference to your telegram of the 23rd May about the Seistan Arbitration, of the nature of the unexpected difficulty which required McMahon's personal inspection of the country between Takht-i-Shah and Siahkoh. The former I understand to be identical with the place of the same name mentioned by you in writing to the Amir on the 24th November. No copy of McMahon's instructions to which you refer has reached me. The terms, both of his Commission and of the Persian Foreign Minister's letter of the 22nd July last, are very wide, but it was not contemplated that McMahon should deal with any question unconnected with the irrigation dispute. See note to the Russian Ambassador inclosed in the despatch to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg of the 21st February last, in which the arbitration is said to be for the purpose of settling a local dispute about water rights. We should do all we can to reassure the Persian Government, who, as you are aware, have been alarmed by misrepresentations as to our designs.

No. 322.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th May, relative to quarantine arrangements in Khorassan.

India Office, May 29, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 322.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 28, 1903.

KHORASSAN quarantine. See telegram from Minister at Tehran, dated the 26th instant.

I disagree with Whyte's suggestion as to neutrals. The Government of India's objection is to a cordon under any conditions whatsoever, as there is no occasion for it, and neutrals are no more to be trusted than others. Our objections to a cordon are fully shared by the Governor of Herat, as Afghanistan is free from plague.

No. 323.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 29, 1903.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 22nd instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister in Tehran,* inclosing the text of the note received from the Russian Legation by the Persian Government, in reply to their representations regarding the withdrawal of the Russian sanitary cordon in Khorassan.

I am to point out that the Russian note bases the retention of the cordon upon the alleged increase of plague in India, and Lord Lansdowne would be glad to receive any observations from the Secretary of State for India as to the number of cases said to have occurred during the month of March last.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 324.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 29, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your Confidential letter of the 15th instant, inclosing a copy of a report from the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, from which it appears that the Commander of His Majesty's ship "Harrier," on the 6th of March last, carried out gunnery exercises in Turkish waters without having obtained the permission of the Ottoman Authorities.

Lord Lansdowne would suggest, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that British naval officers should be warned to be careful in observing the regulations on this subject, as any departure from them invariably forms the subject of complaint.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 325.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 267. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 29, 1903.

I CASUALLY adverted, in conversation with M. Delcassé the day before yesterday, to the Muscat incident, saying that as it had been treated at London by your Lordship and M. Cambon, and was now settled, I had not been called upon to mention the subject to him before.

His Excellency replied very promptly that there had never been any intention on his part to make the matter a serious one, nor to render himself responsible for all the dhow-owners guilty of misconduct. Neither had there ever been any idea of an attack ("atteinte") upon the Sultan. There was no wish on his part to meddle with Muscat; and he hoped to be able to furnish your Lordship with a full list of all these dhow-owners to whom French flags had been given.

The controversy as to the privileges conferred by the possession of such flags was one which it was eminently suitable to refer to the Hague Arbitration Court.

I could not help being struck by M. Delcassé's very evident desire to minimise the importance of this incident. He was most emphatic in his assurance that such a trivial misunderstanding could not be allowed to ruffle the relations between the two countries.

I presume that reflection has shown him that the French case is not only a weak one, but that the pretensions set up by the French officials are hardly anything less than preposterous.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 326.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 28, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a despatch of the 17th ultimo, from the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, relative to the recent French flag incidents at Sur and Muscat.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. J. THOMAS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 326.

Commissioner Kemp to Rear-Admiral Sir C. Drury.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

"Sphinx," at Muscat 17th April, 1903.

WITH regard to the French flag incidents at Sur and Muscat, I have the honour to report as follows:—

In the neighbourhood of Sur there is an Arab tribe called the Beni-al-Ali who form part of the Gafiri Arabs, and who are at present at war with the Hajarien section of the Hinawi tribe.

2. The people living in Sur belong to the Gafiris, the Sheikh of whom is named Abdulla-bin-Salem. Abdulla-bin-Salem found recently that the people at Sur, that is the people of his own tribe, were assisting the Hinawi, with whom he was at war, by sending them stores and assisting them with transport, &c. He then took a force and came down to East Sur, and posted men on the roads leading from Sur inland. He also forbade any native vessel to enter or leave Sur Creek until the matter was settled. After some negotiations between himself and the headmen of Sur, it was

arranged that the latter should pay him 300 dollars. According to Arab custom this fine would have been collected by the headmen of Sur from among the inhabitants as best they could.

3. Among other dhows lying in Sur Creek was one owned by a certain Mubarak-bin-Hamed, who had taken out papers in the name of his son, under which he flew the French flag on his dhow.

Both these men were undoubtedly subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, who does not admit that they have any right under the French flag in his own territory.

4. While the negotiations between Abdulla-bin-Salem and the headmen of Sur were going on, Mubarak-bin-Hamed expressed his intention of leaving Sur in his dhow under cover of the French flag, obviously in order to avoid his tribal difficulties and responsibilities. He was warned that if he did so he would be prevented, and on his persisting, some of Abdulla-bin-Salem's men fired, and a shot went through the French flag.

5. A few days afterwards the son, Mubarek-bin-Hamed, managed to get away to Muscat, and complained to the French Consul, who demanded from the Sultan that a fine of 1,500 dollars should be paid for the brief detention of the dhow, and that the people who had fired on the French flag might be punished.

The Sultan refused to allow the claim, and informed the British Consul. Major Cox protested strongly against the action of the French Consul in formulating such a claim, which was incompatible with the independence of the Sultan.

Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salem is loyal to his suzerain, the Sultan of Muscat, and his action was purely a matter of inter-tribal politics.

6. The second case occurred on the 9th April.

On 8th April, three Arabs and their two servants, all natives of Sur and subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, arrived at Muscat in a mail-steamer from Bombay, the Arabs travelling 2nd class and their servants 3rd class.

The two servants were sent to the quarantine station, and the three Arabs were told to report themselves every day to the Health Officer for inspection, the rule being that the 3rd class passengers are kept on the quarantine station and 2nd class passengers report themselves every day.

During the night of the 9th April, the three Arabs obtained a hired native boat, and having picked up their two servants at the quarantine station, sailed for Sur. They were followed next day by a steam-boat from the "Perseus," in accordance with the Sultan's request conveyed through Major Cox, and brought back to Muscat; the native boat went on to Sur.

7. On arrival at Muscat, at about 10 P.M., the five men were delivered over to the British Consul, who kept them in the Consulate for the night, and handed them over to the Sultan next morning, who sent them back to quarantine.

When the time for quarantine was finished, the Sultan imprisoned them in the fort, and expressed his intention of keeping them in prison for three months for a gross breach of the Quarantine Regulations.

8. The French Consul, who claimed three out of the five Arabs as French protégés, protested to Major Cox against his having detained them, and demanded their immediate release from the Sultan. Major Cox declined to admit the right of the French Consul to discuss the question, and the Sultan refused to release them.

The Sultan, in a letter to the French Consul, pointed out that these men were punished for a breach of the law of their country, and that the whole question of the French flag in Oman was under discussion between the French and British Governments in Europe, and that he was prepared to accept their joint decision with regard to the matter, with due regard to his own independence, but deprecated heated correspondence in Muscat himself.

9. Major Cox considers that this claim on the part of the French Consul is an undoubted attempt to interfere with the Sultan's prerogative, and has telegraphed strongly to the Indian Government, asking that instructions may be sent, and that assurances may be given to the Sultan that his authority will be upheld in the matter.

10. It is generally the custom of the French Consul to visit Sur at this time of the year, and stay there a month. Previously to these things happening the French Consul had expressed his intention of going down to Sur in a native boat, but he has now abandoned his intention, and probably means waiting for a man-of-war.

M. Dorville is the French Consul, and has only been in Muscat a month.

11. These incidents have caused Major Cox to postpone his intended visit to Darfur, at the request of the Sultan, who is apprehensive of things happening.

12. The Health Officer at Muscat is the British Consular Surgeon, who receives pay from the Sultan for doing his work, and who is entirely answerable to him for the Quarantine Regulations being carried out.

(Signed) T. W. KEMP,
Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

No. 327.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Resident, Aden, dated 23rd April, and inclosures, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 29, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 327.

Resident, Aden, to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Aden, April 23, 1903.

COPY of Colonel Wahab's Secret letter, dated Camp Sana, the 21st April last, forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London. It covers the political diary of the Commission from the 1st to 20th April, 1903, inclusive.

(For Political Resident, Aden).

(Signed) H. M. ABUD, Lieutenant-Colonel.

NOTE.—Copies of the diary have been forwarded to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and the Government of Bombay; also to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Inclosure 2 in No. 327.

Diary, 1st to 20th April, inclusive.

1st April.—Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Seifi and Kadri Bey spent nearly the whole day in the British camp settling the affairs of the custom-house, preparatory to its withdrawal from Sana.

Interviewed Sheikh Yusuf Abd-ar-Rahman of the Shaibi; he says that Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar of the Mawsata is confined to his house owing to the enmity which his dealings with the British has aroused against him.

2nd April.—Detailed survey of the frontier zone commenced by a joint party. Turkish custom-house removed from Sana.

5th April.—Ali Salim of Al Bajaba, alleged assailant of Lieutenant Tandy on the 31st December, was captured about a mile from Sana.

6th April.—Interviewed the Muflahai (Yafa) Sheikhs of Khalla; also Sheikh Husen-bin-Husen Ali-as-Sakladi (Shaibi).

It is reported that one of the Azraki has murdered one of the Ahmadi, and the Ahmadi are collecting to attack the Azraki.

Sheikh Abd-ar-Rahman-as-Sakkaf of the Muflahai (Yafa) wrote to the Amir that he intends coming in.

7th April.—Al Khulakai, Sheikh of the Shaibi, wrote that an officer's horse, recently stolen from Dthala, is in the hands of the Beni Hariz section of the Shaibi.

Mr. Fitzmaurice and Major Tod visited the Turkish Commissioners and inquired whether orders had arrived for the dismissal of Zakaria Bey; they replied that orders had not come, but that pending their arrival, Zakaria had been sent to Nadira to be out of the way.

8th April.—The joint survey of the frontier zone continues daily.

9th April.—A number of the followers of Al Khulakai, Sheikh of the Shaibi, came, bringing back the stolen horse.

13th April.—Double company of the 2nd Bombay Grenadiers arrived under Major Baker to relieve the company of the 23rd Bombay Rifles, forming the escort of the Commission.

15th April.—Sheikh Naji Abdallah of the Dakkam wrote that a number of the Al Yubi had taken refuge in his country from Turkish exactions; also that yesterday a Turkish force attacked the Haiki village of Keshar, near the north-western Dakkam border, and the people fled into Dakkam territory.

16th April.—Another conflict is reported between Turks and Arabs on the border of Jabal Sh'ar and Al Aud.

Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar of the Mawsata, Sheikh Muhammad Muthanna-bin-Ataf Jabr of the Dthube, and several other Yafa Sheikhs of both these sections arrived.

17th April.—Interviewed the Yafa Sheikhs. Interviewed Fakir Nasir Ahmad, Mansab of Wali Afif-ud-Dir in the Halmin country.

It is reported that Muhammad Nasir Mukbil has been arrested and marched off to Sana under Turkish escort.

Sheikh Abdallah Kahtan of Lakmat-as-Sallah, who has been for three years a Turkish prisoner at Taiz, returned, having been released in consequence of British representations. He was ceremoniously received by the Amir.

Colonel Mustafa Ramzi wrote that he had received a telegram to the effect that Zakaria Bey is dismissed from the Commission.

Sheikhs Hassan of the Azraki and Awas of the Ahmadi arrived to confer with the Amir about the inter-tribal feud.

19th April.—Seyid Umar-bin-Muhammad-bin-Zen of the Yafa visited the Commission and again produced the document sealed by Sultan Kahtan of Mahjaba, and Sheikhs Mohsin Askar of the Mawsata, and Muhammad Muthanna-bin-Ataf Jabr of the Dthube, promising his father a share of such stipend as they may eventually obtain from the British Government.

The Sheikh of the Al Haiki wrote to the Amir complaining of Turkish oppression, and proposing to come in to the British.

It is reported that Sheikh and Daghar of Jabal Hesha had gone to Mares to raise men to help him to hold Jabal Hesha against the Turks.

The Ahmadi and Azraki Sheikhs went away, the Amir having concluded a six months' truce between them.

20th April.—Twelfth meeting of the Joint Commission took place at Kataba. I produced the map of the frontier zone made by the Joint Survey party, and informed the Turkish Commissioners that the watercourse passing to the north of Kataba is the one that I consider the real Selat Kataba; but refraining from claiming Kataba, I told them that we claim a line leaving Al Ukla to the Amir, and thence following the southern foot of Jabal Barkan and Jabal Jerad. To decide upon the line further west than this, it is considered necessary that the joint map be continued so as to show the junction of the watercourse passing south of Kataba with that passing north of it. The Turkish Commissioners declined to admit the Amir's claim to Al Ukla, and said that they consider that the overflow channel south of Kataba is the real Selat Kataba. They said that their instructions preclude their accepting anything but a rigid interpretation of the green line, whether suitable to the configuration of the ground as ascertained by the correct survey or not, and declining to consider newly-revealed local conditions. I represented that there are certain Dakkam villages north of the Selat Kataba, and others west of the Wadi Tiban, all of which we must include within the Amiri border in taking the Dakkam as a whole. The Turkish Commissioners declined to agree, and asked for a list of these villages; I promised to furnish them with this.

Camp Sana (near Kataba), April 21, 1903.

COPY forwarded to the Resident at Aden.

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB, Colonel.

No. 328.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 29th instant, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, May 30, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 328.

*Resident, Aden, to Government of India.**Aden, May 29, 1903.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S telegram of the 26th instant, and your telegram of the 28th instant, regarding Treaties.

On receipt of Secretary of State's telegram of the 4th instant, action was at once taken. I have sent for Beda Chiefs and their principal Sheikhs, and I am waiting for them at Aden. Satisfactory Treaty has already been provisionally concluded with one section of the Upper Yaffai, and Sheikhs of the Mausatta, the most important section, have announced intention of coming in. It has become known that British Government were prepared to conclude Treaties; it greatly strengthens hands of well-affected majority among Upper Yaffai, and has had, I think, excellent effect. It would be little short of disastrous to hang back now. One of the principal reasons, I understand, for postponing demarcation to desert was that it gave us time to conclude Treaties. Six months will probably be required before all have been arranged. Risk referred to by Secretary of State does not appear great to me; we shall be able, I hope, to send officers back with Beda Chiefs, who will obtain information regarding district on frontier, now greatly needed, and Yaffai, I think, can look after themselves. Beda is not, I would also venture to remind His Majesty's Government, one of the nine Cantons, and at present whole may be claimed by Turkish officers. Encroachment is less likely to be attempted, in my opinion, after than before Treaty.

(Repeated to Secretary of State; Political Secretary, Bombay; and His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.)

No. 329.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 295.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 22, 1903.

THE assurances given me by the Grand Vizier, as reported in my despatch No. 261 of the 12th instant, that Yusuf Bey, who had recently taken up his post at Wakra on the El Katr coast, should be recalled, are confirmed by a telegram from Mr. Acting Consul Crow, stating that the Vali of Bussorah has written to the Mutessarif of Hassa instructing him to send Yusuf Bey back.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 330.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 305.)

My Lord,

Pera, May 27, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 270 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that on the 25th instant I received a telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida, stating that the pirates were still at liberty, although he was

insisting that they should be detained in prison, and requesting me to urge the Grand Vizier to renew his instructions to the Vali.

I consequently sent a message to his Highness by Mr. Block to the effect that if the pirates were not forthwith imprisoned, pending the result of the examination of the judgment at Constantinople, I would submit to your Lordship the desirability of causing the dhows to be burnt by the British naval authorities and of refusing in future to hand over captured pirates for trial by the Turkish authorities.

Yesterday the Grand Vizier caused me to be informed that he had telegraphed instructions to the Vali to arrest the pirates at once.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 331.

Telegrams communicated by India Office, June 1, 1903.

(1.)

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 30, 1903.

COX telegraphs from Muscat, the 29th May:—

"Settlement of French flag question. I received yesterday your telegram of the 27th instant, and in the evening I interviewed the Sultan. Owing to reports spread in the Bazaar and to continued presence of French flag-ship, the release of the prisoners was extremely unpalatable to him. Nevertheless, he agreed that it was incumbent on him to follow our advice on that point; and he has accordingly released the prisoners and dispatched them to Sur. He has also, with the omission of the concluding sentence, addressed both Consuls on the lines suggested in your telegram. His Highness altogether objects to any written undertaking from the prisoners, and I did not insist. He quite approved of the reference to the Hague Tribunal. Finally, he expressed his conviction that the French Commodore would now endeavour to put pressure upon him regarding the attack on the dhow at Sur, but I did my best to reassure him by pointing out that, after the formal execution of the Agreement, this was very improbable, and, at all events, would not be permitted. In order to counteract misrepresentation of the circumstances under which the prisoners were released, I would suggest that an authorized communiqué, rehearsing the terms of settlement, be sent to the Bombay and London newspapers."

I do not think it necessary to act upon this suggestion.

(2.)

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 30, 1903.

"Infernet" is still at Muscat, but "Naiad" and "Perseus" have been ordered to leave. Cox deprecates departure of our ships before "Infernet," and, as latter's presence at Muscat will intensify the disagreeable impression already made by the release of the prisoners, he asks that she should leave at once. I strongly support Cox's request, and hope that our ships may remain till "Infernet" has left, and that French Government will be asked to remove her promptly.

(Repeated to Naval Commander-in-chief.)

Consul Cox to Lord G. Hamilton.

Muscat, May 31, 1903.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Steam-ship "Afghanistan," which left Marseilles on the 5th May, not 18th, has arrived. Sultan requested His Majesty's ship "Pomone" to detain ship and examine cargo on his behalf in the presence of his Representative, after she had discharged Muscat cargo. "Pomone" has complied with the request, and, after examination of Bushire consignments, finds that they are in order and consist principally of sugar. My assistance as British Consul was asked by Agent and master, to save the ship being detained for a considerable time for the complete examination of the cargo. Shall I allow Sultan to proceed further? Commander of "Pomone" thinks that, unless master and owner of "Afghanistan" involved, cargo must be innocent.

No. 332.

Consul-General Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 15. Commercial. Confidential.)

Odessa, May 21, 1903.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11 of this series of the 8th instant, I have the honour to subjoin translation of a note which appeared in the "Odessky Listok" of the 4th (17th) May, on the subject of the Russian line of steamers to the Persian Gulf.

(Translation.)

"Besides the steamer 'Truvor,' which is to leave on the 8th (21st) May, the Russian Steam Navigation Company has made the following fixtures for voyages to the Persian Gulf:—

" 'Kornilov' to leave on the 30th May (12th June).

" 'Truvor' to leave on the 12th (25th) July.

" 'Truvor' to leave on the 5th (17th) October."

This undertaking has suffered the misfortune that Messrs. Holz, the agent appointed by the Russian Company in the Persian Gulf have failed, so that new arrangements are necessary. I understand that the master of the Russian steamer "Truvor" (now leaving for the Persian Gulf), has authority to make any arrangements at the Gulf ports that he thinks advisable. The Company intend at present to send out as temporary agent a sea officer who is without commercial experience. It had been proposed to appoint an experienced man of affairs, but the necessary salary was refused.

I am advised that for the present the Company's policy in this matter is unlikely to be enterprising, because the three years' term of office of the Managing Director (Captain Radloff) is drawing to an end. It is not in human nature that a retiring director should wish to embark on a speculative and troublesome business just before a crisis when he may expect all possibilities of hostile criticism to be used.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. S. SMITH.

No. 333.

Consul-General Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 16. Commercial.)

Odessa, May 23, 1903.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of this series of the 21st instant, I have the honour to subjoin a translation of a further note which appeared in the "Odessky Listok" of the 10th (23rd) May, on the subject of Odessa trade with Persia.

(Translation.)

Several of the local merchants and manufacturers intend to open regular commercial relations with Persia, having taken advantage of the advice given by the Russian Consul-General for Ispahan, Prince A. M. Dabijah, at present staying in Odessa.

No. 331*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 122.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 1, 1903.

WITH reference to telegram of the 28th May from Resident, Aden Delimitation.

His Majesty's Government consider it to be a reasonable suggestion of Colonel Wahab that—pending consideration of his Report—construction of telegram to Kataba should be postponed by Porte.

Can such an arrangement be made?

They propose to establish relations through the mediation of the Russian Diplomatic Agent at Nas-Erina Kuruna, Mr. Termulen, as well as of the agents of the Russian Steam Navigation Company in the Persian ports. The merchants will send samples of their goods to Persia. The Odessa Bourse Committee will also take part in arranging regular communication with Persian merchants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. S. SMITH.

No. 334.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 29th May, relative to the Mudir of Wakra.

India Office, June 2, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 334.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 29, 1903.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 10th May about Turkish proceedings in El Katr, the Porte has assured our Ambassador that it is not aware of Yusuf Bey having been appointed, and that he will be recalled. If, meanwhile, Kemball thinks that Yusuf's staying even for a brief period at Wakra would be inexpedient, and that pressure by a British man-of-war can effect his speedy removal without giving rise to local complications, you may adopt this course.

No. 335.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 31st May, relative to the Seistan Arbitration.

India Office, June 2, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 335.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 31, 1903.

IN reply to your telegram of the 27th May, Takhtishah is the place referred to in my letter to the Ameer of the 24th November last, and it was presumably with reference to the Afghan claim to this place that Colonel McMahon visited the country lying between it and Siahkoh. In his diary of the 27th March he reported his visit to Takhtishah and discussion of the boundary with the Persian Commissioners. He has not told us the precise nature of the unexpected difficulty which made it necessary for him to inspect personally the country between Takhtishah and Siahkoh, but his diary from the 17th to 19th April (inclosed in Foreign Secretary's letter of the 14th May) should be read.

The instructions to which my telegram of the 23rd May refers were those which McMahon received orally from me before he left Simla. I expressly agreed that, in order to obviate further dispute, the line to Siahkoh should be definitely demarcated. That McMahon's arbitration should deal with all disputes regarding the Seistan boundary has always been contemplated by us. This is shown in our letters to the Ameer and in his replies, and it is necessary to consider Afghan claims equally with those of Persia.

I invite a reference to Sir A. Hardinge's telegrams dated the 23rd and 24th July, 1902, the latter of which contains a request from the Persian Government for our prompt intervention to secure the definition of the boundary and restoration to Persia of her legitimate rights. There was no mention of the water dispute in your telegram of the 6th August, 1902, but you referred to alleged encroachments by Afghans, and asked that overt preparations should be made for the arbitration that had been invoked by Persia.

In Hardinge's telegram of the 9th March last it is stated that the Seistan authorities had been required to submit to the Arbitrator, in writing, their case regarding the frontier question and irrigation. Finally Hardinge was instructed in Lord Lansdowne's telegram of the 9th March last, to arrange that delimitation should commence forthwith on the basis set out in my telegram of the 3rd March. In that telegram, I stated that only one Persian Commissioner was required to state the case for the Persian Government, both as regards the infringement of boundary of which they complained and about irrigation disputes, and that one official would similarly present the Afghan case.

Evidently, therefore, from the outset, arbitration has been directed, at the request of the Persian Government, with the knowledge of the Afghans, and under the authority of His Majesty's Government, both to frontier and to water disputes, and to confine it to the latter is now impossible and would be most unwise. It would result in alienating the Ameer, and the revival of friction hereafter would be inevitable.

It is by M. Miller's advice that Persia is now attempting to limit the subject of the inquiry. Realising, as he does, the capacity for irrigation of the Tarakum tract, he has prompted the Persians to endeavour to secure its exclusion from the Award. On this point please see McMahon's diary of the 18th April. The Karguzar has privately informed McMahon that this is the case, and that McMahon's letters are referred by the Yamin-i-Nizam to M. Miller for instructions. Moreover, the Yamin is intriguing with the aid of the Russians to secure the Governorship of Seistan.

In these circumstances, and in view of the delay of the Persian authorities to submit in writing a full statement of their case, I consider that they should be urged to comply at once with their instructions as communicated in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram. Further, in the event of any further delay, the Yamin should be recalled, and the Karguzar left as the sole Commissioner for Persia, the Yamin having violated the conditions upon which alone (see Lord Lansdowne's telegram of the 24th March) we consented to his appointment.

(Confidential.)

It is reported by an officer of Justice (*sic*) who has returned from Seistan that our position there has been greatly undermined by Russian intrigues. In his opinion the results will be most unfortunate if the Yamin is allowed to oust the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, or if we display weakness in the present case.

(Repeated to Hardinge.)

No. 336.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st June, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 2, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 336.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 1, 1903.

THE information desired in your telegram of the 26th May was given in General Maitland's telegram of the 29th May. Whether delimitation follows earlier or later, conclusion of Treaties should certainly, in our opinion, be proceeded with. It would not indeed be possible, without throwing doubt on our good faith, and creating worse situation, to recede now.

(Repeated to Political Secretary, Bombay, and Resident, Aden.)

No. 337.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 3.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 2, 1903.

WITH reference to your letter of the 23rd ultimo, with inclosure dated the 13th idem from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the unsatisfactory results of the trial at Hodeidah of the pirates captured by His Majesty's ship "Harrier," I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, that they concur in the suggestion that the captured dhows should be sold, and propose, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to direct the Naval authorities on the spot to take the necessary steps for handing the dhows over to the Prize Court at Aden.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

No. 338.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd June, relative to Muscat affairs.

India Office, June 3, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 338.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 3, 1903.

THE ships referred to in your telegram of the 30th May had left Muscat before your telegram was received, but I am informed by the Admiralty that "Pomone," which is of approximately the same size as the "Infernet," remained. Please inform me immediately by telegraph whether "Infernet" has left Muscat, and, if so, on what date she sailed.

No. 339.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in letters from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 7th and 14th May, relating to the Seistan arbitration.

Copies of the Seistan Mission diaries have been sent to the Intelligence Division, War Office.

India Office, June 4, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 339.

Extract from the Seistan Mission Diary for the period ending April 22, 1903.

April 17.—The Persian Commissioners have at last replied to my letter of the 15th, and write to say that they have received no instructions about the Perso-Baluch boundary work beyond the telegram of which they forwarded me extracts in their letter of the 24th February (*vide* diary entry of that date). The explanation they

naively assign to this want of communicativeness on the part of their Government is, that the said Government doubtless considers them fully occupied at the present moment with the Seistan arbitration work, and is waiting to hear of their starting for the Perso-Baluch border before sending instructions. The delay in this reply would show that they have got instructions which Mr. Miller, on being referred to, considers it inadvisable for them to communicate to me. The Akhundzada and Musa Khan of Herat came to see me in the afternoon, and we had a long business talk. I propounded to him the boundary-line I would be likely to lay down in my Award, based on my interpretation of General Goldsmid's Award and Map, as substantiated by local survey and inquiry.

This line would separate lanes now occupied on both sides without necessity for surrender on either side. It involves leaving Takht-i-Shah in Persian territory, as careful survey shows that that place is not, and never was in the Naizar, being situated a long strip of mainland projecting northwards into the Naizar. The Akhundzada raised less objection than I expected, but expressed grief at my not intending to give an Award more favourable to the Afghans, even if that involved a large surrender to them of lands occupied and long cultivated by the Persians. I did my best to explain how such surrender would in the end be more of a curse than a blessing.

The Akhundzada begged me to extract from the Persian Commissioners a map* which the Yamin-i-Nizam showed him some years ago, and which showed a boundary-line more favourable to the Persians than mine promised to be.

Captain Irvine, I.M.S., returned from a visit to Major Benn, whom he reports to be a trifle better and able to hobble about on crutches. Just before leaving Nasratabad, Captain Irvine was summoned to attend Mr. Greensill. His native Indian servant, who had been long in his service, appears to have gone mad and tried to cut his master's throat with a razor, and inflicted severe but, fortunately, not fatal cuts. One of our camelmen on the road between this and the city tried to rescue a fellow-camelman, who had fallen into a canal. The rescuer was drowned, and the other man saved.

The river is very high and flooding the country far and wide. All the sites of our previous camps from the time we left Khwabgah till we came here, i.e. Deh Karim Dad, Nad Ali, Pukak, Milak, Shahgul, Kaod, Shahrstan, are all under water. We are luckily on a high gravel plain here where no water can ever reach us. The Persian Commissioners have hurriedly left their former camp on ground just below us and taken refuge on our plateau.

April 18.—I had intended to-day to propound to the Persians the boundary-line my Award would lay down, and then start work forthwith to demarcate it. Mission schemes, like others, unfortunately, have a tendency to "gang agley," and I found this morning to my dismay that the survey of an important tract, albeit a small one, on the west of Takht-i-Shah, was not to be depended on. It is unwise to risk anything in such cases, and there is nothing for it but to hold up any further propounding of my Award until this tract has been definitely surveyed. A surveyor is being dispatched there with all possible haste. Whether the floods will admit of his getting there remains to be seen. It is very aggravating, for, if I had had any inkling of this yesterday, I would have deferred saying anything definite to the Afghans.

When the Persian Commissioners came at the hour appointed, I told them that I regretted not being able to express the definite opinions I had intended to, and must await the completion of the survey of a doubtful tract. In the meantime, I said we should visit the Siah Koh, and to-day I would content myself with hearing their exposition of how they thought the boundary-line ran. I first asked them for their map. They said they had not been supplied with one, not even the map which accompanied General Goldsmid's Award. I was prepared for this, and expressed no more astonishment at this trifling inaccuracy than mere politeness demanded. They, however, knew the arbitral Award well, and the Yamin-i-Nizam was able to repeat passages from memory with fair accuracy, but with a few alterations greatly to the Persian advantage, which had to be pointed out to him and admitted by comparison with the certified copy of the Award sent to me from Tehran. They thoroughly understood General Goldsmid's Award Map when I showed them mine, but said the map was only explanatory of the Award and not authoritative by itself. Briefly put, their contention is that they base their boundary on the written Award, not the map: that northwards the boundary is meant to be calculated from the northern edge of the Naizar i.e., where the Naizar

* The Yamin says this was an English map, which he cut out of a book of travel.—A. H. McMAHON.

becomes Hamun, and, as Hamuns are all water, the northern edge of a Hamun is the only tangible point for basing boundary calculations; that eastwards the old Helmand bed is the boundary; that southward the line from the Band-i-Kohak is not a straight one, but intended to be drawn so as to leave on the Afghan side only the present cultivated patches on the river bank such as Mashi, Dak-i-Dehli and Bund-i-Kamal Khan, thus leaving Tarakun, &c., in Persian territory.

I asked them a few questions, ostensibly for my own information, but in reality to give them a delicate hint that there were other interpretations of Goldsmid's Award which were not quite so favourable to Persian interests. I asked them whether it was true that the real bed of the Helmand in Goldsmid's time was the present Shela-i-Shamshiri;* that the Naizar then extended to Pukak and Nad Ali; and that the present Band-i-Kohak is some 1,000 yards higher up the river than it was in 1872. They expressed complete ignorance on these points, and said they would make inquiries. I thanked them, and said I would defer any definite expression of opinion until later.

My object is, of course, to get both sides to abandon any sanguine views they may have formed about my Award, so that, if possible, each may think they have scored something when the Award is actually given.

We are to go to the Siah Koh together as soon as possible.

April 19.—To-day I had a long interview with the Afghan Commissioner. He brought with him not only Musa Khan, but the "Comedan" of Farrah, the Sartip and Yar Muhammad. He evidently wanted to have witnesses to prove to the Amir that he has done his best to state the Afghan case in a proper manner. I gave him every facility and listened for two hours to a long dissertation on the accuracy and authoritativeness of General Goldsmid's Award Map, and how the line on that map leaves a large tract of present Persian territory in Afghanistan. He read extracts from letters from His Highness the Ameer to the Viceroy, in which names of places along the boundary-line as claimed are stated. He made the familiar appeal, *ad misericordiam*, to the effect that any award contrary to such definitions would mean his personal ruin† or death, as indicating want of talent or energy on his part in stating the Afghan case. I made a suitable reply, and said what was necessary without holding out any hope of being partial to either Afghan or Persian, no matter to what extent my sympathy might be with one more than the other side. I took the opportunity, too, of pointing out the interpretation the Persians applied to the Goldsmid definition of the line from the Band-i-Kohak to Koh-i-Malik Siah, which, if accepted, would deprive Afghanistan of Tarakun. I was not to be drawn into a premature disclosure of my own opinion on this point.

The Akhundzada, with a very small party, is to accompany me to Siah Koh. As the route there by Afghan territory is now impassable, he will have to go with me through Seistan.

The Afghan Commissioner and his people have been much impressed with the hospitality shown them by us here. They have been provided with tents and all food for themselves and their horses, and are entertained very handsomely. As the Akhundzada has with him representatives from Herat, Farrah, Kandahar, and is visited daily by Headmen from the Helmand districts, the political effect is likely to be widespread. I hear their opinions on the subject are very loud spoken.

April 20.—It has been now arranged that I am to make a State entry into the city on my way to the Siah Koh. The Governor has been unable to come out here and visit me for many reasons, the cumulative force of which cannot be disputed. It is contrary to Persian custom; not authorized by any orders from Tehran; not done in Sir Frederick Goldsmid's case; very difficult in itself, and, moreover, likely to be represented as a mischievous attempt to interfere in Mission matters. To make up for it, he is to go out of his way to make my reception at the city one hitherto unknown in Seistan. His two sons and Sardars, and all the sowars up to 300 procurable, are to meet me some miles out and escort me with led horses and bands to the city and take me through streets lined with infantry to the British Consulate, where the Governor is to call on me that evening, having first sent Mehmani and presents to the value of 10,000 krans. There are to be fireworks that night.

This morning I received a letter from the Persian Commissioners which, I fear,

* This flows to the west of Deh Dost Muhammad, and was at some former time the main bed of the river.—A. H. McMAHON.

† The example of poor Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan, my last Afghan colleague, who has been so long in the Cabul gaol, has a dispiriting effect on Afghan Commissioners generally, and especially here, where Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan, as Chief of the Nurzais Farrah, has a great name.—A. H. McMAHON.

tends to confirm the Karguzar's opinion. The Commissioners refer to my intention to inspect the Siah Koh, and say that (1) the Siah Koh is $1\frac{1}{2}$ farsakhs from the frontier; and (2) it is in no way connected with the division of water, i.e., with our arbitration work, and that, therefore, our going to Siah Koh depends on obtaining permission from Tehran. In case I still wish to go there, they beg me to write to them officially, so that they may represent the matter to Tehran and wait for orders. The Persian Commissioners were informed of my intention to go to Siah Koh on the 18th, and I am obliged to infer that the lapse of time which has occurred before they wrote to me on the subject is due to a reference having been made to Mr. Miller. This is the second time in the past week that I have had to draw a similar inference. The latter is doubtless trying to interfere with my visit to Nasratabad.

I wrote in reply that my duties as Arbitrator necessitated checking the survey of country through which the boundary-line runs, and visiting all doubtful and disputed portions. Their present question about Siah Koh makes it additionally necessary for me to visit that place, and I proposed, therefore, to carry out my previous intention of doing so.

I informed the Afghan Commissioner that, as there was now some doubt about the Persian Commissioners accompanying me to Siah Koh, he had better defer his coming to Nasratabad until the question is settled. He agrees to this, and I am relieved of a certain amount of anxiety regarding his reception at Nasratabad. If he has to come after me, I will by that time have put the matter right with the Hashmat-ul-Mulk.

No. 340.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 7th May, respecting the Perso-Baluch boundary.

India Office, June 4, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 340.

Memorandum.

THE papers specified in the margin* were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter dated the 30th April, 1903.

Inclosure 2 in No. 340.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

Camp Khwaja Ahmad, April 18, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy (with translation) of the marginally cited letters to and from the Persian Commissioners regarding the demarcation of the Perso-Baluch boundary southwards of Koh-i-Malik Siah.

2. The Persian reply to my letter is not satisfactory, and I place no faith in the statement that they have not received definite instructions.

P.S.—A copy of this letter and of its inclosures have been forwarded to the British Minister, Tehran.

* Telegram from Colonel McMahon, dated April 9; telegram to Colonel McMahon, dated April 22; telegram from Colonel McMahon, dated April 15; telegram to Colonel McMahon, dated April 24, 1903.

Inclosure 3 in No. 340.

Colonel McMahon to Persian Mamurs.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

April 15, 1903.

AS the completion of arbitration work is now approaching, I write to inquire whether you have yet received any definite instructions from your Government regarding boundary work from the Koh-i-Malik Siah southwards, and, if so, what the nature of those instructions are.

It is advisable for me to ascertain those instructions as early as possible to avoid delay such as occurred on a previous occasion should it be necessary for me to make further references to my Government with regard to them.

Inclosure 4 in No. 340.

Persian Mamurs to Colonel McMahon.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

April 17, 1903.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your esteemed letter dated the 15th April last. You have asked that, if we have received definite instructions in the matter (of the boundary) from Koh-i-Malik Siah southwards, we may acquaint you with them.

You are, of course, well aware of the contents of the telegram* which was issued (to us) at the beginning of the work, and from which we sent you extracts with our official letter, viz., that the boundaries there have also been fixed, and we have only been ordered to build pillars in those parts.

As we are in Seistan at present, the Agents of our Government are, no doubt, waiting for the required result of the affairs of this place being submitted to them in order to favour us with the necessary instructions at the time of our departure towards those parts.

Inclosure 5 in No. 340.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

Camp Khwaja Ahmad, April 18, 1903.

WITH reference to the question of the Perso-Baluch boundary south of Koh-i-Malik Siah, I have the honour to state that I have just received from Tehran a copy of Colonel Holdich's Agreement in Persian. I understand that this is a copy of the original Agreement signed by the British and Persian Commissioners.

2. I consider it necessary to point out that the Persian version differs in some respects from the wording of the Agreement as recorded by Colonel Holdich in English.

3. I attach, for information, a copy of the Persian original of the last portion of that Agreement referring to the boundary-line between pillar No. 11 and the Koh-i-Malik Siah, together with a literal English translation for comparison with Colonel Holdich's definition in English of the same portion of the boundary-line.

4. A copy of this letter and inclosures is forwarded to the British Minister in Tehran for information.

(Literal translation of Persian.)

From pillar No. 11 towards the north of the Talab Rud to the junction of the Mirjawa Rud has been fixed for the boundary, and from there in a straight line to the nearest peak of the Koh-i-Mirjawa range, which is the limit of all drainage from the direction of the north into the Mirjawa Rud, and from there from the summit of the peak of Kachah Koh has been drawn from the direction of the north to reach the highest point of the Kachah Koh, and from there has been drawn in a straight line to the highest point of the Koh-i-Malik Siah.

* Telegram dated February 2, 1903, of which extracts are given in the Persian Commissioners' letter of the 24th idem to me.—A. H. McMAHON.

Inclosure 6 in No. 340.

Colonel McMahon to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Camp Nasratabad, April 27 (Dalbandin, May 4), 1903.*
 PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 9th April and letter of the 18th April. The more I consider the present personnel and instructions and intentions of Persian Commissioners, the more certainty I see of a deadlock, unless we adopt one of the following alternatives: The first is to demarcate strictly in accordance with Holdich's definition of boundary-line, which would forego concession at Padaha, and may involve a boundary inconveniently near Robat, or even loss of Robat Thana, of which I cannot guarantee the accuracy of position on map. The second is to get Persian Government, Tehran, to accept (?) a modification of boundary on grounds of facilities for demarcation, such as straight line from present terminal pillar Koh-i-Malik-i-Siyah to highest peak of Lar Koh, thence straight line to highest peak of Kachah Koh, thence watershed of Kachah Koh and Mirjawa range, thence onward as defined by Holdich, with the addition of a concession of, say, a mile square of land with water at Padaha. I am very doubtful of accuracy of position of Robat Thana on our map; I know that Miller has told Persians it is on Persia's side of Holdich's line, and they intend to make strong stand on that point. I will defer any discussion of Holdich's boundary until receipt of your instructions. A local deadlock is undesirable from every point of view.

No. 341.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 76.) *Gulahek, June 4, 1903.*
 (Telegraphic.) P.
 I HAVE received a telegram from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tabriz, reporting the outbreak there of religious riots, directed against the Belgian Customs and projected railroads. By the latter he presumably means the new chaussée being constructed by the Russians, which is intended to be so built as to make its conversion into a railway easy. He says that the situation appears to be serious, and that the Vali Ahd, pressed by the rioters, has ordered the Belgian Director of Customs to leave Tabriz with his family.

No. 342.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th instant, relative to the departure of the French cruiser "Infernet" from Muscat.

India Office, June 4, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 342.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 4, 1903.*
 MUSCAT: With reference to your telegram of 3rd instant, I have received by telegraph from the Political Agent, Muscat, the following message, dated the 3rd instant:—
 "Nothing further has transpired. The 'Infernet' has just left for the Seychelles."

No. 343.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated 4th instant, relative to the Mudir of Wakra, on the El Katr coast.

India Office, June 4, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 343.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 4, 1903.*
 ON receipt of your telegram of 29th May, about El Katr affairs, I consulted the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, who has sent by telegraph the following reply:—
 "In my opinion the recall of Yusuf Bey by his own Government, would be much the better course, and, so long as his ultimate removal is achieved, I see no objection to his remaining at Wakra a little longer. I am writing more fully as to this. In the meantime could not a request be made to the Porte that their orders, which apparently the local authorities are neglecting to obey, should be reiterated?"
 I agree in the Resident's views.

No. 344.

Major Cox to Government of India.—(Communicated by India Office, June 5.)

(Confidential.) *Muscat, May 4, 1903.*
 I HAVE the honour to refer to the telegrams which have passed with regard to the exact reading of the Secretary of State's telegram of 27th April in connection with the French flag question.
 2. When I addressed you my telegram of 28th April, I thought at the portion of the Secretary of State's message to which I referred was intended to be read—
 "... Major Cox may be authorised to assure His Highness of the support of His Majesty's Government. He (i.e., the Sultan) should plead, &c. . . ."
 From your telegram of 3rd May, however, which has just reached me I now understand the wording to be as first telegraphed, viz.:—
 "... Major Cox may be authorised to assure His Highness of the support of His Majesty's Government if he should (should he) plead that . . ."
 I understand the telegram to mean "Major Cox may be authorised to assure His Highness of the support of His Majesty's Government, always provided that, in persevering in his refusal to release the French flag-holders, he does not give the French Consul any invalid or arrogant reason for so doing, but simply pleads as his excuse the fact that the whole question is under discussion in Europe, and that meanwhile, until the contrary is proved or adjudged, he is within his rights in so doing." This is, in fact, the line which the Sultan has all along taken and will take; but as even after the Secretary of State's explanation I find the wording of the telegram a little ambiguous, it seems advisable for me to report by letter the interpretation which I have put upon it. I need hardly explain to the Government of India how very welcome is the Secretary of State's authorisation and how much it simplifies matters.

3. I regret to report an act of His Highness the Sultan during the past week which seems to be injudicious and likely to be made something of by the French. In paragraph 4 of my letter dated the 25th April, I made mention of the death of the French Dragoman's father and the former's departure for his native village. He returned on 24th April, and according to established Arab custom sat in his house for two days receiving condolatory visitors. Among these was the Sultan himself.

There is nothing unusual in itself in His Highness looking in at the house of any bereaved acquaintance of respectability, and it is not to be regarded as anything but a thoughtless act on the part of Saiyid Feysal in the present instance; but considering Abdul Aziz's personality and the present political juncture, His Highness' visit of condolence seems both unnecessary and regrettable, and I have taken an opportunity of telling

him what my views are on the subject. As was to be expected, he replied that it was merely an act of ordinary courtesy, and that it did not occur to him that there was any harm in it; but the fact is that it will give the French a reasonable handle for the argument, which they are always prone to introduce, that in the matter of the refusal to receive Abdul Aziz, or the French flag, or any kindred question, it is not the Sultan who is the prime mover, but the British Government in the background.

4. Owing to the rumoured date of the arrival of the French cruiser "Infernet" being coincident with the presence of His Majesty the King in Paris, His Highness the Sultan left on the 2nd instant for the interior for a change of air, and will remain away until His Majesty has left France.

5. The French Consul either not knowing what to say to the Sur community if he went there while their fellows are in confinement, or else because he is expecting the "Infernet" to take him down, has postponed his departure, but has sent his Dragonman, Abdul Aziz, in his stead to see that the "titres de navigation" of the home-coming dhows are in order.

No. 345.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

India Office, June 5, 1903.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 18th May last, inclosing a copy of the telegraphic instructions sent to the Viceroy on the 16th May, regarding the postponement of the delimitation in a north-easterly direction of the territory of the nine tribes in the vicinity of Aden, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to request that you will refer Lord Lansdowne to the copy of a telegram from the Viceroy concurring in this course, which was forwarded to you on the 19th ultimo.

I am also to say that, subject to Lord Lansdowne's concurrence, Lord George Hamilton proposes to approve the Viceroy's suggestion that the demarcation should be taken up in a south-westerly direction to the sea, as soon as the Amiri border has been settled.

Should this proposal commend itself to Lord Lansdowne, Lord George Hamilton would suggest that the Resident at Aden should be instructed to prepare beforehand a report on the approximate frontier which it would be expedient to claim for the Haushabi and Subaihi tribes.

I am further to request that you will refer Lord Lansdowne to the telegraphic correspondence,* between this Office, the Government of India, and the Resident at Aden, with reference to the question of concluding Treaties with the Upper Yaffai and other tribes.

Lord Lansdowne will see that the matter has already proceeded too far to enable His Majesty's Government to recede without aggravating the existing situation. His Lordship therefore proposes, with Lord Lansdowne's concurrence, to authorize the Government of India to proceed in accordance with his instructions of the 4th May last, leaving the question of eventual delimitation to the desert in a north-easterly direction to be settled in accordance with the decision of His Majesty's Government conveyed to the Viceroy in the telegram of the 16th May.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 346.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, June 5, 1903.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a telegram of to-day's date, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, relative to the departure of His Majesty's ship "Pomone" from Muscat. I am to add that though their Lord-

* Nos. 306, 328, and 336.

No. 344*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 125.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1903.

I REPEAT to you a telegram from Viceroy respecting El Katr, dated the 4th June.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn your opinion as to course proposed by his Excellency.

No. 345*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1903.

YOU will have received the Viceroy's telegram of the 31st May respecting the Seistan frontier arbitration.

So far as we are aware, previous correspondence, and more especially Mr. des Graz' telegram No. 42 of the 24th July, 1902, your telegram No. 29 of the 9th March last, and telegram from the Government of India of the 3rd March last, referred to the infringement of the boundary as connected with the water dispute, and not to any other boundary.

Please let me have your views on this subject.

ships assume that the Commander-in-chief would not have withdrawn the "Pomone," unless the French cruiser "Internet" had already left, they have telegraphed to him for confirmation of this assumption.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 346.

Rear-Admiral Drury to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)
"POMONE" left Muscat for Kurrachee.

June 5, 1903.

No. 347.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 6, 1903.

WITH reference to telegram No. 55 from your Lordship.

It was the water question which provoked the appeal made to us by the Persian Government, who are anxious that the Arbitration should be kept to this point.

We can, however, should the Indian Government consider it advisable, and so long as we confine it to the Goldsmid line, extend its scope on the ground that counter-complaints against encroachments by Persia, in violation of the Goldsmid Award, have been made by the Afghans. I have defended our right to do so on this ground to Mushir-ed-Dowleh, though only unofficially. The Shah has sent the latter an autograph, which, in connection with MacMahon's visit to Bundan, insists that the Arbitration should be confined to the question of the Helmund water. Considering this question from the point of view of Persia, my own inclination would be to limit as far as possible the scope of the Arbitration. As, however, I understand from the telegram which I have received from the Viceroy that its effect on our relations with the Ameer was also a consideration of importance, I have, in the course of a conversation with a Representative of the Persian Foreign Office, who was sent to see me on the subject adopted his [? Viceroy's] line of argument, and pointed out that Arbitration was not expressly limited to the water question by the note addressed by the Foreign Minister to Mr. des Graz.

No. 348.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 308.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 2, 1903.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 122 of the 1st instant, suggesting that I should urge the Ottoman Government to postpone the extension of their telegraph line to Kataba, I have the honour to remark as follows:—

A request of this nature would certainly be interpreted by the Turkish Government as a symptom of our intention to obtain possession of that place, and it would effect the good result which I hope may be had in regard to the delimitation of the whole Amiri frontier, by telling them that we do not insist upon any claims which we may have to Kataba.

Apart from this, I do not see the necessity of this request, or how it concerns the delimitation down the Wadi Tiban or, even if it did, how I could justify it. The Turkish telegraph line now goes to Tais, and from thence to Kataba it will traverse exclusively Ottoman territory.

Furthermore, repeated assurances have been given to the Ottoman Government that His Majesty's Government do not desire any extensive or wholesale departure

from the limits laid down by the green line, and I fear these assurances would be rendered nugatory by a demand such as the British Resident at Aden suggests, and which I trust your Lordship will not instruct me to prefer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 349.

Papers communicated by India Office, June 9, 1903.

Camp Sanah, near Kataba, May 25, 1903.

COPY forwarded for information to the Political Secretary, India Office.

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB, Colonel,
Commissioner, Aden Boundary Commission.

Resident, Aden, to India Office.

(Confidential.) *Aden Residency, May 30, 1903.*

COPY of Confidential letter, dated the 30th instant, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, forwarded, with compliments, to the Under-Secretary of State, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London.

(For Political Resident, Aden),
(Signed) H. M. ABUD, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Note.—Copies of this despatch have been forwarded to the Government of India and His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Brigadier-General Maitland to Government of Bombay.

(Confidential.) *Aden Residency, May 30, 1903.*

BY this mail is forwarded a packet containing a Secret Report, dated the 25th instant, from Colonel Wahab, Commissioner, Aden Boundary Commission, on the demarcation of the Amiri border, together with three maps.

2. Three alternative lines of demarcation are proposed by the Commissioners:—

(1.) This would, I understand, follow the watercourse known (lower down) as the Selat Kataba, or the ridge running parallel to it on the south, giving the village of Al Ukla to the Amir. From a point near, and east, or north-east, of the mound called Jabal Bitar, the line strikes south-west and follows the overflow, or irrigation, channel, mentioned in previous correspondence, to the well called Bir-al-Aslam, on the main road leading south from Kataba. Thence it leads west-north-west to the junction of the Selat Humar with the Selat Kataba. From this point it would, apparently, follow the Selat Kataba south-west for 3 to 3½ miles; after which it turns westward so as to include the whole of the Dakkam country in the territories of the Amir. From here its course is shown by the green line on the Map "C" (general survey of the Amiri border zone). [It would have been convenient if the whole of this line, which represents the green line of the "Joint Map" inclosed in Colonel Wahab's letter of the 2nd December, 1902, had been marked in green.]

(2.) A line starting as before, but following the main course of the Selat Kataba, and therefore giving Kataba to the Amir. Afterwards this line follows the foot of the hills so as to include the whole of the Yubi and Haiki country, and finally joins the green line at a point about three miles west of the junction of the Selat Kataba with the Tiban.

The Yubi and Haiki country is a tract of about 130 square miles lying wholly outside the green line.

(3.) A line leaving Kataba to the Turks, as in (1), but taking in the Yubi and Haiki country, as in (2).

3. The British Commissioners are strongly in favour of the second alternative, and deprecate the first line which they consider would give an unsatisfactory border.

4. I confess I have been considerably surprised by these proposals. I knew no more of the views of the Commissioners than was disclosed by their telegrams forwarded to me for transmission. It was evident that they were inclined to claim Kataba, and some at least of the Yubi and Haiki villages, but after the Secretary of State's telegram of the 16th May I did not suppose that any claims of this nature would be pressed; especially as Colonel Wahab's telegram No. 266 repeated the statement made in his No. 260 that the Commission had advanced no claims to Kataba.

5. The Conference in London of August 1902 agreed that the red line on the map accompanying Colonel Wahab's letter of the 7th April, 1902, should be provisionally accepted. This line indicated, as well as the imperfect knowledge of the country then permitted, the boundary of the Amir's actual possessions at the time that demarcation was proposed by the Turks. The green line of the Joint Map produced in the November following was a modification of the red line, not at all, I think, in the Amir's favour, and the dotted or broken portion of it followed the course of the Selat Kataba and the Tiban all the way.

6. That an examination of the ground would necessitate modifications of this line was certain, especially as it had been decided in the meantime to maintain the Amir's claim to the territory of the Dakkam tribe. But I do not think there has been any alteration in the principle underlying our claims, viz., that we should retain for the Amir all the country of which he was in possession in the autumn of 1901, before demarcation was proposed and accepted. The only exception has been in the case of isolated places within the line, like Jalela, of which the Turks had taken forcible possession before that time. The evacuation of these has been caused by the action of His Majesty's Government at Constantinople; but no claim has hitherto been put forward to any place on the ground that it had been included in the territory of the Amirs of Dthala prior to the Turkish invasion of 1873.

7. No other claim, however, has been made by the Commissioners to Kataba and the territory of the Yubi and Haiki. It is not asserted that these places have been in the possession of the Amir or his predecessors at any period since 1873. Doubtless it is the case that the tendency of the Yubi and Haiki, and of the villagers of Kataba, is to unite themselves to the territories under the Amir, and that the Turkish rule in this tract is oppressive and unpopular. The convenience in certain ways of a frontier which included the whole of the plain country up to the foot of the Mares and Al Aud ranges may also be admitted. But I do not think His Majesty's Government will be prepared, on these grounds, to go so far beyond the line which the Turkish Government have been induced, after much delay, to accept.

8. The first of the Commissioners' alternatives, that is to say, the green line modified according to the limits of the tribes, and the configuration of the ground is, I think, the most that we can now claim, and I hope that its acceptance will be urged on the Turkish Government. In doing so, it might, perhaps, be pointed out to the Porte that Kataba and the Yubi and Haiki country formerly belonged to the Amirs of Dthala, and that if demarcation is still delayed, and we are compelled to lay down a frontier for ourselves, we should be obliged to take the line which can be most easily maintained. It might include these places and, possibly, also portions of the Amara and Homar country (paragraphs 66 to 68 of Colonel Wahab's Report).

9. With regard to the monetary claims against the Turks for the losses sustained by the Amir on account of their occupation of his territory, the Commissioners put forward in March a claim for 4,800 dollars. This was for loss of revenue, &c., from the villages on the plateau between Jalela and Kataba. Two further claims are now submitted, one for 5,841½ dollars, on account of damage and plunder at Lakmat-es-Salah, the other of 3,600 dollars, on account of loss of revenue at Mafari. The total of the three claims amounts to 14,241½ dollars, and I venture to hope that they will be pressed on the Turkish Government.

The Commissioners also make a further claim for 58,800 dollars on account of thirty years' loss of the revenue of the Yubi and Haiki districts. This claim is preferred on totally different grounds from the former claims, which are all for losses sustained by the Amir on account of the action of the Turks in country actually in his possession. It could not be put forward unless His Majesty's Government were prepared to make, and to maintain, a claim to the Yubi and Haiki country. But, curiously enough, the Com-

missioners would give up the claim for loss of revenue if we obtained for the Amir the country in respect of which the claim is made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. J. MAITLAND, Brigadier-General,
Political Resident.

Colonel Wahab to Government of India.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Camp Sanah, near Kataba, May 25, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report that, almost immediately after the evacuation by the Turks of Jalela and the neighbouring Amiri villages, I moved the Commission to this village of Sanah some 2 miles south of Kataba, finding the Turkish Commission camped close by that place.

2. Their attitude was still their usual one of excessive suspicion, but, in spite of this, we succeeded in almost at once beginning the joint survey which was the necessary preliminary to actual demarcation.

3. I arranged with them to make a detailed survey 2 kilom. roughly on each side of where the boundary would run. The map sent with my Report No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902, showing the green line, was styled by the Turkish Commissioners and myself a "carte approximative," it being understood that the exact details would be worked out at the time of actual delimitation, and my information of the country along the south-west continuation of the green line towards the Dakkam and Wadi Tiban was so meagre, and the Turkish Commissioners' map on which it was based probably so inaccurate, that I merely drew a broken or dotted line.

4. As reported in my telegrams Nos. 256 and 260, "these gross, if not wilful, inaccuracies" were soon revealed, watercourses, depressions, and the position of villages being marked miles out of their actual place, and in total disregard of the configuration of the ground.

The Turks have no trained Surveyor or instruments, and had evidently never expected that their misconstruction of facts and topography, backed up last year by arguments of force and "bluff," would ever be put to the test of accurate survey.

5. Again, they were most anxious to keep up, in the eyes of the natives, the fiction that the Turkish party which accompanied our survey party on both sides of the green line was participating in the joint survey. By humouring them in this respect, and the exercise of great forbearance, I succeeded in nearly completing the survey of the ground around and near Kataba, as shown in the copy of the Boundary Survey Map marked (A) hereto attached, when the Turkish Commissioners, apparently in virtue of their original instructions, relapsed into their old policy of obstruction by claiming that the Selat Kataba, i.e., the Kataba watercourse, or the Amiri boundary, recognized in the Turkish Sultan's rescript in 1619 during the early Ottoman occupation, and by the Imams of Sana, as shown by the numerous documents attached to my Memorandum No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902, was not the main watercourse running north of Kataba, but a small overflow channel running south of that place, and known below or south-west of Kataba as the Wadi Shaddad. South-west of the well called Al Azlum, close to Kataba, the Wadi Shaddad, upon which name even the Turks are agreed, runs south-west for some miles and then rejoins the main watercourse, or real Selat Kataba, close to the village of Lakmat-ad-Duki.

6. The untenable theory of the Turks would have obliged our surveyor and this Commission to wilfully mark incorrectly on a map purporting to be the result of an accurate scientific survey, the main watercourse of the country across which the boundary is supposed to run. This, of course, was out of the question, and was contrary to the Turkish instructions, the text of which was telegraphed by Sir N. O'Connor in his No. 11 of the 18th March, ordering the Turks to delimit on the bases of the green line "in accordance with the configuration of the ground." While this inaccuracy of the Turkish map was being laid bare, the Turkish "surveyor" became exceedingly suspicious and obstructive.

7. Though the village of Kataba was under the Amir's control previous to 1873, I abstained from making any official claim to it on his behalf, but told the Turkish Commissioners that, as the "configuration of the ground" showed the Amiri boundary running north of Kataba, it would be better to continue the survey of the Selat Kataba and the Wadi Shaddad to their junction, with a view to finding a solution of the difficulty. The Turks agreed, and on the following day sent their party to accompany our surveyor, who

was working on the 2 kilom. on our side of the Wadi Shaddad, but the third day, when our surveyor, in accordance with our agreement, proceeded to do the 2 kilom. on the north side of Selat Kataba, they not only refused to co-operate, but forbade his working there.

8. They explained their attitude by saying that their instructions were not to delimit on the basis of the green line "in accordance with the configuration of the ground," but "to apply the green line strictly to the ground," ignoring its manifest inaccuracies, the fact that it was a rough line with the express reserve written on the corner of the map that its "details were taken from Turkish and native sources," the fact that a great part of it from the supposed junction and south-west through the Dakkam country was merely dotted, and that the junction of the depression running south of Kataba with the Selat Kataba is not as shown on their map just below that place, but a good way south-west.

9. I pointed out the physical impossibility of applying such an inaccurate line to "the configuration of the ground," and endeavoured to induce them to take a reasonable view, but they persisted in their pretention, stopped the survey on the 22nd April, and, as reported in my telegram No. 260, referred the matter home, thus leaving me no option but to follow the same course.

10. The Turks having thus rendered it impossible to come to any arrangement below the junction of the Wadi Reshan, I endeavoured with them to find the point of contact of the Amiri border with Mares between the north-east continuation of the Selat Kataba above the point north-east of that place, where the overflow channel running south of Kataba leaves the main watercourse running north of it, that is the Wadi Mawad and the Wadi Reshan, running between the high hills of Jarad and Barkan and the mountain wall of Mares rising abruptly 2,000 feet above the plain.

11. The Turks declare that the villages of Reshan, Huan Zinia, and Ukla are not Mares, so that we should be entitled to include all three in Amiri territory, more especially as both the configuration of the ground and Imami documents, dating as far back as 1711 A.D., prove the Amir's title to the village of Reshan (*vide* Document 2).

12. In the hope of inducing my Turkish colleagues to delimit even the 3 miles between Lakmat-es-Shub and Kataba, I offered to leave the two villages of Reshan and Huan Zinia on their side, and draw the line along Jarad and Barkan to where the latter, in accordance with the configuration of the ground, join on to what they themselves call the mountains of Mares, leaving Al Ukla, which is detached from Jebel Barkan and Mares, to the Amir, to whom it should belong in virtue of Document 3. According to the latter, Bilad-al-Khurraj, which, as shown by the attached certificate of the Cadi of Khobar, comprises Al Ukla, had in the time of the Imams the same status as Haiaz, the ancient seat of the Amira near Jalela. The inclusion of Al Ukla is, moreover, essential for finding a point to continue the boundary north-east between Mares and the Shaibi section of Yafa.

13. The large district of Mares, stretching from the Selat Kataba to the River Bana, and covering an area of some 200 square miles, with its forty villages, is shown by documentary and oral evidence to be related to Yafa, all sections of which tribe have recently, by Imperial Irade, been recognized as within the British sphere.

14. Although the peaceful and friendly character of the people of Mares would have insured this Commission an easier passage north-east than through the more independent and avaricious sections of Shaibi, Mausatta, &c., and though the real sources of the Selat Kataba take their rise within Mares, yet, in a spirit of compromise, I have not pressed these claims—an attitude which is in sharp contrast with that of the Turks.

15. As regards the green line on the "approximate" map accompanying the Amiri Report of the 2nd December, 1902, I particularly disclaimed any responsibility for its topographical accuracy, and wrote on the corner of the map that "All details on this map to the north and west of Jihaf are from Turkish or native sources."

16. The extraordinary and violent attitude of the Turks last year when they occupied Jihaf and Mafari in force, and fired on any member of our Commission venturing beyond the cordon drawn clear round Dthala, is still fresh in the memory of His Majesty's Government.

17. It then seemed hopeless to find any basis for delimiting the Amiri boundary, and, in accordance with Government's decision in August last, I compiled, at the maximum of disadvantage, the information on which a solution of the Amiri question was to be based, and then prepared to proceed with the north-east delimitation. Owing, however, to the same obstructive and violent methods of the Turks from their position at Jalela, this too became impossible, so that, some seven months after the original decision to proceed with the north-east delimitation, His Majesty's Government decided to bring about the evacuation of Jalela and thus put our Commission in a proper position to ascertain accurately the details necessary for the establishment of the Amiri border. This

Commission is thus only now in the position where it ought to have started in December 1901.

18. Some of the inaccuracies of the green-line map based on the Turkish Commissioners' map are manifest from a comparison of the original green line and the results of the survey (Map A) carried out jointly by the British and Turkish surveyors immediately after the evacuation of Jalela.

19. I should here remark that the Selat Kataba, or water-course of Kataba, as also other water-courses between the Rivers Tiban and Bana, is not, like the latter, a perennial or continuous stream of water, but merely a dry stream-bed appearing topographically as a depression in the land, and only here and there, according to the configuration of the ground, presenting the feature of well-defined banks, the greater part of the water-course, or depression, consisting of fields and cultivation, with difficulty distinguishable from the lands on both sides. It is only during the three months' rainy season in the year and after the torrential downpour that these portions of the water-courses (Selat or Wadi) near steep hills or slopes in the ground have a flow of water, which in a few hours is soaked in by and disappears in the parched fields.

20. The joint survey (Map A) shows that the main water-course, or Selat Kataba, runs north of Kataba, while the Selat Reshan is not, as shown on the Turkish map, to the north of Kataba, but applies to the reach of the water-course in the immediate neighbourhood of the village of Reshan. The course of the Selat Kataba after Kataba runs down by Lakmat-ad-Duki, near which it is joined by its tributaries, the Selat-ar-Rebi, the Selat Husman from the north-east, and by the Wadis running south of Kataba and past the villages of Kabil-es-Salami and Jes-al-Jamal. The main water-course, or Selat Kataba, is known as such down to the village of Sharifa, on the border of the Dakkam, and on its junction with the Tiban, although the villagers give each section of it a distinctive name, e.g., from the junction of the Wadi Humar to a point south of the village of Shakhah it is called Labhur; lower down, Abara, Hefash, &c.

21. The Wadi shown on the survey map as running from the junction of the Wadi Reshan near the hill called Bitar, and down to the well Al Aslum, is simply an overflow channel originally started and still used for irrigation purposes in years of heavy rain, when there is a superabundance of water in the main channel.

Kataba.

22. As the Selat Kataba, shown as the Amiri boundary in Turkish official documents of 1619 A.D. and Imami documents up to the eighteenth century, runs north of Kataba, that place would naturally remain on the British side of the border, and it was doubtless to obviate such a contingency that the Turks in their map juggled with the topography of the country round Kataba and called the Selat Kataba the Selat Reshan, which really lies to the north-east of Kataba.

23. Apart from the geographical situation of Kataba, the Amir's rights to the place are based on the following evidence:—

(1.) Document 1 attached to this Memorandum—an Imami document, dated 1702 A.D., showing that the Amirs had dues and rights in Kataba at that date.

(2.) No. V in my No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902—Decree of the Imam of Sana, dated the Mussulman month of Al Haj Al Haram 1217 A.H., or 104 years ago, ordaining that the Amir should receive from the Imam's agent and representative at Kataba 40 dollars and 30 kada of grain per month, equal to an annual revenue of 1,560 dollars.

N.B.—The same document ordained monthly payments to the Amir of 40 dollars and 40 kada of grain from the town of Taiz.

(3.) Document No. 32 in my Memorandum No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902, dated 1277 A.H., i.e., 1860 A.D., an acknowledgment of the suzerainty of the Amir by the Sheikh of Kataba, who undertook to pay him 150 dollars per annum as tribute, together with half the proceeds of the market of Kataba, previously assigned to the Amirs.

(4.) Document No. 33 of my No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902, dated 1283 A.H., i.e., 1866 A.D., confirms the preceding.

24. These three latter documents are a fair indication of the last 100 years' history of the place. The power of the Imams of Sana, in Yemen, gradually shrank, until it extended but a short distance beyond the capital of Sana, and Document 2 shows the

transference of Kataba from the sovereignty of the Imams to the suzerainty of the Amirs.

25. Document 3 shows that, in 1860 A.D., the Sheikhs of the family of Hanumi, i.e., the hereditary Sheikhs of the place, had become subject to the Amir, agreeing to pay the latter 150 dollars as annual tribute, together with half the market dues, amounting to a considerable annual sum, and these payments were actually continued for some time after the Turkish invasion in 1873, the Amir's share of the market dues having been since appropriated by the Kataba Municipality, or, in other words, by the local Turkish officials.

26. These documentary proofs of the Amir's rights are conclusive, while the oral evidence of credible witnesses, who remember the state of things before the coming of the Turks in 1873, points in the same direction.

27. The Kadi of Khobar, or chief religious and legal authority of this whole district, where the Sheria Mahomedan law alone obtains, is not at all well disposed to the Amir, and was the close friend of the fanatical Turkish nominee of Lakmat-es-Sallah, the author of recent inflammatory appeals to Jihad against the British. Yet his evidence is that, before the Turks made their appearance in 1873, Kataba was administered by Sheikhs and elders, under the Amir, the Imam of Sana's agent only visiting the place once or twice a year.

28. Sheikh Musad Abdurrahman Aida Hanumi, son of the Sheikh of Kataba at the time of the coming of the Turks, and subsequently deposed from the Sheikhship on account of his leanings towards the Amir, confirms the above.

29. Kataba is a large village of some 400 houses, of which over 100 are inhabited by Jews, and the remainder by Arabs, the Turkish element being represented by three or four officials, together with the military, who are quartered in tents near the remains of a small guard-house to the west of Kataba, built many years ago of sun-dried mud bricks, but now marked "ruined" ("kharab") on the Turkish map.

30. The normal garrison of the place appears to have been some thirty men in support of the Jalela outpost, the real military centre being at Nadira, some twelve hours' journey on the road to Yerin.

31. The houses, of sun-dried bricks, are mostly very small, and of one or two storeys, while there is but one small mosque. Owing to the blighting influence of Turkish rule, many of the houses are in a dilapidated condition, and over 100 are reported to be uninhabited.

32. The inhabitants are adherents of the Amir, but the recent prompt deportation by the Turks of the son of the Sheikh, who in 1873 adhered to the cause of the Amir, Ali Mukbil, coupled with a stern prohibition against visiting us, prevents any overt manifestation of their feelings.

33. I should not forget to add that even the Turkish Sultan's Rescript, quoted in paragraph 59, by declaring that all between the Selat Kataba and the Wadi Hilah belonged to the Amir, obviously included in Amiri territory Kataba, which lies south of the Selat Kataba.

34. In fact, it is clear that during the nineteenth century, when the power of the Imams of Sana was on the decline, the influence of the ancient house of the Amirs, who, far from being parvenus of comparatively recent and obscure origin, date back at least some 400 to 500 years to the time preceding the original Turkish conquest in 1520 A.D., increased, and their territory comprised, beyond their old country, the districts of Yerin, Damar, and all the country up to Ibb and Taiz inclusive.

35. The Amirship was for a hundred years a big factor in Southern Arabia, and the fact that they originally appear to have been an offshoot of the House of the Imams of Sana seems to have influenced the latter in viewing with complacency the absorption by the Amirs of districts that were gradually slipping from their own grasp.

36. The approximate extent over which they directly or indirectly exercised authority and influence previous to 1873 is shown on tracing "B," accompanying this Memorandum.

37. When the Turks, after an absence of 242 years, reconquered Yemen, they swept down over the country as far even as Lahej, which, despite the protests of Her Majesty's Government, they continued to hold until a force was actually marched out of Aden to expel them. They apparently did not at first interfere with the then Amir, Ali Mukbil, collecting his revenues (as set forth in Documents 1, 2, and 3) and exercising influence in Kataba, in the hope that he would be amenable to their wishes, but when he refused to surrender his independence and rights, and claimed the protection of the British Government in virtue of our written engagements towards him, they suddenly appropriated or stopped the payment of his Kataba dues and tribute.

[1617]

38. The Amir then went to Aden to complain of and demand protection against Turkish aggression, and was given assurances by the Resident, but, immediately on his return to Dthala, he was inveigled over to Kataba by the Turks, seized, and sent off to Taiz, where he was thrown into prison for having sought "infidel English" protection. He was kept in prison for some months, regardless of the protests of His Majesty's Government, although renewed and energetic remonstrances ultimately secured his release.

39. As the Sheikh of Kataba, named Abdurrahman Aida Hanumi, remained staunch to the Amir, he was promptly deposed by the Turks from the Sheikhship, and when recently, on the arrival of this Commission in the vicinity of Kataba, his son, Sheikh Musa'd Abdurrahman, paid the Amir a friendly visit, the Turks immediately removed him to the Haiki country, where they detained him by force, although the Amir wrote expressing a wish to see him on business connected with extensive landed property owned by the Sheikh within the now recognized Amiri limits.

40. Should His Majesty's Government decide to support the Amir's claims to Kataba, and insist on its restoration to him, the Turkish resistance to such a course would probably be mainly based on the "argument" that from time immemorial it has formed an integral portion of the Sanjak of Taiz. The expression "time immemorial" usually refers to some date in the distant past, but in the mouths of Turkish officials would appear to be a meaningless term, having no pretensions to be based on historical accuracy, while almost the entire so-called "administrative district" of Kataba has been carved out of Amiri territory without the slightest regard for the repeated remonstrances of His Majesty's Government or the as often repeated assurances of the Sublime Porte.

41. Again, as in the case of Jalela, they may lay stress on the guard-house and other Government buildings at the place. However, as stated above, the Turkish map of Zakariya Effendi marks the guard-house as "in ruins," while the only other building of a public nature is that used as the Government offices, and is a two-storied structure of sun-dried mud bricks, repaired and whitewashed on one side, some three months ago, by Zakariya Effendi, out of some money collected mostly from the Amir's subjects.

Dakkam.

42. As the Turks still refuse to admit the Amir's rights to the whole Dakkam, or Fajra, the district name by which it is officially known to the Turks, I may again briefly state their case:—

43. The Imami Rescript (No. IV in my No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902), dated A.H. 1118, or A.D. 1707, assigns the Amirs "140 kadas of grain and 140 dollars from Jihaf, Fajra (*i.e.*, Dakkam), and the Humada, and he should protect them from aggression by the people of Taim, Halmin, and Radfan, as they are under his orders, and he (the Amir) is their representative before God." This proves the subjection of Fajra, or Dakkam, in the Amirs in the time of the Imams.

44. Again, before the coming of the Turks in 1873, Document 7 in my No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902, shows that in A.H. 1265, or A.D. 1868, Husen Naji Zendani, Sheikh of Jihaf, and Abdallah Saleh-ad-Dakkam, Sheikh of Fajra, appeared before the Kadi of Khobar, and "acknowledged, on behalf of themselves, their relatives, people, and all the inhabitants of their countries, that the Amir, Shafal Abd-al-Hadi, was their father and ruler, and that they are his for weal or woe, good or evil. They are to listen to and obey God and him. They have undertaken and bound themselves to pay him in perpetuity 80 dollars annually, binding themselves to this in the oath of God and in the presence of witnesses."

45. After the irruption of the Turks into Amiri territory, Husen Naji Zendani, of Jihaf, was forced to submit to the Turks, and persuaded Abdallah Saleh-ad-Dakkam to pay tribute to them through himself (Husen Naji Zendani). After the death of both the Dakkam fought and successfully resisted Turkish pretensions. They have never since paid tribute or taxes to the Turks, and have throughout acknowledged the suzerainty of the Amir. Some seven years ago, at Turkish instigation, Saleh Zendani, their recent nominee on Jihaf, betrayed Sheikh Naji, the present Dakkam Chieftain, to the Turks, who flung him into prison, and only released him after two months on payment of 300 dollars as ransom.

46. In March last Muhammad Nasir Mukbil, after laying waste the villages of Jabal Hosha, threatened to invade the Dakkam. The Commission brought the facts to the notice of Government, adding that the Dakkam "as a whole" should be included in the

Amiri border—a view which was endorsed by his Excellency the Viceroy in his telegram of the 6th March.

47. In the map attached to my No. 180, of the 2nd December, 1902, I left the green line in the Dakkam country dotted, remarking "between Kataba and the Humada the country is unsurveyed owing to the determined opposition of the Turkish Commissioners to any British party visiting the disputed territory," and I have since discovered that some Dakkam villages marked on the Turkish map as on this side of the dotted line are really beyond it, while Ukaib, the residence of the Dakkam Chieftain, is on the west side of the Wadi Tiban.

48. Dakkam (Fajra), in pre-Turkish times, as shown by the above-quoted documents, has always gone with Jihaf, while the Turkish relations with the place have also been through the Jihaf Sheikh, and now that Jihaf has been restored to the Amir, the Fajra (Dakkam) naturally reverts with it.

49. The Dakkam Chieftain, who, during the first days after our arrival here, was busy looking after refugees, the victims of Turkish oppression in the Haiki country, has come in to renew in person his relations of friendship and fealty with the Amir.

50. When the Turks, on the 22nd April, stopped the joint survey I sent a survey party into the Dakkam country. This provoked rather violent protests from the Turkish Commissioners, but as our claim to the Dakkam, "as a whole," is so clear, and as it would probably have taken weeks, if not months, to obtain the acquiescence of the Sultan's Government to our survey, I ignored their protests, and completed the survey.

Haiki and Yubi.

51. Beyond the broken or dotted portion of the green line are the villages of the small clans of Haiki and Yubi, whose claims to be admitted within the limits of the Amir and the latter's rights over them can no longer be ignored.

52. The document (No. 4, attached to this Memorandum) establishing their subjection to the Amir has been in the hands of Commission since its arrival here, but being prevented by the Turks from visiting the Selat Kataba, and relying simply on information "from Turkish or native sources," I then thought that the Haiki and Yubi villages were situated, not actually on the dotted green line, and in the plain between Mount Jihaf and the range to the north, but among the hills of that range. Circumstances then pointed to the possibility of the Yubi and Haiki remaining on the Turkish side.

53. However, shortly before the evacuation of Jalela, Zakariya Effendi, former Turkish Commissioner and Acting Sub-Governor of Kataba, but since dismissed from both functions owing to the remonstrances of His Majesty's Government, proceeded to levy taxes from the Yubi villages with the usual Turkish accompaniments of plundering and village-burning. It would seem that Zakariya Effendi, aware of the old relations between the Yubi villagers and the Amirs, determined to terrorize the former and thus prevent their claiming the protection of the Amir. His subordinates carried out the work in such a ruthless manner that the Yubi Sheikh and his followers were obliged to flee, and took refuge with the Amir at Dthala, calling on him to assure their protection in accordance with the documents and stipulations existing between them. I refused to see them, and told the Amir he must induce them to return to their villages; while I, at the same time, got the Turkish Commissioners to promise their freedom from molestation during the presence of the Commission here.

54. The document shows that in 1867 the Yubi recognized the Amir as "their father and Ruler"; that they were absolutely under his orders; that they paid him a fixed tribute, and that he undertook to protect them against aggression. The Contracting Parties are the Amir Shafal on the one hand, and Sheikh Ahmad Saïd (Sheikh of the Haiki) on the other. On the death of the latter, the stipulations of the Agreement were confirmed, as shown in the third part of the document, by his son, Saïd-bin-Saïd, whose son is now Sheikh of the Haiki. The second part of the document is between the Amir and the Yubi Sheikh Mukbil Naji, whose brother, Ahmad Naji, is the present Sheikh of the Yubi.

55. The tract of country inhabited by the Yubi villagers, some of whom are on the southern or Jihaf side of the Selat Kataba, is the small plain lying between the mountain of Jihaf and the Dakkam border on the south and the lofty range of Al Aud on the north,

while on the east they are hemmed in by the continuous mountain barrier of Al Aud and Mares, our claims to which latter we are disposed to surrender to the Turks. On the west their boundary is the Haiki country.

56. Most of the Yubi have been forced by Turkish exactions and oppression to emigrate, and they now possess some seven small villages, composed of two or three houses, each house being surrounded by some huts inhabited by the slaves and retainers of the master of the house, with their families. Besides these villages there are about twenty hamlets, consisting of from four up to twenty huts, scattered over the plain.

57. The document proving the former subjection of the Yubi villages to the Amirs also establishes a similar subjection of their western neighbours, the Haiki. The area of their country is about the same as that of the Yubi, while their villages number six, with eighteen hamlets, both similar to those of the Yubi. The Haiki case has also been brought into prominence by Turkish barbarous methods. Since our arrival here the Turks, evidently with the same idea of terrorizing them, have carried fire and sword among the Haiki villages, destroying their villages with cannon and forcing the inhabitants to take refuge in the Dakkam country.

58. The document on which the Haiki-Yubi and Amiri relations are based, and dated 1285 A.H., i.e., 1867 A.D., or some six years before the beginning of Turkish encroachments, is perfectly authentic and genuine, being drawn up by the Seyids of Ad Dubiyat, who are still extant, and witnessed by respectable Sheikhs who are not the Amir's direct subjects, and whose testimony is consequently more reliable.

59. Again, Document No. 3, attached to my Memorandum on the Amiri border, No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902, is an official letter dated 1029 A.H., or 1619 A.D., of the then Pasha of Yēmen, embodying the Turkish Sultan's Imperial Rescript confirming the Amir in his boundaries "from the Selat Kataba to the Selat Milah, with all that lies between them, and from the Wadi Bana to the Wadi Tiban, with all their tributaries, &c." Water-courses like the Wadis Rebi, Husman, Jimri, &c., shown on the map as tributaries of the Selat Kataba and Wadi Tiban, run through the Haiki and Yubi district, so that the Amir's rights in the matter are supported by documents dated 1619 A.D., or during the Turkish era, and 1867 A.D., or the era of the Imams of Sana.

I should add that in neither the Haiki nor Yubi districts have the Turks any posts, barracks, or permanent official buildings.

60. The renewal of Turkish obstructive methods in the matter of the Dakkam, with Al Ukla, and their extraordinary interpretation of the course of the Selat Kataba, as well as the instructions to the Joint Commission to refer to their respective Governments any points that could not be decided on the spot, leave me no choice but to refer these latter questions to His Majesty's Government. I have, therefore, stated the case of the Yubi and Haiki, as should His Majesty's Government decide not to condone Turkish encroachments in both districts and insist on their being restored to the Amir, their inclusion in a final and comprehensive settlement would seem natural, if not easy, just as the Shaibi were apparently accidentally included in the Irade of the 13th February, acknowledging the British claim over the Yafa, although the Turkish Commissioners here were prepared to make a more stubborn fight over them than over many portions of Amiri territory recently relinquished by their Government.

61. The Amir's rights over the Yubi and Haiki being incontrovertible, there remains the question of the expediency of claiming them, both from the political point of view, as also from the point of view of securing a sound border. I can say nothing on the political side of the question, but the pretensions of the Turks to prove that the Wadi Shadad is the Selat Kataba shows the hopelessness of an open water-course, dry practically throughout the whole year, covered with cultivation, and lying across the plain, ever forming a permanent border that Turkish officials, custom-house and others, are likely to respect; while the boundaries of the Yubi and Haiki, running up to the foot of the lofty ranges of Al Aud and Mares, from the natural dividing-line between the plain and the highlands of Yēmen.

62. The area occupied by these two sections consists of an open fan-shaped plain, sparsely inhabited and traversed by the numerous water-courses which meet near the head of the Tiban Gorge between the Hosha and Jihaf Mountain. Were this restored to the Amir, the very desirable result of keeping aggressive and unscrupulous Turkish officials and soldiery out of the plain might be obtained. Once out of the plain, their boundary would not easily lend itself to the establishment of custom-houses intended rather to strangle the Aden Hinterland trade than for the collection of legitimate revenue.

63. Under the very eyes of this Commission they have started customs under tents in disputed territory to the south of the Selat Kataba, and are levying dues far in excess of the 1 per cent. export and 8 per cent. import duties sanctioned by Treaty. They have detained even our Commission camels for three days, despite our protests, only releasing them on our paying exorbitant dues. I have remonstrated with them about the propriety of starting a customs, even in tents, within the belt of territory still to be delimited; but their only reply was, suddenly and without warning, to begin converting the customs in tents into a stone structure, with the evident intent of settling this part of the boundary by a "fait accompli" on the same lines as their occupation of Jihaf and Mafari last year.

64. Should it be decided not to insist on the reinstatement of the Amir in his rights over the Haiki and Yubi, the Ottoman Government should certainly be compelled to refund him the revenue he would have drawn during the last thirty years, amounting, at the 100 and 150 dollars per annum stipulated in the Yubi and Naiki documents respectively, to 1,500L, calculated at the former rate of rupees 2:8 to the dollar and 12½ rupees to the £ sterling.

If paid locally by the Yēmen authorities—a course which would save the Ottoman Government the difference arising from the depreciation of the Maria Theresa dollar—the amount would be 7,500 dollars. I may add that the Turkish officials have been endeavouring to extract annually from the Yubi 1,500 dollars and about 2,000 dollars from the Haiki, or 3,500 dollars in all per annum, with the result stated above that the country has been practically reduced to a waste, most of the villagers having emigrated to places where they are not so exposed to Turkish exactions.

65. Should the Amir's rights to these lands be compounded for the above money payment, that sum represents what he has lost during the last thirty years' wrongful occupation by the Turks, and does not allow for the "goodwill" or a number of years' purchase. It would, therefore, seem advisable not to formally and officially surrender his claims and thereby prejudice the future; for, if his northern boundary is drawn across the plain from near Kataba to the Wadi Tiban along a dry water-course, full of cultivation, such a boundary is almost certain to lead to disputes, eventually forcing both Governments to reopen the entire question. This is specially to be foreseen in the case of neighbours, who, like the Turks, display such raiding tendencies in the collection of taxes and their so-called "suppression of smuggling."

Amara, Humar, Shurman, and Janadiya.

66. Document 4, which is a Decree of the Imam of Sana, bearing date A.H. 1118 or A.D. 1707, assigns to the Amirs "specified amounts, in addition to those duly fixed and received by them from the time of their predecessors, viz., 50 kada of grain monthly (amounting to some 600 dollars per annum) from Humar and Shurman, and 30 dollars' worth of grain in kind with 40 dollars per month (i.e., 90 dollars per month, or 1,560 dollars per annum) from Janadiya and Amara, the fixed amounts from Uddain, Taiz, and Kataba to be continued to him as usual, and he has to ensure the safety of the roads in his territory."

N.B.—The phrase from "Amara" to "in his territory" was omitted through the copyist's error in the translation submitted in the Memorandum of the 2nd December, 1902.

67. The lands of Amara, Humar, Shurman, and Janadiya lie in the western tributaries of the Wadi Tiban, and were, consequently, as shown by the document quoted in paragraph 59, within Amiri limits. The Turks have had no regular administration in these parts, but ruled them through their nominee, the notorious Muhammad Nasir Mukbil, who lived at Daheneh, near the village of Mavia.

68. His attempts, culminating in the Ad Dareja incident in 1901, to include Haushabi territory within that of Humar, though defeated in that instance, may have been to a small extent successful in other cases which have hitherto escaped notice. This Commission has not yet had an occasion of visiting and examining the Haushabi border, but it is to be foreseen that any minor rectifications of that border which may be found necessary at the moment of actual delimitation there would be rendered impossible if the Amiri rights to Humar are now definitely ceded to Turkey. After any such cession to the Turks, they will hold us strictly to what they now consider the border between Haushabi and Humar, and as the Haushabi have no claim to Humar, the possible necessary rectifications of the

Haushabi border, on the nine tribes basis, would only be practicable by keeping open the Amir's claims to the former Amiri clan of Humar. It may even seem advisable, while leaving Shurman and Janadiya to Turkey, to claim the country of the clans Amara and Humar, thus rounding off the Amiri-Haushabi portion of the boundary, and giving a practicable road-connection along that part of the boundary, the Tiban defile through the precipitous mountains of Hosha and Jihaf being impracticable for traffic.

69. The Turkish Commissioners have seen the above document; but I have based no claim on it, leaving the decision to His Majesty's Government.

70. As shown by the red line on tracing (B), attached to this Memorandum, the Amir's sphere of influence and authority, delegated by the Imams even as far back as 1707 A.D., covered a wide stretch of territory, but the Amir himself draws a distinction between the territory between the red and blue lines, where he exercised no really direct and independent sway, and the territory south of the blue and green lines, which he directly governed, both with the consent of the Imams and that of the people of the country, as proved by the documents exhibited. I refer to the Haiki, Yubi, and the village of Kataba. I have shown that his rights over all three are indisputable.

71. As regards Kataba, it has been the centre of a caza or administrative sub-district, and as such the Turks may be specially anxious to retain it, but, as mentioned above, the "former" Caza of Kataba was carved almost entirely out of Amiri territory, and comprised Upper Yafa, with Shaibi, Shairi (Jalela), Jihaf, Mafari, &c. It is highly inexpedient that the administrative centre of even the now reduced caza should be situated on the very edge of the Amiri border, and, if a concession is made to the Turks and Kataba left in their possession, our line should be rigidly drawn close round the place, so as to accentuate the present tendency of the Turks to remove the "caza" centre to the healthier spot of Nadira, some twelve hours' journey north of Kataba. In that way Kataba itself would sink into insignificance and cease to be a potential source of unrest on the Amir's frontier.

72. A line drawn from the point of junction of the Selat Reshan and the Selat Kataba (close to the hillock called "Bitar"), where the overflow channel comes down in front of Kataba; then along the channel bed to the well called Al Aslum, and thence across to the junction of the Selat Humar with the Selat Kataba, would secure this result, while leaving two roads from Kataba to the Mares country in the hands of the Turks.

Amir's Money Claim against Turkish Government.

73. Whatever be the final settlement of the Amiri question and border, the Amir is certainly entitled to compensation by the Turkish Government for his more direct financial losses arising from their disturbing the *status quo* of the period preceding the arrival of this Commission. Our arrival was the cause of the violent attitude of the Turks, and by not immediately insisting on the restoration of that *status quo*, His Majesty's Government is to a certain extent responsible for the losses thereby occasioned to the Amir and his adherents.

74. My telegram of the 12th June, 1902, and my despatch of the 4th December, 1902, referred to a portion of these losses, and it was only after the restoration of the *status quo* that I was able in my telegram of the 11th March last to give a more accurate estimate of the Amir's direct losses from the loss of revenue, damage to property, &c., in his villages south of Kataba, amounting to 400l., or 4,800 dollars.

75. From the correspondence I notice that at Constantinople this was interpreted as revenue collected by the Turks. I have no means of calculating the amounts exacted by the Turks, the 400l. (4,800 dollars) representing the revenue which the Turks prevented the Amir from collecting during the period of their disturbance of the *status quo*.

76. The Secretary of State's telegram of the 18th March to the Resident stated that the British Ambassador "was officially assured that orders were being sent for repayment to the Amir of 400l., while the Secretary of State's telegram of the 19th March stated that the British Ambassador had been instructed to use his discretion in the matter, rather leaving it to be inferred that it was not being pressed, while again in his telegram of the 18th March to the Foreign Office, the Ambassador spoke of fixing a date for payment by the Turkish Government and of "taking our own measures to recover" the sum, if not paid by that date.

77. The evacuation of Jalela by the Turkish Government was but a very tardy recognition of the Amiri and British claim to the country which it dominated, and left a great portion of the Amir's country in such a disturbed state that he has had considerable expense in reducing matters to order again. There is no question of asking the Sultan's Government to recoup the Amir for such outlay, but his previous losses, such as the 400l.

revenue, should most certainly, I think, be made good to him by the Turkish Government or its Yémen authorities.

78. There are two other items of the Amir's losses where the Turkish Government's direct responsibility was involved, and where consequently a good claim for indemnity to the Amir lies. One of these was when the Turkish Chief Commissioner proceeded, with a force and two guns to Lakmat-as-Sallah, ousted the Amir's Representative, and installed the Turkish nominee, Seid Ahmad Mohsin, the subsequent author of inflammatory letters, who, with his followers, aided by the Turks, plundered, destroyed, or removed the property of the Amir's agent and his relatives.

79. On the restoration of the *status quo* the Amir had to make good these losses in great part out of his own pocket, and the Turks should certainly be compelled to refund him the amount. I have been to great pains to obtain accurate estimates of the Lakmat-as-Sallah losses, and I herewith forward detailed accounts of the same, vouching for their being rather under than over the exact totals. They amount in all to 5,841½ dollars, which at the present rate of exchange are equivalent to rupees 7,216 : 5 : 0, or 481l. 4s.

80. Another item of loss for which the Turkish Government was directly responsible was the Amir's Mafari loss of revenue, &c.

Mafari.

His Majesty's Government will recollect the Turkish occupation last year of the disputed territory of Jihaf, whence a Turkish force with one of the Commissioners proceeded to Mafari and ejected the Amir's people, doing considerable damage to their property.

81. Mafari, as proved by Documents 16 and 17, sent with my No. 180 of the 2nd December, 1902, is the property of the Amir; and his loss of revenue, &c., owing to the Turkish usurpation in 1902-1903, amounts to 3,600 dollars, or 300l.

82. The three foregoing items, amounting in all to 14,241½ dollars, or 1,181l. 4s., represent the Amir's direct losses occasioned by the disturbances of the *status quo* of October 1901, and in no way include his many indirect losses during or before that period, e.g., his stipulated annual payments from Jihaf, Dakkam, &c. Their refund to the Amir seems a *sine quâ non* of any comprehensive settlement. Similarly, should the Turkish usurpation of the Yubi, Haiki, and Kataba be condoned, such condonation should be contingent on the Turks paying to the Amir the amount of revenue he was entitled to draw from them during the last thirty years, throughout which they have, without any title, enjoyed the usufruct of these places. I have given the details above (see paragraph 23), and the total sum, omitting the Amir's share, of the Kataba market dues amounts to 58,800 dollars, or 9,000l., i.e., 147,000 rupees at the average old rate of exchange of 2½ rupees to the dollar.

83. The three claims arising from the disturbance of the *status quo*, together with the Yubi, Haiki, and Kataba items, would thus amount to 73,041½ dollars, or 11,231l. 4s.

84. If paid like the recent Italian Red Sea piracy claims, i.e., by the Yémen authorities, the latter would prefer to pay to this Commission or some other Representative of the British Government than direct to the Amir.

Résumé.

85. While leaving the question of Amara, Humar, Shurman, and Janadiya to the appreciation and decision of His Majesty's Government, the foregoing shows that, if we surrender our claims to Mares (as I am disposed to do), three solutions of the present difficulties of the Amiri border suggest themselves:—

86.—(1.) To delimit on the basis of the green line, with its inaccuracies and unavoidable defects.

For this it is indispensable—

(a.) To include the Dakkam portion of Fajra as a whole.

(b.) To include the village of Al Ukla.

(c.) To draw the line close round Kataba, as in paragraphs 71 and 72, so as to induce the Turks to remove their administrative centre back to Nadira.

(d.) To secure payment to the Amir by the Turks of his losses, amounting to 11,231l. 4s., or 73,041½ dollars.

This would be a settlement very generous to the Turks, and would give an unsatis-

factory border, running across a plain, and not sharply defined by any well-marked natural feature.

87.—(2.) To secure the rectification of the broken portion of the green line implied by the restoration to the Amir of the Yubi and Haiki villages of Fajra, with Kataba, the payments to the Amir being correspondingly reduced to 1,181*l.* 4*s.*, or 14,241½ dollars. This would not increase the responsibilities of the Amir or His Majesty's Government, and would give, instead of the dotted portion of the green line, a natural frontier of a lofty mountain range as opposed to a line running across a plain. The Amir's rights to all three, as shown above, are clear and unanswerable, while the rights of the Turks are merely those of usurpers. They have no officials or other vestige of administrative control in the Haiki or Yubi villages, so that their withdrawal of the two or three officials and their present small force at Kataba would, *ipso facto*, yield the above frontier.

88. I should, perhaps, explain that the term "Fajra," which means "cutting" or "gorge," is applied to the country above the Tiban gorge between Mounts Hosha and Jihat; and the word "Fajra," according to the Turkish interpretation, is applied to the Dakkam, Yubi, and Haiki: so that Yubi and Haiki would be comprised by "Fajra," mentioned in Documents 7, 8, and 13 attached to my Memorandum of the 2nd December, 1902.

89.—(3.) The third solution would be to include the Haiki and Yubi within our boundary, leaving Kataba to the Turks in the way indicated in (1) (c), in which case the Amir's indemnity would be 8,981*l.* 4*s.*, or 61,041½ dollars.

90. Solution (2) would unquestionably be the most satisfactory. For it would not only give a frontier the sharply-defined natural configuration of which would make it well-nigh impossible for the Turks to transgress—thus putting a permanent stop to their scandalous behaviour during the last thirty years—but it would, moreover, restore to the Amir the real limits within which, in 1873, his predecessors exercised direct control. The Turks would, no doubt, resort to the same tactics of "bluff" as last year, but would not carry them to anything like the same length. The Sultan's Government must recognize the justice of the Amir's rights as set forth in the documents quoted, and, though their Commissioners here may misrepresent matters, they know well the weakness of their case; while the Sultan, judging by the British Ambassador at Berlin's telegram of the 16th March last, would not get much foreign encouragement.

91. The green line drawn at Dthala under considerable disadvantages, and from apparently wilfully inaccurate Turkish information, had as its basis the Selat Kataba, with its tributaries, and the Dakkam border. A rectification of it (especially the dotted portion), taking in the Haiki and Yubi villages, is inconsiderable, as their lands extend only from 2 to some 7 miles beyond it, their villages lying between the tributaries of the Selat Kataba.

92. The part of the green line between Lakmat-es-Shub and Kataba was understood to be the border between Amiri territory and Mares, our claims to which district, with its forty villages, we propose to surrender to the Turks. The latter admit that the villages of Al Ukla, Huan Zinia, and Reshan are not Mares. They must consequently be Amiri. The Selat Kataba runs north, and not (as wrongly asserted by the Turks) south, of Kataba; while the green line below the supposed point of junction of the two water-courses running to the north and to the south of that place, and down through the Dakkam, was left merely dotted or broken.

93. The idea may occur to His Majesty's Government that there is no finality in this question of the Aden hinterland boundary. This is not so; and now that, since the evacuation of Jalela and the admission by the Sultan of our claims to all sections of Yafa, this Commission is in a position to form some general idea of that frontier, I may point out that the important part of that frontier is the stretch from Kataba to the south of Taiz.

94. To the north-east, the international or Turkish aspect of the question was settled in principle by the Irade obtained by the Constantinople Embassy on the 13th February last, acknowledging all sections of the Yafa as within the British sphere, and, if Treaty arrangements are made with Beda and Behan, the difficulties up to the border of Rada ought to be mostly internal (*i.e.*, with the tribes, and not with the Turks), the Aulaki and Hadramut being secured against outside interference or encroachment.

95. To the south-west, the Haushabi and Subehi tribes are already acknowledged by the Turks as two of the "nine cantons" under British influence, so that our difficulties along their borders ought to be merely matters of minor rectifications, while, as regards the low unhealthy sandy plains towards Sheikh Saïd, once the point where the boundary-line abuts on the sea is fixed, a mile or two inland one way or the other will not matter much either to the Turkish or British Government.

96. The Amiri has not even yet been expressly admitted as one of the nine tribes by the Sultan's Government which still styles the Amir "Sheikh of Dthala," and, in point of fact, the Amiri is not one tribe, but a collection of clans, either owing direct allegiance to the Amir, like Dthala, Mafari, Yubi, Haiki, or under his suzerainty, like the Mihrabi, Kotaibi, Ahmadi, &c.

97. As shown above, his limits, as far back as 1707 A.D., comprised Ibb, Uden, Taiz, and Demar, but even the Amir, despite all he and his predecessors have suffered at the hands of the Turks, has no idea that these limits should be restored to him. Unlike, for example, the Haushabi or Yafa, the Amiri confederacy was of a loose nature, affording the Turks more scope for piecemeal encroachment, and nowhere else along the frontier do I anticipate anything like the difficulties and delays encountered in the settlement of the Amiri border.

98. The rectification of the green line to the extent shown by the blue line on the accompanying tracing (B) would again bring under his control the Haiki and Yubi villages with Kataba, would restore him the limits of the country once under his direct rule, and, if supplemented by the portions of Amara and Humar necessary to round off the point of junction of the Amiri and Haushabi borders, would give a final and sound frontier which the Turks, in virtue of the nature of the ground, would be likely to respect.

99. There is another consideration that should not be lost sight of, *viz.*, that the work of this Commission is closely bound up with the good-will of the native Chiefs, whose independence is recognized by His Majesty's Government.

100. The Amir is deeply grateful for the protection, however tardy, recently afforded him, but the circumstances set forth in paragraphs 53 and 57 have led him to feel the necessity for rectifications within the limits laid down in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 4th May. There can be little doubt that the Turks, who have harassed the Haiki and Yubi under our very eyes, will, after the departure of the Commission, make both these small clans, if left on the Turkish side, feel the full weight of their resentment at the villagers having manifested a desire to claim their old allegiance to the Amirs. This would not fail to re-act unfavourably on the Commission, especially in the Yafa district. The Yafa, owing to their isolated situation and the wild mountainous nature of their country, are exceptionally narrow-minded, fickle, and credulous of false or exaggerated rumours, and I feel convinced that our dealings with them would be much smoother if we could point to the Amir's territory as an example of prosperity and contentment resulting from the presence and work of this Commission.

101. Finally, I would beg to point out the somewhat peculiar conditions under which this Commission is supposed to work. In the ordinary course, its duty would have been to delimit the boundary on the principle of give-and-take, in a debatable zone previously surveyed. This was apparently out of the question in dealing with a Government like that of Turkey, with the result that political work arising from thirty years' toleration of Turkish encroachment has been mixed up with and retarded actual delimitation.

102. Survey work in disputed territory under Turkish occupation has been well-nigh impossible owing to the peculiar system of the Turks, which compels them to rigidly exclude us from territory not recognized by their central Government as ours, while delimitation on the principle of "give-and-take" is also out of the question, the Turkish Commissioners being unable to yield an inch beyond what is actually laid down in the Sultan's Irade, as interpreted by their superiors.

103. At the outset His Majesty's Government tacitly accepted the actual wording of the Turkish Government's proposal for delimitation, and since then instructions to this Commission have been confined to communicating to us the text of the Imperial orders to our Turkish colleagues, obtained with much trouble from the Sultan's Government. The delays and disadvantages of such a system, with the heavy expenditure it entails on His Majesty's Government, are obvious, and the present difficulties regarding the necessary rectifications of the green line are entirely the outcome of the obstructive tactics pursued by the Turks last year, if not, indeed, during the last thirty years.

104. I have the honour to attach three maps and a photographic panorama. The latter, taken from Lakmat Magharam, a mile west of Sanah, shows the open nature of the country between Jebel Jihat and the high range rising behind the Haiki-Yubi border and north of Kataba; while giving an exaggerated idea of distance, it rather dwarfs the mountains. Map (A) is a *fac-simile* of the map on the scale of $\frac{1}{100,000}$ (about 1½ inches to a mile), specially made for the delimitation by our surveyors, accompanied by a Turkish officer and party, as explained in paragraph 5. This survey was abruptly stopped by the Turkish Commissioners on the 22nd April. Map (B), scale $\frac{1}{100,000}$ (about 16 miles to an inch), is a sketch map of Southern Yemen showing the extent of the Amir's territory in past times, and the towns beyond his actual borders from which he drew tribute. Map (C),

scale $\frac{1}{126720}$ (2 miles to an inch), is the result of the survey just completed of the Amiri border zone. A comparison between it and the map on the same scale on which the green line was marked shows the serious inaccuracy of the part west and south-west of Kataba which was taken from Turkish sources, and the impracticability of "applying the green line strictly to the ground," as the Turks insist on doing. The position of the villages of Masharih, Habil Hurud, Habil Rafa, and the junction of the Wadi Safiya with the Selat Kataba, as well as the Selat Kataba itself, are examples of this.

105. I have not drawn the Amiri boundary on the map, leaving it to His Majesty's Government to decide finally where that boundary should run. The Dakkam limits are shown accurately; those of the Haiki and Yubi approximately, our surveyors being, as explained in paragraph 102, precluded from visiting the country. Still, though the topographical detail could not be fully shown, all villages which it may be necessary to include in order to obtain a satisfactory border are comprised within the blue lines.

106. Should His Majesty's Government decide to insist on the Ottoman Government admitting the Amir's claim to these clans, orders to the Turkish Commissioners to recognize the Haiki and Yubi within the British sphere would meet the requirements of the case, as in the instance of the Irade including the Shaibi with the Yafa, by which the boundary between that district and Mares was practically fixed as far north-east as the River Bana. The borders of the Amara and Humar are only approximately indicated, as the surveyors were unable to visit any points commanding a good view of that district.

107. It is usual, in laying down a boundary, to mark it with cairns or pillars. In the case of the Aden hinterland, however, where neither the Turks nor ourselves have any regular administration, it is certain that any artificial marks would be speedily removed by the Arabs on one side or the other, the Turkish Arabs accusing ours of doing so, and *vice versa*, and would thus be the cause of constant little frontier incidents. Subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, I would be disposed to mark the boundary merely on a joint map, accompanied by a more or less detailed description of the natural features defining it, such as the villages, water-courses, hills, &c., on either side.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB, Colonel,
Commissioner, Aden Boundary Commission.

P.S.—The instructions which reached the Turks on the 22nd March last to evacuate Jalala ordered them, while "applying the green line strictly to the actual ground," to reserve the rights of their Government for subsequent discussion of the matter between the Sublime Porte and His Majesty's Embassy, Constantinople, so that no work here on the spot by the Joint Commission to determine the Amiri border could have been final, and the present reference home was in any case inevitable.

R. A. W.

I.

Translation of Imami Document.

In the name of the most compassionate God.

The honourable Amir and noble champion Matahar-bin-Mokbil Shafal shall continue, according to the honourable and Mahdi Decrees (may God exalt them!), to enjoy what has been assigned to him by the Master (may God preserve him!) on the villages and Jews, and his expenses derived from Kataba, as well as his maintenance; nothing shall be cut off from what has been laid down for him by the Master, the Commander of the Faithful Al-Madhi Le Din-Ellah Rab-al-Alamin (the leader to the Faith of the Lord of the Universe). This letter of ours is a witness in his hands, and all who see it should act upon it. God is sufficient for us. Blessing and peace be upon our master Mahomed and his descendants.

Dated the month of Jumad-al-Awal, 1114 A.H., or 1702 A.D.

(Signed) (Illegible.)
(According to the decrees of the Master may
God save him and preserve him.)

II.

Translation of Imami Document.

The Kingdom is God's: praise be to God.

This honourable Imami, Mahdi, and Mahdawi letter (may God exalt it and refresh the eyes of him who acts upon it!) is a witness in the hands of Sheikh Mutahar-bin-Mokbil Shafal (the Amir), that he shall continue according to the Imami documents he holds in accordance with the established customs in Reshan; that his status shall not be altered, and his mind shall not be disturbed, but will be firm according to his established usage like his other cousins, the responsibility being on Sheikh Umar-bin-Mohsin and every official of ours in the district. This is a witness in his hands; it should be relied upon, and on God is the reliance. He is sufficient to us, and the best Agent.

Dated the month of Al-Hijja, 1123 A.H., or 1711 A.D.

III.

Translation of Imami Documents.

In the name of the most compassionate God.

This honourable letter and highly-exalted order (may God exalt it and make it effectual!) is a witness in the hands of the "fulcra" (theologians), Beni-al-Hawza'i residents of Bilad-al-Khurraj, of the district of Hayaz; that they shall have honour and respect and regard; that they shall enjoy their customs and established usages according to the purport of the holy letters (may God exalt them!); that their status shall not be altered, nor their minds (please God) be disturbed. They are on a different footing from the subjects of the country, so far as the Imami demands are concerned. Nothing due by them except the necessary and legitimate dues which should be honestly remitted to us through the distinguished Kadi Abi Bakr-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Hawza'i, who shall receive them from his relatives, and pay it to us (please God) in full. We have entrusted him with the same under the firm oath of God and solid covenant. We have stipulated with him to be obedient to God (be His name exalted and magnified!) and to his prophets and righteous Imams; to be the friend of their friends and enemy of their enemies; to do good and avert evils; to encourage good acts and discourage illicit deeds; to observe Friday prayers and "Jama't," and to continue to serve the holy theology. It should be known to all concerned. God is sufficient Agent, best Master and Defender, and there is no virtue nor power but in God the Almighty. Blessing and peace be upon our Master and his descendants!

Dated Al-Kaada-al-Haran, 1061 A.H. (or 1651 A.D.)

(Signed) ALI AL-MADI.
(May God exalt him!)

Translation of Certificate of the Kadi of Knobar.

Praise be to God.

I have seen a document of the Imam to the following effect:—

[Here follows contents of Imami document dated 1061 A.H., or 1651 A.D.]

This letter is for the Hawza'i of Al Ukla of Bilad-al-Khurraj; it should be known to all concerned.

(Signed) ABDURRAHMAN-BIN-MUHAMMAD-AL-ABBADI.

IV.

Praise be to God.

There appeared before me Sheikh Ahmad Saïd Al-Haiki, and acknowledged on behalf of himself, his relatives, and all the people of the country of Haiki in a true and lawful manner that Amir Shafal is their father and Ruler, and that they are his sons and dependent on him; that they are to listen to and obey what he orders or forbids in the country, whether for good or evil, and whether just or unjust; that they have undertaken and bound themselves to give him a fixed sum of 150 dollars every year; that should anybody bring trouble upon them, Amir Shafal should support them as he does in his own country. Binding themselves by this, and swearing by God, in the presence of the witnesses Saïd Muhammad Ahmad Ad-Da'ri, Sheikh Abdurrahman Aidtha Al-Hanumi, Sheikh Mohsin Mokbil Abu Hadal, Sheikh Musa'ed-Saleh Abu Hadal, and God is a sufficient witness.

Dated the month of Rajab, 1284 (1867 A.D.).

(Signed) RUDTHWAN HUSEN MOHSIN AHMAD
WAIS SUFIAN.

Praise be to God.

There appeared before me Sheikh Mokbil Nagi Al-Yubi and his relatives the Yubis, and acknowledged in a true and lawful manner that Amir Shafal Abdul Hadi is their father and Ruler, and that they are his sons and dependent on him; that they are to listen to and obey what he orders or forbids like the people of his own territory, whether for good or evil, and whether just or unjust; that they have undertaken and bound themselves to give him a fixed sum of 100 dollars every year; that should any tribe bring trouble on them, Amir Shafal should support them as he does his own people, binding themselves by this and the oath of God. This was done by their free will and consent on the same date and in presence of the same witnesses as above written.

(Signed) RUDTHWAN HUSEN MOHSIN AHMAD
WAIS SUFIAN.

Praise be to God.

There appeared before me Saïd-bin-Saïd Al-Haiki, and acknowledged in a true and lawful manner that he has ratified and sanctioned the acknowledgment of Sheikh Ahmad Saïd Al-Haiki; that he has sanctioned it of his own free will and consent in presence of the witnesses Sheikh Abdurrahman Aidtha, who is a witness and intermediary, Sheikh Husen Marshad, Ismail Ali Ath-Thuer, and God is a sufficient witness.

Dated the month of Al-Hajja-al-Haram, 1285 (1868 A.D.).

(Signed) RUDTHWAN HUSEN MOHSIN AHMAD
WAIS SUFIAN.

PARTICULARS of Property lost by Saïd Ahmad-bin-Saleh and family, Amir's Agent, of Lakmat-es-Sallah, when dispossessed by the Turks, who brought 2 guns and 100 men to install their nominee, Saïd Ahmad Mohsin.

	Dollars.	Dollars.	Total in Rupees. Rs. a.
Sheikh Hasan Abdallah-ebn-Haj Saïd, his sons and nephew—			
12 cattle	240		
30 goats	90		
3 rifles	45		
Silver ornaments	55		
Cooking pots, &c.	18		
Ghi and honey	8		
Rugs, &c.	65		
Nephew Ali—			
Kirbi, &c.	50		
137 kola grain	500		
Household effects	20		
Son Kassim Hassan—			
Household effects	30		
Ulub trees	46		
Ploughs and agricultural implements	20		
Tower (house) destroyed	800		
Destruction of hamlet (Robat Abdul Hamid)	100		
Share of camel stolen	20		
Books, &c.	15		
		2,122	2,652 8
Saïd Saleh Ahmad-ebn-Haj Saïd—			
7 cattle	150		
2 camels	200		
3 she-donkeys	17		
118 kola grain	354		
Kirbi, &c.	170		
Firewood	30		
Ulub trees	30		
Mats	4½		
9 rugs of sorts	26		
Various leather articles	20½		
Woollen sacks and ropes	14½		
Agricultural implements	30		
Ghi and honey	11		
1½ kola sesame seed	12		
Silver ornaments	140		
1 French rifle	16		
2 muzzle-loading guns	80		
2 hookahs	9		
Cash	28		
		1,344½	1,680 5
Saïd Ali Saleh-ebn-Haj Saïd—			
Ulub trees	30		
3 cattle	65		
181 kola grain	543		
Agricultural implements and camel gear	55½		
Kirbi, &c.	262		
Wearing apparels	10		
Hookah	6		
Household effects	6		
3 books (Koran)	22		
Firewood	25		
Cash	84		
Documents and title-deeds without value.		1,108½	1,385 10
Ali Matabhar Abdul Wahid-ebn-Haj Saïd, of the village of Adth-Dthabr—			
4 kadah dajri	26		
2 tins and 10 kasas of jowari	4		
Agricultural implements	4		
	and 4 annas		
6 leather bags	10		
3 leather bags' ropes	2		
1 axe	8 annas		

			Total in Rupees.
	Dollars.	Dollars.	Rs. a.
Ali Matahhar Abdul Wahid-ebn-Haj Saïd, of the village of Adth-Dthabr (<i>continued</i>)—			
2 pickaxes and 1 pair sandals	1 rupee		
15/16 wakeya of ghi	2		
4 wakeya of grease	1½		
¼ kasa of coffee	4 annas		
1 kasa of salt	4 "		
½ kasa fulha (foeungrock [?] seed)	4 "		
1 bottle of kerosine oil	2 "		
Earthenware	1 r. 14 a.		
1 empty gourd for holding oil	6 annas		
1 kala of boiled jowari	4		
Kirbi	30		
1 spectacle and 1 bucket	1½		
	68		
His brother—	1 r. 2 a.		
Jowari, agricultural implements, and household effects, valued	71		
		139	
		1 r. 2 a.	
			174 14
Sons of Obed, sons of Abdalla Obed, Shafal Matahhar, Saleh-el-Haj, of the family of Haj Saïd, of the village of Adth-Dthabr—			
12 kola jowari	48		
5 goats	15		
Kirbi	25		
6 wakeya ghi	12		
Household effects, agricultural implements, tobacco, dyed cloth and white cloth, books, Koran, and a gun	70		
Camel gear and 17 goat skins	80		
		220	
			275 0
Sheikh Abdalla Kahtan of Sha'b-al-Esud—			
With Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mokbil—			
1 mule	200		
5 woollen rugs ("farda"), at 4 dollars	20		
4 silk turbans ("maktab") of Shar	50		
1 Snider rifle, with belt	50		
1 silver jambia ("asseb")	50		
1 silver amulet case ("herz")	10		
With Aziz Effendi—			
1 Malabar hookah	15		
With Khalil Effendi, Mudir—			
1 Snider rifle	40		
1 revolver	15		
With Ahmad Alesh, the "Mustantik" (Prosecutor)—			
In cash	30		
Due by the Customs officials—			
3 years' pay, at 100 piastres per month =			
5,600 piastres, or	360		
		840	
			1,050 0
Grand total	..	..	7,218 5
			Dollars.
Or, Maria Theresa dollars, at 1 r. 4 a. to the dollar	..	..	5,841½
			£ s. d.
Or, at 15 rupees to £1	..	..	481 4 0

R. A. W.

No. 350*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 9, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

Try to ascertain whether the information contained in the telegram from the Government of India of the 3rd June repeated to you to-day is correct, and, if so, warn the Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government will hold the Persian Government responsible for their complicity if they facilitate any such action on the part of the Russians in Seistan, and that we shall have to consider what action we shall take in order to safeguard our interests in that region.

No. 350.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 9.)

Sir,

India Office, June 9, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, forwarding copy of a telegram from Sir A. Hardinge, No. 77, dated the 6th instant, on the subject of the Seistan Arbitration.

Lord George Hamilton concurs in the views expressed in the Viceroy's telegram of the 31st ultimo, that the arbitration should include the whole of the Goldsmid line, and he would suggest, if Lord Lansdowne sees no objection, that Sir Arthur Hardinge should be instructed to make an official representation to the Persian Government on the subject in the sense of the communications which, as reported in his telegram of the 6th instant, he has already addressed to the Persian Foreign Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 351.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 10.)

Sir,

India Office, June 9, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter of the 21st ultimo, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to forward, for Lord Lansdowne's consideration, a copy of a further telegram from the Viceroy on the subject of the Russian quarantine cordon.

I am at the same time to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 29th May inclosing Sir A. Hardinge's despatch of the 6th ultimo, which transmitted the text of the note from the Russian Legation to the Persian Government, in reply to their representations regarding the withdrawal of the Russian sanitary cordon in Khorassan.

In reply, I am to say that the numbers of cases of plague quoted by the Russian Minister as having occurred in Bombay and Karachi are presumably taken from the published Returns, and are practically correct. These figures do not, however, in any way modify the view taken by the Secretary of State for India, that quarantine is not required to safeguard Persia against the introduction of plague. The period of incubation of this disease is known to be ten days. While, therefore, Afghanistan and Baluchistan are free from plague, the detention of travellers to Persia from those countries is clearly unjustifiable.

It will be remembered that the proposal of the Government of India, in their telegram of the 20th May, to establish a British cordon in Seistan, was made purely as a retaliatory measure, with the view of applying pressure for the removal of the Russian cordon. How far a re-establishment of the cordon would be likely to have the desired effect, Lord George Hamilton is not at present in a position to judge.

It should not, however, be overlooked that the establishment of a British cordon in Seistan might be used to weaken the force of any further protest which His Majesty's Government might raise to the Russian cordon on the ground that it is opposed to the Venice Convention.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 351.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 3, 1903.

RUSSIAN quarantine.

With reference to my telegram of the 20th ultimo. Consul-General, Meshed, telegraphs that he apprehends that the Russians intend either to be beforehand with us, or else to claim equality of rights with us, in Seistan. It is said that a hospital, with an establishment of doctors and nurses and a guard of 100 cossacks, is to be built there. We hope that we may receive instructions on the subject at an early date.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 10, 1903.

MY telegram No. 76 of the 4th instant.

I am informed by the Grand Vizier that the religious riots of Tabriz, which I reported in the telegram above referred to, and others which have since occurred at Ispahan are the result of a clerical movement against the present policy of the Persian Government and the proposed financial reforms, organized at Kerbela, and supported here by the Opposition, and that until the Persian army has been reorganized so as to be able to deal effectively with this resistance, these reforms will have to be postponed.

I asked His Highness how he proposed to procure the necessary funds, as this reorganization means money. At the same time I warned him that His Majesty's Government might view a third Russian loan as an unfriendly action, and that it might aggravate the anti-foreign elements and the present discontent of the clergy.

It would, I think, be of advantage if your Lordship would authorize me to intimate pretty plainly: (1) that if the Persian Government make a fresh Russian loan, it will involve a breach of friendship between them and His Majesty's Government; (2) that whilst we can helpfully exercise our influence at Kerbela and Nejed in favour of judicious reform for the good of Persia, it may also produce effects which the Persian Government may find very disagreeable, should our advice be disregarded by them.

There seems no doubt that the Shah has been a good deal alarmed by the recent letters from the Ulema at Kerbela, and we want a good Political Agent there in touch with Persian politics.

No. 353.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 10, 1903.

I DOUBT the truth of the story about the doctors, hospital, and Cossacks, mentioned in your Lordship's telegram No. 57 of the 9th June, and it appears *à priori* improbable that the Persian Government would connive in such a proceeding, which would so greatly increase its difficulties and would be so inconsistent with its own interests.

I am informed, however, by Colonel Whyte, that it is believed that tents and arms are being sent to the Russian Bank at Seistan under the disguise of trade goods, and although, possibly these may be destined for the use of the Persian Government, as it has repeatedly been reported that stores are being procured by the latter in Russia, to supply a larger garrison in Seistan than at present exists there, it is also credible that it is the secret intention of the Russian Government to forestall us in establishing a quarantine cordon in Seistan.

I mentioned the matter yesterday verbally to the Grand Vizier, but he professed to know nothing about the reported dispatch of these tents, or for that matter about the trade consignments of the Russian Bank.

I have accordingly addressed a note to his Highness, informing him that your Lordship has heard these reports; that I have received instructions from you to verify their truth, and in the event of their proving founded, to address to him a warning, which for the present I abstain from communicating; that I have informed your Lordship that I doubt their truth, but that I would wish his Highness to give me an explicit assurance on the subject.

No. 353*.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1903.

SEISTAN Frontier Arbitration Commission.

With regard to the wish of the Persian Government to restrict the work of the Commission to the settlement of the water dispute, as reported in your telegram No. 77 of the 6th June, I should wish you to make official representations to the Persian Government to obtain an extension of the scope of the arbitration to the Goldsmid line, in the sense of communications already made unofficially by you to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 355 A.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 11, 1903.

THE note communicated by you to the Grand Vizier respecting the Seistan arbitration, as reported to me in your telegram No. 79 of the 10th June, has my approval.

No. 355 B.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 11, 1903.

YOU are authorized to use the language which you suggest in your telegram No. 78 of the 10th June, respecting the attitude which His Majesty's Government would adopt if the Persian Government were to have recourse to a fresh Russian loan.

I cannot, however, authorize you to threaten that we shall use our influence in any event at Kerbela and Nejef in order to promote the success of the clerical movement.

But you may inform Grand Vizier that it depends upon the manner in which the Persian Government treat us how far we shall give them our support in face of any political difficulties which they may have to contend with.

I should wish to be informed what kind of Agent you would suggest at Kerbela, and upon what terms you would propose to employ him.

I should be ready to consider the question if a good native agent could be found for the purpose.

No. 354.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 11.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 9, 1903.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 2nd instant on the subject of the disposal of the dhows captured from pirates at Hodeidah, my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have had under their consideration the further communications from Sir N. O'Connor, No. 270, dated the 18th May, and No. 305, the 27th May, which were forwarded, the first under cover of your letter of the 28th May, the latter semi-officially.

As no definite conclusion in respect of dealing with the dhows has, so far, been arrived at, my Lords propose to defer any communication to the Commander-in-chief on the subject pending a decision by the Secretary of State as to the course to be pursued.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

No. 355.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 11.)

Sir,

India Office, June 10, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant relative to the case of Salem Kemri, who is stated to have been brought to Paris by M. Piat, formerly French Consul at Zanzibar, for the purpose of assisting in the production of an anti-English publication.

In reply, I am to say that his Lordship agrees with Lord Lansdowne in the opinion that, in view of the antecedents of Salem Kemri, it would be difficult to approach the French Government formally with a complaint based almost entirely upon his evidence.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 356.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 12.)

Sir,

India Office, June 10, 1903.

WITH reference to Mr. Villiers' letter of the 17th January last, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to inclose a copy of a letter, dated the 7th May last, containing the views of the Government of India in regard to Sir A. Hardinge's suggestion that, in the event of the Russian Minister visiting Southern Persia attended by a military escort, detachments of Indian cavalry should be sent to Tehran; and that, if Cossacks are stationed at Bushire and Shiraz, Indian cavalry should be sent to Tabreez and Resht.

The Government of India, Lord Lansdowne will observe, are convinced that, irrespective of the movements of the Russian Minister, it is desirable to increase the Consular guards in Persia from a total of 50, stationed at Bushire, Ispahan, Kerman, Seistan, and Meshed, to a total of 240, of whom 24 should be attached to each of the above-named Consulates, and to Bunder Abbas, Mohammerah, and Shiraz, and 48 to the Legation at Tehran.

On the other hand, they would not send guards to any part of the country where Russian influence is already firmly established.

The increased cost is estimated at 1,11,232 rupees initial, and 1,94,664 rupees annual, which would, under the arrangement of September 1890, be equally divided between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.

Lord George Hamilton will be glad to be favoured with Lord Lansdowne's views upon the proposal of the Government of India; and also upon the further proposal to raise a force of Bakhtiari and Arabs, under British officers, in order to establish security in the Karun region, which was originally made by Sir M. Durand in 1896. With regard to the latter proposal, Lord George Hamilton is not convinced of its expediency.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 356.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Simla, May 7, 1903.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Secret despatch, dated the 30th January last, regarding a proposal to place detachments of Indian sowars at Tehran, Tabreez, and Resht, or to make some other similar demonstration, in the event of the Russian Minister at Tehran travelling in the south of Persia with a Cossack escort.

2. In our Secret despatch dated the 18th July, 1901, as a retort to Russian military activity in Persia, we sketched a scheme providing for a Consular Guards Contingent organized in six independent troops, each consisting of twenty-four fighting men and four followers, to be stationed at Tabreez, Resht, Tehran, Ispahan, Mohammerah, and Bunder Abbas. It appears, however, that the strength of the proposed Russian guards had been overstated, so eventually, on the advice of Sir Arthur Hardinge, a small escort of only four native non-commissioned officers and twelve sowars was dispatched to Ispahan, and the consideration of the larger scheme was suspended for the time. We now avail ourselves of your Lordship's inquiry to revive those proposals, subject to certain modifications.

3. We do not anticipate much benefit from the presence of Consular guards from the Indian army at Resht and Tabreez, owing to the fact that these places are in a part of the country where Russian influence is already firmly established, and we no longer recommend that they should be located there—at any rate, under present conditions. On the other hand, our officers at Bushire, Ispahan, Kerman, Meshed, and in Seistan now possess the escorts noted in the margin.* We recommend that these should be raised to the strength proposed in our previous despatch, and that similar escorts should be stationed at Bunder Abbas, Mohammerah, and Shiraz. At Tehran there has been for some years what is practically a Russian force of 1,000 to 1,500 men, and we think that it is a matter for serious consideration whether the British Minister should not possess a guard of not less than half a squadron, or about 48 sowars. The necessity for providing adequate protection for His Majesty's Legation in the capital was recently brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government, but the question of storing arms there was left over for further consideration, owing to the temporary abandonment of the scheme for Consular guards, as explained in the letter dated the 18th January, 1902, from the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, which was received with a letter dated the 14th February, 1902, from the Secretary in the Political and Secret Department. The despatch of a Consular guard from the Indian army of the strength specified would enable His Majesty's Minister to carry out the proposals for the protection of the Legation, if these are still considered to be necessary.

4. The strength of the Persian Consular Guards Contingent would, if these proposals are approved, consist of ten troops, or 240 fighting men, with a proportionate increase in the total cost to a total annually recurring charge of 1,10,650 rupees for pay and allowances and other charges, to which must be added about 1,14,000 rupees on account of rations and forage, and an initial cost of 1,39,040 rupees, as explained in the margin.† The charge for the present guards would, of course, be set off against this expenditure,

* Bushire	1 native non-commissioned officer and 8 sowars.
Ispahan	4 " " officers and 12 "
Kerman	1 " " officer and 5 "
Seistan	1 " " officer and 13 "
Meshed	2 " " officers and 3 "

	Rs.	a.	p.
† Initial charges—			
(i.) Cost of 240 horses, at 250 rupees each	60,000	0	0
(ii.) Cost of saddlery and stable gear, at 100 rupees per horse	24,000	0	0
(iii.) Clothing of soldiers,* 100 rs. 14 a., for 240 men	24,210	0	0
(iv.) Clothing of followers,* 31 rs. 1 a., for 42 men	1,304	10	0
(v.) Cooking pots,* 9 sets, at 25 rupees	225	0	0
(vi.) Ordnance stores	21,150	0	0
(vii.) Transport* to and from Persia	8,150	5	0

Total initial charges .. 1,39,039 15 0

Of which 33,889 rs. 15 a. will recur under each three-year relief.

* These will recur with each three-year relief.

and the net extra cost would amount, approximately, to 1,11,232 rupees initial, and 1,94,664 rupees annually recurring.

It is our opinion that the raising of such a force is desirable, independently of the contemplated action of the Russian Minister at Tehran, and we trust that your Lordship will represent to His Majesty's Government the necessity of adopting some such course as one means to combat the ever-increasing activity of other Powers in Persia.

5. As a further possible means of increasing and consolidating our influence in Southern Persia, we would also invite your Lordship's attention to the proposal made by Sir Mortimer Durand in 1896 to raise a force of Bakhtiari and Arabs under British officers. The state of disorder which now prevails in the province of Luristan is well known to your Lordship. In a recent diary received from our Resident in the Persian Gulf we have heard that at the end of January last the Ferahan Regiment, 800 strong, while marching from Khoremad to Dizful, was attacked by the Judaki Lurs, and routed, with a loss of eighty men and all the arms, ammunition, and clothes of the soldiers who surrendered, and were stripped. The Lurs are said to have captured a large caravan worth 40,000 tomans on the same occasion. It is further reported in the same diary that the Prince Governor is besieged in Khoremad by the Lurs, and that attempts are being made to raise a Bakhtiari force to deal with the Lurs. Were this proposal carried out, chaos might be expected to supervene, with possibly disastrous results to British trade and influence if a Cossack force from Tehran were called in to put down the disturbances. We would, therefore, be glad to be informed of the views that are now held by His Majesty's Government on the proposals which were made by Sir M. Durand; and should your Lordship be in a position to assure us that any such suggestion would be favourably entertained, we shall be prepared seriously to consider the matter, and to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in furthering a scheme which we believe to be feasible in itself, and to be calculated greatly to benefit British and Indian interests in these important parts of the Persian dominions.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

CURZON.

T. RALEIGH.

E. F.-G. LAW.

E. R. ELLES.

A. T. ARUNDEL.

DENZIL IBBETSON.

No. 357.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 12, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 5th instant, relative to the delimitation of the territory of the nine tribes in the vicinity of Aden.

The Secretary of State for India proposes to approve the Viceroy's suggestion as to the demarcation of the frontier in a south-westerly direction to the sea as soon as the Amiri border has been settled, and to instruct the Resident at Aden to prepare beforehand a report upon the approximate frontier which it would be expedient to claim for the Haushabi and Subaihi tribes.

As regards the question of concluding Treaties with the Upper Yaffai and other tribes, the Secretary of State suggests that the Government of India should be authorized to proceed in accordance with the instructions sent on the 4th May last, leaving the question of eventual delimitation to the desert in a north-easterly direction to be settled conformably to the decision of His Majesty's Government conveyed to the Viceroy on the 16th May.

I am to inform you, in reply, that Lord Lansdowne concurs in these proposals.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 358.

Consul Churchill to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 15. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Trieste, June 10, 1903.

WITH reference to your Lordship's Circular of the 5th April last, I have the honour to inclose herewith a short note for publication in the "Board of Trade Journal," should it be considered suitable for that purpose."

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY L. CHURCHILL.

Inclosure in No. 358.

Note for publication in "Board of Trade Journal" respecting the Austrian Lloyd's Steam Navigation Company and the Persian Gulf.

THE Austrian export to Persia (by direct line) is sensibly increasing. Whereas in 1901 its value came to 10,918*l.*, in 1902 it arose to 19,719*l.* (nearly double). Now the Austrian Lloyd's in order to develop this trade will make a trial voyage to Persia leaving Trieste on the 15th June with the steamer "Urano." This steamer will sail direct for the Persian Gulf touching Port Said, Suez, Aden, Bussorah, and Bushire. The "Urano" will carry sugar, coffee, paper, and wood (for the manufactory of date cases). On her return voyage she will carry a full cargo of dates.

No. 359.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 12th June, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 12, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 359.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, June 12, 1903.

PLEASE note the statement regarding survey of the Shaibi border in Fitzmaurice's telegram to Constantinople forwarded by me to-day, and also his remark concerning the Secretary of State's orders of the 16th ultimo. I have referred the Commissioners to the last part of your telegram of the 14th May, and asked them to postpone negotiations with the Shaibi for the present. I understand, however, they propose to go on. Wahab has also sent me a telegram containing nearly 400 groups, deprecating postponement of the delimitation to the north-east on the ground that the Commission were not consulted as to this step, and that the settlement of a Treaty with the Yaffai is not a necessary preliminary. I have replied to the effect that the orders of the 16th May indicate that delimitation was to be postponed for reasons which are stated, and which are separate from the question of a Treaty. Wahab, however, still desires that his message should be put forward. As the cost of repeating this telegram to the usual quarters would amount to about 200*l.*, I propose to send it, with my observations, by next mail, unless I receive other directions. There clearly cannot be any urgency about the Shaibi survey. Besides, my letter will give reasons why any attempt to press delimitation to the north-east at the present time is highly inexpedient.

(Repeated to India Office, Bombay, and Constantinople).

No. 360.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 12th June, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 13, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 360.

Resident, Aden, to Sir N. O'Connor.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, June 12, 1903.

FITZMAURICE sends the following message for transmission to the British Ambassador, Constantinople:—

"The order for the removal of the Customs, referred to in your telegram of the 9th and letter of the 19th May, has not yet arrived, but a considerable abatement of the nuisance has been followed by an equivalent increase in traffic. 1 per cent. *ad valorem* is now levied on the tariff price of merchandise permanently laid down by the Taiz authorities, and not on the market value. Our No. 275 of the 6th June has been detained at Aden, and until a decision upon it has been arrived at, we are endeavouring to survey the Shaibi frontier. We received here on the 10th June the Secretary of State's message of the 16th May to the Viceroy. It appears not to be founded upon information received from the Commissioners, but may have been suggested by the Resident's telegram of the 18th April. This latter coincides with my telegram to your Excellency in respect of the Yaffai demarcation (?)."

(Repeated to India, Bombay, and India Office.)

No. 361.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1903.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne the telegram from the Viceroy of the 20th ultimo, inclosed in your letter of the 21st, relative to the Russian Sanitary cordon in Khorassan.

Lord Curzon suggests that, in view of the Russian reply to the representations in which the Persian Government requested the abolition of the cordon, the Persian Government should be informed that His Majesty's Government considered it their duty to join with Russia in protecting Persia from any risk of infection, by establishing a British quarantine cordon in Seistan, consisting of a doctor with a suitable escort, who would remain as long as the Russians remained at Turbat-i-Haidari and Karez. Further, that His Majesty's Government reserved their right to send a quarantine doctor and guards to any post which they might consider necessary in South Persia.

The Viceroy's proposal, which has been carefully considered by Lord Lansdowne, appears to his Lordship to be open to two principal objections: Firstly, that any such action on the part of His Majesty's Government would be contrary to the provisions of the Venice Convention, and, secondly, that it would probably not entail the withdrawal of the Russian cordon, but would compel British Indian traders and pilgrims to submit to two quarantines or medical inspections instead of to one.

Lord Lansdowne would suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that the Russian Government might now be addressed, through their Ambassador in London. Upon this subject his Lordship would propose that a Memorandum should be given to Count Benckendorff showing clearly how the existence of the Russian cordon is contrary to the terms of the Venice Convention, and stating that, as the Persian Government have repeatedly pressed for its withdrawal, His Majesty's Government could only arrive at the conclusion that its maintenance was illegal in itself and, at the same time, an encroachment upon the sovereign rights of Persia, whose integrity and independence His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government were equally interested in maintaining.

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The hope might be expressed that the Russian Government would take immediate steps for the withdrawal of their officers and men from the quarantine posts which they now occupy in Khorassan, and it might be stated that, in the event of this measure not being adopted, it would become necessary for His Majesty's Government to consider what action would be required on their part to meet the situation, and to protect the interests of the British Indian and Afghan traders and pilgrims proceeding from India and Afghanistan to Khorassan.

Should ulterior measures become necessary, Lord Lansdowne would propose that an Anglo-Indian Officer, accompanied by a doctor and a mounted escort, should be sent as Consul to Turbat-i-Haidari, with the avowed object of protecting our people and trade from molestation at the hands of the Russian Sanitary cordon.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 362.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 13, 1903.

HELMUND arbitration.

I would request your Lordship's permission, before raising officially the question of the scope of the arbitration, according to the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 58 of the 11th June, to await the receipt of a further communication from the Persian Government. I would suggest that Colonel McMahon should quietly collect all the materials for giving his award. Major Douglas informs me that the latter will probably prove acceptable to the Persians, there being only one doubtful point (*i.e.*, Takht-i-Shah), and it should not be difficult to arrange a compromise as to this. If I raise the matter officially in a note which will have to be laid before the Shah, some foolish order may be given by His Majesty which will give rise to a lot of difficulties, and afford a handle for fresh intervention on the part of the Russians, whereas if I say nothing beyond the verbal statements I have already made the matter may rest.

I have informed the Persian Government that the complaints as to the violation of the Goldsmid line made by the Afghans must be heard as well as theirs, and I would prefer not to emphasize the point at present, unless they return to the charge.

No. 363.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 13, 1903.

PROPOSED action at Kerbela and Nejef.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 60 of the 12th June.

I am making suggestions by messenger with regard to the proposed appointment of a British Agent at Kerbela. A blunt threat was not what I contemplated, but merely a pointed reminder as to the influence at Kerbela given to us by the Oudh bequest. I have not yet fully made the intimation which you have authorized, but it has already had effect, as, in response to a suggestion that I might write and tender good advice to the Chief Priests, I have been asked by the Grand Vizier to send it through Bagdad by telegraph.

I informed him in reply that, as the holy places are in Turkey, I must obtain your Lordship's permission before doing so. An opening for stating the implied conditions of such friendly service will be given by your reply to this request; but, anyhow, I think that the establishment, with the approval of the Persian Government, of political relations with the Chief Priests will strengthen our position.

I would propose my informing the latter that we heard that the financial reforms and the employment of Europeans were being opposed by them, and that we thought these methods ill-advised, although we were as zealous as themselves for the independence and strength of Persia, in view of our interests; we should then hear what reply they would give.

There is still unrest at Tabreez, and the Russian Minister has hinted in guarded terms that, should the movement grow more serious, intervention may become necessary.

The Grand Vizier seemed very anxious yesterday; but the trouble will probably blow over.

No. 364.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 67. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 4, 1903.

I MENTIONED incidentally in my despatch No. 65 of the 28th ultimo the occurrence of somewhat serious disturbances at Meshed, which His Majesty's Consul-General reported were being encouraged by the local Representatives of the Russian Government, with the object, amongst others, of bringing about the recall of the present Governor-General of Khorassan, his Highness the Nair-ed-Dowleh.

I have now the honour to report, on the authority both of Colonel Whyte and of the Atabeg-i-Azam, that tranquillity has—at any rate, for the present—been restored. His Highness, whom I saw yesterday evening, informed me that he had declined to accede to the request of the Ulema of Meshed for the removal of the Nair-ed-Dowleh, and had warned them that the troops he was bringing from Kuchan, Boojnoord, &c., would, if the disorders continued, put them down by force; but that he had promised, if they ceased at once, to pardon the ringleaders, and that, as the result of the steps which he had taken, the latter had left the shrine and the riots had subsided. He added that the Russian Minister had suggested to him the dispatch of Russian Cossacks from Trans-Caspia to assist the Persian Government in restoring order, but that he had declined this proposal, and had declared that he would be personally responsible for the safety of all foreigners in Meshed.

A few days ago orders were given to the Commander of the Cossack brigade here to have 300 Cossack horsemen in readiness to start on the 2nd instant for Khorassan, and the Cossack guards of several of the foreign Legations here were withdrawn from them with this object. I reminded the Grand Vizier that we had always deprecated the employment of the Cossack brigade for services in provinces bordering on Afghanistan and India, and that he had himself, on previous occasions, assured me that the Persian Government had no intention of authorizing it. He thereupon promised me that, if the Cossacks were sent (in order to meet an exceptional crisis) to Meshed, they would not remain there a moment longer than was necessary to re-establish tranquillity, and that no Russian officers (who, he wished me to note, were employed by the Shah as instructors, and not as Commanders in the field), or even non-commissioned officers, would go with them; and at our interview of yesterday he told me that there was now no question of employing them. It seems probable—in view of the fact that it would have taken the Cossack cavalry from Tehran nearly a month to reach Meshed—that the order for them to proceed there was intended rather as a menace to the rioters (and, perhaps, also, as a satisfaction to the Russian Minister) than as a really practical measure.

The Atabeg further stated, in reply to an expression of my hope that he would continue to support the Nair-ed-Dowleh (who would prove, I believed, if a proper inquiry were instituted into the cause of the recent trouble, to be in no way to blame for it), that his Highness had offered to resign the post of Governor-General, and that the Shah had been in favour of accepting his resignation; but that he himself had been opposed to his removal from Meshed for the present. This was, however, he observed, the third outbreak which had occurred there during the Nair-ed-Dowleh's Governorship—a fact which seemed to indicate that, whatever his merits, he was hardly the best man for his present post.

Colonel Whyte suggested, in one of his recent telegrams respecting the Meshed riots, a warning to the Persian Government that the appearance of Russian troops at Meshed would be followed by our occupation of Bender Abbas and Charbar. I could obviously not convey so serious an intimation without explicit instruction from your Lordship, but it is one which I believe His Majesty's Government might deem it necessary to make in certain emergencies, for the sudden occurrence of which it might be advisable to be prepared beforehand.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 5, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Colonel MacMahon, with reference to his despatch to the Government of India of the 18th March last, a copy of which he was good enough to send me respecting the seizure by the Seistan Customs of property belonging to his Mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 365.

Sir A. Hardinge to Colonel McMahon.

Sir,

Tehran, May 4, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 597 of the 18th March, on the subject of interference by the Customs of Seistan with the property of your Mission, and to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch addressed by me on this subject to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which was also sent by me to the Government of India.

On receipt of your despatch under reply I directed Mr. Seymour, Third Secretary of His Majesty's Legation, to call on M. Naus, and draw his Excellency's attention to the telegram respecting the prohibition of the export of cereals mentioned by M. Maurice to Major Benn, and interpreted by the former as being aimed at your Mission.

M. Naus declared that this instruction, which was sent nearly three weeks before your arrival in the neighbourhood of the frontier, has nothing whatever to do with your Mission, but was intended to prevent the export of cereals on behalf of the Heshmet-ul-Mulk, Governor of Seistan, who had already forced the Customs to allow the passage of one caravan in which he was interested across the frontier. It was in anticipation of resistance by the Governor's accomplices that the order to report any forcible exportation of provisions in defiance of Regulations had been given.

At Mr. Seymour's request M. Naus embodied the above explanations in an official letter of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith.

I have no doubt whatever of the sincerity of M. Naus' regret that M. Maurice should have so misinterpreted his instructions. Whatever may have been the relations between M. Maurice or M. Molitor and Major Benn, M. Naus himself has always evinced a desire to maintain the most cordial relations with His Majesty's Legation, and even if this were not the case, he is far-seeing enough to realize the placing of petty obstacles in the way of a British Diplomatic Mission must not only be futile, but must eventually recoil on his own Department. The annoyance which he displayed when he brought me the telegram reporting M. Maurice's action (it was the first news I had of it) was, however, obviously genuine, and he lost no time in sending telegraphic orders to Seistan to release the stores intended for your Mission at once.

In my own opinion the blame for the delays, and other vexatious incidents attendant upon your reception in Persian territory, was due to the neglect of the Persian Foreign Office to make, notwithstanding my repeated warnings to it, the necessary preparations, and to give sufficiently clear and definite orders beforehand, both to M. Naus and to its own officials, in Seistan. This negligence was, I think, rather from procrastination than from ill-will on the part of the Persian Ministers, and was, I have little doubt, the result of a hope that your arbitration, which they viewed with alarm as likely to cause difficulties with Russia, and which M. Vlassoff had persuaded them would deprive them of territory, would by some means or other be put off. The consequence was that when this hope was unfulfilled and you actually arrived on the frontier, it took some little time for the instructions which they then dispatched to reach their local officials, whilst the latter, intimidated by M. Miller, had no clear idea as to how the Central Government desired you to be received.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to you to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

M. Naus to Sir A. Hardinge.

Téhéran, le 3 Mai, 1903.

M. le Ministre,

COMME suite à la conversation que je viens d'avoir avec votre Secrétaire Mr. Seymour, je tiens à confirmer à votre Excellence que la défense de permettre des exportations de céréales envoyée par moi à la Douane de Seistan le 20 Janvier dernier ne visait en aucune façon la Mission du Colonel MacMahon, lequel à cette époque devait d'ailleurs se trouver encore bien loin du Seistan.

J'avais reçu un rapport du Seistan me signalant que le Gouverneur, d'accord avec le nommé Pourdill Khan, pratiquaient la fraude des céréales à la sortie, et qu'une caravane avait franchi la frontière nonobstant l'opposition de la Douane.

C'est alors que j'ai télégraphié à M. Molitor à Meched l'ordre suivant :—

"Donnez ordre formel l'ouane Seistan s'opposer absolument à toute exportation céréales sauf quantités autorisées pour Robat.

"Si exportations ont lieu par force nonobstant défense, faire dresser procès-verbaux de contravention et me câbler immédiatement."

Je le répète, ceci visait le trafic illégal auquel se livraient le Gouverneur et Pourdill Khan, mais nullement la Mission du Colonel MacMahon.

Votre Excellence voudra d'ailleurs bien se souvenir que mon intervention relative-ment aux ordres à donner concernant la Mission a toujours eu pour but de faciliter les affaires.

Je vous prie, &c.

(Signé) J. NAUS.

No. 366.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 14, 1903.

THE telegram from the Government of India of the 9th instant, and your Lordship's telegram No. 46 of the 11th May, seem to make it desirable that I should explain more fully and clearly than I have yet done the exact financial situation in Persia, and the bearing upon it of the advance made last month by His Majesty's Government, for the completion of which the Persian Government is now applying.

The revenues of the Persian Government may be estimated at about 1,200,000*l.* a-year, but for practical purposes the only ones we need take into account are those under European administration, viz., the customs and posts.

The Caspian Sea royalties represent 20,000*l.* a-year, but the permanence of this source of revenue is doubtful.

The telegraphs represent at present, under Persian management, only about 5,000*l.* a-year.

Of the "maliat," or land revenue, which may be estimated at about 700,000*l.* or 800,000*l.* a-year, but which under proper administration would bring in a great deal more, very little reaches the Imperial Treasury.*

The annual revenue of the posts, under Belgian administration, may be estimated at 10,000*l.*

The customs brought in last year a revenue of 420,000*l.*, and M. Naus estimates that this year they will rise to 440,000*l.*, and, when the new Tariff is in thorough working order, to 500,000*l.* Of this the northern customs, including with the term those of all the western and eastern frontiers, contribute about 260,000*l.*, and the southern about 180,000*l.*

These revenues are charged with the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the two Russian loans (of 3,200,000*l.*), representing an annual payment of 176,000*l.*, with the payment of 24,000*l.* a-year, representing the interest on the advance made at 12 per cent. in April 1901, by the Imperial Bank of Persia, and with a portion of the interest on the advance of 200,000*l.* made by His Majesty's Government through the Imperial Bank in April 1903, which though nominally also secured on the Caspian

* Many of the employés of the Central Government are paid, however, out of drafts on the Provincial Treasuries, and much of the land revenue covers local expenditure.

fisheries and on the posts, will, however, as a matter of practical convenience, be entirely paid out of the customs receipts.

The total annual charge on account of loans on the customs of Persia is therefore, roughly, 216,000*l.*, out of a total present estimated revenue of 440,000*l.*, of which 176,000*l.* are paid to Russian and 40,000*l.* to British creditors.

There is therefore room for another loan at 5 per cent. of about 2,000,000*l.* on the northern, and of about 3,250,000*l.* (interest and sinking fund) on the southern customs.

In practice, however, such large loans as those indicated above cannot safely be made by the Persian Government. Its annual expenditure, including the charges on the loans, has almost always exceeded, since the accession of the present Shah, by 200,000*l.* or 300,000*l.* its annual receipts, and if it is to attempt to balance its Budget by reducing its expenses and by reforming the "malat," and is to continue paying the interest on existing debts (failing which Russia forecloses on the northern customs), it cannot venture to contract any further loan bearing interest of more than 80,000*l.* a-year, *i.e.*, of about 1,500,000*l.*, or if the customs increase by another 100,000*l.*, of 2,000,000*l.* Even this would be most dangerous unless the money were employed remuneratively, *e.g.*, in order to provide a sufficient force to crush resistance to increased taxation and to the abolition of ruinous abuses.

I append a Table illustrating the above statement by figures.

In connection with the above-described pecuniary liabilities, the Persian Government has entered into certain political engagements towards Russia and Great Britain respectively, which, although already familiar to His Majesty's Government, it may be convenient that I should recapitulate, for convenience of reference, side by side.

1. Engagements towards Russia.

The Persian Government has bound itself towards Russia—

(a.) To give the Russian Bank, in case of default, supervision, and if this is insufficient to secure the regular payment of the interest due on the loans, control over the customs pledged as security for the loans, *i.e.*, all the Customs of Persia except those of "Fars and the Persian Gulf."

(b.) Not to redeem the Loan of 1901 till 1910, and not to redeem the Loan of 1903 till 1912, giving six months' notice in each case.

(c.) Till the loans are repaid or redeemed, to "issue no foreign loan" (Contract of 1901), and to "contract no foreign loan for a long term" (Contract of 1903), without the consent of the Russian Government. The Russians interpret this as meaning that although Persia is free to accept advances from the Imperial Bank of Persia, which is in a sense her State Bank, and with which her Government has an "account current," or to discount royalties, such as those due on the Caspian Fisheries Concession, the D'Arcy Petroleum Concession, and telegraph lines worked by the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the Indo-European Telegraph Company, she cannot stipulate, or accept a stipulation, that the advances made to her shall only be redeemable "à longue échéance." The expression "longue échéance" has not been precisely defined, but I suppose it might be reasonably contended that a term of twenty years, perhaps even of ten, would constitute "longue échéance," but that one of five would be "courte échéance." The difficulty could probably be turned, supposing that we wished to lend Persia a given sum for twenty years, by providing that our advance could be redeemed in, say, five years, but that if it was redeemed before ten the interest would be doubled, or substantially increased. In the case of the recent advance this was not necessary, as the nominal security was a fixed sum, payable annually for a term of twenty years.

(d.) Persia has further undertaken, till the loan is repaid, not to lower her duties without the consent of Russia, and this engagement has now been made independent of the repayment of the loan by its incorporation in a secret Article attached to the new Russo-Persian Commercial Treaty.

2. Engagements to Great Britain.

In 1897, under instructions from Lord Salisbury, Mr. Hardinge, the Chargé d'Affaires here, in connection with certain rumours as to a contemplated Persian Loan, requested, in a note to which a Memorandum was annexed, an assurance from the Persian Government that under no circumstances whatever would the control of the

customs of Southern Persia be ceded to a foreign Power. The Memorandum annexed to this note pointed out that it would be a grave error of policy to pledge to foreign financiers the customs revenues of the Southern Persian ports. It added that Great Britain would protest against the alienation to a foreign Power of the Shah's control over the customs of his "southern ports," an expression which was altered in the Persian text of the Memorandum to "control over the revenues of the customs of Southern Persia."

The then Mushir-ed-Dowleh, on the 23rd October, 1897, replied to this note in a communication of which the English translation in our archives runs as follows:—

"You have written that there was a rumour that the customs of Southern Persia would be placed under foreign supervision and control as guarantee for a loan. I therefore take this occasion of informing the Legation that this rumour is absolutely without foundation, and that they will never be placed under foreign supervision and control."

The actual Persian text, which of course is the only one which the Persian Government would regard as binding on itself, is a little less lacking in precision: translated literally it runs:—

"This that you had written it has been rumoured that 'some' (or 'certain') South Persian customs are being placed under foreign supervision and control against the amount of a foreign loan, has been brought to notice, and it has been deemed necessary to bring to the notice of the respected Legation that the rumour is completely without foundation and under foreign supervision and control" (they—this pronoun is understood, but does not actually figure in the text) "never will be placed."

Not long afterwards, in his despatch No. 149, of 4th November, 1897, Mr. Hardinge reported that the Persian Ministers were negotiating a Dutch loan on the security of the southern customs, and intended to reconcile their action with the above assurance by a declaration that as their payments would never be in arrears, the control and supervision which they had promised us not to part with would never become effective; in other words, that they were free to pledge the southern customs, so long as they did not actually cede them. I have little doubt that they would revive this contention to-day if we argued that they had broken the engagement of 1897 by pledging the Customs of, say, Kerman and Mohammerah (supposing the latter port to be excluded from the term "Fars and the Persian Gulf"), and further, that they would lay great stress upon the fact that the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, in his note of 23rd October, had only given an undertaking in respect of "certain of the South Persian customs," and not in respect of them all.

It appears to me, therefore, that before committing ourselves to a formal declaration, or at any rate entering into a discussion of details with respect to this engagement, we should first decide (1) whether it is undoubtedly violated in the letter, as I think it is in the spirit, by the Russian loan contracts of 1900 and 1902; and (2) in what precise sense we understand the terms "Southern Persia" and "Fars and the Ports of the Persian Gulf" respectively, since they are susceptible of different interpretations.

What do we mean exactly by "Southern Persia"? Is the expression to be understood in contradistinction to "Northern Persia"? In which case it would include the southern half of the Shah's dominions, *i.e.*, the whole country south of, say, the 32nd parallel of latitude, and take in not merely Arabistan, but Kerman and Seistan. Or is it "Southern" as distinguished from "Central" as well as "Northern" Persia? In which case the northern limit would be drawn a good deal further south, and take in the eastern frontier and the ports of Persian Baluchistan, but hardly Seistan or the Upper Karun, *i.e.*, Ahwaz and Shuster. It is evident to me that in 1901 your Lordship had yourself not come to any definite decision on this question, for in your telegram No. 38 of that year, you pointed out to me as a reason for collecting the customs of Arabistan at Mohammerah and not at Ahwaz, that those of the latter place might be held to be pledged to the service of the Russian loan.

What, again, is your Lordship's view of the meaning of the term "Fars and the Ports of the Persian Gulf"? In its narrowest sense, and in this the Russians doubtless construe it, it might be restricted to the administrative Provinces of Fars, and to the ports constituting the "Banadir District" administered by the Governor of Bushire, which extends from Bunder Rig on the west to a point just west of Jask on the east, but does not include Mohammerah in Arabistan, or Jask, Charbar, or Gwetter in Persian Baluchistan. Or it may be held to comprise all the Customs division administered by the "Direction Générale" of the Persian Gulf at Bushire, which at present excludes Mohammerah, but takes in the ports of Persian Baluchistan. A still wider definition would include besides the stations within the limits of this division, Mohammerah (with

its dependencies Shuster and Ahwaz) which, whilst not for administrative purposes a part of the Provinces of Fars or Benádír (Bushire) or for Customs purposes under the Director-General of Bushire, is nevertheless a "port of the Persian Gulf" though the Russians, I believe, argue that Mohammerah, being 60 miles up the Shat-el-Arab, is not a Gulf port in the strict sense of the term.

When the first Russian loan was negotiated in 1900, the Persians intimated, I believe, to Russia that they had promised us not to place their southern customs under foreign control, and as Russian control was a contingent condition of the loan, their exclusion had to be provided for. The term "Customs of Fars and of the Ports of the Persian Gulf" was accordingly adopted in the contract, and the Persian negotiators, who are never precise, were satisfied with it, as expressing all the custom-houses controlled from Bushire, with which those of Jask, Chabar, and Gwetter, were in process of amalgamation. Mohammerah, and its dependent customs, Ahwaz and Shuster, were at that time outside this division, their administration being still in the hands of Sheikh Khazal, and they were only united to it in the autumn of last year, to be again separated from it (no doubt at Russian instigation) a few months ago, and constituted as a separate division under the title of "Direction Générale de l'Arabistan."

It must be noted in this connection, and whether we like it or not, it is undoubtedly a weak point in our case, that at the time when the Russian loan contract was first published, on the 30th January, 1900, with the clause excluding only the customs of "Fars and the Persian Gulf," His Majesty's Government made no formal reservation or protest with regard to this particular point, either to Russia or Persia, on the strength of the engagement of 1897. They had official knowledge from the communiqué in the St. Petersburg "Pravitelstvenny Vestnik," which reproduced the substance, but not the actual articles, of the Agreement, that all the customs of Persia, except those of "Fars and the Gulf," were pledged to and were liable to contingent control by Russia, but they did not even demand to be furnished with a text of the loan Agreement, in order to ascertain how far it affected the engagement of 1897. Sir Charles Scott, indeed, spontaneously reminded M. de Witte of that engagement verbally, in the course of conversation, but without calling attention to the distinction between "Southern Persia" and "Fars and the Persian Gulf." Two months later, in connection with the proposal to place Mohammerah under the Belgian Customs, Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Mr. Spring Rice to inform the Persian Government that no change in the administration of the customs there should be made without our consent, and to remind it of the engagement of 1897, ascertaining at the same time whether or not the Customs of Mohammerah were included in the guarantee of the Russian loan. The result of the discussions which followed this instruction, and which I need not recapitulate at length, was that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated verbally that if Mohammerah was included (as he personally believed it to be) in the expression "Fars and the Gulf of Fars" it was excluded from the Russian guarantee, and that if control ever became necessary the Persian Government would decide to what ports the control should apply. His Excellency, however, deprecated a written discussion, and asked that Mr. Spring Rice's note inclosing Lord Salisbury's telegram might be regarded as a verbal communication only (Mr. Spring Rice's telegram No. 50 of the 4th April).

So matters remained, we claiming in the abstract that the term "Fars and the ports of the Persian Gulf" must, in view of the engagement of 1897, include Mohammerah, but without saying how much more it included, and the Persian Government evading an official expression of opinion on the point till when the second loan was concluded on the same lines as the first. I obtained your Lordship's permission to place on formal record that no pledge in either of the Russian loan contracts could affect the earlier promise made to us by the Persian Government, that the customs not merely of "Fars and the Gulf," but of "Southern Persia," would never be placed under foreign control, and I did so in my note to his Highness of the 10th May, 1902. That note the Persian Government have never answered. In June 1902 I mentioned this fact to the Atabeg at Carlsbad, but as he professed ignorance, or rather an inaccurate recollection of the text of the engagement, and talked generally of discussing all current questions in London, I thought it better not to press the point, since I did not feel quite certain what view your Lordship took of it, and, moreover, had no papers about it with me. I have very little doubt that the Persians would prefer not to commit themselves to any formal definition. If they say officially that "Fars and the Gulf Ports" include the ports of Arabistan and Persian Baluchistan, they will become involved in a controversy with the Russians, who will retort that they understand the term as employed in their loan Agreements in its literal sense, and that as any doubts as to these Agreements are, by Article 15 of the first loan Contract, to be "jugés par entente entre les Gouvernements

de Russie et de Perse," they claim a joint right with Persia of defining the meaning of an instrument to which they are a party. If, on the other hand, the Persians say that "Fars and the Persian Gulf" exclude the ports of Arabistan and Baluchistan, which, whatever "Southern Persia" may mean, are clearly included within it, they expose themselves to a charge on our part of having violated the engagement of 1897, in so far as they have consented to these ports being placed, in case of default, under Russian control. We have, therefore, now to consider the question whether we shall insist on their immediately impaling themselves on one or other of the horns of this dilemma, and, supposing we decide it in the affirmative, whether we shall do this in connection with the completion of an advance nominally made by the Imperial Bank of Persia.

I am personally of opinion that there is no harm in raising the point, but that we should not raise it in a form which will necessarily compel Persia to give us an immediate answer, and that in any case such an answer, in the sense desired by us, should not be made the condition of what is practically our first Persian loan. We want to obtain an effective hold on the southern customs, and to prevent Persia from contracting fresh political loans with Russia, and to do this we must, for the present, make our terms more attractive than those offered by our rivals. It is certain that the Persians, if we make an answer on this point a *sine quâ non* of our pecuniary assistance, will have to consult the Russians whose loan Contract it touches, and that the latter will find out that we are negotiating a fresh advance and will interfere to stop it, especially as they will guess that the money really comes from us and not from the Imperial Bank, which can have no interest, as a private concern, in raising a purely political question as a condition to a business transaction. The point, moreover, is not of any immediate practical consequence, since the customs of Mohammerah, Charbar, &c., are of no present pecuniary value, the trade of these ports being as yet purely local. The important ones are Bushire and Bender Abbas, which are covered by the term "Fars and the Gulf," and it is on these that we must strengthen our hold.

We have, moreover, an admirable opportunity for formulating our views on this question in a more plausible and, I think, a more dignified manner. The Anglo-Persian Declaration of 9th February last provides for the drawing up of a "Règlement Douanier" to be agreed upon between the Persian Government and the British Legation at Tehran, which shall determine, amongst other things, the "classification" of the "bureaux douaniers" throughout Persia. When this "règlement" is submitted to us we can ask for information as to the reason for the separation of the Customs of Arabistan from those of the remaining ports of the Persian Gulf, and can then put in a caveat, and insist, if need be, on an answer to it, as to the exclusion of all the southern ports, including Charbar and Mohammerah, and for that matter, if your Lordship thinks fit, of the land Custom Houses of south-east Persia, i.e., Kerman, Mirjavar, Kuh-i-Malek, Siah, and Seistan, from the scope of the two Russian loans. We are on far more solid ground for such action, if we take it as the result of a right conferred upon us by our Commercial Treaty, than if we raise the point in connection with what is theoretically a private financial transaction between the Persian Government and the Imperial Bank. And as our commercial declaration will have been ratified in the course of the next week or so, there need be no delay about doing it.

Suppose, moreover, that the Persian Government declines, rather than face a dispute with Russia, to give us the answer we require on the ground that the engagement of 1897 speaks only of "some of the South Persian customs," and that if we understood it to cover more than "Fars and the Gulf," we should have protested at the time of the first loan contract, we shall be in a better position if we refuse to accept this answer in connection with the "Règlement Douanier" than if we do so in connection with our advance. In the latter case the advance falls through, and any new one on the security of the southern customs becomes very difficult; in the former we can reply that we reserve our rights, and shall take such measures as we think fit to enforce them should the Persian Government actually break the engagement of 1897 by allowing Russian control over the customs of any place in Southern Persia.

In any case it would, I think, have been very unwise on my part to have raised this question in connection with the advance of 4th April last, as to have done so at a moment when, as I had the honour to explain to your Lordship, rapid and decisive action was essential, would have probably resulted in upsetting the whole negotiation, and would have enabled the Russian Bank to obtain, in return for a fresh Russian advance, if not a formal Mint monopoly, at any rate so strong a Mint contract as would have endangered the future of the Imperial Bank of Persia.

I would also respectfully point out that by obtaining a collateral hold on the customs of the Persian Gulf, we have strengthened our guarantee against their being

employed as security, or partial security, for a foreign loan. The engagement of 1897 would not, as I have observed, have made it legally impossible for the Persians to undertake to pay a Russian advance out of the revenues of, say, the customs of Bender Abbas, so long as the creditors did not stipulate for supervision and control in case of default, nor will the danger of such an assignation or ear-marking of these revenues be absolutely excluded till we have either made a sufficiently large loan to prevent it, or have obtained a clear promise from Persia, not only that she will not permit foreign control or supervision over the customs of Southern Persia, but that she will never affect or assign any portion of their revenues for a foreign loan without our consent. I cannot but think that an agreement by which the customs of "Fars and the Gulf Ports" are made for 20 years, the collateral security for an English advance is at least a slight step in this direction, and *pro tanto*, a substantial, if only a modest, gain.

I also think that the lien on the posts, and above all on the telegraphs, including the new line which the Persian Government is building to Seistan, is worth having, if only to prevent the pledging of their revenues to Russia, and thus giving her a pretext for meddling in their management.

A colleague representing a neutral Government told me that he considered this provision a distinct advantage from our point of view. "L'Angleterre," he said, "à été très adroite en chipant une ressource qui aurait pu servir de garantie, les douanes du nord une fois épuisées, à un nouvel emprunt Russe." And, as I mentioned in my telegram No. 62, the Viceroy, who is now disposed to depreciate its value and to contend that the Government of India always insisted on the customs as first security, himself suggested in his telegram of the 11th February, the telegraphs as first security and the customs as second, for an Anglo-Indian loan of half a million.

When his Excellency complains that these loans are not arranged on business lines, by which I suppose he means, in an open and straightforward manner, and in return for positive (instead of merely indirect, remote, and negative) advantages on both sides, he, I think, loses sight of the fact that as Persia's engagements with Russia forbid her to make a foreign loan "à longue échéance" at all, the conclusion of such a transaction, in a strictly business manner, presents formidable initial difficulties, which can only be turned by a flanking movement, and not by a direct attack on the open, like Lord Methuen's at Magersfontein.

Persia dare not openly violate her contract with Russia, and must therefore either have recourse to subterfuges to evade it or submit to all its consequences, and, in return for each Russian advance, consent to deal some fresh blow to British and Indian interests. We have, moreover, in Russia an active competitor, which has already advanced Persia over 3,000,000*l.* and is willing to provide more, if absolutely necessary, on easy terms, rather than let her escape from financial tutelage. Just now the Atabeg would, for a variety of reasons, rather borrow from us, *ceteris paribus*, than from the Russians, but he would rather borrow from them, even on unfavourable terms, than risk an open rupture with them.

His own views on the subject were briefly summed up in a phrase which he used to M. Naus when the pros and cons of our rival offers were being discussed by the Persian Ministers: "Si prenons aux Russes," said his Highness, in his broken French, "Anglais fâchés—si prenons aux Anglais, Russes fâchés; quelqu'un toujours fâché—alors prendre le meilleur."

Had we more fully realized this standpoint in 1898 we might now be the masters of Persia.

I trust that your Lordship will excuse the excessive length of this despatch. The most important question discussed in it—that of the bearing of the engagement of 1897 on the expression "Fars and the Persian Gulf ports" of the loan Contracts—is no longer immediately pressing, in view of the Grand Vizier's decision, arrived at since I began to write it, to defer for the present his request for the completion of the advance of the 4th April. It is, however, almost certain that he will, sooner or later, apply to us again, and I have therefore thought it might be convenient, and might save subsequent misunderstandings involving costly telegraphic explanations, if I stated, however lengthily and minutely, in a despatch, which could be kept for reference, the salient points to be borne in mind in any present or future discussion of the loan question which, tiresome and vexatious as it is, is the pivot on which all Persian politics turn, and to which we cannot, therefore, afford to be indifferent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 366.

Persian Customs' Revenue, capitalized at 5 per cent.

THE following figures are only approximate.

The estimate of 440,090*l.* is M. Naus' for this year, but it must be borne in mind that the relative value of the Northern and Southern Customs is likely to be a good deal altered by the new Tariff, the general effect of which will be to lower the Customs revenue derived from importations by Persia from the north, and to increase it on importations by her through the southern ports.

NORTHERN CUSTOMS.

		£		£
Capital..	..	5,200,000	Interest at 5 per cent.	260,000
Pledged	..	3,200,000	Interest and sinking fund	176,000*
Available	..	2,000,000		

SOUTHERN CUSTOMS.

		£		£
Capital..	..	3,600,000	Interest at 5 per cent.	180,000
Assigned	..	400,000	Interest at 12 and 5 per cent.	40,000†
Available	..	3,200,000		

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CUSTOMS TOGETHER.

		£		£
Capital..	..	8,800,000	Interest at 5 per cent.	440,000‡
Pledged and assigned	..	3,600,000	Interest and sinking fund	216,000
Available	..	5,200,000	Interest at 5 per cent.	260,000

		Roubles.		
* Russian Loan, 1900	..	22,500,000	} Interest and sinking funds ..	{ 1,670,194.20 roubles, payable per annum at 9.50 roubles per £, (say) 176,000 <i>l.</i>
Russian Loan, 1902	..	10,000,000		

		£		£
† Bank Loan	..	200,000	Interest at 12 per cent.	24,000 per annum.
Government Loan	..	200,000	Interest at 8 per cent., including sinking fund	16,500 "
				40,500 "

‡ Estimated Customs revenue.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 70.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 14, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report that at a garden party at His Majesty's Legation on the 11th instant, the Russian Minister took the Grand Vizier aside and told him that M. de Witte was extremely displeased with him for having taken an English advance, and that he had heard, and thought it not improbable, that he would, to mark his displeasure, place such high duties on Persian fish as to ruin the Caspian fisheries industry.

The Atabeg-i-Azam replied that if M. de Witte were to act in this manner, his action would be deemed unfriendly by the Persian Government, which would decline to be responsible for its effects upon the cordial relations between Persia and Russia. He went on to say that he was greatly surprised that M. de Witte should use such threats, and should adopt a tone so inconsistent with the good will towards Persia of which the Emperor himself had assured him.

M. Vlassoff seems to have thought he had gone too far, for in the evening, after a dinner at the Turkish Embassy, he again broached the subject to his Highness, and promised to explain the position to Count Lamsdorff, who took, as it was, a more moderate view of the question than M. de Witte, and would, he felt sure, deprecate any step likely to cause misunderstanding or ill-feeling between the Russian and Persian Governments.

He also assured the Grand Vizier that he personally had always been opposed to attaching hard conditions to financial assistance by Russia to Persia. His Highness, however, tells me that he does not believe this, and attributes the insistence of M. Grube on the mint monopoly to M. Vlassoff's influence. My information on this point does not bear out this impression, but I think M. de Witte would have waived the mint condition if M. Vlassoff had pressed him to do so.

I suggested to the Grand Vizier that he might conciliate the Russian Government by striking out the Caspian fisheries from our Agreement, and securing the entire advance on the revenues of the posts and southern customs. He showed no inclination to respond to this suggestion, and merely said it was not the nature of the security, but the fact of the advance having been made from English sources at all which had incensed the Russian Minister of Finance. It was evident, too, that he did not regard the threat of ruining the Caspian fisheries industry as a serious one. M. Vlassoff has, however, assured other informants of mine that M. de Witte means to carry it into effect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 368.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 72. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 20, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 71 of yesterday, a translation by Mr. Churchill of the instructions recently sent by the Persian Government to the Yemen-i-Nizam, with respect to the delimitation of the Perso-Baluch frontier between Kuh-i-Malek-Siah and pillar 11. I was originally asked to procure these instructions for him by Colonel MacMahon, but it may be convenient for your Lordship to have them by you for reference. The translation is a somewhat rough one, as the official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whom the Mushir-ed-Dowleh sent with them was not authorized to leave a copy, and Mr. Churchill had thus to make a running translation of them from his dictation.

The secret supplementary instruction about Padaha was not included in the communications made to me by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, but I obtained the information from a confidential and absolutely certain source.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 368.

Foreign Office Instructions to Yemen-i-Nizam.

IN the year 1313 it was decided between Persia and Great Britain to delimitate the frontier between Persia and Kelat from the environs of Kuhk to Kuh Malek Siah.

The Persian Government sent Etesham-el-Vezareh, and the frontier from Kuhk to Kuh Malek Siah was delimited according to the Protocol sent to you.

The frontier is marked from pillar No. 1 to pillar No. 11 (which is the beginning of the Talab River), and from pillar No. 11 to the north of the Talab River, until it joins the Mirjawar River, the frontier is delimited. From there to the nearest hill of the Mirjawar range (which is the limit of the basin to the north of the Mirjawar River), and from there to the tops of the Kachakoo Mountains to the north, a straight line has been drawn to the heights of Kachakoo, and from there a straight line to the highest mountain of Malek Siah.

From pillar No. 11 to this point the frontier is not specially marked, but has been fixed. For this reason, in the end of 1319, according to the Shah's orders, custom-houses were about to be opened at Mirjawar. The Agents, on arriving, found Captain Webb-Ware, with a troop of soldiers, encamped on Persian territory. He had also built a castle and other buildings, and prevented the Customs Agents from carrying out their duties, and stated that the territory in question belonged to English Baluchistan.

The Agents reported to their Chiefs, who reported in their turn to the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office consequently communicated on this subject with the British Legation, both verbally and in writing. As you will see from the copies of the correspondence sent to you, the British Legation agreed in the end to our view, in an official note dated 26 Zilkadeh, 1319, as follows:—

"It is not necessary to continue discussing a question of Persian soil, which Captain Webb-Ware took possession of under a misapprehension."

They further stated in that letter that instructions had been sent to Captain Webb-Ware from India to withdraw from that point, but it was decided to send Commissioners from their side and from ours to settle the point in dispute.

You are accordingly appointed Commissioner on behalf of the Shah, to go to the afore-mentioned points with the British Commissioner, and see to this business according to the following directions:—

1. You will begin by advising the British Commissioner of your appointment.
2. Your commission is only for the fixing of frontier marks where they do not already exist—that is, from pillar No. 11 to Kuh Malek Siah, according to the Protocol of 1313, and from there to Bend Seistan, according to Goldsmith Protocol of 1872 A.D. The frontier from Kuh Malek Siah to Bend Seistan has already been delimited in a straight line. Therefore, the west side of the mountain (Malek Siah) belongs to Persia.
3. You must know that, according to the Protocol of the 14th December, 1899, the mountain-tops of the Mirjawar Mountains are the frontier points. The west side of those mountains is Persian. The ground adjoining the Mirjawar and Ladis Rivers is also Persian territory.

Additional Instructions shown confidentially.

According to reports received from the Customs officers, in the bed of the river (which has dried up, owing to stones and deposits), at the juncture of the Talab and Mirjawar Rivers, the English have appropriated 3,000 yards, to which they have no right. You are to rectify this. They made a tank at Padaha, which you are to see is handed over to us.

No. 369.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 74.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 21, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch No. 67 of the 4th instant, that his Highness the Nair-ed-Dowleh has resigned the Governor-Generalship of Khorassan, and has been succeeded by the Ruken-ed-Dowleh.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a telegram received by me on this

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subject from His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed, and of a despatch which I have addressed to him in reply to it.

It is regrettable, from our point of view, that the Nair-ed-Dowleh should, like Prince Alexander of Bulgaria in 1886, have spontaneously played into the hands of his ill-wishers and thus made his own position untenable; but, as the Grand Vizier explained to me, it was impossible for the Shah, after having promised an amnesty to the leaders of the movement on condition of their ceasing their agitation, to consent to their being banished from Meshed.

With reference to the question of the Russian Cossack cordon in Khorassan, on which Colonel Whyte lays stress, I am in general agreement with the views expressed by that officer. I learn from the Persian Ministers that they have made it clear to M. Vlassoff, and have intimated as much in an official note, that the maintenance of the cordon is not desired by them.

M. Vlassoff has now given them to understand that the alternative to the maintenance of the present quarantine arrangements at Karez and Turbat-i-Haidari is the closing to Persian trade of the Russian frontier to the north of Khorassan, which, however injurious to Russian commercial interests, will be very much more so to those of Persia.

I have told the Grand Vizier that I have transmitted the reply of the Russian Legation to your Lordship, and that I await your instructions before taking further action in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S. May 25.—Since writing this despatch I have received from Colonel Whyte a telegram, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith. I have the honour at the same time to inclose a copy of my reply.

A. H. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 369.

Consul-General Whyte to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.)

Meshed, May 15, 1903.

I COMMUNICATED with Nair-ed-Dowleh this morning. He informs me that he wrote to Shah explaining cause and nature of riots, and asking for support and permission to arrest ringleaders of the movement. Otherwise he resigned. He tells me two of ringleaders, rich merchants, Rais-ut-Tujjar and Muavin-ut-Tujjar, who have repeatedly intrigued against him, and who will continue to intrigue against any Governor-General who does not let them have their way, apparently heard of step he had taken, and appealed to Russian Consul-General for protection. Latter telegraphed in cypher to Thran that if attempt was made to arrest these men, riots would begin again with renewed violence. There is no sympathy with these men in town, and there can be no mistaking significance of Russian action. It means that Russians are prepared to engineer riots here, with help of Persian subjects, in which bloodshed, pillage, and incendiarism take place, and to subsequently accord their protection to Persian subjects helping them, or, failing this, to covertly threaten to start riots afresh.

On behalf of British, British-Indian, and Afghan subjects here, I was for appeal for protection against this form of Russian terrorism. On their behalf, I also beg that Persian Government may be called upon to remove these two men and their associates from this province, as they constitute danger to lives and property of British-Indian and Afghan subjects. Muavin is man to whom Russians are now consigning wheat they are importing. If Russians persist in protecting these men against their Government, you are in position to effectively retaliate by formally taking under your protection Persian subjects of importance in the south. Afghan Agent here is man of some intelligence. He has told me that he is convinced that movement is work of Russians. He sends confidential reports to Ameer direct by mail of affairs here, and they are likely, if Russian intrigues completely succeed, to be very damaging to us. Secret Agent informs me that Afghan Agent has recently expressed his amazement at acceptance of new Customs Tariff by British Government.

(Repeated to Legation.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 369.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul-General Whyte.

(No. 34. Confidential.)
Sir,

Tehran, May 17, 1903.

THE Grand Vizier informed me on the 14th instant that the Rukn-ed-Dowleh had that day been appointed Governor-General of Khorassan, the Shah having accepted the resignation of the Nair-ed-Dowleh.

I said I feared I was too late to suggest the name of his Royal Highness the Moayyed-ed-Dowleh, the late special Envoy to the King's Coronation, who had asked for my support and for that of my Russian colleague. His Highness said that the Russian Minister had already pressed for his appointment, but that the Persian Government preferred the Rukn-ed-Dowleh, whose selection would be popular in Khorassan, which his father had already governed. The Rukn-ed-Dowleh was, I may remind you, a competitor for the post last Noruz, and bid higher than the Nair-ed-Dowleh. The latter's money was, however, regarded by the Court as more certain, the Rukn-ed-Dowleh being more profuse of promises of what he would give than of actual cash down.

I observed that, from the information I received from you, I adhered to the opinion I had formed that the Nair-ed-Dowleh had been the victim of circumstances, for which he was not himself to blame, and that I could not but think that he had received insufficient support. His Highness replied that there had been no intention of recalling him, and that as he had already told me the Ulema and others had been convinced that their demand for his removal could not be complied with, but that the Nair-ed-Dowleh had insisted as a condition of remaining that some dozen leading citizens of Meshed whom he regarded as responsible for the recent demonstration against him should be exiled, and as this would have been to invite a recurrence of trouble, the Government had considered the acceptance of his resignation as a lesser evil. He added that the reports brought from Meshed by the Agha Bashi Mutammad-ul-Haram, the chief eunuch of the Shah, who had just returned from a confidential mission to Meshed, had greatly influenced the Shah's decision in the matter.

It is evident to me that the Nair-ed-Dowleh miscalculated the strength of the support on which he could count at Court from the friendship of the Hajib-ed-Dowleh and Sepah Salar, and did not allow for the extreme timidity of the Shah, who was, I hear, prepared to recall him during the riots, as he did his own son, the Shua-es-Sultaneh, from Shiraz under similar circumstances, and was only dissuaded from doing so by the Grand Vizier, on the ground that this would be a sign of weakness. Perhaps he felt his position to be in any case untenable, and preferred to anticipate by a voluntary resignation the recall which would have probably followed a fresh outbreak.

He has, it seems, accepted the Russian decoration mentioned in your telegram No. 82 of the 16th May, for the Grand Vizier informed my interpreter last night that he applied some days ago for the Shah's permission to accept and wear a high class of the Russian Order of St. Anne, and had been informed that there was no objection to his doing so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 369.

Consul-General Whyte to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.)

Meshed, May 21, 1903.

YOUR despatch No. 33. Quarantine cordon received this morning. Russian note reveals, I think, exact position Russia means to take up. Threat to send British quarantine detachments to Seistan has apparently had no effect, and Russia doubtless counts upon either keeping her troops in Khorassan, or in forcing us to some action, which would be likely to bring up question of quarantine internationally, hoping then to bring up internationally question of Afghanistan's external relations. I think movement of Russia can be easily defeated (please refer to my telegram No. 72 of the 16th August last). Proposal to send quarantine detachments to Seistan did not originate with me. I adopted it when suggesting recently that as an answer to pressure of Russia

in these parts, strong quarantine detachments should be sent to Persian Gulf, more because it is important that we should not allow Russia to send detachments there than from any belief that such a step would cause her any uneasiness. In my opinion, Persian Gulf and Mohammerah are the points where we can cause her genuine apprehension.

May 19th, last Russian note. I should like to modify my suggestions. I would now respectfully suggest that we should notify to Persian Government that our objections are not so much directed against the cordon as against employment of Russian officers and troops on the cordon. The Persian Government might be also reminded that they have quite recently given assurances that they continue to regard Article VI of the Treaty of 1857 as binding them, and that in the event of any serious dispute arising with Afghan Government with regard to manner in which their quarantine arrangements at Karez are being carried out, they are bound by the Article of Treaty quoted to refer dispute to Foreign Office for settlement. They should have no difficulty in realizing that in such a contingency unpleasant complications would be likely to arise from fact of their quarantine arrangements being in the hands of Russian officers. In view then of the admitted responsibility which Great Britain incurs in matter of Perso-Afghan relations, she can justly claim to be heard on the subject of any quarantine measures which Persia may think it necessary to enforce on the Perso-Afghan frontier. If, however, Persia, with the view of showing her anxiety to meet Russia's wishes, desires to maintain quarantine observation post at Karez and other places on Afghan frontier, Great Britain would raise no objection, provided the control of arrangements is given to officers of some European nationality which Great Britain can regard as neutral. Existence of these posts should relieve Russia from any anxiety as to plague reaching Khorassan via Afghanistan.

With regard to contention that plague might reach Khorassan from the south, Venice Convention would appear clearly to apply.

Our position mobilization [*sic*] of routes across Afghanistan is not, in my opinion, strong, but I think Concession proposed, provided genuine neutrals are chosen, should dispose of Russian arguments for retention of their troops in Khorassan, and, if accepted, do us no material injury. On the other hand, if Russia declines to accept proposal, our position in this question will be, to my mind, vastly stronger than before. If any such arrangement as I propose should come about, I cannot, after a year's experience of Belgians in these parts, too strongly deprecate their being regarded as neutrals.

Inclosure 4 in No. 396.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul-General Whyte.

(No. 35.)

Sir,

Gulhek, May 26, 1903.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 89 of the 24th instant, and am transmitting a copy of it to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the messenger leaving to-morrow.

Without going so far as entirely to discard your suggestion that we should propose the substitution of "neutral" for Russian quarantine officers in Khorassan, I feel considerable doubts as to its utility, even if, which I think most unlikely, it were to commend itself to the Russian Government.

You have yourself pointed out that the Belgian Customs officials in Persia have not shown themselves impartial or considerate to British interests, and I see no reason to suppose that quarantine officers selected from one of the other minor States of the Continent, Dutchmen, Danes, or Swiss, would prove much more satisfactory than Belgians of the same class, though Danes or Swiss would probably be calmer and more conciliatory than representatives of the central European nationalities.

The faults of the Belgians, viz., a tendency to the arrogance and arbitrariness so frequently displayed by the Continental bureaucrat, and especially of the "fonctionnaire subalterne," an ignorance of the difference between Eastern and Western ways and habits, and a disposition to enforce, without regard to it, the minute regulations of civilized Europe among backward Asiatic populations, would probably be found in a scarcely lesser degree among officials from Holland, Switzerland, or Scandinavia, necessarily devoid of any practical administrative experience of Orientals, and would, as in the case of the Belgians, lead to constant friction both with us and with the Russians. We are not the only foreigners who complain of the Belgians; the Russians, at least here in

Tehran, are constantly engaged in angry disputes with them, and M. Vlassoff has gone so far as to hint that M. Naus is in the pay of His Majesty's Legation with the object of injuring Russian interests.

Moreover, the Russians might claim as a condition of their acquiescence in a "neutral" quarantine cordon in Khorassan that the English quarantine officers in the Persian Gulf should also be superseded by "neutrals," an arrangement which would hardly be welcomed by British shipping or commercial interests.

Your proposal will, however, I have no doubt, receive careful consideration at the hands of His Majesty's Government, which will send me its instructions on the whole question as soon as it has examined the Russian Legation's latest note, when I will address to you a further despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 370.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 76. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Gulhek, May 24, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on the recent proposals made by the Persian Government for the completion of the advance of the 4th April last:—

On the 7th instant M. Rabino, Chief Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, informed me that he had received an official application from M. Naus for another 100,000*l.* on account current, and M. Naus himself called on me on behalf of the Grand Vizier shortly afterwards to solicit my assistance in the matter. I inclose a copy of his Excellency's note to M. Rabino.

I told M. Naus that it would be useless for me to ask your Lordship to provide 100,000*l.*, repayable at short notice, as the point on which you had laid special stress in making the advance of the 4th April was that the repayment of the latter should be spread over a term of years; but that I was ready to ask you to increase that advance by the amount now applied for by his Highness on the same securities, and with the provision for a sinking fund which would bring up the annual payment to about 8 per cent. M. Naus seemed to think it certain that the Grand Vizier would accept these terms, which might be embodied in a Secret Article to be added to the Agreement of the 4th April, if he could not get the advance "à compte courant;" and I accordingly addressed to your Lordship, and repeated to the Viceroy, my telegram No. 61 of the 7th instant.

Upon this the Government of India objected to the completion of the advance unless the terms on which it was made were revised, and insisted—

1. That the southern customs should be made the only security; and
2. That the term, "Customs of Southern Persia," should be substituted for the term, "Customs of Fars and of the Persian Gulf."

The former condition would have been difficult; the latter (for reasons which I have explained in my despatch No. 69 of the 14th instant), one practically impossible of attainment.

I accordingly suggested, in my telegram No. 62 of the 9th instant, that, instead of His Majesty's Government providing the funds to complete the advance, they should merely assist the Imperial Bank to furnish 50,000*l.* on account current (payable out of the southern customs), on the lines indicated by your Lordship in your telegram No. 28 of the 3rd August, 1900. This sum, plus 50,000*l.*, which the Persian Government have lately repaid to the Imperial Bank out of our advance of the 4th April, would have met the requirements of the Persian Government, and would have brought up the British stake in the revenues of Persia to nearly 500,000*l.*—a modest sum, no doubt, compared with the 3,250,000*l.* of the Russian loans, but still a substantial element of influence.

The nature of my suggestion was—perhaps owing to my own fault in impairing its clearness by attempted conciseness—not quite understood by your Lordship; for it was evident from your telegram No. 46 of the 11th May that you supposed me to be supporting the Grand Vizier's original proposal for the completion of the advance on account current and without adequate security, whereas I merely mentioned this proposal incidentally as one which I had myself put aside, in so far as direct assistance from His Majesty's Government was concerned.

As soon as it was clear that your Lordship was prepared to complete the advance on

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the security of the southern customs, I called on his Highness and explained your views. I was spared the necessity of touching upon the question of the definition of these customs, for his Highness (who had evidently made up his mind that the present moment would not be opportune for such an arrangement as I had suggested) pretended that M. Naus had misunderstood his instructions, which were not to negotiate for a Government advance, such as that of the 4th April, through the nominal agency of the Imperial Bank, but to borrow from the latter institution, if possible, in the ordinary course of business. I therefore dropped the subject, as I thought it unwise to seem too anxious to lend the Persian Government money, and merely said that, should the Grand Vizier desire later on the completion of the advance which we had made in April, he would find us ready for it upon easy and reasonable conditions.

He has now obtained 50,000*l.* on account current from the Imperial Bank of Persia. The latter can provide this amount out of its capital without running counter to the terms of its Concession, as the debt of 200,000*l.* incurred in April 1901 has been reduced by annual repayments to about 150,000*l.*, and the 40,000*l.* borrowed in February last has been repaid out of the 200,000*l.* advanced by us. He has also asked the Banque d'Escompte, through M. Naus, if they would be prepared to lend him 200,000 tomans (about 40,000*l.*) on account current and without conditions; and M. Grube has referred the question to M. de Witte, but had not, when I last saw M. Naus yesterday, received any reply from St. Petersburg.

Even if the reply from the Russian Government is in the negative, or is fettered with political conditions which will oblige the Grand Vizier to reject it, he will, I imagine, be able with the 50,000*l.* borrowed from the Imperial Bank to tide over the next few months. The most pressing demand which he has to satisfy is one for about 30,000*l.* on account of arrears of pay due to the troops.

In the meantime, he has displayed his appreciation of the service rendered by the Imperial Bank by making the mintage arrangement described in my telegram No. 72 of the 21st instant.

The reasons for the Grand Vizier's reluctance to borrow another 100,000*l.* from us on the same lines as, or on lines similar to, those of the Agreement of the 4th April, are, I believe, partly unwillingness to propose it to the Shah, and partly fear of Russian resentment.

The Shah was, as I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my despatch No. 47 of the 6th April, very much opposed to making the southern customs even a collateral security for an English advance. Unfriendly influences have made him believe that we are bent on obtaining possession of the Gulf ports and of Seistan, and my insistence in the matter of the advance of the 4th April on the "southern customs" aroused, or rather confirmed, already existing suspicions in his mind. The Atabeg-i-Azam's enemies, on the other hand, have persuaded His Majesty that the pledging of the northern customs in 1900 was a very grave error, and he is unwilling to repeat it in the south, and thus assign the whole of his custom-houses to foreign creditors. He accordingly, for some time, resisted my suggestion. When the Atabeg first made it he exclaimed, "Ne misheved" (It won't do), and even after he had been talked over by M. Naus he held the draft Agreement for half-an-hour in his hand in a hesitating manner, just as he did the Tabreez Road Concession last year, before he would actually initial it. The Grand Vizier, therefore, shrank from a further proposal to him to assign the southern customs for twenty years, especially as he feared that his opponents at the Court, whom the Shah now consults much more than formerly, would use the proposal against him, and might possibly even betray it to the Russians. "A proposal of that kind," he said to M. Naus, "had better come from the Shah himself; he is sure to ask me for more money sooner or later, and it would be more politic that it should not originate with me."

His Highness is, moreover, aware that the Russian Legation and Bank are watching him with a good deal of suspicion, and that an increase, to the amount of 100,000*l.*, of his borrowings from us would at once become known to M. Vlassoff, and might convert the latter from a doubtful friend into an open enemy. As he is not in very urgent or immediate need of the money, or at least of all of it, and is not being pressed to supply it by the Shah, he prefers, in his usual procrastinating spirit, to put off a fresh unpleasant discussion with the Russian Legation, and to obtain the funds he wants by degrees in the form of small advances theoretically repayable at short notice, which attract comparatively little attention.

He told me on the 22nd instant that M. Vlassoff had just cross-questioned him as to the truth of a report that he was again obtaining money from English sources, and that he had answered that he had authorized M. Naus to borrow a sum of between

50,000*l.* and 100,000*l.*, repayable at short notice, by drafts on the customs, from the various local banks, but that he had left the details of the transaction entirely in his hands as Administrator-General of Customs, and was not yet aware what arrangements, if any, had been made by him; these would, however, doubtless involve dealings both with the Imperial Bank and the Banque d'Escompte.

I should mention, before closing this despatch, that I have endeavoured indirectly to sound the Atabeg-i-Azam, through Abbas Kuli Khan, as to the question of a cash payment or subsidy, as suggested by His Majesty's Government, in return for the grant to us of certain political guarantees. I have the honour to inclose a Memorandum by Abbas Kuli Khan of a conversation on the subject with his Highness. It is evident that the Atabeg did not regard the suggestion as a serious one (and I told Abbas Kuli Khan to throw it out only as his own, and not appear to be making it by my instruction), but he did not dismiss it as impracticable, and it is possible that, should his financial anxieties again assume an acute form, he may give it more careful consideration. His great difficulty would probably be the impossibility of getting the Shah to keep it secret, and the danger that its betrayal might result in some extreme step being taken by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 370.

M. Naus to M. Rabino.

Monsieur,

Téhéran, le 7 Avril, 1903.

LA mise en vigueur du nouveau régime douanier a eu pour conséquence, ainsi qu'il fallait d'ailleurs le prévoir, d'infliger un relentissement momentané au mouvement des importations. Beaucoup de négociants attendent l'écoulement complet de leurs stocks de marchandises avant de se décider à renouveler leurs commandes à l'étranger.

Durant cette période transitoire les recettes des douanes demeureront forcément inférieures aux prévisions basées sur les besoins normaux de la consommation et on doit escompter qu'il s'écoulera peut-être à peu près une année avant que le nouveau régime douanier produise le chiffre de recettes prévu, lequel devra alors atteindre environ six kourours de tomans.

Afin de parer aux inconvénients qui résultent pour le service de la Trésorerie de cet état de choses passager, Sa Majesté le Schah et son Altesse l'Atabeg Azam m'ont autorisé à négocier avec l'Imperial Bank of Persia une avance de 100,000*l.*, qui serait mise en compte courant à la disposition de l'Administration des Douanes pour me permettre d'effectuer avec la régularité désirable les paiements ordonnés par le Gouvernement sur la caisse des Douanes. Si après l'expiration d'une année la rentrée normale des recettes n'avait pas rétabli l'équilibre entre les recettes et les sorties du compte courant des Douanes, le Gouvernement aurait à se mettre d'accord avec l'Imperial Bank of Persia sur le mode et les termes du remboursement.

J'ai l'honneur de vous en soumettre la proposition en vous priant de me faire connaître s'il entre dans les convenances de l'Imperial Bank of Persia d'y souscrire et, le cas échéant, à quelles conditions.

Veillez, &c.
(Signé) NAUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 370.

Memorandum.

(Confidential.)

IN an interview I had to-day with the Atabeg-i-Azam, his Highness, in the course of conversation, referred to the financial situation of Persia, and I, as you had desired, took the opportunity of sounding him as to whether the Persian Government would be prepared to accept, until they have reformed their finances, assistance in the form of a subsidy or cash payment from His Majesty's Government, if the latter at any time deemed it desirable to make such an offer.

His Highness remarked that such an offer did not seem to him likely to be made, or, if made, it could not be free from hard conditions. I intimated, that, considering the

desire of His Majesty's Government for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia, the conditions of such an offer, if made, would probably be acceptable to the Persian Government. His Highness then wished to know what I thought the conditions were likely to be. I said His Majesty's Government might, perhaps, ask for certain privileges in Southern Persia, such as the right of priority in making roads, railways, or factories; they might ask for a guarantee that no territory or port on the Persian Gulf shall be alienated to any foreign Power, or they might try to come to some understanding with the Persian Government not to renew its agreement with Russia which prevents the construction of railways in Persia.

With regard to the cession of territory or a port to a foreign Power, his Highness said the Persian Government did not contemplate and would never consent to such a step, and a stipulation to that effect seemed therefore superfluous.

With regard to the Russian Railway Agreement, his Highness remarked that at the time he did his best, but without success, to dissuade the late Shah from making this Agreement, which he knew the Russians would never give up. Without saying it in so many words, he intimated that it would not be easy for the Shah to resist a demand by Russia for a further prolongation of the period.

On the whole, his Highness thought the conditions suggested by me presented considerable difficulties, and might be deemed to tie the hands of Persia in other respects as completely as those of the Loan Contract of 1900 had done as regards money matters.

At the conclusion of our conversation the Atabeg, however, hinted that should the question of a subsidy ever come forward, its conditions could then be discussed, thus evidently implying that he did not wish his criticism on my suggestion to be regarded as a rejection in principle of the idea.

(Signed) ABBAS KULI.

Tehran, May 16, 1903.

No. 371.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 78. Confidential.)

Gulhek, May 26, 1903.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the monthly summary of events in Persia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 371.

Monthly Summary of Events in Persia, not reported in separate Despatches.

Tehran.

A STRIKE of the employés of the Post Office took place about a fortnight ago, the pretext of which was the insolence of one of the Armenian officials, but which M. Naus believes to have been instigated by the Vazir-i-Humayum (a royal jester and buffoon, who was at one time Minister of Posts, and who was lately exiled for a year for conspiring against the Grand Vizier), with the object of discrediting the Belgian Administration and, indirectly, the Atabeg-i-Asam himself, and of stirring up Moslem fanaticism. The strikers took sanctuary in the Shah's stables, and prevented the horses being taken out for His Majesty's usual drive, demanding justice for themselves and for Islam. This, however, proved an error in tactics, as it only served to irritate the Shah, and he supported M. Naus, and sanctioned the punishment of the ringleaders, who have been banished to Ardebil.

There is still much talk of a reform of the Maliat, and reductions in expenditure on a small scale have been effected by the dismissal of some superfluous officials, and by cutting down the emoluments of others. The Atabeg-i-Asam is said to be preparing a draft scheme for submission to the Shah.

The Shah has refused to renew the contract of Mr. Dellagana, an English veterinary

surgeon employed in the Royal Stables. This gentleman was unfortunate enough to offend the Shams-ul-Mulk, under whom the stables are, by too great an inquisitiveness into some of the grosser abuses in their management, and as the Shams-ul-Mulk is the son of the Ain-ed-Dowleh, who is now the most influential person in the Shah's entourage, the two easily set His Majesty against him. Hearing that the new Cossack Colonel meant to take advantage of this opportunity in order to apply for a new veterinary surgeon from Russia, nominally for his brigade, Sir A. Hardinge asked the Grand Vizier if this was the case, and was assured that this application would not be entertained by the Persian Government, as the latter wished to reduce and not to increase the cost of the brigade, and had cut down Colonel Tchernozuboff's estimates.

Ispahan.

M. Van Roosebroeck, Inspector-General of Posts, who was reported in my last diary as having left for Yezd, proceeded to Shiraz instead, having received instructions at the last moment to go there in connection with the recent postal robberies in the south.

In spite of the plentiful supply of water and the good prospect of the crops prices remain high.

Shiraz.

The new Governor is showing great energy in restoring order, and steps have been taken to recover property recently stolen by the Kashkai tribe, and for the arrest of the robbers who attacked the Residency courier.

The roads are now reported to be safe.

Astrabad.

In a recent disturbance in the town about thirty men were wounded.

The inhabitants of Kurd Mahaleh recently revolted against the authorities on account of the oppressive conduct of the Governor. They defeated and expelled the Cossack garrison.

Bushire.

Herr von Mutins, the new German Consul, arrived on the 23rd March.

Mr. McLeon returned from Shiraz on the 25th March and left for Bunder Abbas.

In reply to a communication from the Grand Vizier to the effect that the new Tariff is for the benefit of the country and must be enforced at once, the merchants have declared that they cannot agree that the Tariff is beneficial to the country and people, that they cannot bear the burden imposed by it, and that if it is enforced they will have to stop their business. They therefore again request a grace of three months to enable them to clear their goods now lying in the Custom-house.

Sheikh Husein, Chief of Chakoota, having refused to come to Bushire in compliance with the Governor's summons, his Excellency dispatched an expedition against him. Chakoota was captured, but the Sheikh managed to escape.

News has been received from Bussorah that the Turkish transport "Adna" left there on the 3rd April with one battalion of recruits for El-Hasa.

A boat with a large cargo of arms and ammunition coming from Muscat was recently captured by the Persian Government ship "Muzaferi." The boat is the property of two Persians of Bushire, who have taken sanctuary with one of the leading Mullahs. The arms and ammunition are said to belong to two Koweit merchants.

Mohammerah.

The Beni Truf have not yet paid up the arrears of revenue, but have given the sons of two of their Sheikhs to the Sirdar Arfa as hostages.

An act of piracy with murder has been committed near Zein on the Turkish side, opposite Mohammerah. Some arrests have been made.

The Nasir-ul-Mulk, until recently Guardian of the Shrine at Meshed, has been appointed Vazir to the Salar-ed-Dowleh, Prince Governor of Arabistan.

Resht.

The Chief Engineer of the Russian Road Company is very much dissatisfied with the condition of the road between Piri Bazaar and Imam Zadeh Hashem.

In consequence of his recommendations, two powerful automobiles are being sent out for the purpose of drawing trains of carts, in which it is proposed to bring ballast from the mountains, the gravel which has so far been used being quite useless.

M. Ziedler talks despondently of the road, and evidently considers it a white elephant.

There has recently been considerable agitation against the Babis, and several disturbances have taken place, instigated by the Mollahs and students.

The perpetrators of various outrages against the members of this sect have been severely dealt with by the Nasr-es-Sultaneh, Governor of Ghilan, who is himself suspected of being a Babi.

Two of the leading Babis have now left Resht, and there is a prospect of the agitation quieting down.

Seistan.

Major Benn reports that Colonel McMahon crossed the Helmund and made a formal entry into Persian territory on the 16th March, camping at Pokak.

On the following day he held a Durbar for the first reception of the Persian Commissioners. The Durbar, which was a most imposing spectacle, did not fail to impress the local Persian officials.

A report has reached Major Benn that the Persian Mamours are somewhat perturbed at the number of British officers who are "wandering about the country" on survey work.

The difficulties in obtaining supplies for the Consulate still continue, and the prices charged are most exorbitant.

The new Persian telegraph line from Meshed reached Neh about the 24th March, and an office has now been opened there. There is likely to be some delay before the line reaches Nasratabad. It is said that the Russian engineer proposes to examine the routes to Seistan before prolonging the line any further. There are two routes to choose from. One across the Hamun, which is the most direct, and the other a more circuitous one via Aliabad and Madeh (along the Palang Kuh Valley) to Sehbuk, and thence to the capital. The latter, which is the one which will probably be adopted, while avoiding the Hamun, has many disadvantages owing to its inaccessibility from the city and its lack of water. The line is not expected to reach Nasratabad till the middle of May at the earliest. A telegraph office is being constructed in the new Customs inclosure.

Mr. Clementson, agent of Messrs. Forbes, Forbes and Co., is desirous of opening up the export trade of Seistan. He states that his firm are anxious for him to buy all the wool procurable, and gradually divert the flow of this commodity from the Khorassan market into his own hands, and this before the Seistan market is flooded by the subsidized Russian traders who are reported to be coming to Seistan very shortly. If this export trade can be developed it will in a small degree counterbalance the loss in imports by the Nushki route, which must necessarily attend the introduction of the new Tariff. It is also hoped that it will tend to secure a steady supply of return loads to India, the absence of which has hitherto deterred Indian camel owners from using the Nushki route to any extent.

Captain Plunkett, Assistant to His Majesty's Consul in Seistan, whose period of deputation to Seistan expired at the beginning of the month, left on the 11th March, visiting the Helmund Arbitration Commission on his way. Major Benn states that Captain Plunkett has done very useful work in the interests of the Intelligence Department. He has carefully traversed the whole of Seistan, and has acquired an intimate knowledge of the country from a military point of view.

Mr. Miller, the Russian Consul, has informed Major Benn that his application for leave has been granted, but that he has orders not to leave Seistan until the Helmund Commission has left the country. Dr. Miller, who stated that he would remain for another three months, will probably act for his brother.

It is stated by the Customs employés that the post of Director of Customs in Seistan is to be done away with, and that in future only an Assistant Director will remain there. If this is true, M. Maurice will leave shortly and M. Dhoedt will remain

in charge of the Seistan bureau. The reason given for this reduction is that the new Customs Tariff will so diminish the import trade from India that there will not be sufficient trade to justify the appointment of two European officers.

Meshed.

The Sarakhs agent reports that no fresh troops have been brought to Russian Sarakhs, and it is not known with what object the seven guns, the arrival of which was reported in his last diary, have been brought there.

The Russian Bank is sending a large caravan to Seistan with piece-goods, kerosene, sugar, and china.

The Commander-in-chief of Herat has received a rebuke from the Amir for having invited Captain Fisher to that place, but its mild nature has greatly relieved the apprehensions of the Governor-General.

The Amir has ordered that every attention is to be paid to Captain Fisher, but the latter suspects that his letter contains a hint that he should be discouraged from remaining longer than necessary, and His Highness is sending a special doctor from Cabul.

There have been no further disturbances at Meshed.

It is reported from Turbat-i-Haidari that the Russians have brought a military signaller there, and that he works in the Persian telegraph office, using his own instrument.

(Signed) WILLIAM A. F. ERSKINE.

Tehran, May 27, 1903.

Inclosure 2 in No. 371.

Notes on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia for the Week ending April 25, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

March 27.—10 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 211 boxes of ammunition and 3 boxes containing rifles were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

March 28.—5 infantry and 2 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 2 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched in the direction of Ashkabad.

March 31.—13 waggon-loads of dried provisions were dispatched in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 1.—22 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 12 infantry and 6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 34 packages of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 2.—8 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, April 25, 1903.

Inclosure 3 in No. 371.

Notes on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia for Week ending May 2, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

April 4.—16 packages of clothing and 2 boxes containing rifles were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 4 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 5.—2 waggon-loads of supplies and 81 packages of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 15 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 5 infantry and 12 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 6.—22 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 8.—31 infantry and 8 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 3 waggon-loads of supplies and 800 boxes of dried provisions were dispatched in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 10.—7 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia; 3 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 6 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 2.—108 Cossacks, with horses, left Merv in the direction of Shaikh Junaid; 6 waggon-loads of flour were dispatched from Merv in the direction of Shaikh Junaid.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, May 2, 1903.

Inclosure 4 in No. 371.

Notes on Russian Military Movements in Trans-Caspia for the Week ending May 9, 1903.

THE following information has been furnished by news-writers:—

April 11.—14 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 8 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 13.—9 infantry and 3 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 14.—11 waggon-loads of dried bread and other provisions were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 15.—45 boxes of ammunition and 1 waggon-load of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 16.—6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 27 boxes of ammunition were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 4 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 17.—10 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 2 waggon-loads of supplies, 2 guns, and 55 boxes of ammunition were dispatched in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 18.—9 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 33 packages of clothing were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 4 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 19.—9 infantry and 6 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 7 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 5 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 21.—12 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 3 waggon-loads of supplies were dispatched from Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 22.—230 boxes of ammunition passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad; 22 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

April 23.—5 Cossacks passed through Krasnovodsk on their way to Russia.

April 24.—9 infantry passed through Krasnovodsk in the direction of Ashkabad.

(Signed) J. F. WHYTE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul-General.

Meshed, May 9, 1903.

No. 372.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 80.)

My Lord,

Gulahek, May 26, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 73 of the 24th instant, a copy of the note which I am sending to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh respecting the separation of the customs of Arabistan from those of Fars and of the rest of the Persian Gulf.

M. Naus informs me that the "Règlement Douanier" now in course of negotiation with the Russian Legation will probably not be concluded for some months. The draft which he submitted immediately after the ratification of the Russo-Persian Commercial Declaration has come back from St. Petersburg with a number of amendments, which M. Vlassoff declines to discuss, and expects him to accept without question. This he refuses to do, and he is now drawing up fresh counter-proposals

which will have to be again submitted to the Russian Government, as the Russian Minister insists on referring every point in them home. As an instance of this, he told me that an article in which he had provided on the subject of fines, that the Central Customs Authority might modify them on appeal from the local authorities, had been altered under a misapprehension at St. Petersburg. He had written "l'Autorité Centrale aura le droit de lever ou d'abaisser les amendes." The Russian Foreign Office mistaking the meaning of "lever," and supposing it to signify "élever," had struck out this word, and though he had explained to M. Vlassoff that its real meaning was to "remit," and not to "raise," the latter would not agree to its insertion, in this sense and with this explanation, without a further reference to St. Petersburg.

He has promised, however, to let me have the papers on the subject as soon as his reply to the Russian proposals is ready, which it will be in about ten days' time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 372.

Sir A. Hardinge to Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency,

May 24, 1903.

HIS Majesty's Resident at Bushire reported early this year to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Legation at Tehran that the Customs Administration of Arabistan had been separated from that of the remaining ports of Southern Persia which are under the "Direction Générale" of Bushire, and had been constituted into a separate division with a Director-General of its own at Mohammerah.

The Government of India has called the attention of His Majesty's Government to this new arrangement, and I am now instructed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to address your Excellency respecting it.

His Lordship anticipates that the separation of Mohammerah for customs purposes from the other ports of the Persian Gulf might, in the absence of a clear declaration to the contrary, give rise to an impression that the customs revenues of Arabistan were excluded from the term "Customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf," used in the Russian Loan contracts of 1900 and 1902, and were therefore pledged to the service of the loans created by those two agreements.

It will be within your Excellency's recollection that in March 1900, just after the conclusion of the first Russian Loan, Mr. Spring Rice was instructed by Lord Salisbury to point out to you, in connection with customs changes at Mohammerah, that the customs of that port could not, in view of the engagement given us by the Persian Government in 1897, be included in the guarantee for the Russian Loan. In May 1902, after the conclusion of the second Russian Loan, I had the honour, in obedience to an instruction from Lord Lansdowne, to remind the Persian Government of the above engagement, and to state that, being anterior to both the Russian Loan Agreements, it could not in our view be affected by any of their provisions, whatever the construction placed on them.

I am personally convinced that the Persian Government, in separating the Customs Administration of Mohammerah and its dependent stations on the Karun from that of the rest of the Persian Gulf, was guided exclusively by considerations of administrative convenience, and I reported as much to Lord Lansdowne on the strength of a statement made to me to that effect, in an unofficial conversation, by M. Naus. But his Lordship would deem it more satisfactory if I could send him an official assurance from your Excellency that the above was the only reason for the change, and that Mohammerah and its dependencies, including all the ports of Arabistan, are still comprised with the remaining southern custom-houses in the term "Fars and the ports of the Persian Gulf" employed in the loan contracts above mentioned.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 373.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 81. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 27, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report that the long struggle between the Court party and the Grand Vizier has culminated in a perhaps temporary, but none the less striking, victory for the latter. His Highness, finding his position one of daily increasing difficulty, boldly told the Shah that he could not reform the finances unless the Hakim-ul-Mulk and the Vazir Afkham, the two most active members of the Opposition, were removed from His Majesty's Councils, and he supported his arguments by accusing these Ministers of having inspired certain anonymous pamphlets of a seditious character which have recently been circulated, and which attack the policy of the Persian Government, and do not spare the Shah himself. The Hakim-ul-Mulk's friends assert that these pamphlets are composed by a Mollah in the pay of the Grand Vizier, and that the Shah is aware of this, but that he has been induced to yield to his Highness' demands by fear that unless he does so he will not be able to obtain the funds for the European tour next summer on which he is at present bent.

His Majesty accordingly sent for the Hakim-ul-Mulk two days ago, told him that the Grand Vizier complained that his opposition was paralyzing the work of financial reorganization, and asked what he should do. The Hakim-ul-Mulk (I am giving the latter's own account of what passed) begged to be allowed to resign his appointment as Vezir-i-Derbar and to leave Tehran, and he asked for the vacant Legation at Vienna. The Shah, alleging that this post was too distant, offered him, and he accepted, the Governor-Generalship of Ghilam. His Majesty, who displayed great emotion at the prospect of their separation, assured him that he would not remain long there, and that he would within two months recall him, but I think the Hakim-ul-Mulk would be unwise to place too much confidence in this promise.

The Vazir Afkham was at the same time offered the Governorship of Yezd, which he had no option but to accept.

The Royal Harem was greatly agitated at this triumph of the Atabeg's, and I hear from a Palace source that the ladies, and especially the chief wife, Hezret Oliah, overwhelmed the Shah with such bitter reproaches for his weakness, that he beat a hasty retreat from the "anderoon."

Whether the next few days may not see some sudden or startling change it is difficult to say, but for the moment the Court party is disorganized and terror stricken, and it looks as though the Atabeg, whose star had been steadily waning for the last few months, had recovered all his ancient authority.

Meanwhile, a fresh Palace incident has been provided by the flight of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh, the Shah's second son, who, after repeated applications to be made Minister of War or given a Governorship, or else to be allowed to travel abroad, has suddenly quitted Tehran without leave, with the avowed object of proceeding to Europe. Orders have been telegraphed to stop him at Kazvin or Enzelli. The Governor of Kazvin has, however, failed to give effect to them, but even if he is not arrested at Rcsht or Enzelli, he will doubtless be refused a passage on the Russian steamer. Should he nevertheless succeed in reaching Baku, he will very likely be sent back by the Russians, who regard him with no friendly feelings.

At first sight I thought it possible that the flight of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh might be connected with the removal from Tehran of the Hakim-ul-Mulk and the Vazir Afkham, as his Royal Highness is also a bitter enemy of the Atabeg's, but I find that this is apparently not the case.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 374.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 22. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Gulahek, May 24, 1903.

M. NAUS spoke to me yesterday about the commercial relations between Persia and Afghanistan.

The effect of the new Persian Tariff is to exempt almost all Afghan imports,

No. 374°.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.—(Communicated by India Office, June 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 12, 1903.

WITH reference to your telegram about Seistan of the 31st ultimo, instructions have now been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to represent officially to the Persian Government that the Goldsmid line should be included in the scope of the arbitration, using similar language to that which, as reported in his telegram of the 6th June, he has already used unofficially to the Persian Foreign Minister.

which are chiefly wool, hides, and live stock, from duty altogether, and greatly to diminish the revenue which Persia formerly derived from her duties upon them under the old 5 per cent. *ad valorem* régime.

The Afghans, on the other hand, continue to impose on Persian imports into their country an average duty of more than 10 per cent.

Under the Law of the 26th February last, inclosed in my despatch No. 4, Commercial, of the 14th February, Persia is free to impose a duty double that provided by the new Tariff, and of 10 per cent. *ad valorem* in the case of articles which the new Tariff treats as free, on the imports of all countries which do not give to her produce the treatment of the most favoured nation, and as she has no Treaty of commerce guaranteeing her this privilege with Afghanistan she would, strictly speaking, be within her rights in imposing this duty on Afghan imports. She has not, so far, attempted to do so, but M. Naus said that she might have to consider the question unless some arrangement as to reciprocal Tariffs could be come to with the Government of Cabul, and he asked for my opinion on the subject.

I said that I saw *à priori* no reason why an arrangement such as that which he had indicated should not be negotiated through His Majesty's Government, which would be in virtue of our political agreements with the Amir, the proper channel for a discussion of this nature, and that I was ready, if he wished, to consult your Lordship and the Viceroy on the subject.

The question presents many difficulties, the chief of them being the inability of the Persian Government to reduce its duties on any imports into its territory without the consent of Russia; but I think we might render a service both to Persia and Afghanistan, and improve the relations of the two countries, besides increasing our own influence and prestige in both, if we could arrange some commercial agreement between them.

M. Naus does not regard it as a very urgent matter, and has promised to confer with me about it again later on; but I should be glad in the meantime to be favoured with the views entertained respecting it by your Lordship and the Government of India.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 375.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident at Aden, dated the 14th June, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 15, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 375.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, June 14, 1903.

IN continuation of my telegram about the Shaibi border of the 12th instant.

I have heard from Wahab that a surveyor has already gone to [?]. Perhaps there is no great harm in this, though for the present I should have preferred that no move should be made for the present in a north-easterly direction.

(Repeated to India Office, Bombay, and Constantinople.)

No. 376.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 15.)(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*Gulahek, June 13, 1903.*

PROPOSED action at Kerbela and Nejef.

My telegram No. 81 of the 13th June.

I have sent the following telegram to His Majesty's Resident at Bagdad. Would your Lordship authorize latter to give the message, should you think its language judicious, and to inform me of the reply he receives?

"There have been disturbances at Ispahan against the Babis and at Tabreez against the Belgian Customs. The Persian Government attribute these to orders which Agha Sharabiani has issued from Kerbela.

"I understand that the latter is in receipt of funds from the Oudh bequest. I have accordingly suggested to the Grand Vizier that means might be found by us of representing to him the dangers which incitements of this kind involve.

"I should be glad if, on receipt of authority from Lord Lansdowne to do so, you would convey to him from me some such message as the following, with whatever polite amplifications etiquette may require:—

"The political interests of the British Government are identical with those of Persia, of whose independence it is a firm supporter. To take a small matter, its administration of the Oudh bequest is one of many proofs of the respect with which it regards the Mahomedan religion, which millions of its people profess, and it will never favour any measures which could cause Persia weakness or injury. Appeals to religious hatred are, however, likely to do far more harm than good, and it deprecates strongly all such. Not only Russia, but Turkey and England have agreed to the new Persian Tariff, whatever may be said for or against it, and it is only by negotiations with these three Powers that it can be changed, and such negotiations would entail great difficulties. Let the Hazarat address, in a loyal and respectful manner, to the Shah or Grand Vizier any complaints which they may have against the Persian Government, and at the same time discourage the clergy here from making use of any language which might be misunderstood by the ignorant as an incitement to violence or riots."

"(Secret.)

"It is desirable at present to strengthen our influence with the Persian Government by exerting it in a manner favourable to it at Kerbela; but I should also wish myself to enter into such friendly personal relations with the Chief Priests as would enable me to use them as a lever, if necessary, with the Persian Government should the latter show signs of contracting fresh loans with Russia or following an unfriendly policy.

"If, therefore, by a friendly and sympathetic attitude you could encourage explanations of their views and real objects, which I suspect to be mainly directed against Russian preponderance here, and, if possible, get them to send me a letter, it would help me."

I was informed yesterday by the Russian Minister that the Tabreez disturbances had spread to Ardebil and Urmi. Religious riots have to-day broken out against the Babis at Yezd.

No. 377.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 16.)

Sir,

India Office, June 15, 1903.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Hardinge's letter of the 25th ultimo, inclosing a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, deprecating a proposed reduction in the staff of the Tehran-Bushire section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

In reply, I am to say that his Lordship concurs in the view taken by Lord Lansdowne as to the inexpediency on political grounds of a reduction of the number of British telegraph officials in Southern and Central Persia, at all events for the present.

A copy of this letter will be communicated to the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, whose note explaining his action in the matter is herewith inclosed for Lord Lansdowne's information.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure in No. 377.

Note on Foreign Office Letter, dated May 25, 1903, on subject of Reduction of the Telegraph Staff on the line Tehran to Bushire.

ON the 10th March, 1903, I wrote to the Director of Telegraphs at Tehran, saying that I could not satisfy myself that the two Sub-divisional Officers and four Inspectors, all Europeans and senior men on good pay, were now needed for the effective maintenance of the 692 miles of line between Tehran and Bushire. I asked him if, in his opinion, this large staff was really wanted. I told him that, taking into consideration the existing conditions as regards roads, and the improved attitude of the inhabitants to the telegraph line and establishment, I thought one Sub-Divisional Officer and three Inspectors were sufficient staff for the section of the line in question.

On receipt of my letter, the Director consulted His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and, as the correspondence now forwarded by the Foreign Office shows, Sir A. Hardinge is opposed to any reduction of the staff.

I would state that in making my proposal for reducing establishment I did not lose sight of the political side of the question. It appeared to me that with the appointment of a Consul-General at Ispahan the necessity of keeping a Sub-Divisional Officer there had been removed, and that with three Inspectors travelling over the same ground that four do at present, there would be no loss of intercourse between these officials and the inhabitants of the country.

If the political value of the Telegraph officials is so great in Persia, it follows that this Department is now by the construction of the Central Persia line doing a work of very great political importance. This line is proving a costly one to construct and will be so to maintain. The transfer to it of one or two men, who can well be spared departmentally from the Tehran-Bushire section, will affect a saving, and at the same time, it appears to me, will only move the sphere of their influence to localities where it will be more useful both politically and departmentally.

Sir A. Hardinge suggests that the opportunity should be taken of reconsidering the policy of this Department of sacrificing all other interests including political considerations to the paramount one of economy. I do not think it can be admitted that such a policy exists, and it seems to me that the fact of the Department having obtained sanction for the construction of an alternative line through Central Persia is a sufficient answer to this.

(Signed) H. A. KIRK.

June 2, 1903.

No. 378.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th June, relative to Kerbela affairs.

India Office, June 16, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 378.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 15, 1903.

WITH reference to the telegram of the 10th June from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, we are taking steps to appoint to Kerbela, as Vice-Consul or Consular Agent, Mirza Muhammad Hassan Mohsin. He is a man of intelligence and conversant with Persian politics. We are also regulating the business of the Oudh bequest. By these means we shall be in a position to exercise control over the principal people at Kerbela and Najaf. I shall send papers by an early mail.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 379.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 15th June, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 17, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 379.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 15, 1903.

WITH reference to Maitland's telegrams of the 12th and 14th instant. His letter forwarding the telegram from the Commissioners will be awaited. The Commission might in the meanwhile, I think, provided no difficulty or risk is incurred, continue to survey the Shaibi frontier, the nearest portion of which is shown marked green on the map accompanying the report of the 2nd December.

(Repeated to Aden.)

No. 380.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Resident, Aden, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 17, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 380.

Resident, Aden, to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, June 9, 1903.

AMIRI boundary. Final report and map prepared by Wahab reached London by last mail (see my telegram of the 28th May), and by next mail you will receive my covering letter to the Government of India. First alternative line of demarcation, viz., green line modified according to configuration of (?) ground and tribal boundary, is the only one I can support.

Inclosure 2 in No. 380.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, June 9, 1903.

WAHAB telegraphs, 6th June:—

"No. 274. No claims, except as regards Dakkam and Ukla, have been made to Turks, nor proposed to His Majesty's Government, by British Commissioners, see letter from Resident, Aden, dated the 30th May, paragraph 4. We have confined ourselves, Turks having forced reference home, to stating facts fully in light favourable to Ameer, as has been done on their side by the Turks, but we have left it to his Majesty's Government to decide what claims are expedient, after pointing out the solution which the facts themselves suggest."

(Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay and Constantinople.)

No. 381.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch to the Government of India, dated the 12th instant, relative to the seizure of supplies and camels belonging to the Seistan Arbitration Commission by the Persian Customs authorities.

India Office, June 17, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 381.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord,

India Office, June 12, 1903.

I INCLOSE herewith, for the information of your Excellency's Government, a copy of letters which have passed between this Office and the Foreign Office with reference to the Secret letter from the Government of India of the 23rd April last.*

Your Excellency will see that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, no further action is necessary in regard to the seizure of supplies and camels belonging to the Seistan Arbitration Commission by the Persian Customs authorities in March, regard being had to the attitude of the Persian Government in the matter, and to M. Naus' explanations, reported in Sir A. Hardinge's telegrams of the 13th and 21st March last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 382.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 17th instant, relative to Kerbela affairs.

India Office, June 18, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 382.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 17, 1903.

HIS Majesty's Government will not issue orders to the Resident in Turkish Arabia upon the communication to Aga Sharabiani at Kerbele, referred to in Hardinge's telegram of the 15th instant, until they are in possession of your views. Send them as early as possible by telegraph.

No. 383.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 17th instant, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 18, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 383.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 17, 1903.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 1st instant about Aden, His Majesty's Government concur in the view that the conclusion of Treaties with the Upper Yaffai, Upper Aulaki, including, if necessary, Lower Behan, and Beda must, in the circumstances stated in Maitland's telegram of the 26th ultimo, be proceeded with. With regard to eventual delimitation to the desert, the decision stated in my telegram of the 16th May holds good. Meanwhile, in order to prepare the way for delimitation in a south-westerly direction after the Amiri border has been settled, as suggested in your telegram of the 19th ultimo, Maitland should receive instructions to draw up a report upon the approximate line of boundary which it would be expedient to demand for the Subaihi and Haushabi.

No. 384.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 18, 1903.

WITH reference to my letter of the 1st instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from Sir N. O'Connor,* in which his Excellency urges objections to the proposed request to the Ottoman Government that the extension of the Turkish telegraph line to Kataba should be postponed.

Sir N. O'Connor points out that a request of this nature would certainly be interpreted by the Turkish Government as a symptom of our intention to obtain possession of Kataba, and would be calculated to render nugatory the assurances given by His Majesty's Government that they do not desire any extensive or wholesale departure from the limits laid down by the green line.

In these circumstances, Lord Lansdowne would propose to instruct Sir N. O'Connor not to proceed further in the matter, and I am to inquire whether the Secretary of State for India concurs in this course.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 385*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th June, relative to the status of the Imperial Bank of Persia.

India Office, June 19, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 385*.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 18, 1903.

WITH reference to the despatch of the 29th March last from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, would consent of whole body of shareholders be required to change in the constitution or disposal of the charter of the Imperial Bank of Persia? We think that this point should be ascertained in London; and if unanimity on part of shareholders is essential, we might, without involving Government in any liability for the manner in which the Bank's affairs are conducted, acquire the valuable power of veto upon any such change by buying a few shares.

No. 385.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 17th June, relative to the Russian quarantine cordon in Persia.

India Office, June 18, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 385.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 17, 1903.

QUARANTINE in Khorassan.

There seem to be two objections to the proposal in your telegram of the 20th ultimo to establish a retaliatory cordon in Seistan. In the first place, it involves a departure from the principles of the Venice Convention; in the second place, it would probably fail to bring about the removal of the Russian cordon, in which case British Indian pilgrims and traders would be subjected to inspection twice over.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has suggested a representation to the Russian Government through the Russian Ambassador here. The proposal is that he should give to Count Benckendorff a note objecting to the Russian cordon as a violation of the Venice Convention, and also as an encroachment on the sovereign rights of Persia, in view of the fact that Persia has repeatedly expressed the wish that it should be withdrawn.

The note will proceed to express a hope that the cordon will immediately be removed, otherwise, it will be stated, His Majesty's Government will be obliged to take such action as may be necessary to meet the situation and to protect British and Afghan subjects.

If action should become necessary, it is proposed to send an Anglo-Indian officer to Turbat-i-Haidari as Consul, with a medical officer and cavalry escort, with avowed intention of protecting from molestation at the hands of the Russian sanitary cordon our people and trade.

No. 386.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 337.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 13, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 295 of the 22nd ultimo respecting the removal from Wakra of Yusuf Bey, one of the three Mudirs recently appointed to the El Katr coast, I have the honour to report that I learn from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Bussorah that Arabi Effendi, the Mudir of Zobara, has returned to Bussorah.

Mr. Crow reports that he has confirmation that orders were sent by the Vali of Bussorah to the Mutessarif of Hassa to remove Yusuf Bey from Wakra, and I will report again as soon as I hear that these instructions have been carried out.

I am requesting the Resident at Bushire to assure himself that no Mudir has been sent to El Odeid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 387.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 343.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 15, 1903.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 305 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeida stating that the pirates have been sent to prison.

Mr. Richardson also informs me that he has forwarded to me copies of the depositions of the witnesses and proceedings at the trial.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 388.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 349.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 16, 1903.

I HAVE received Colonel Wahab's Report, marked No. 271, Secret, of the 25th May, and also Colonel Maitland's Confidential despatch No. 160 of the 30th May, commenting thereon.

As your Lordship will doubtless expect me to offer my remarks, I shall endeavour to be as precise and brief as possible.

I always understood that His Majesty's Government agreed to enter upon these negotiations in order (1) to prevent the recurrence of incidents such as that of Ad Dareja in 1901, and (2) in order to delimitate the actual frontier, that is to say, the frontier between the Yemen, as in occupation of the Turks since 1875 or 1876, and the nine cantons.

There were special reasons in regard to Jelale that compelled His Majesty's Government to transgress this understanding, but these reasons in no way apply to the territorial demands now put forward, and based on old Firmans granted by the Imams of the Yemen to the Emirs of Dhali, dating from 1619 onward.

I am distinctly of opinion that all these territorial claims ought to be sternly rejected, except in one or two instances, which I will refer to later on.

I would similarly advise that pecuniary claims, such as those mentioned in paragraphs 64 and others of Colonel Wahab's Reports, should not be supported. I would make an exception, however, in favour of the 400*l.* which we have already claimed on account of the specially aggravating circumstances attending the Turkish occupation of Mafari. Its liability has been admitted by the Sublime Porte.

If these views commend themselves to His Majesty's Government the frontier line might be drawn as described in Colonel Wahab's paragraph No. 72, and I feel fairly confident of being able to retain for the Amir El-Ukla, which is a favourable point of departure for the delimitation north-eastwards to the desert.

More precise and definite information respecting the Dakam villages west of the Wadi Kataha would have been desirable, especially as the Report does not show that any of them have been under the authority of, or paying tribute to, the Emir of Dhali of recent date. If, however, His Majesty's Government should be of opinion that there are strong objections to these villages being detached from the kindred villages to the east of the river, in this case I would endeavour to persuade the Turkish Government to recognize them as part of the Amiri country, and to accept Colonel Wahab's green line, as marked on his Map (C), from where it leaves the river at Lakmat-ad-Duki, and runs across the plain to the summit close to Safaf, and then down the ridge of the spur to Bale-al-Fajar.

It will not be an easy matter to persuade the Sultan to alter the green line, but if I am able to use the abandonment of our claims to Kataba and the Yubi and Haiki districts as a leverage, I am inclined to think that I may be able to come to terms with the Imperial Government.

I fail to see any sufficient reason in Colonel Wahab's Report why the frontier should not follow the Wadi Tiban from Bale-al-Fajar southwards, as far as it may be necessary to go.

Colonel Wahab's arguments in regard to the Amara and Humar territory need

not be considered if your Lordship agrees with the premises of this despatch, and rejects claims founded on ancient documents which have been in desuetude for a couple of hundred years.

I am not afraid, like Colonel Wahab, that any serious inconvenience will follow from leaving Kataba and the other districts which he mentions to the Turks. Their tendency will be to withdraw further from a well-defined frontier, while the tendency of the inhabitants will be gradually to cross into British-protected territory, where they may escape the exactions and misrule of the Turks. In fact, I shall not be surprised if, at no very distant date, they move the Kaïmakam from Kataba to Nadua.

The frontier ought, however, to be clearly marked, and, as posts and pillars would be liable to be removed by either party, I hope some small towers, visible one from the other, may be built along the border.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

No. 389.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 68.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 20, 1903.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 80 of the 26th ultims, and I approve the terms of the note addressed by you to the Persian Government relative to the separation of the customs of Arabistan from those of Fars and of the rest of the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE

No. 390.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 20, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister in Tehran on the subject of the commercial relations of Persia and Afghanistan,* and the question of some arrangement as to reciprocal Tariffs between the two countries being negotiated through the medium of His Majesty's Government.

Lord Lansdowne would be glad to be favoured with any observations that the Secretary of State for India may desire to make on the points raised in Sir A. Hardinge's despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 391.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 21, 1903.

DEFINITION of "Fars" and "Gulf."

I have received a reply from the Persian Government to the note inclosed in my despatch No. 80 of the 26th May. It is evasive as I had expected, and is to the effect that, for administration and customs purposes, Fars and Arabistan have always been separate, and that they were only united ten months ago as a temporary measure for customs purposes; that the question whether Mohammerah is to be considered as a "Gulf port" is one to be determined not by them but by geographers.

The Grand Vizier, to whom I spoke about this note yesterday, showed great reluctance to grapple with the real question at issue. I confined myself to reminding him of the promise of the Russian Government of 1897 respecting the customs of Southern Persia, thinking it more prudent not to press him too hard for the present.

* No. 374.

and told him that, in reporting the answer of the Persian Government to my note, I would ask for further instructions from your Lordship.

Three days ago I received a message from His Highness intimating that it might be necessary for him to ask us to complete the advance of the 4th April; but I did not respond to his hint in view of the present question and of the line taken by the Viceroy respecting it.

No. 392.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 28th May, relative to the French flag incident at Muscat.

India Office, June 20, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 392.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, May 9, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter No. 183, forwarded by last mail, I have the honour to report what is passing in regard to the French flag incidents.

2. As telegraphed to you on the 9th instant, the "Infernet" has not yet put in an appearance, though telegrams have been awaiting her for some days. The Sultan remains in the interior, but is not far off, and may be back at any time.

A number of Suri French protégés and their relations have been in Muscat for the past fortnight, importuning the French Consul to effect the release of their comrades confined in the fort, and M. Dorville has been putting them off from day to day with the assurance that the "Infernet" would be here at any moment and would do the necessary. Meanwhile, the ship is more than a week overdue, and this, combined with the fact that the French Consul had sent his Dragoman down to Sur, gave rise to the suspicion that the "Infernet" had stopped there *en route*, and might possibly be trying to obtain satisfaction from Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salim's following there, for the molestation of the French protégé's dhow.

It seemed, therefore, advisable to make sure on the point by sending one of His Majesty's ships to ascertain. Accordingly, His Majesty's ship "Perseus" proceeded to Sur yesterday, and as my interpreter is quite a new hand and I had no one else to send with her, I thought it best to proceed in her myself in case the "Infernet" should be found there, and the Commander should then find it difficult to know what course to pursue.

There was no sign of any French man-of-war, however, but apparently the French Dragoman had been promising the arrival of the "Infernet" from day to day, bringing home the released prisoners, and the "Perseus," which arrived at dusk, was mistaken by them for that vessel. Numbers of persons interested turned out on the shore to greet their released friends, and were much disappointed to find the ship was the "Perseus," and that no French man-of-war had yet arrived.

I did not land at Sur at all, as I thought that Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salim might possibly be there, and my meeting him at the present juncture might be compromising. I merely sent a peon to the house of the chief British subject to inquire if all was well with the Hindu community, and to let them know of the complaint which Abdulla-bin-Salim made against them, alleging that they were supplying his enemies with provisions.

All was reported well on shore; Abdulla-bin-Salim was still in his country, and the hostilities current between him and the Hinawi were said to be dying out.

3. It is to be noted that, since the present issues arose, Goguyer has been telegraphing all news and movements of His Majesty's ships to the Russian Consul at Bushire. It seems probable that, when the latter recently visited Muscat, he must have given Goguyer instructions to that effect, or else that the Frenchman sends information to the Russian Consul for retransmission to Europe.

Inclosure 2 in No. 392.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, May 12, 1903.

IN confirmation of my telegram of to-day's date, regarding the attitude of the French Commodore, I have the honour to report as follows:—

2. The "Infernet" arrived yesterday, the 11th. After calling on her, the French Consul visited the Sultan's brother, who is acting for His Highness, and said that Commodore Forestier had an important oral communication from the French Government for the Sultan, and that it was necessary that His Highness should come in without delay to receive it. Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki wrote to his brother accordingly. This morning, early, the Commodore called officially on Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki, and repeated his Consul's observations of the previous day.

3. Meanwhile, Commodore Forestier and Captain Johnston Stewart, of the "Naiad," Senior Naval Officer, had exchanged visits, and the former asked Captain Stewart to tell me that he had messages to me and my family from Commodore Kiesel, of the "Catinat" (his predecessor), and was anxious to meet me.

I therefore called on him unofficially this morning. He was extremely cordial and volunteered the information that he had come with a message from his Government to the Sultan, and seemed inclined to discuss local questions.

I told him that I performed such duties as I had in Muscat to the best of my judgment and lights, and trusted that he would believe that, in doing so, I had every desire to be reasonable and friendly with all representatives of his nation, and hoped that our relations would be as pleasant as mine had always been with Commodore Kiesel. He replied that he was sure of it, and that it would be very much easier for him if he could talk frankly with me on matters affecting us both, and I replied that, as far as I had any authority to speak, I was at his service. At the same time, I said I thought that, generally speaking, the questions affecting our relations with Muscat, unimportant as they were comparatively, had been left too much to local adjustment and could perhaps be better settled at home. In view of this conversation, I have thought it advisable to telegraph to the Government of India, and I do not think that I have anything to add to what I have stated in that message.

Inclosure 3 in No. 392.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, May 16, 1903.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 12th instant, I have the honour to report subsequent developments of the issues concerning the French flag question in amplification of news submitted during the week by telegraph.

2. It will be remembered that the French Commodore visited the Sultan's Representative, his brother Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki, on the 12th instant. Saiyid Muhammad, according to usage, returned the visit the following morning. An account of what passed while he was on board the "Infernet" is furnished in a separate Memorandum (Inclosure No. 1). Saiyid Muhammad, I may mention, is a man of totally different calibre to his younger brother, the Sultan, being somewhat hot-headed and quick-tempered. Immediately on landing from the "Infernet," he sent a message to me asking me to come over and see him, and on going to the Palace I found him in a state of considerable agitation and anger at the treatment he had received at the hands of Commodore Forestier. One of his suite had, at his direction, made pencil notes during the interview of what had passed, and as to the language used; and with the help of the notes thus made Saiyid Muhammad gave me an account of what had occurred, which I have recorded in the Memorandum above mentioned.

3. The reason why the Commodore practically dropped the Sur incident altogether and took his stand on the question of the release of the imprisoned protégés (a much more trivial matter on its merits) is not far to seek. The imprisonment of the quarantine-breakers is a matter which, as it should be, is apparent to all. Added to that, as previously reported, there are a number of Suris in Muscat, relations and friends

of the flag-holders, who have been for some time clamouring at the French Consulate for the release of their comrades, and have been put off with assurances that the arrival of the "Infernet" would effect that end immediately. The continuance of the protégés in confinement after the "Infernet's" arrival consequently places the French in an awkward position, and they are anxious to save their face.

4. While I was listening to Saiyid Muhammad's account of the interview, his clerk returned with the Arabic translation of the Commodore's letter. Neither it nor the original French version, in the Commodore's handwriting, was signed by any one, and the clerk said that he had pointed this out to the French Consul, and had asked him to sign the letter, but that he had refused, saying, however, that, perhaps, the Commodore would sign it if it were taken to him.

I advised Saiyid Muhammad that he should refuse to accept it or to send it to his brother until it was duly signed, as it might afterwards be repudiated; and he accordingly sent his man off to the Commodore with the Arabic translation for signature. Meanwhile, I took a hurried copy of the French original, which I now inclose (Inclosure No. 2).

This happened about 12 noon. During the afternoon the incidents of the morning and the threats of the Commodore were published abroad, and caused a good deal of excitement and unrest; and in view of this fact, and also because Commodore Forestier's conduct, after what he had said to me the previous day, seemed extremely unscrupulous and disingenuous. I addressed a communication to the French Consul in the evening, intimating that I was prepared to support the Sultan's authority in the matter of the quarantine-breakers, seeing that the flag question was under discussion in London.

The Commodore's letter, duly signed, was sent out to the Sultan in the evening, but apparently found him only a few miles away, and his Highness reached Muscat the same night. In the morning he informed me that he had thought it best to come in and get the matter over, but that he had not the least intention of giving in; and that, if the British Government were prepared to be firm in his support, he was equally prepared to see the matter through, in order that the issue might be settled once for all. I repeated to him the assurance which the Secretary of State authorized me to give him, and impressed upon him particularly that, in pleading justification for his action, he should be careful to make his chief argument the fact of the flag question being under negotiation in Europe. I subsequently put the same in writing to him.

At 9 o'clock A.M. the French Consul called upon him, but merely to arrange an hour for the Commodore's visit in the evening. This was duly fixed, and at 4 P.M. the Commodore landed, accompanied by twelve of his officers. The French Consul's Cavasse was sent on ahead to inform the Sultan that, after being introduced to his Highness' suite, the Commodore wished that the latter should be dismissed from the Durbar room, so that they could see him by himself. In this the Sultan and his brother refused to acquiesce, saying that, as the Commodore was accompanied by a dozen or so of companions, so would they be. The request was not pressed. Nothing passed during this interview, which was purely formal; but the Sultan was asked to come on board the "Infernet" the next morning, the Commodore saying that he had business which would take three or four hours to discuss. The Sultan would have been quite justified in declining this honour, as his brother had already paid an official visit to the "Infernet" in his behalf two days before, but he apparently thought fit to comply, and went on board at 8 A.M. the next morning, disembarking again at 10.45. The details of what passed are recorded in detail in Inclosure 3 of this letter.

5. It will be seen that on this occasion again the Sur incident was practically left out of the discussion, no doubt in the hope of getting some concession from the Sultan in the matter of the prisoners. In this latter connection it is interesting to note how very little the alternative of handing the prisoners over to the French Consul for custody was brought forward; in fact, only at the very end of the interview, as a last resort; the reason being no doubt that such a course, if carried out honestly, would not fully appease the Suris. As a matter of fact, the French Consul has no place where he could confine them.

Now that they have failed so far to make any headway with the Sultan with regard to the imprisoned protégés, it seems very probable that the French will revert to the flag incident at Sur and endeavour to come to issue with the Sultan over that.

6. Since writing the above I learn that there is another very good and sufficient reason why the French are not now pressing the matter of the attack on the dhow at Sur. It will be remembered that, in the civil suit of Goguyer *versus* Abdulla-bin-Ali (*vide* this office letter of the 22nd November, 1902), Goguyer was ordered by the Consul to refund 7,000 dollars to the defendant. He appealed to the High Court at Réunion,

which some time ago rejected the appeal, and 7,000 dollars is consequently now due to Abdulla-bin-Ali; but the Consul has informed the latter that he will not take any action towards obtaining the refund from Goguyer until the indemnity of 1,500 dollars claimed in the dhow question is paid.

The Sultan has received this information through Abdulla-bin-Ali, but has not moved in the matter yet, and it would be useless his doing so at the present juncture. It will be plain from the above, however, that, subject to any assistance we can give, the French have the remedy for the Sur incident in their own hands.

Inclosure 4 in No. 392.

Memorandum of what passed at the interview on board the "Infernet" between Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki, brother of the Sultan, and Commander Forestier, dated the 13th May, 1903.

ON going on board Saiyid Muhammad was not shown over the ship, as is usually done on such occasions, but was taken straight to the Captain's cabin. Saiyid Muhammad retained four companions with him, the others were left outside.

Commodore Forestier at once proceeded to business, saying that he had been deputed by his Government to obtain settlement of three matters:—

- (a.) The violation of the French flag by Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Salim at Sur;
- (b.) The misappropriation by Abdulla-bin-Salim of part of the dhow's cargo;
- (c.) The imprisonment of the three French protégés in Muscat.

He continued that the first two incidents the French Government were prepared to overlook, but with regard to the third he had received imperative orders from his Government to exact complete and prompt satisfaction. He went on to demand the immediate release of the prisoners, saying that he would give Muhammad-bin-Turki two hours in which to comply. Saiyid Muhammad replied that this was quite impossible, and that in any case he himself had no power to take any action in the matter in the absence of the Sultan.

The Commodore and M. Dorville then began to coax Saiyid Muhammad, saying that he was in a position to release the protégés if he chose, and that it was most important to the French Government that they should be released, and that, if he could by any means arrange it, he would receive an expression of the cordial thanks of the French Government.

Saiyid Muhammad replied that he would not dream of doing such a thing in the Sultan's absence and without his orders.

In that case, said the Commodore, it was imperatively necessary that the Sultan should be brought back at once, and he would give His Highness forty-eight hours' law. Saiyid Muhammad answered that, if the Sultan was not busy, he might come in, but that it was very possible that he might be detained by other business. The Commodore then proceeded to accuse the absent Sultan of having fled to escape the "Infernet."

Saiyid Muhammad replied that he had absolutely no grounds for suggesting such a thing, and that his brother always went away at this time of the year. He added— "What had he to fear from the 'Infernet'? If any one is at fault in the matter, it is entirely your own Consul, who gave the Sultan no intimation whatever that you or the 'Infernet' were coming. If he had done so, as it was his business to do, the Sultan would not have gone away." The Commodore then rejoined that, anyhow, it had been telegraphed to Paris (by Goguyer, no doubt) that, on receiving news of the coming of the "Infernet," the Sultan had fled to the interior. Saiyid Muhammad said it was a libel.

The Commodore and Consul then had recourse to intimidation. The former drew his sword from its scabbard, and laid it on the table, and said, "Now you have got to choose one of two alternatives. You will either release those three French protégés, in which case the ancient friendship between Muscat and France will endure and increase; or else you will persist in your refusal to release them, in which case the result will be this, the sword. What do you think you will gain by this, and what do you suppose the British Government will do in the matter? Remember the fate of Zanzibar, which is now under the thumb of the British. That will be the fate of Muscat too. Look, too, at this Order on my breast. I got this for services in reference to Ajuouan. Your own kinsman, Hamud-bin-Hamed, showed himself hostile to the French, and the result was

that I was sent to punish him, and I captured his country and added it to the French dominions. You had better take warning."

Similar arguments and threats were repeated for some time. Then Saiyid Muhammad asked the Commodore to put in writing to the Sultan the words and threats just used to him. The Commodore replied at first that he would not, but on being pressed he said he would write something, and thereupon sat down and wrote a letter in pencil which was read out to those present. On hearing it, Saiyid Muhammad said: "That is not all what you have said to me: write to him in just the same terms in which you have spoken to me."

The Commodore replied that he was not going to write any more, but that the rest of what he had said could be imparted to the Sultan by Saiyid Muhammad himself if the latter so wished. He then handed Saiyid Muhammad the letter written in French, and, returning his sword to his scabbard, said he hoped he would not have to draw it in anger: it would be a bad day for Muscat if he did. Saiyid Muhammad observed that it was no use his sending the letter to his brother in its present form, as his Highness had no one who understood French, and asked for a translation of it. He was told to send a clerk to M. Dorville as soon as he got on shore to take down a translation of it, M. Dorville having no one at present who could write the translation.

Thus the interview terminated, and Saiyid Muhammad took his departure.

Inclosure 5 in No. 392.

Letter in the handwriting of Commodore Forestier, an Arabic Translation of which was dispatched under his Signature to His Highness in the Interior, dated the 12th May, 1903.

J'AI l'honneur de présenter mes salutations à sa Hautesse le Sultan Saiyid Feysal, Souverain de Muscate, et de l'informer que je suis envoyé par le Gouvernement de la République Française pour entretenir avec lui les rapports de bonne amitié qu'ont toujours existés entre nos deux nations. Je crois devoir lui dire, au nom de mon Gouvernement, qu'il serait nécessaire que sa Hautesse daigne me donner immédiatement une audience dans sa Palais de Muscate. J'ai l'honneur en conséquence de lui demander de vouloir bien quitter sa résidence de Modda El Hadar (*sic*), car je suis chargé de traiter avec elle d'affaire importante qui ne souffre pas de retard.

Je demande, au nom du Gouvernement de la République Française, la mise en liberté des trois prisonniers, protégés Français (mettre leurs noms) que doivent être remis entre les mains de M. le Consul de France devant moi et tous les officiers de l'"Infernet."

Je me permets de dire à sa Hautesse que mon Gouvernement tient absolument à avoir satisfaction sur ce point et qu'ainsi la vieille amitié qui nous unit ne sera pas troublée, mais, au contraire, augmentée, j'espère, pour nombreuses années.

Inclosure 6 in No. 392.

Memorandum of what passed at Interview on board the "Infernet" between the Sultan of Muscat and the French Commodore Forestier, dated the 15th May, 1903.

(Noted down from the statement of one of the Sultan's suite, who was present during the interview and was sent over to me immediately afterwards with written notes of what had passed, and also from the account related to me later by the son of the late Vizier, who was also one of the Sultan's companions and was present throughout.)

(A.) As on the occasion of Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki's visit to him, Commodore Forestier opened the conversation by saying that he had been sent to Muscat by his Government to obtain satisfaction about three matters:—

1. Violation of French flag flown on dhow at Sur;
2. Detention of said dhow and robbery from her cargo;
3. Imprisonment of French protégés in Muscat.

With regard to the first two matters, it was possible the French Government would overlook them, or at all events postpone the discussion of them for the present.

With regard to the third incident, the French Government would brook no delay, and he had absolute orders to settle the matter satisfactorily.

The following conversation then took place:—

Commodore.—Has your Highness any desire to keep up the friendship which has always existed between the French Government and your ancestors?

Sultan.—For a reply to that question you have only to refer to your Consul, to whom I have very recently written a very clear expression of my feelings on the point (*i.e.*, Sultan's letter of 12th April).

Commodore.—Then why have you oppressed French subjects?

Sultan.—I have never oppressed French subjects. I do not admit that the persons to whom I know you refer are French subjects.

Commodore.—How can you say that when you know that from time immemorial they have frequented our Colonies and have French papers and flags, and are recognized wherever they go as French subjects? And why did you bolt from Muscat as soon as you heard the "Infernet" was coming?

Sultan.—You forget that the French Government, though I have often asked them, have never given me any information as to whom they claim to protect and whom they do not. How am I to know? Besides, that matter is, as you must well know, under discussion between the English and French Governments in Europe, and it is notorious that they have had long correspondence about it, which is still going on, and the British Consul, too, has been corresponding with your Consul about it. Until those negotiations are finished, I claim that there is no one among my Omanis who is not my subject. As for bolting for fear of the "Infernet," the suggestion is absolutely baseless. Why should I run away? You never warned me that she was coming, and I always go to the interior at this time of the year.

(B.) The Commodore then took out the Treaty book and read out the Declaration of 1862, and also the French Commercial Treaty, and discussed them, and said the Sultan was bound to accord proper treatment to French subjects. His Highness replied that he could not talk from that standpoint, as the persons under reference were his own subjects, in his opinion.

Commodore Forestier then said he now begged his Highness, on behalf of the French Government, to forgive and release the prisoners as an act of clemency, and added that he asked him this, in the first instance, as a favour, and not threateningly. The Sultan replied that it was not possible; that the case was not one into which favour or sentiment could properly enter; that the prisoners in question were offenders who had flagrantly snapped their fingers at all the Quarantine Regulations which had been framed for the safety of the community at large, with the concurrence and in consultation with all Consuls in Muscat, and had thereby committed a very serious offence, not only subversive of his own lawful authority, but prejudicial to the interests of all civilized peoples, and that it was absolutely necessary, on public grounds, that they should be adequately punished.

The Commodore hereupon produced a telegram which, he said, he had just received from his Government, in which he was directed to telegraph the result of his negotiations, *i.e.*, as to whether the Sultan agreed to release the protégés or not, and informed the Sultan that he required a categorical answer. His Highness replied that he had already given his final answer, and had none other to give. Commodore Forestier said he would allow him till 2 o'clock to reconsider the matter. The Sultan replied that he did not require any time for reconsideration.

(C.) The Commodore then adverted to the details of the arrest of the men. "Why had the Sultan allowed a British man-of-war to arrest them?" The Sultan replied: "Why should I not? This was a very small matter. I have no steam-launch of my own, and therefore asked the 'Persens' kindly to place hers at my disposal. What was there in that? Suppose for a minute it had been your ship here instead of the 'Perseus,' and I had asked you for your steam-launch, would you not have accommodated me in such manner?"

Commodore.—No, I should not.

Sultan.—You know best, but I think you would.

Commodore.—It is your Highness' business to keep a steam-launch of your own for quarantine work such as this.

Sultan.—That may possibly be the case, but, if so, why did your Consul not point that out to me before when quarantine was first started, or any time in the last three years?

(D.) *Commodore*.—Then, again, why were the men imprisoned on board a British man-of-war, the "Perseus"?

Sultan.—Have you any good grounds for saying that, because, as far as I know, the prisoners were brought straight from the launch to the British Consulate?

Commodore.—Then why were they imprisoned at the British Consulate?

Sultan.—They were brought back to Muscat in the middle of the night and were taken straight to the Health Officer, who lives at the British Consulate. Then they had to await my orders, and during the night I do not allow people into my Palace, and so they were detained at my request at the British Consulate till the next day.

Commodore.—Then, again, why were they afterwards sentenced to imprisonment, and not to a fine? (At this stage the Commodore sent for his ship's doctor, who read out some section of the French Law code which purported to say that persons breaking Quarantine Rules must be fined, and that imprisonment is not obligatory.)

Sultan.—Laws and punishments differ in different places. In this case I considered that imprisonment was necessary, and my Health Officer, who conducts all my quarantine arrangements, was of the same opinion, and wanted them properly punished.

Commodore.—I am credibly informed that people are habitually absconding from quarantine, and that no one minds, and that the quarantine arrangements are not run by rule at all. Take the "Pomone," for instance, which has just come from Bombay; I do not believe the doctor has been near her.

Sultan.—It is absolutely untrue what you allege about people absconding from quarantine; and as to the "Pomone," I have no doubt the doctor has made proper arrangements about her. Captain Lethbridge is not the first person to superintend quarantine arrangements here. I first had two medical men of my own in charge. For the last three years I have had British medical officers, of whom the present one is the third, and I am confident that the work is done very carefully. The arrangements were devised in communication with all the Consuls at Muscat, and they have made no complaints to me on the subject.

Commodore.—The fact is that these people were not fairly imprisoned at all; you are in the hands of the British Government and "managed" by them, and it is they who have got this done arbitrarily.

Sultan.—That is not true at all. I am not "managed" by the British Government in any way. I "manage" myself; but if I want any assistance from the British Government and ask for it in any matter, they give it me. The present case was simply a matter of quarantine. My doctor wanted the people punished, and I agreed that it was necessary. You can see my doctor, if you like, on the subject.

Commodore.—I have nothing to do with your doctor. If you are the Sultan of this place in fact as well as in name, we ask you as a favour to release these prisoners.

Sultan.—I regret I cannot do so.

Commodore.—If you do not comply voluntarily you will be forced to comply. I shall inform my Government and you will have to take the consequences. If the Government of France once embark upon a thing, nothing ever stops them from going through with it, and those men will be forcibly released even if there are fifty British ships here. But it will be a great pity if there is death and bloodshed at Muscat, and you had better reconsider in time.

Sultan.—If you are ordered to proceed to violence, you will, no doubt, do so. I must take my chance of that. What else can I do?

Commodore.—And your Highness surely does not suppose that the British Government will fight with the French Government over a little matter like this at the bidding of Major Cox.

Sultan.—I do see what Major Cox has to say to it, or why he should be introduced into the matter?

Commodore.—Major Cox is an enemy of my Government.

The Consul then joined in, and the two jointly asked His Highness whether, if he would not release the prisoners, he could not see his way to hand them over to the French Consul for confinement under his charge. The Sultan replied that he could not do so. M. Dorville continued that in that case at 2 o'clock they must wire to their Government to tell them of the Sultan's refusal, and that the result would be that in two or three days he would receive orders to haul down his Consular flag and leave Muscat.

The Sultan made no special reply, and soon afterwards, seeing that there was nothing further to be got out of him, they let him take his departure.

No. 392*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th June, relative to the Russian quarantine cordon in Khorassan.

India Office, June 22, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 392*.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 20, 1903.

I HEARTILY agree in the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regarding the Russian quarantine cordon communicated to me in your telegram of the 17th June.

Inclosure 7 in No. 392.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, May 19, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt this day of Foreign Department telegram, dated the 18th instant, repeating the Secretary of State's telegram of the 15th May, on the subject of the French flag.

I shall be careful to be guided by the instructions contained therein, and, with reference to the concluding portion of the telegram, I beg to assure Government that I have in the past consistently abstained from posing as the representative of the Sultan, and shall continue to do so.

It was only in view of the fact that the French flag question was admittedly under discussion between our Government in Europe, and that Commodore Forestier, of the "Infernet," seemed at the time of my interview with him desirous of transferring the discussion to Muscat, that in my telegram of the 12th May, after deprecating any local discussion, I suggested that, in the event of such a course being considered expedient, it could, perhaps, be stipulated that the British Representative should be present at discussions between the Commodore and the Sultan in regard to the flag question, not as a spokesman for the Sultan, but in order to watch proceedings on behalf of His Majesty's Government, in view of its rights under the Declaration of 1862.

No. 393.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Resident, Aden, dated the 21st June, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 22, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 393.

Resident, Aden, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Aden, June 21, 1903.

I HAVE received your telegram of the 18th instant, transmitting the Secretary of State's orders of the 17th. I fear there are not sufficient data for a report on Haushabi and Subaihi borders. Wahab's survey of 1892 shows approximately the limits of Haushabi territory, but at that time the Subaihi had taken up so hostile an attitude that he was able to indicate only a small portion of their boundary, and it would not, I think, be safe to rely even on that. He was unable, apparently, even to approach the rest. His explanation was telegraphed to you on the 7th December, 1901. It seems that the officer sent to survey the Shaibi country returned to the Commission on the 14th instant, having been prevented by inter-tribal hostilities from proceeding.

[Repeated to Secretary of State, Bombay, and Constantinople.]

No. 394.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th June, relative to the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia in Seistan.

India Office, June 22, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 394.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 20, 1903.

WITH reference to your message of the 28th ultimo. Establishment of branch of Imperial Bank in Seistan.

I have heard by telegraph from the Consul that no building suitable for the bank is to be had. A site of about 5,000 square yards has been chosen by him, but special instructions have recently been telegraphed to the Karguzar that neither the Russian nor the British Consul is to be permitted to get possession of land for building purposes without special leave from the Persian Government. Pending such instructions, the Karguzar has undertaken to reserve the site for us, but he has hinted that unless early orders reach him we may be forestalled by others. The agent of the Russian Bank is daily expected to arrive, and this is the best time of the year for building. Immediate steps are therefore necessary.

If it can be arranged, the Consul should be furnished by telegraph with a copy of the orders sent to the Karguzar. Consul has been speaking openly about the intention to open a bank, but recommends that our intention to acquire a site should be kept as secret as possible.

Temporary quarters for the bank, but not suitable accommodation for a European manager, can be provided in the British Serai until the premises have been built.

[Repeated to Tehran.]

No. 395.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 24.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 22, 1903.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a despatch, dated the 3rd instant, from the Commanding Officer of His Majesty's ship "Harrier," inclosing a report by Lieutenant W. S. Leveson-Gower on the recent trial of pirates at Hodeidah.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 395.

Commander Tower to Admiral Sir C. Domville.

Sir,

"Harrier," at Malta, June 3, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, a semi-official Report received by me from Lieutenant Honourable W. S. Leveson-Gower, giving an account of the trial of the prisoners and the private dhows captured by His Majesty's ship "Harrier's" armed dhow No. 1, on the 18th January last, on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea: observing that an official report of the proceedings will be made by His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah in due course.

2. I would bring to your notice that the Turkish authorities eventually declined to hold a Prize Court on the dhow "Hedjab," at the preliminary trial of which I was present. As reported to you in my previous letters, Senior Naval Officer Red Sea, nothing was wanting to prove conclusively that the dhow "Hedjab" was actually captured by pirates whilst trading in Turkish waters, in company with an Italian dhow, which was also captured at the same time. Written evidence was given by the captured Italian dhow to His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah, after the Italian dhow had made her escape and was proceeding to Massowah.

3. The dhow "Hedjab" was restored by me through the Turkish authorities at Kamaran to her rightful owner, a merchant Baksht, at the town of Loheiya.

4. I entirely concur with the reasons submitted by Lieutenant Leveson-Gower for the refusal of the Turkish authorities to hold a Prize Court on the dhow in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CYRIL TOWER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 395.

Lieutenant W. Leveson-Gower to Commander Tower.

Sir,

Hodeidah, May 14, 1903.

I HAVE the honour to report to you the proceedings of the so-called trial of pirates, captured by me 18th January last. Of the sixty prisoners, fifty-eight were acquitted and discharged, the other two, who were nakhudas (pilots) were sentenced to three months' imprisonment from the date of detention; the term having expired last month they were also discharged. Their sambouks and property were ordered to be returned.

It was difficult to prove they were actual pirates, as the evidence was circumstantial, but by the prisoners' contradictory evidence on every point raised by the prosecution it went very much against them.

But on the complaint of their firing on my armed dhow the evidence was conclusive of guilt. The Court, for reasons unknown, would not accept evidence of prosecution, though clearly given and unshaken by cross-examination. The prisoners' statements, on the other hand, varied with each other to an extraordinary extent, and on cross-examination they contradicted themselves and each other. Statements by prisoners made to me at time of capture they now deny, and the President refused to take them as evidence against them.

The Court was improperly composed, a point the Consul had already pointed out to the Ambassador. The President, a Turk, who is President of the Slave Court, has never had a case to try before. He knew no English and very little Arabic, so the proceedings were conducted in Turkish. The Assessors were two Arabs who understood nothing but Arabic. So all the evidence of the prosecution, which was translated very inadequately straight from English and French into Turkish was entirely lost upon them. One Assessor was a merchant brought to the Court against his will. The other was a loafer, half blind and quite deaf, and without as much intelligence as a coolie. The Public Prosecutor, specially suborned for the occasion, was an Arab who is an ex-slave-runner and still suspected of being in the trade. These three Arabs slept through the greater part of the trial. The lawyer for the defence is the local fortune-teller of Hodeidah.

In the defence it was urged that I should be imprisoned or fined for sailing on the high seas without a flag flying, and that I should most certainly be punished for leaving my ship at Aden and cruising about in the Red Sea in a sambouk; that I had also committed an international offence by invading the waters of the Sultan. To all this the Turks present nodded their approval.

Throughout the proceedings, whenever I wished for a translation of some statement, question, or answer, the President would not allow it. On my protesting, seconded by the Consul, he invariably replied that it was for his own private information only.

To show how it was all prearranged: After the evidence and cross-examination was heard the President woke the Public Prosecutor and told him to read the summing-up. This Arab produced a paper which he had in his pocket all day, and read it. So the summing-up was written before the trial began! The reason for the prearranging of the sentence, &c.—if I may be allowed to point it out—is that the Vali, having always declared to his Government that there is no piracy in the Red Sea, wishes to show that these pirates are innocent. The Consul also considers this the reason for the refusal of the Turkish authorities to hold a Prize Court on the dhow "Hedjab," recaptured by me from pirates on the 18th January.

I have omitted to state that the merchant Assessor, from hearing the contradictory evidence of the prisoners only, declared that they should be punished with the

full power of the law. He was overruled by the President, and made to sign the Judgment under protest.

To conclude, I must state that the proceedings throughout were conducted more like a comedy than a Court of Law of a civilized Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. S. LEVESON-GOWER.

No. 396.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Resident, Aden, dated the 23rd May, and inclosures, relative to the Aden delimitation.

India Office, June 23, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 396.

Resident, Aden, to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Aden, May 23, 1903.

COLONEL WAHAB'S Secret letter, dated Camp Sanah, 21st instant, forwarded, with compliments, to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London. It covers the political diary of the Commission from the 21st April to the 20th May, 1903, inclusive.

(For Political Resident, Aden),
(Signed) H. M. ABUD,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Note.—Copies of the diary have been forwarded to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and the Government of Bombay; also, to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Inclosure 2 in No. 396.

Diary.

(April 21 to May 20, 1903, inclusive.)

April 22.—Seyid Kassim-bin-Alawi, of Karn, visited the Commission; he is the bearer of a letter from Kadi Atik-bin-Ahmad, of Behan-al-Kasab, to the Resident.

April 23.—Survey of the frontier zone stopped by Turkish officers, who object to survey being carried on north of Selat Kataba.

Sheikh Nazi Abdallah, of the Dakkam, came in, accompanied by Sheikh Said Ismail Thuer, of the Shairi.

April 24.—Thirteenth meeting of the Joint Commission took place in the British camp.

The Turkish Commissioners refused to agree to a continuation of the survey of the frontier zone north of Selat Kataba, and to the inclusion of Dakkam territory north of Selat Kataba, and west of Wadi Tiban, on the British side of the line.

April 26.—Major Crawford, Special Service Officer, arrived.

April 27.—A column, consisting of 100 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 100 23rd Bombay Rifles, and two guns No. 6 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, all under Lieutenant-Colonel English, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, marched out from Dthala, and encamped west of Sanah.

A Sub-Surveyor, with an escort of sixteen men, marched for Masharib to survey the Dakkam country.

April 28.—It is reported that Sheikh-ad-Daghar, of Jabal Hesha, is besieging Seyid

Hamud, the deputy left in charge by Muhammad Nasir Mukbil, in the village of Al Beya on Jabal Hesha.

April 29.—Mr. Fitzmaurice and Major Tod paid an informal visit to the Turkish Commissioners.

April 30.—Sheikh-ad-Daghar, of Al Hesha, has appealed to Sheikh Naji-ad-Dakkam to help him against the Turkish officials.

Camels bringing in grain for the supply of our camp detained by the Turkish Customs officials.

May 1.—Major Crawford, Major Tod, and Lieutenant Tandy joined the survey party in the Tiban Valley.

May 2.—The camels mentioned above were released by the Turkish Customs, but only on payment of dues in excess of the amount sanctioned by Treaty. Protested to the Turkish Commissioners, and requested them to fix a day for the removal of their custom-house beyond the radius of frontier delimitation. They replied, as usual, that they must await orders from their superiors.

May 3.—The Turkish Commissioners protested against the proceedings of our survey party.

May 4.—Mr. Fitzmaurice visited the survey party in the Tiban Valley.

May 5 to 10.—Nothing of importance.

May 11.—Party rejoined from the Tiban Valley, having visited the borders of Al Hesha, Amara, and Humar, as far as they march with those of the Dakkam and Ahmadi.

Three men, subjects of the Amir, were brought in severely wounded, having been ambushed by Turkish customs levies, as they were said to be smuggling tobacco through the Yubi country. One man was killed, also five camels, and nine or ten camels captured.

May 13.—A semi-formal meeting of the British and Turkish Commissioners took place at Kataba. I again urged upon the Turkish Commissioners the desirability of removing their custom-house beyond the sphere of delimitation. They again replied that they were powerless to take action without orders from Constantinople, which they hoped to receive shortly. They informed me that a telegraph line is about to be constructed from Taiz to Sanah, via Ibb.

I showed the Turkish Commissioners the document referring to the Haiki and Yubi, which was mentioned in Lieutenant-Colonel Abud's Memorandum of the 2nd February, 1902, and told them that the incidents which had forced the villagers of these districts to take refuge with the Amir, and claim his protection, had compelled me, now that we had the opportunity, denied us last year, of visiting these parts to inquire into the matters; and that in view of the knowledge thus obtained, and our instructions to delimit in accordance with the configuration of the ground, I felt compelled to lay the matter before His Majesty's Government, and, accordingly, notified them, as they might similarly wish to write to their Government on the subject.

May 16.—The Turks have now built a stone custom-house at the place where only tents have been pitched hitherto; this, it appears, is their response to our protests.

Colonel Scallen and Captain Warneford visited the Commission.

May 17.—The Amir left to accompany Captain Warneford to the Kotaibi.

Two Turks came with some vegetables, &c., for sale, and offered to supply us regularly. They said that they were traders from Ibb, but admitted having been soldiers and custom-house officials.

May 20.—It is reported that the Turkish telegraph line from Taiz to Ibb is completed, and that they are commencing a line from Taiz to Kataba. The Turkish detachment, which has been exacting revenue in the Hadei and Amara districts, is now said to be in Hesha.

Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar, of the Mausatta, visited the Commission before leaving for Aden. He brought favourable replies from the Headmen of N'awa, and from two Shaibi Sheikhs, to letters he had written advising them to come in.

There has been good rain daily since the 17th instant, and ploughing and sowing are in progress.

(Secret.)

Camp Sanah (near Mataba), May 21, 1903.

Copy forwarded to Resident at Aden.

(Signed) R. A. WAHAB,
Colonel.

No. 397.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd instant, relative to the establishment of branches of Russian and English banks in Seistan.

India Office, June 24, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 397.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 23, 1903.

IN continuation of my telegram of the 20th instant, we hear, by telegraph, from the Consul in Seistan, under date 15th June, of the arrival, under the superintendence of the Gomashita of the Russian bank, of a large Russian caravan, bringing notes and coin. The Consul anticipates the immediate commencement of loans and other banking business, and thinks that we shall be completely forestalled unless the English bank sends a representative to commence operations in Seistan at an early date.

No. 398.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd June, relative to the Seistan Arbitration.

India Office, June 24, 1903.

Inclosure 1 in No. 398.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 23, 1903.

MACMAHON telegraphs from Kuhak on the 15th instant to the effect that Afghan and Persian cultivators have come into collision regarding the crops on disputed territory near Siksar, about three days previously. Three Afghans were reported by the Afghan Commissioner to be wounded, and one horse killed. The Afghan Commissioner stated that the attack was not provoked by the Afghans, who, in accordance with orders, refrained from retaliation. MacMahon had not heard the Persian account of the incident, but, as further disturbances would otherwise inevitably have ensued, he had laid down a line in this disputed tract, and warned the Persian and Afghan Commissioners that, pending further orders, no interference with the land or water by their respective nationals must be permitted beyond their own side of that line. This line is identical with that which MacMahon, in considering his arbitral decision, had previously made up his mind to fix.

No. 398*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd June, relative to Aga Sharabiani.

India Office, June 24, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 398*.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 23, 1903.

IN consequence of your message of the 17th June, I have telegraphed to the Resident at Bagdad to the effect that the Government of India understand that Sharabiani, mentioned in Hardinge's telegram, is identical with the Mujtahid of Nejef referred to in the Resident's letter of the 20th September, 1902. I have also asked whether the Resident considers that responsibility for the Tabreez riots rests upon Sharabiani; whether this person is now a beneficiary under the Oudh bequest; and whether he would be likely to act upon the Resident's advice.

Inclosure 2 in No. 398.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 23, 1903.

(Repeated to Tehran, with reference to Sir A. Hardinge's No. 80, dated the 13th June.)

IN continuation of my previous telegram of this day's date.

MacMahon further telegraphs on the 15th instant, with reference to a telegram from me of the 8th instant, which he had just received, that, without first deciding on the boundary line, a decision on the water dispute is impossible. His orders of the previous day to the Commissioners, which he had reported in his telegram of even date, No. 361, made a definite settlement and delimitation of the boundary necessary. He is sending in a complete Report upon the boundary in that vicinity, which will allow of the question being definitely discussed and arranged at Tehran, and thus put an end to the existing uneasiness regarding his arbitration, which has been kept alive by the Russians and their Persian agents, and which is wholly baseless.

No. 399.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 313.)

Foreign Office, June 24, 1903.

Sir,

I TOLD the French Ambassador to-day that I thought we should, without further loss of time, address ourselves to the task of preparing a "compromis" for the purpose of giving effect to our agreement that the Muscat case should be referred to the Tribunal at the Hague.

His Excellency having expressed his agreement with me, we decided that we should each of us prepare the draft of a reference, and then compare and discuss the two drafts unofficially before going further.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 400.

Consul Stevens to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 15. Commercial.)

Batoum, June 17, 1903.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the local newspaper of to-day's date states that the Ministry of Finance is adopting measures for the purpose of encouraging the exchange of merchandise by the sea route between Russia and Persia.

With this object in view, the Department above mentioned has recently addressed itself to the more important manufacturers of this country suggesting that they should open up trade relations with Persia. In reply to the invitation of the Ministry of Finance, several wholesale firms have expressed their willingness to experiment on the possibilities of selling their manufactures in the Persian markets, and have sent their agents to the Persian Gulf to sell their goods in Persia.

The paper further states it is much to be deplored that amongst the persons who have been selected to proceed to the Gulf, there are men who are utterly ignorant of trade with the East and the requirements of its markets.

In order to more successfully bring about a good understanding between Russian exporters and Persian Gulf merchants, and with a view to rendering the latter familiar with the diverse articles of Russian manufacture, the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company has decided to establish, at Bushire and Bussorah, permanent exhibitions of Russian industries, to be styled "Russian Museums," where complete collections of products and articles of export, manufactured by different firms in Russia, will be exposed, together with the f.o.b. prices labelled on them.

M. Gorsky, agent of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company at Bushire, and M. Pavloff, holding the same appointment at Bussorah, have been instructed to organize museums of this kind in those towns.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. STEVENS.

No. 401.

Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 93. Commercial.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, June 23, 1903.

WITH reference to the despatch from Mr. Smith, His Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa, to your Lordship, No. 7 of the 30th March, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of an Imperial Order authorizing the payment of an annual subvention for twelve years of 200,000 roubles (21,000*l.*) to the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, and the reimbursement of the dues paid for passage through the Suez Canal, in consideration of the maintenance of a regular steam-ship service between Odessa and the Persian Gulf ports and Bussorah.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

Inclosure in No. 401.

Extract from the "Official Messenger" of June 10 (23), 1903.

(Translation.)

IMPERIAL Order for the establishment of a regular steam-ship service between Odessa and the ports of the Persian Gulf and Bussorah.

The Council of the Empire has proposed :

1. To permit the General Administration of Mercantile Navigation and Ports to enter into a contract with the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company to keep up a regular steam-ship service between Odessa and the ports of the Persian Gulf and Bussorah.

2. To grant from the Imperial Exchequer, through the General Administration of Mercantile Navigation and Ports, for twelve years, beginning in 1903, 200,000 roubles a-year for payment to the Russian Steam Navigation for maintaining such service.

3. To reimburse to the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company the full amount of the dues paid by the Company on the steam-ships maintaining the regular service for both journeys through the Suez Canal and back for the duration of the contract.

Proposal approved and sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty the 2nd (15th) April, 1903.

No. 402.

Memorandum communicated by Musurus Pasha, June 29, 1903.

(B.)

MUSURUS PACHA présente ses compliments au Marquis de Lansdowne et, se référant à la lettre de M. Villiers du 4 de ce mois relative à actes criminels commis par Ahmed Salih-ul-Latifi et ses acolytes de la tribu de Seabihi (neuf Cantons), il a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de sa Seigneurie que, d'après un récent télégramme du Gouverneur-Général intérimaire du Yémen, les individus en question ont encore enlevé huit chameaux appartenant au nommé Nassiri Anbéri de la tribu de Hakem, et que celui-ci n'a obtenu la restitution des dits animaux que moyennant 110 réaux.

Comme de pareils actes, qui se renouvellent au grand préjudice de la tribu précitée, peuvent entraîner des actes de représailles et donner ainsi lieu à des incidents

No. 403*.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 30, 1903.

PERSIAN Loan.

Abbas Kuli Khan had a conversation yesterday with the Grand Vizier. He told him that the completion of the advance of the 4th April must be secured on the Southern customs alone.

The Grand Vizier said he would come in a few days to see me about it.

I should like to submit to him a draft of an Article if your Lordship would be so good as to telegraph it to me.

In order that we may come to terms, I would suggest our being content, for this 100,000*l.*, with the words "Fars and Persian Gulf."

Although last year's debts are paid off by late advances, there will probably still be a deficit of at least 300,000*l.* at the close of this year, and M. Naus informs me in confidence that they will have to borrow again before that time. M. Naus regards the situation as desperate. They dare not permit the reform of Maliat in the face of the present clerical movement, and it is hopeless to get the Shah to economise.

I think the Russian idea is to lend the Persian Government considerable sums of money, which shall be spent on creating brigades of Cossacks in all the principal cities.

By this means the national parties and the clergy's opposition will be crushed, and the Russians can then reorganize the Maliat.

The Grand Vizier may be tempted to risk this plan, despite the fact that it is fraught with grave danger to the Persian Government.

The disaffected elements are said to be secretly favoured by Vali Ahd, who believes that he himself will have nothing to succeed to if the Shah is allowed to complete the ruin of Persia.

fâcheux, Musurus Pacha prie le Marquis de Lansdowne de vouloir bien faire transmettre à qui de droit les ordres nécessaires pour la punition exemplaire des coupables et la restitution des animaux précédemment enlevés.

*Ambassade Impériale de Turquie,
Londres, le 24 Juin, 1903.*

No. 403.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th instant, regarding Aga Sharabiani.

India Office, June 29, 1903.

Inclosure in No. 403.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 27, 1903.

IN continuation of my telegram of the 23rd instant, following has been received from Resident at Bagdad:—

"Your presumption is correct. Aga Sharabiani may, in my opinion, be partly responsible for the riots at Tabreez. He has declined politely any part of the Oudh bequest. He is very difficult to approach, but I propose shortly to try in the direction suggested by Sir A. Hardinge. It is worth trying, but it is a delicate and difficult matter."

I am not confident that Resident's proposed communication will succeed, but I see no objection to it.

No. 404.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 165.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 30, 1903.

THE Turkish Ambassador handed to me to-day a note, of which copy is inclosed,* containing a complaint of a further raid made by certain of the Subaihi tribe on members of the Hakim tribe.

I told his Excellency that inquiries were being made as to the alleged incident, but that it was no doubt extremely difficult to prevent these lawless tribesmen from raiding one another's flocks and disappearing with them into the inaccessible country in which they resided. It was easier to ask for punishment and restitution than to obtain either.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 405.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 30, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, and to inform you that His Majesty's Minister in Tehran will be requested to furnish his observations on the proposals made by the Government of India as to an increase of Consular guards in Persia, and the raising of a force of Bakhtiari and Arabs under British officers.

* No. 402.

As regards the latter proposal, Lord Lansdowne concurs in the view expressed by the Secretary of State for India, and considers that such a step would probably be inexpedient at the present moment. His Lordship is, however, of opinion that the Bakhtiaris and Lurs might be encouraged, possibly by means of a small subsidy, to raise a military police of their own for the protection of the roads developed by British enterprise and capital in the Karun region, and that this force might be inspected and reported upon from time to time by the Indian Military Vice-Consuls at Ahwaz and Kermanshah.

Lord Lansdowne considers that an arrangement of this nature might be feasible, and would certainly be advantageous, and he would prefer it to that recommended by the Government of India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 406.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 30, 1903.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that he has had under his consideration the despatch from the Resident at Aden of the 30th May and the Report from the British Commissioner on the Aden frontier of the 25th May, recently communicated by your Department with regard to the demarcation of the Amiri border.

I am to inclose herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople containing his observations on the proposals discussed in those papers.*

Lord Lansdowne entirely concurs with Sir N. O'Connor as to the manner in which this question should now be dealt with, and he is of opinion that the views expressed by his Excellency should be allowed to prevail.

His Lordship is not prepared to support the claim recommended by Colonel Wahab that Kataba should be included in the territory of the Amir of Dthali, and he considers that a demand of this nature would lay His Majesty's Government open to an imputation of bad faith.

He believes that the attempt to discover, in a case of this kind, a scientific frontier corresponding precisely with geographical or ethnographical features, would lead to friction and misunderstanding out of all proportion to the advantages which such a frontier, under the actual local conditions, could be expected to afford.

If Sir N. O'Connor can persuade the Sultan to allow the Amir of Dthali to retain the village of Al Ukla, and, perhaps, the outlying portions of the Dakkam, this arrangement would, in Lord Lansdowne's opinion, be as satisfactory a solution as His Majesty's Government can reasonably hope to obtain.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

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